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SUMMARY
Summary of Thesis submitted for Ph.D. degree
by Nicholas Adams
on
British Extradition Policy and the Problem
of the Political Offender
(1842 - 1914)
The aim of this study is to examine the nature of the British
approach to extradition with particular reference to the
definition of political offences and the position of
political refugees in extradition law and practice. The
attention of policy-makers and public opinion was always
mainly focused upon these two issues, and this study will
therefore concentrate upon them. In abstract terms, the
definition of political offences was found to be generally
impossible, although attempts to define them generated much
important and interesting discussion. In practice, some
guidelines were laid down in individual cases, but they did
not amount to a solution of the general question.
Before 1870, fears that efficient extradition would
necessarily endanger political refugees prevented Britain
from establishing a system of extradition treaties, with the
result that many common criminals escaped punishment. A
shift in opinion took place, and it came to be accepted that
efficient extradition and security for political refugees
could co-exist, but even after 1870, efficient extradition
was still hampered to an extent by statutory safeguards for
the position of political refugees. Furthermore, on several
occasions, amendments of the law that were desirable in the
interests of the efficient administration of the law were
abandoned on the grounds that they might endanger political
refugees.
Foreign states resented British devotion to protecting
political refugees, both because it hampered efficient
extradition and because they resented British protection of
refugees who were considered a threat to the security of
foreign regimes. There was considerable pressure from
abroad, and from certain sections of opinion within Britain,
for her to abandon, or at least modify, her traditional
stance vis-a-vis political refugees within extradition law
and practice, and more generally, but it remained largely
unaltered throughout the period under discussion. Up to
1914, political refugees were better protected by Britain
than by any other nation. Thereafter, things began to
change, as the peculiar conditions which had made such a
policy both desirable and possible gradually altered and
eventually disappeared.
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PREFACE
Preface
Victorian and Edwardian extradition has remained very
much unstudied by historians. Apart from a few lines here, a
couple of footnotes there, and the odd chapter, the subject
has been almost totally ignored (apart from a couple of
isolated areas), and what has been written has not always
been either accurate or illuminating. One reason for this
lack of historical activity may have been the problem of
gaining access to many of the relevant Home Office papers
which survive: a difficulty which I am pleased to report has
been overcome. The Home Office has been extremely co-
operative in allowing me to consult large numbers of 'closed'
files (in the classes HO 134, HO 144, HO 151 and HO 162),
which had not previously been available for research.
Another reason may have been the amount of research needed to
produce a comprehensive study: more than 2,000 individual
government files and volumes have been studied for this work,
in addition to Hansard, the press, and so on. 1 Still, there
is no good reason why extradition should have been so totally
ignored, for it was certainly of great importance to the
Victorians and Edwardians themselves. One writer was even
moved to write of the 'Romance of Extradition', 2 but
unfortunately most of his 'romantic tales' were inventions of
his presumably love-sick imagination. This thesis is
therefore unlikely to become a 'Mills and Boon Classic', but,
1. Only British sources have been available for this study.
2. 'A Solicitor', 'The Romance of Extradition', Chambers's
Journal volume 13 (1909-1910), pp.629-32.
despite this grave failing(!), extradition does merit the
historian's close attention.
Extradition stands in an almost unique position as a
bridge between both foreign and domestic policy; almost like
an estuary, where two separate rivers meet, mix, and flow out
into the sea together as one. To take the analogy one step
further, when rivers meet, a certain degree of turbulence is
caused: similarly, the meeting of the competing, and
sometimes mutually exclusive, needs of foreign and domestic
policy was not always a very easy process. Foreign policy
aims might dictate the need to pursue policy A; domestic
considerations might dictate the need to pursue policy B; and
the result might be policy C, which completely satisfied the
needs of neither foreign nor domestic policy. It was rather
like an arranged marriage: two partners forced together,
rather unhappily, but without the option of a divorce when
relations broke down irretrievably. It is this bridging
position which produces the wider historical significance of
extradition policy.
Extradition of course has an intrinsic importance, of
interest in itself even if it had no wider significance.
Although it did not cause any wars, extradition was of great
importance on that lower, day to day level of international
relations, which cumulatively could often mean so much.
Extradition was also important to the growth and development
of international law as a practical concept. It was one of
the first branches of the law to become truly international,
and even today, when the concept of international law is much
appealed to, extradition remains one of the few areas of it
that is actually enforceable, and enforced. By the
1980s, extradition has become less commonplace than (as we
shall see) it was before 1914, but cases that do arise tend
to be increasingly important, involving Nazi war criminals,
terrorists, 'drug-barons', and the like. On occasion,
extradition still manages to 'hit the headlines'.
It is necessary to state at the outset that this study is
,
not a legal history of extradition. Rather, the aim is to
determine how the legal framework of extradition operated
within its socio-political context. The law of extradition
did not, and indeed could not, operate in a vacuum, and in
many vital aspects was deeply influenced in its operation,
application, and interpretation by the prevailing socio-
political climate. Indeed, Britain's relationship with
extradition during this period cannot be fully understood
without reference to this climate. The fault of some of the
many legalists who have dealt with extradition has been that
they have left such factors out of their calculations
altogether. The result tends to be a rather bland statement
of the details of a statute or the facts of an extradition
case, which by no means tell the whole story, sometimes
coupled with some rather unhistorical comments.
To be fair, not all legalists should be tarred with the
same brush: in particular, Paul O'Higgins stands out as a
legalist fully aware of his history. Nevertheless, it
remains broadly true that legalists have not paid as much
3. Rather than including them here, out of context, examples
will be noticed in the relevant part of the text.
attention to good history as they should have done. However,
one should perhaps not be too critical of them for this, for,
after all, there was hardly any historical writing for them
to consult, and one cannot expect legalists to do detailed
historical research. In any case, the result might have been
very different from this thesis: historians and legalists
necessarily approach extradition from a different
perspective. Nonetheless, I would hope that it would be of
-
some use to legal scholars, as well as filling a significant
gap in historical research.
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Extradition has been defined as, "the process by which
one nation surrenders for purposes of trial and punishment,
individuals accused of crimes committed outside its borders,
to the nation in which the alleged crimes were committed."1
Such surrender has always been considered unusual, an
exceptional measure rather than the norm, and, as a result,
it has been suggested that the process came to be known as
extradition because it was 'extra-tradition', that is,
against the tradition of giving refuge and sanctuary.2
However, it seems more likely that the origins of the word
extradition lie in the Latin extradere, which means the
forceful return of a person to his sovereign. 	 Extradition
originated among the ancient Egyptian, Chinese, Chaldean and
Assyro-Babylonian civilisations.
1. B.A. Banoff and C.H. Pyle, 'To surrender Political
Offenders', New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics, volume 16 (1984), p.173. For other
definitions: cf. G.V. LaForest„ Extradition to and from 
Canada (New Orleans 1961) p.15; F. Kopelman, 'Extradition and
Rendition', Boston University Law Review volume 14 (1934),
p.591; J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law (Leiden 1972) volume
5, p.269; J.B. Moore, The Difficulties of Extradition (New
York 1911) p.3; M.G. Bassiouni, International Extradition 
(Leiden 1974) p.1; and L.C. Green, 'Recent Practice in the
Law of Extradition', Current Legal Problems volume 6 (1953),
p.274.
2. In 1861, Travers Twiss (a future Law Officer) wrote
extradition as "extra-tradition", so indicating his view as
to the origins of the word: T. Twiss„ The Law of Nations 
(Oxford 1861) pp.348-9.
3. For the early history of extradition, see: M.C.
Bassiouni, op. cit., pp.1-5; C. Van den Wijngaert, The
Political Offence Exception (Deventer 1980) pp.4-18; P.
O'Higgins, 'History of Extradition in British Practice',
Indian Year-book of International Affairs volume 13 (1964)
pp-78-115; and I.A. Shearer, Extradition (Manchester 1971)
pp-5-12.
The first recorded extradition arrangement dates from circa 
1280 B.C., and is the second oldest document in diplomatic
history: 4 extradition was provided for as a part of the
peace treaty signed between Ramses II, Pharaoh of Egypt, and
the Hittite King, Hattusili II, after the latter's
unsuccessful attempt to invade Egypt. The two sovereigns
"pledged reciprocal aid... against internal foes, who were to
be extradited when taking refuge with the ruler of the other
-
country."	 Similar provisions may be found in treaties
signed throughout the rest of the ancient period, the Middle
Ages, and the Early Modern period. Extradition even makes an
appearance in the Bible:
if any man hate his neighbour, and lie in wait for him,
and rise up against him, and smite him mortally that he
die and fleeth into one of these cities: Then the
elders of his city shall send and fetch him thence, and
deliver him into the hand of the avenger of blood, that
he may die.4'
The traditional view .' has been that throughout this
early period of extradition the process was devoted almost
exclusively to the surrender of political and religious
4. It is carved in hieroglyphics on the Temple of Amman at
Karnak, and is also preserved in clay tablets in Akkodrain at
the Hittite archive at Boghazkoi.
5. A. Nussbaum, Concise History of the Law of Nations (New
York 1954) p.2.
6. Deuteronomy, chapter 19, verses 11-13.
7. Exemplified by L. Oppenheim, International Law (8th edn.
1955) volume 1, p.696: "Before the eighteenth century,
extradition of ordinary criminals hardly ever occurred.
offenders; those guilty of treason, heresy, and the like.
More recently, however, this view has been challenged by
Paul 0' Higgins, at least so far as England is concerned..a
The first treaty concluded by an English monarch which
included provision for extradition was the Treaty of Falaise,
signed by Henry II and William of Scotland in 1174. In fact,
from 1174 until the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707, "there was
a fairly continuous system of extradition in operation"
between these two nations.'? For example, in 1204 King John
ordered the Sheriff of Northumberland to deliver up certain
outlaws to the Scottish King; in 1449 the Lord Wardens of the
Marches were instructed to hand back fugitives fleeing from
Scotland; and an English Act of 1606 provided for the
delivery to Scotland of persons accused of any offence
against Scottish law. O'Higgins also cites examples of
similar English arrangements with France, Spain, Portugal,
Flanders, and the United Provinces, which provided for the
mutual surrender of pirates, murderers, thieves, and other
criminals in addition to traitors, rebels, and heretics. "°
Whilst O'Higgins does dispel the impression that extradition
B. P. O'Higgins, on.. cit. The following paragraph owes much
to O'Higgins' work. It has been asserted (C. Parry [ed.].
British Digest of International Law [19653 volume 6, p.445)
that further research "would probably explode the notion...
that extradition... originated as a device for the punishment
of treason and rebellion," but as yet, this remains unproven.
As recently as 1980 it was asserted (V.P. Ravaschierre,
'Terrorist Extradition and the Political Offence Exception',
Virginia Journal of International Law volume 21 [1980] p.166)
that "before the nineteenth century, the primary function of
extradition treaties was to capture political offenders."
9. P. O'Higgins, OP. cit. p.81.
10. ibid. pp.81-7 and 88-105.
was solely a device for gaining possession of political
offenders, the fact remains that this is precisely what it
was used for in very many cases. There are some notable
examples of this practice. In 1331 Castile surrendered
Thomas de Gourney (one of the assassins of Edward II) to
England; in April 1591 James VI of Scotland surrendered the
Irish rebel O'Rourke to Elizabeth I; and after the English
Restoration in 1660, Holland handed over three of the
regicides." That extradition should have beenso used was
eminently logical. The escape of ordinary criminals was not
regarded as a danger to the state (the preservation of which
was the primary interest of governments), whereas the
converse was true with respect to political criminals, who
were pursued and punished whenever possible. "A petty thief
was not a threat to the political order, but a rival
faction... might harbour the seeds of total annihilation"
Furthermore, states had little interest in handing back
common criminals, for there existed "little, if any,
conscious feeling of the existence of an international
community which may have an interest in the suppression of
common crimes; hence, there was no incentive to co-operate to
that end."1
11. Similarly, by the fifth article of a treaty of alliance
signed by Charles II and Frederick III of Denmark in 1661,
the Danes agreed to hand over any regicides who might be
found in Denmark. A copy of this article may be found in F.
Kopelman, op. cit. p.594n.
12. V. Epps, 'Political Offender Exception', Harvard 
International Law Journal volume 20 (1979), p.62.
13. Harvard Research in International Law, 'Extradition',
American Journal of International Law Supplement to volume 29
(1935), p.108.
Whatever its purpose, throughout its early history,
extradition tended to be rather an informal business (which
is hardly surprising given the fact that international
relations tended to be conducted on a very personal level), a
sign of goodwill between sovereigns, which was usually
provided for within treaties of peace and alliance.
Extradition may be "one of the oldest international
institutions,"" but that is not to say that it is also one
of the oldest institutions of international law. It was not
until the seventeenth century that extradition came to be
thought of in strictly 'legal' terms. Scholars such as
Dumoulin and Hugo Grotius (who constructed a "theoretical
framework which is still the corner-stone of classic
extradition law")' '25 began to emphasis the importance of
extradition vis-A-vis the suppression of ordinary crime, and
criticised governmental failure to pursue common criminals
who fled abroad.' By the mid-eighteenth century, Cesare
Beccaria can be found asserting: "Impunity and Asylum are
more or less the same... Asylum is a better invitation to
crimes than punishment is a deterrent."17'
Despite its consideration by such learned jurists,
extradition could still hardly be called a branch of the law,
14. J.H.W. Verzijl, op. cit. p.270.
15. M.C. Bassiouni, op. cit. p.370.
16. cf. C. Van Wijngaert, op. cit. p.7.
17. C. Beccaria, Dei Dellitie Delle Pene (Torino 1764).
Quoted in ibid. p.8: "L'impunitA e l'Asilo non differiscono. 
the di pius e meno... oli Asili inivitano PiU ai celitti di 
Quell°, che le pene non allontinano." It was in the
eighteenth century that the term 'extradition' came to be
commonly used.
either municipal or international.
In any case, 'international law' was not widely recognised
at this time: before the nineteenth century "the law of
nations remained more a matter of doctrine than of state
practice. 'B
As far as Britain was concerned, it was not until just
before the nineteenth century that extradition became a
formalised, legal process, aimed exclusively at common
offenders. By Article 27 of the Anglo-American Jay Treaty of
1794 (signed 19 November), the extradition of murderers and
forgers was provided for upon the production of prima facie 
evidence of the guilt of the accused. This provision of the
treaty had no effect until ratified by the British Parliament
under statute: for one thing, the arrest in Britain of an
American fugitive would be illegal unless statutory provision
was made for it. Such a fugitive had committed no crime in
Britain, and so could not be liable to arrest in the absence
of a statute implementing the treaty.'"' For the first time,
18. A. Nussbaum, op. cit. p.ix.
19. Article 27 was implemented in 1797 by Section 26 of 37.
Geo.III.c.97. On the Jay Treaty generally: cf. S.F. Bemis,
Jay's Treaty (Yale 1965), which has a copy of Article 27 on
p.482. cf. also M.M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 
(Washington 1968) volume 6, p.751 and; C. Parry (ed.) op. 
cit. p.445. The treaty expired in 1806. Article 27 was
reproduced in Article 21 of a new treaty signed in 1807, but
the treaty never became operative. The primary aim of the
Jay Treaty was to settle general problems: its signature,
"averted a serious clash at almost the last possible
moment... war... was no remote possibility:" B. Perkins
(ed.), 'Lord Hawkesbury". Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review volume 40 (1953), p.291. There is a memorandum on
extradition cases under the treaty in FO 5/400, ff.204-11.
extradition was given a definite standing in the law of the
land, and in 1799 came the first modern British extradition
case: the surrender of Nathan Robbins to Britain on a charge
of murder arising out of a mutiny on board H.M.S. 'Hermione'.
Nevertheless, extradition still remained only an aspect,
and not necessarily a very large or important one, of general
treaties of peace and settlement, and was to remain so for
some years to come. Article 20 of the Treaty of Amiens
(signed by Britain, France, Holland, and Spain in 1802)
provided for the extradition of persons accused of murder,
forgery, or fraudulent bankruptcy. 	 Similarly, Article 10
of the Anglo-American Convention as to Boundaries, the
Suppression of the Slave Trade, and Extradition of 1842 (the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty), made provision for extradition.'
It was not until the signing of the Anglo-French Extradition
Treaty of 1843 that Britain concluded her first extradition
20. A copy of Article 20 may be found in Harvard Research in
International Law, op- cit. p.274. See also M.M. Whiteman,
op. cit. p.751 and C. Parry (ed.) op cit. p.445. The
article was given legal standing in Britain by Section 21 of
the 1802 Alien Act (42.Geo.II.c.92) but never came into force
as a result of the renewal of the Anglo-French war. The
provision re-appeared in the Anglo-French treaties of 1614
and 1815, but only applied to French and British Indian
possessions.
21. On the treaty generally: cf. E.D. Adams, 'Lord Ashburton
and the Treaty of Washington', American Historical Review 
volume 17 (1912), pp-764-82. Its main purpose was to settle
long standing boundary disputes which had come to a head
during the Canadian rebellion of 1837-38. On this: cf. W.P.
Shortridge, 'Canadian-American Frontier', CHR volume 6
(1926), pp.13-26; and A.B. Corey, The Crisis of 1830-42 (New
Haven 1941). The treaty led to a "general improvement" in
relations [6.G. Van Deusen„ Seward (New York 1967) p.79], and
"brought to an end the ugliest Anglo-American crisis for many
years:" H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States 
(1954) p.403.
treaty proper: it dealt exclusively with extradition. With
the signing of this treaty, extradition was recognised as
having an importance all of its own.
In parallel with the establishment of extradition in
international and municipal law, so too can its modernisation
be traced in the gradual removal of political offenders from
its operation. It is not easy to give a simple, clear
explanation for this "veritable revolution dans les idees, la 
substitution d'un ideal A un autre," to use the words of Jean
Graven.	 Most writers link the development and acceptance
of this principle to the changes in state and society
inspired by the American and French revolutions, and the
ideas they promoted.
The rise of revolutionary ideology.., brought about a
totally new attitude towards political offenders and
completely undermined the traditional conception that
political crimes, being the most serious, ought to be
subjected to the most severe penalties. The notion that
resistance against oppression is legitimate was
increasingly supported by political thinkers and
philosophers.
The French and American revolutions had proclaimed and
justified the right to revolt against unjust and oppressive
22. Still, the treaty was regarded as one of the means by
which Britain and France "could give practical expression to
their desire for renewed co-operation:" M.E. Chamberlain,
Aberdeen (1983) p.344.
23. Quoted in C. Van den Wijngaert, op. cit. p.11.
24. ibid. p.9.
regimes, and indeed Article 120 of the Jacobin constitution
of 1793 explicitly asserted that the French people "donne 
asile aux êtrangers bannis de leurs pays pour la cause de la 
libert6. Ii le refuse aux tyrants!"	 As far as British
writers are concerned, Francis Hutcheson, in his posthumous
System of Moral Philosophy of 1755, was perhaps the first to
advocate the exemption of political offenders from
extradition. He said that, "political offenders were often
good men who had already suffered loss of their fortunes and
banishment from their native country because of their
activities and accordingly it was humane not to surrender
them."Th
As the years passed, the twin doctrines of the right of
resistance and asylum entered mainstream political thought
under the wings of men such as Burke, Bentham and J.S. Mill.
In 1802 L. de Bonald (in his Lègislation Primitive) became
the first legal writer to oppose extradition for political
offences, and Kluit followed this lead in his De deditiane 
profugorum of 1829. These doctrines also came to be
justified by leading politicians and statesmen. On January
30 1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison that he held
that "a little rebellion, now and then, ia a good thing, and
as necessary in the political world as storms in the
physical.' 7 In 1815 Sir James Mackintosh asserted that:
25. C. Van den Wijngaert„ op cit. p.9.
26. P. O'Higgins, 'Extradition - Offence of a Political
Character - Terrorism', Cambridge Law Journal volume 32
(1973), p.182.
27. Quoted by S. Lubet, 'Extradition Reform', Cornell 
International Law Journal volume 15 (1982), p.249n.
"though nations may often agree mutually to give up
persons charged with the common offences against all
human society, civilised states afford an inviolable
asylum to political emigrants... none of its principles
more venerable, than the inviolable right of political
asylum... Our territory Eis]... a city of refuge; our
flag... the symbol of security and the badge of hope to
the eye of the oppressed exile."
In 1816, Castlereagh declared that, "there could be no
greater abuse of the law than to allow it to be the
instrument of inflicting punishment on foreigners who had
committed political crimes only."21°
We have seen that during the early years of the
nineteenth century the phrase 'political crime' began to
enter the vocabulary of statesmen and writers in the context
of extradition. However, the precise meaning of the term was
by no means clear. Some acts (treason for example)
constitute crimes simply because of their political nature,
without which they would not be regarded as criminal: as
such they are relatively easy to define, and have come to be
known as 'pure political offences'. On the other hand, there
28. 1H,(C),29,cc.1138-1151, (1 March 1815); and
1H,(C),34,c.453, (10 May 1816). cf. Lord Hawkesbury to
Merry, 10 June 1802, quoted in, N.W. Sibley and A. Elias, The
Aliens Act and the Right of Asylum (1906) p.126. During
1798-1802 there occurred the first case of the surrender of a
political offender arousing widespread protest and
controversy: the case of Napper Tandy. On this see: P.
O'Higgins, 'Unlawful Seizure', British Year-book of 
International Law volume 36 (1961), pp.298-300;
Coughlan, Napper Tandy (Dublin 1976); S.N. Chinneide, Napper 
Tandy (Dublin 1962); J.S. Watson, Reign of George III (Oxford
1960); and C. Parry (ed.), OPp cit. p.653.
are 'relative political offences', the definition of which is
more difficult. These are ordinary offences to which a
political motivation or justification may be sought to be
ascribed. Almost any crime may be committed with a political
motive or in pursuit of a political aim, and the question
whether such an offence may be called 'political' does not
depend on any quantifiable objective criteria. Imponderable
factors such as the motivation of the offender have to be
considered and evaluated, so making the resOlution of the
issue extremely problematical.
Perhaps the most significant landmark in the early
history of the non-extradition of political offenders came
with the enactment of the Belgian extradition law of 1833.
As well as being the first law devoted exclusively to
extradition, it contained "the first official codification of
the political offence exception." The law provided that
under extradition treaties concluded by Belgium, "l'étranqer 
ne pourra ètre poursuivi ou puni pour aucun cêlit politique 
antêrieur A l'extradition ni pour aucun fait connexe A un 
semblable cOlit."	 In November 1834 the Franco-Belgian
Extradition Treaty became the first to include the political
offence exemption.
However, it should not be thought that at this time the
political offence exemption was all conquering. At this
stage its application and observation was very much limited
29. C. Van den Wijngaert, op. cit. p.12-13. The gradual
adoption of the principle was in itself of some importance in
abstract terms, for it was "one of the first legal principles
which clearly and unequivocally contemplated the protection
of the individual:" ibid. p.37.
to the more liberal European states. As far as the 'despots'
of Europe were concerned, not much has changed since the
Middle Ages. In 1817, Captain Massenbach, accused of
treason, was extradited from Frankfurt to Prussia, and in
1832 Bruggeman, a student with "revolutionary leanings" was
surrendered to Prussia by Baden. m The treaties concluded in
1832-36 between Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Germanic
Federation, which established the 'Holy Alliance', made
express provision for the extradition of persons accused of
explicitly political offences, such as high treason and
rebellion.
These illiberal continental powers approached the
question from a perspective which was very different from
that of Britain and other liberal nations. The continental
despots "believed it was incumbent on all the powers in the
interests of European stability to co-operate to ensure the
security of their established regimes from internal
subversion as well as external aggression." Such a
perspective gave rise to policies which included, for
example, "mutual aid against dissidents and revolutionaries
who operated across national frontiers: collaboration
between police forces, extradition for political offences,
(and) denial of asylum to refugees." 1 Britain would have
nothing to do with such things. By the 1840s the granting of
an inviolable asylum to political refugees had become very
widely accepted as a revered national institution, as
30. J.H.W. Verzijl, op. cit. p.303.
31. B. Porter, Britain. Europe and the World (1983) p.23.
precious as any other. 	 Such conflicting approaches to
extradition and asylum sowed the seeds for conflict between
Britain and her neighbours. As yet, such conflict had not
arisen to a serious extent, but the potential for it was very
real indeed.
Despite the persistence of almost medieval attitudes in
parts of the continent, by the mid-1830s extradition had
entered its modern and recognisable phase, and the Victorian
era was to see it transformed into a system which cannot be
markedly distinguished from that which operates today.
Particularly as far as Britain is concerned, the procedures
and limits of extradition established during the Victorian
era remain very much the same in the 1980s. 	 The
fundamental battle lines of the development of extradition
(the position of political refugees and the definition of
political offences) had also been established by the mid
1830s, although as yet these issues had only been sketched in
outline rather than fully developed or tested. However,
during the following 80 or 90 years, these issues came to the
fore of British domestic politics and international
relations, and it is on this process that this study will
concentrate.
32. In 1844 there was a "parliamentary storm... bitter
debates in both houses... outcry in the press... (and a)
series of public protest meetings" when it was revealed that
the government was opening Mazzini's mail, and communicating
the contents to the Italian authorities: F.B. Smith,
'British Post Office Espionage, 1844', Historical Studies 
(Melbourne) volume 14 (1970), p.189; cf. B. Porter, Refugee 
Question (Cambridge 1979) p.54.
33. Unless of course the present government has its way.
Plans are afoot to radically alter British extradition
procedure and policy: cf. Sunday Times 8 December 1985;
Guardian 9 December 1985; Independent 18 November 1987.
CHAPTER ONE 
GENESIS (1842-1859) 
Chapter One: Genesis (1842-1859) 
In 1842, Article 10 of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty
(signed on 2 August and negotiated in Washington by Lord
Ashburton and Secretary of State Daniel Webster) established
extradition between Britain and the United States, and in
1843 an Anglo-French extradition treaty was concluded: the
Britain extradition experience thus entered its modern phase.
As did all treaties which affected British domestic law, they
-
had to be confirmed by statue, so giving Parliament an
opportunity of discussing this novel but important policy
matter. It is difficult to emphasise just how novel the
concept of extradition was, and how ill-acquainted people
were with it. In 1846 the Law Times could be found asserting
that extradition was "a branch of law very ill understood by
the Profession, and upon which information is difficult to be
obtained when required".' Since readers of this study may
be equally unfamiliar with it, it would perhaps be helpful to
reproduce the terms of the extradition arrangements of 1842-
1843.
Article 10 provided for the extradition of persons
accused of murder, assault with intent to commit murder,
piracy, arson, robbery, forgery, or the utterance of forged
paper, upon production by the country seeking extradition of
such evidence of criminality as, according to the
laws of the place where the fugitive..., shall be found, would
justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the
crime or offence had been there committed.
1. Anon, 'Review of Charles Egan's The Law of Extradition',
Law Times volume 7 (1846), p.501.
Applications for extradition were to be heard by a
competent judge or magistrate, whose duty it was to decide
whether sufficient evidence had been adduced. 	 The Anglo-
French treaty followed the same forms of words, the only
difference being that it applied to fewer crimes: murder,
attempted murder, forgery, and fraudulent bankruptcy.	 Both
treaties also applied to fugitives seeking an asylum in the
colonies of the signatories.
The two necessary bills were introduced as a pair into
the Lords on 26 June 1843. Generally speaking, both were
well received, and the principle of extradition was warmly
supported. Lord Brougham "highly approved" of them;
Lansdowne believed the "general policy of Ethe) bills it was
impossible for him or for the Parliament to "doubt"; Peel
regarded them as a "great advance in civilisation"; and there
were calls for the scope of the treaties to be
2. Copies of Article 10 may be found in PP (1843) LXI:
'Treaty between Her Majesty and the United States of
America', p.7; FO 5/2206; and The Times 15 September 1842,
p.5. cf. M.E. Chamberlain, op.cit. p.331. C.M. Fuess, Daniel 
Webster (Hamden 1963) volume 2, p.113, incorrectly states
that the treaty provided for "the enlargement of the number
of offences for which extradition might be asked": before
the treaty was signed, Anglo-American extradition was not
possible at all. R.N. Current, Daniel Webster (Boston 1955)
p.121, erroneously implies that Article 10 applied to Canada
and America only.
3. For the exact terms of the Anglo-French treaty, cf. C.
Parry (ed.), op.cit. p.446; The Times 17 March 1843, p.6; FO
881/1446, pp.29-31; and FO 27/676. The correspondence (which
began in November 1842 and was initiated by France) preceding
the conclusion of this treaty may be found in FO 27/659.
W.W. Fifield ('A History of the Extradition Treaties of the
United States', Unpublished PH.D. Thesis, University of
Southern California (19367, p.31) describes the treaty as
"very comprehensive", which, considering that it only applied
to four crimes, is hardly accurate.
enlarged. 4. The story was much the same outside Parliament.
The Times spoke of the "palpable and self-evident absurdity
of any of shadow of opposition to a project in every way so
reasonable and desirable... its importance can hardly be
over-rated". For Charles Buller, the "only subject for
surprise or regret" was "that such an arrangement has not
long ago been established between all the civilised nations
of the world".
-
Although there was no opposition to the principle of
extradition, nor to the practical implications of the Anglo-
French treaty, disquiet was felt with regard to the possible
ramifications of the American arrangement. It was feared by
a considerable body of opinion that Article 10 would enable
American slavers to recover fugitive slaves from Canada
(where there were approximately 12,000 such escapees by the
1840s, each of whom represented a financial loss to his
master, and an encouragement to other slaves) dm and other
havens in the British colonies. There can be no doubt that
this was precisely what many in America hoped for, and in the
past, slavers had tried (unsuccessfully) to make use of local
4. 3H,(L),70„c.475,(30 June 1843); ibid. c.1325, (25 July
1843); 3H,(C)„71,c.583,(11 August 1843); cf. the speeches of
Lansdowne and Campbell: 3HOL),70,cc.1325 & 1327,(25 July
1843); and Peel: 3H0C) 5 70„c.583.(11 August 1E143). When
passed they became 6 & 7 Vict. c.75 & c.76.
5. The Times 4 July 1843, p.4; and C. Buller, 'Lord
Ashburton', Westminster Review volume 39 (1843), p.196. cf.
The Times 13 January 1843, p.5 and 14 August 1843, p.4
6. R.W. Winks, Blacks in Canada (New Haven 1971) p.169.
Canadian laws to recover fugitive slaves."'
As soon as the terms of the treaty became known,
abolitionists on both sides of the Atlantic began a campaign
to have slaves positively excluded from its operation.
Abolitionist fears were exacerbated by the surrender of
Nelson Hackett (a slave) in February 1842. This seemingly
contradicted the policy pursued in the 1830s, when Canada had
repeatedly refused to surrender fugitive slaves accused of
crime, but the Hackett case was in reality very different
from its predecessors. In the earlier cases, slaves had been
charged with, for example, stealing horses on which to
escape. However, in addition to stealing the horse on which
he escaped, Hackett had also stolen - as he admitted - a
7. By the statute 3.Will.4.c.7, ('An Act to provide for the
Apprehending of Fugitive Offenders from Foreign Countries,
and delivering them up to Justice') Upper Canada had made
provision for surrendering fugitives accused of murder,
forgery, larceny, or other crimes punishable in Upper Canada
by "death, corporal punishment... or by confinement at hard
labour". A copy of this Act may be found in PP (1842)
XXVIII: 'Canada (Nelson Hackett)', pp.141-2. On attempts to
extradite fugitive slaves under its provisions, cf. F.
Landon, 'Fugitive Slave in Canada', University Magazine 
volume 18 (1919), pp.270 & 275-6; J.M. Leask, 'Jesse Happy',
Ontario History volume 54 (1962), pp. 87-98; A.L. Murray,
'Fugitive Slaves'. CHR volume 43 (1962), p.299 and n; and
'Canada and the Anglo-American Anti-Slavery Movement',
Unpublished PH.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania (1960),
pp.123-33; W.R. Riddell, 'Slave in Canada', Journal of Negro 
History volume 5 (1920), pp.261-377; and 'An International
Complication', Journal of the Illinois State Historical 
Society volume 25 (1932), pp.123-6; R.W. Winks, op.cit.
pp.168-71; and R.J. Zorn, 'Criminal Extradition', CHR volume
38 (1957), p.284. In 1826-28, Clay had tried to negotiate
for the return of fugitive slaves, but Britain spurned his
advances: cf. J.M. Callahan, American Foreign Policy (New
York 1937) p.208; R.J. Zorn, op.cit. p.284; and F. Landon,
op.cit. p.270. Canada was not the only place from which the
return of slaves was sought. cf . 3HOL),60,cc.317-27,(14
February 1842); 3H0C),65 0 cc.322-3,(19 July 1842); 'Tappan
Papers' pp-216-21; and A.L. Murray, 'Fugitive Slaves'.
pp.303-5.
beaver coat, a gold watch, and a saddle (in addition to that
used on the horse he rode), which could hardly be said to be
necessary to his escape. Hackett was therefore treated as a
common criminal, and surrendered.0
Even before he left the United States, Ashburton was
approached by American abolitionists, whom he managed to
reassure: Lewis Tappan (a prominent figure in American anti-
slavery circles) wrote that "our fears respecting any action
adverse to the safety of fugitive slaves subsided". The
Times felt that abolitionists were exaggerating the danger,
but British activists were not so easily calmed as their
American colleagues."' Whilst accepting that the government
did not want to endanger fugitive slaves, they maintained
that they should be specifically exempted from extradition.
This was "the theme of a campaign which was carried into the
far corners of the British Isles"."' Twenty-four anti-slavery
societies petitioned Parliament, and the leaders of the
British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society lobbied dozens of
politicians. Throughout the campaign, the abolitionists'
8. On the Hackett case: cf. CO 42/488; FO 5/386; PP (1842)
XXVIII: 'Canada (Nelson Hackett)', pp.133-42;
3H,(C) 5 64,cc.640-1,(27 June 1843); R.W. Winks, op.cit.
pp.171-2; R.J. Zorn. op.cit. pp.285-8; and 'An Arkansas
Fugitive Slave Incident', Arkansas Historical Quarterly 
volume 16 (1957), pp.139-149; A.L. Murray, 'Fugitive Slaves',
pp.303-5; and 'Tappan Papers' p.226.
9. L. Tappan to J. Beaumont (17 November 1842), quoted in
A.L. Murray, 'Fugitive Slaves', p.309; and The Times 14
August 1843, p.4. cf. R.N. Current, 'Webster's Propaganda',Misissippi Valley
 Historical Review volume 34 (1947), p.197.
10. A.L. Murray, 'Fugitive Slaves', p.310. cf. Morning Herald 
24 & 29 September 1842, p.4.
aim was to amend the treaty in Parliament.''
When the treaty came before Parliament, government
spokesmen at once tackled the slavery question. Aberdeen
acknowledged the fear "that a fugitive slave might be
delivered up", but attempted to reassure his audience that
this was an "unfounded notion". No British court would
consider a slave guilty of crime for stealing a boat or horse
as a means of escape. Requests for extradition would be
made by the Federal government, which was "itself... a
considerable security against an improper application";
colonial governments would seek advice from London "in case
of any difficulty arising"; and if attempts were made to
abuse the treaty, Britain could terminate it at once.
Ashburton himself asserted that it was "settled... that a
slave once landing on any part of our dominions could never
be claimed".'	 Their Lordships were broadly satisfied: even
the abolitionist spokesman, Brougham, expressed his
"gratification" on hearing Aberdeen's statement, although he
added that at some stage it might be worth considering
11. The best accounts of the abolitionist campaign may be
found in: 'Tappan Papers' passim.; A.H. Abel-Henderson and
F.J. Klingberg, 'Sidelight on Anglo-American Relations',
Journal of Negro History volume 12 (1927), pp.122-78; H.
Temperley, British Anti-Slavery (1972) pp.203-5; R.J. Zorn,
'Criminal Extradition', pp.288-91; and 'Arkansas Fugitive
Slave Incident', pp.146-9; and A.L. Murray, 'Fugitive
Slaves', pp-308-314; cf. Earl Leslie Griggs, Thomas Clarkson 
(1936). W.D. Jones., The American Problem (1974) p.19, wrongly
states that "the extradition treaty would cause no
difficulties".
12. 3HOL),70,cc. 473-4 & 478-9030 June 1843). cf. a similar
speech by Sir Fredrick Pollock (Attorney General): 3H, (C),
71,cc. 565-8011 August 1843).
"whether it would be better to introduce some explanatory
clause into the bill, in order to do away with all ambiguity
on this point"..'
In the Commons, this was precisely what was advocated.
Sir Benjamin Hawes (Liberal MP for Lambeth), who feared that
the treaty "would lead to an encroachment on the
principle to which England owed so much of her glory - the
principle, that a slave, the moment he touched her soil,
became a free man", 14. proposed a-motion positively excluding
slaves from its operation. The government resisted it,
pointing out that slaves could hardly be given a free hand to
commit whatever crime they liked, however odious, in the
certain knowledge of impunity if they could reach British
territory. Hawes' motion was defeated by 59 votes to 25.
The abolitionist campaign had failed.
However, just months later, colonial governors were
informed that when they received an extradition request,
copies of the depositions supporting it were to be sent to
London. This was clearly an attempt to ensure that no slave
was surrendered without the London authorities first having
an opportunity to consider the merits of the case, and advise
as they thought fit. 1° Further, when pressed by the
13. 3H,(L),70,c.475,(30 June 1843).
14. 3H,(C),71„cc. 580 & 585011 August 1843). Other speakers
who shared these fears were V. Smith and Macaulay: ibid. cc .
564 & 568-72.
15. A copy of the circular may be found in CO 854/3, No. 84,
f. 201. cf. A.L. Murray, 'Fugitive Slaves', p.311.
Americans, Aberdeen admitted that the government regarded
extradition in a manner favourable to slaves."' With
reference to this circular, one authority asserts that
"abolitionist vigilance checkmated the potential Southern
use of criminal extradition. It was abolitionist agitation
that induced Britain to exclude slaves from extradition under
the Webster-Ashburton treaty". He also states that this was
a "newly defined" policy.
-
However, the foregoing represents a misinterpretation of
the situation."' The government did not need to re-define
policy in an effort to protect slaves. From the time when
extradition was first discussed, the one thought upper-most
in the minds of British ministers had been the need to ensure
such protection.'''
In 1839 Palmerston (Foreign Secretary) emphasised that
any arrangement with the United States should "not... Embrace
the Cases of Runaway Slaves", and in 1840, at his instance,
the British authorities decided not to include horse-theft in
any future treaty on the grounds that its inclusion might
facilitate the surrender of slaves who stole horses to
16. ibid. p.313 and n.
17. R.J. Zorn, 'Criminal Extradition', pp.291 & 294.
18. Zorn makes very little use of primary sources. He only
uses published primary sources, such as Parliamentary Papers,
which do not always reveal the whole story. He makes no use
of the records of government departments.
19. A.L. Murray, 'Fugitive Slaves', passim.; and R.W. Winks,
op.cit. pp.169-71.
escape on. 2m In 1841 Lord Sydenham (Governor General of
British North America) expressed himself strongly in favour
of a treaty, as long as it contained "provisos which
effectively prevent its abuse by the United States in the
case of Slaves".' One could go on.
	
Similarly, throughout
the negotiation of Article 10, the position of slaves was not
forgotten. Ashburton himself noted that "slave desertion...
must remain untouched by any treaty".° 2 Furthermore, when
,
Webster suggested the inclusion of mutiny on board ship in an
effort to cover the case of slaves who mutinied to secure
their freedom, the proposal was blocked. 21
 To conclude
discussion of this aspect of the study, it is important to
note that no slave was ever extradited to the United States
20. Memorandum by Palmerston (FO. 11 September 1839): FO
5/333, f20. cf . Memorandum by Palmerston (FO. 31 March 1840):
FO 5/386, f.4; Addington to Colonial Office (FO. 12 June
1844): FO 5/419, ff.125-126; Addington to Home Office (FO. 26
October 1850): HO 45/398, /24; Clarendon to Crampton
(No.16)(FO. 22 April 1853): FO 5/561, ff.173-174; Russell to
Orne (No.7) (FO. 7 July 1859): FO 80/136, f.62; Layard to
Home Office (FO. 2 February 1863): HO 45/7386, /3; Rogers to
Foreign Office (CO. 7 April 1863): FO 37/412; and 'Tappan
Papers' p.453.
21. Sydenham to Russell (No.76) (Kingston. 21 June 1841): CO
42/479, f.277.
22. Ashburton to Aberdeen (No.5)(Washington. 12 May 1842): FO
5/379, f.82. cf. A.L. Murray, 'Fugitive Slaves', p.306.
23. cf. Ashburton to Aberdeen (No.5)(Washington. 28 April
1842) enclosing the extradition clause suggested by Webster:
FO 5/379, ff.52-57 & 76-77; Aberdeen to Ashburton (No.10)(FO.
3 June 1842): FO 5/378, ff.94-5; Aberdeen to Ashburton
(Private. 3 June 1842): Aberdeen Papers, BL Add. MS 43123,
ff.122-124; Ashburton to Aberdeen (No.12) (Washington. 29
June 1842): FO 5/379, ff.201-208; and Ashburton to Aberdeen
(No.18)(Washington. 9 August 1842): FO 5/380, ff.164-166, cf.
M.E. Chamberlain, op.cit. p.321; C.M. Fuess, op.cit. op.cit.
volume 2. p.113; and W.D. Jones, op.cit. p.23.
under Article
* * *
In September 1843, Gersdorff announced the desire of the
Saxon government to conclude an extradition treaty with
Britain, based on the model of the Anglo-French treaty.
Although no-one at the Foreign Office had any positive
objections to the proposals permanent under-secretary Horatio
Addington felt that "more experience of the Conventions
already concluded" might be "desirable before a decisive
answer is returned".	 In contrast, Home Secretary Sir James
Graham saw:
no objection to extending the application of the
Principle of Extradition as established in the recent
Treaty with France.... A similar Engagement with
Saxony.... might lead to the general adoption of this
international policy, which appears to me sound.2.6
Nevertheless, Gersdorff was informed that the government had
decided not to conclude further treaties "until they shall
have had greater experience of any practical deficiencies or
24. cf. R.W. Winks. op.cit. p.174, and H. Temperley, pp.cit.
p.205. The Americans did attempt to extradite slaves: the
first occasion occurred in December 1843: cf. PP (1844)
XXXIX: 'Fugitive Criminals (United States)', pp.297-306; R.J.
Zorn, 'Criminal Extradition', p.291; and H. Temperley,
op.cit. pp.204-5. In 1860-61, as will be seen, a
particularly important case occurred.
25. Gersdorff to Aberdeen (16 September 1843); and minute
thereon by Addington (FO. n.d.): FO 68/53.
26. Minute by Graham (HO. 20 September 1843): HO 45/445.
D.W.J. Johnson, 'Sir James Graham as politician and Home
Secretary', Unpublished B.Litt. Thesis, Oxford University
(1948), contains no reference to extradition whatever.
inconveniences which may be inherent in those already
concluded". °7'
Such a policy was wise, for 'practical deficiencies and
inconveniences' a-plenty soon arose. In February 1844 the
American Minister complained that the Act implementing
Article 10 was rather ambiguous- 2B More serious was the
French complaint that whilst a fugitive had recently been
extradited to Britain under the Anglo-French treaty, thus far
not one French criminal had been sent the other way. As
Aberdeen saw it, such a situation was "obviously contrary to
justice and reason" and constituted a "hazard" to good Anglo-
French relations: he feared that unless something was done,
the French would "release themselves from engagements which
produce benefit to Great Britain alone".°5'
The essential reason for this imbalance was that while
in France the granting of extradition was largely an
executive function, in Britain the powers of the executive
were limited to securing the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of fugitives whose extradition was desired.
Thereafter it was up to France to bring the case before
a magistrate. One problem was that in no case had the French
supplied sufficient prima facie evidence to the satisfaction
27. Aberdeen to Gersdorff (FO. 7 November 1843): FO 68/53.
28. Everett to Aberdeen (20 February 1844): FO 5/416, ff.28-
31. It was not pressed further.
29. cf. FO 27/708 & 712. The complaint was first made on 25
June 1844, and repeated on 16 July and 4 December; Addington
to Home Office (FO. 22 July 1844 and 14 March 1845): HO
45/398, /5 & /13. During 1843-4, France made twenty
unsuccessful requests for extradition.
25
of a British magistrate. Another was the difference between
the definition of offences in English and French law. For
example, fraudulent bankruptcy was made extraditable by the
treaty, and was a definite crime in French law, but there was
"no offence which is expressly provided against" by English
law "under the name of Fraudulent Bankruptcy". 3m Whilst some
of the acts which constituted this offence under French law
were also criminal offences in Britain, not all were.
_
Therefore, not every French criminal accused of fraudulent
I
bankruptcy was guilty of an offence under English law, and so
not all could be extradited, for extraditable acts have to be
criminal under the laws of both countries.
Such differences between French and English law were
unavoidable, but other difficulties could be remedied. For
one thing, the French could improve the nature of their
requests for extradition: they were sometimes "vague", and
sometimes the French even failed to provide a description of
the accused. In other respects, matters could be improved by
changes in British law and practice. For example, the
foreign authorities were responsible for finding and
arresting the fugitive, and this, not unnaturally, was the
source of some difficulty. Whilst improvements in procedure
in Britain were considered, Aberdeen assured Jarnac that:
"no efforts will be wanting on the part of Her Majesty's
Government strictly to carry out their engagements under the
Treaty".' In July 1845, a bill 'for facilitating Execution
30. Law Officers' Opinion by Thesiger and Waddington (24
January 1845)(Copy): FO 27/739.
31. cf. FO 27/741 & 743; and Aberdeen to Jarnac (FO. 31 July
1844): FO 27/708.
of the Treaties with France and the United States for the
Apprehension of certain Offenders' was introduced, and it
passed into law in August. 2 The Act provided that when a
request for extradition was received, a secretary of state
would require a London magistrate to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the fugitive, no matter where he was in England.
Such warrant was to be executed by the relevant local police
force; the fugitive would then be brought before the London
,
magistrates, who would either grant or refuse extradition.
Prior to the Act, cases could be heard by any magistrate:
now they would be heard by the Chief London Magistrate, or,
in his absence, one of his colleagues, who, "in any case of
difficulty" could be advised by the Crown Law Officers. It
was hoped that "by these means uniformity of Practice will be
maintained, and some security taken for the prevention of
failures of justice"; but should it prove otherwise, Aberdeen
promised that he would be "willing to adopt any other mode
which may be consistent with the principle and practice of
English law for securing the attainment of the desired
end".
Aberdeen's promise was soon put to the test: in January
1846 Jarnac again expressed his government's dissatisfaction
with the operation of the treaty.
	
Tinkering with it had
32. 8 & 9 Vict. c.120. It passed without debate. In
introducing it, Aberdeen emphasised its purely procedural
nature: 3H,(L)„82,c.617,(17 July 1845).
33. Phillips to Foreign Office (HO. 18 March 1845); and
Aberdeen to St. Aulaire (FO. 7 April 1845): FO 27/739.
34. Jarnac to Aberdeen (9 January 1846): FO 27/763.
failed to provide a remedy. The Chief London Magistrate,
J.J. Hall, suggested the negotiation of a new treaty and the
enactment of a new Act in which extradition procedure would
be altered radically. Instead of requiring the production of
prima facie evidence that would justify committal if the
offence had been committed in Britain, Hall recommended that
fugitives be surrendered on the production of a French arrest
warrant which was certified by the French Minister of Justice
-
or a person of similar rank to be a right and proper
document.	 Hall's suggestion was adopted as the basis for
action, and in March 1846 Aberdeen proposed that such a
scheme should be incorporated in a new treaty.	 By June a
draft treaty was ready for submission to France.
The number of crimes made extraditable remained
unchanged. France would surrender criminals on the authority
of the Minister of Justice, upon the production of an arrest
warrant issued by a competent British judge or magistrate.
The procedure under which Britain would make surrenders was
as follows. The French would present an arrest warrant,
issued by a competent authority, which clearly laid down the
nature of the charge, together with certified copies of the
depositions upon which the warrant was granted. After
authentication by the signature of a secretary of state,
35. J.J. Hall to Home Office (Bow Street. 5 February 1846):
HO 45/398, /17. Extradition on the production of an arrest
warrant was normal practice on the continent: cf. Memorandum
by Waddington (Printed for the Cabinet)(HO. 15 January 1861):
HO 45/7238.
36. Aberdeen to St. Aulaire (FO. 6 March 1846): FO 27/763.
these documents would be considered:
sufficient proof that the party named therein is
charged with an offence under the provisions of the
present Convention, and liable to be arrested and
delivered up in pursuance thereof.
They would then be produced before a magistrate, who, after
receiving sworn evidence as to the identity of the accused,
-
would make an order for extradition. On 22 June 1846,
Aberdeen offered this draft to the French authorities.7
Before any reply was received from France, there was a
change of government in Britain, with Russell forming his
first Cabinet in July 1846. 	 The new Foreign Secretary,
Palmerston, was as much in favour of extradition as Aberdeen
had been, and suggested signing treaties with Holland and
Belgium, for he had recently heard of a case in which a
fugitive reached Belgium and so escaped punishment. Home
Secretary Grey agreed, and indeed the Home Office view was
that robbery and embezzlement should be added to those crimes
which were the subject of extradition.	 In December 1846 a
draft treaty was prepared for submission to the Dutch and
Belgians, which repeated the procedure proposed to France in
37. A copy of the draft may be found in ibid.
38. F.A. Dreyer, 'The Russell Administration', Unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, University of St. Andrews (1962), contains no
reference to extradition.
39. cf. Stanley to Home Office (FD. 11 November 1846) and
minute thereon by Grey (HO. n.d.): HO 45/1622; and Phillips
to Foreign Office (HO. 27 November 1846): FO 37/266.
June..4m
However, unlike the draft Anglo-French treaty, this
draft was submitted to the Law Officers. In March 1847 they
reported that "the scope and terms" of the treaty "require
the most serious consideration since it may be abused and
applied to political offenders". The cause of their
misgivings was the new extradition procedure, which placed
great faith in the trustworthiness of foreign governments and
legal systems: a degree of faith that might not always be
justified.'" With this opinion, the Law Officers effectively
killed the proposal to negotiate treaties with Holland and
Belgium, but the treaty had already been offered to France,
and could not be withdrawn without causing serious
complications.
In April 1647 the French government finally responded to
the treaty offered it. Generally speaking, they were pleased
to find "removed from the new project the dispositions which
had, contrarily to the wishes so manifest of the two Courts,
principally hindered the operation of the primitive
convention". However, the French were unhappy with the
requirement for sworn evidence as proof of identity, and
believed it would make the new treaty as useless as the old
one. Furthermore, in France, the arrest warrant was often
issued before any evidence was collected: if no demand for
40. Copy in HO 45/398, /18.
41. Law Officers' Opinion by Dundas and Jervis (4 March
1847): HO 48/39, No.8.
extradition could be made until depositions were ready,
fugitives would be given additional time in which to escape.
To avoid these difficulties, it was suggested that Britain
should extradite upon the production of a French "sentence of
condemnation" or "decree of indictment", which clearly showed
the nature of the crime charged, together with a description
of the accused and any other documents which might serve to
prove identity. After authentication by a secretary of
state, these documents would be sufficient to justify
extradition. It was also proposed that the list of
extraditable offences should be augmented.
Before the French counter-proposal could be given any
detailed consideration, attention was diverted by the private
request of the Neapolitan Minister for an extradition treaty
with Britain. This approach led Samuel March Phillips (Home
Office permanent under secretary) to minute as follows:
The expediency of entertaining this proposition seems
very questionable. With France and America we have made
Treaties... for many good reasons: having confidence in
the Governments of those Countries that they would not
use the powers of the Treaty covertly for political 
purposes... But could we have the same confidence in
the Neapolitan Government?... such a Convention might be
perverted to political purposes. It was perhaps significant
that the approach came only a few days after a Neapolitan
request for action against political refugees in Malta and
42. Jarnac to Palmerston, enclosing French counter-draft (29
April 1847)(Translation)(Copy): HO 45/398, /19.
the Ionian Islands. In addition, there was no real need for
such a treaty: English criminals "never" went to Naples, and
even if they did, it would be difficult to secure their
return "on account of the irregularities or looseness which
would probably be found to exist in their Criminal
proceedings". 4.	 Furthermore, those "Neapolitan delinquents"
who came to England were "understood generally" to be
political offenders. The Neapolitan Minister was therefore
politely informed that his request had been refused.'"'
This was the first occasion upon which Britain had
rejected a foreign approach for an extradition treaty out of
hand. The cause of this sudden change of attitude was that
the acceptability of such treaties very largely depended upon
the nature of the state with which it was proposed to
conclude one. The Neapolitan government simply could not be
trusted to abstain from attempting to extradite political
refugees from Britain /
 whether overtly or covertly.
Furthermore, there existed widespread distrust of her
judicial processes generally: even a common criminal who was
surrendered might not get a fair trial. Apart from their own
personal qualms about concluding an extradition treaty with
43. Addington to Home Office (FO. 23 August 1847) and minute
thereon by Phillips (HO. n.d.): HO 4511967; and Castelcicala
to Palmerston (18 August 1847): FO 70/218. cf. D.F. Smith,
'Sir George Grey', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Toronto
University (1972), p.118. W.E. Gladstone's Letter to the Earl 
of Aberdeen. on the State Prosecutions of the Neapolitan 
Government (1851) later made Neapolitan ill—treatment of
political offenders notorious.
44. Du Marchant to Foreign Office (HO. 2 September 1847): HO
34/8, p.28; and Addington to Castelcicala (FO. 11 September
1847): Fp 70/218.
such a regime, Ministers also had to consider the likely
political and public reaction to a scheme such as this. The
'liberal' British Parliament and people were hardly likely to
accept such a proposal. Any government which sponsored it
was almost certain to run into severe difficulties in a House
of Commons where the absence of close party ties made support
for governments a very fluid affair, and where the support of
even the strongest Cabinet could evaporate overnight if it
chose to sponsor the wrong measure. 	
-
British Governments had to face this dilemma because as
yet not all countries possessed an 'acceptable' legal system
or had accepted the principle that 'politicos' should be
exempt from extradition. During the 1840s the marked
differences in state and society between 'liberal' Britain
and very many of the continental European regimes were
perhaps at their greatest ever. 4 In this situation, the
conclusion of extradition treaties with very many nations
simply could not be contemplated, and it was perhaps
fortunate for Britain that none of the more powerful 'despots
of Europe' (such as Russia or Austria) sought an extradition
treaty. A refusal to negotiate with another sovereign state
clearly implied a lack of confidence in its legal system and
general trustworthiness, and was quite an insult on a
nation's character. The consequences of such a refusal if
directed at one of the great powers of Europe would certainly
have been far more serious than refusing to negotiate a
treaty with insignificant powers such as Naples.
45. cf. B. Porter, Britain. Europe and the World chapter 1;
and 'Bureau and Barrack', Victorian Studies volume 27 (1984),
pp. 407-33.
This episode illustrates one of the basic reasons why
extradition was so often a source of difficulty for British
governments. Extradition was an issue within both domestic
politics and foreign relations, and the requirements of
foreign and domestic policy were not always the same: indeed
they were frequently in direct opposition. Foreign policy
aims might dictate a need to conclude an extradition treaty
with a certain power as a means of cementing good relations
-
(or at least to avoid causing offence), whilst the domestic
need to avoid placing before Parliament a treaty with an
'unacceptable' power was a force pushing just as strongly in
the opposite direction.
Meanwhile, Chevalier Bunsen had proposed the conclusion
of an Anglo-Prussian extradition treaty. 4.4' The government was
not indisposed to consider the idea favourably, but the Home
Office feared that if an Anglo-Prussian treaty was signed
along the lines of the treaties of 1842-43 1 it would be
similarly inefficient, and "be the subject of fresh
complaints". It was therefore decided that Bunsen's proposal
should remain until the terms of the new Anglo-French treaty
were settled.. 7
 However, the French counter-proposal was
causing the Home Office "considerable difficulties of a legal
description", 443 so much so that it
46. Bunsen to Palmerston (26 March 1847): FO 64/280.
47. Phillips to Foreign Office (HO. 10 February 1848): HO
34/8, pp.171-172. cf. Palmerston to Bunsen (FO. 15 February
1848): FO 64/292.
48. Phillips to Foreign Office (HO. 10 February 1846): HO
34/9, pp.171-172.
was not until February 1846 that the Home Office informed the
Foreign Office of its view. Although Home Secretary Grey was
prepared to accept the French proposal in so far as it
concerned the nature of the documentary evidence that would
justify extradition, he could not agree to the removal of the
need for sworn evidence of identity.'"'
* * *
Then, however, negotiations were interrupted by the out-
,
break of revolution in Europe. It is not for nothing that
_
1846 is known as the 'Year of Revolutions', for in many parts
of the continent there was a "massive breakdown of social
coherence and government". 	 The revolutions began in several
Italian states in January; in February Louis Phillipe of
France fell, and by the spring, many major cities were
affected, including Rome, Vienna, Milan, Prague, Berlin and
Munich. However, by mid-1649, the counter-revolution was
victorious, and the revolutionaries ousted from power.
Despite all the trouble, very little actually changed
permanently: only Louis Phillipe lost power for good.
Nevertheless, 1846 was important in other ways. Most
important to this study is the fact that the revolutions and
their aftermath confirmed Britain's position as the asylum of
Europe. Whilst the revolutions raged, Louis Phillipe,
Guizot, Princess Lieven and Metternich, to name but a few,
49. Waddington to Foreign Office (HO. 25 February 1848):
ibid pp.183-190. cf. D.F. Smith, op.cit. p.119.
50. J.A.S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped (1976) p.9.
found safety in Britain. When the revolutionaries lost, many
eventually turned up in Britain: among their number were
Karl Marx, Louis Blanc, Alexandre Ledru-Rollin, Victor Hugo,
Louis Kossuth, Alexander Herzen and Felice Orsini. 1 Made
apprehensive by the revolutions, in May 1848 Parliament had
passed an Alien Act "to authorise for one year, and to the
end of the then next session of parliament, the removal of
aliens from the realm". °° However, the Act was never used
against anyone: aliens continued to come and go as they
pleased. This was the only time during the Victorian era
that an alien's right of entry could be in any way legally
restricted, but in practice it was not.'s
In the mid-nineteenth century, Britons were positively
proud of their policy of granting asylum to political
refugees of all creeds: it was a policy that was fully
accepted and justified right across the political spectrum.
In a sense, the asylum policy was a symbol of mid-Victorian
liberalism. The Chartist Red Republican asserted that to
51. Perhaps surprisingly, there was no spate of requests for
the extradition of the refugees. In July 1850 Frankfurt
sought the extradition of two men implicated in the murders
of Prince Lucknowsky and General Anerswald in 1848 - it was
refused, as it had to be, since there was no extradition
treaty with Frankfurt: cf. HO 45/3275; and FO 30/145. I can
find no evidence of other similar requests. Continental
regimes were perhaps deterred by the well known fact that
Britain would not extradite in the absence of a treaty. They
were perhaps also glad to be rid of them for the time being.
52. 11 & 12 Vict. c.20. Even in the worrying times of 1848,
not all had supported the bill: for example, Mowatt (Liberal
MP for Penryn and Falmouth) called it a "silly and useless
Bill": 3H0C),98,c.853,(11 May 1848).
53. cf. Memorandum by W.W.L. (10 July 1894): CAB 37/36,
No.21; Memorandum by Digby (HO. 17 October 1899): HO
45/10063/B2840, /8; and B. Porter, Refugee Question passim.
D.F. Smith, op.cit. p.122, is wrong to state that the Act was
"rarely enforced".
take action against political refugees, "would not be merely
a crime against humanity, but also an act of treason to
England herself". The Times confidently asserted that:
We should be most unfaithful to our Constitution, most
untrue to our political faith.... if we consented to the
exclusion or other ill-treatment of political
refugees... There is no point whatever on which we are
prouder.	 .
The Spectator (Liberal) felt that granting asylum was a
policy that was "honourable to England".
Parliament felt much the same. Sir George Grey asserted
that "it has long been the boast of England" that she was the
asylum of Europe, "and a just cause of boast it is." Lord
Lyndhurst believed the asylum policy was "in perfect
accordance with the character of an enlightened, a generous,
and a powerful country". Derby bluntly stated that "God
forbid that we should ever cease to be!" an asylum. Richard
Monckton Milnes (Tory MP for Pontefract) regarded the "right
of asylum" as "agreeable to the laws, the customs, and the
feelings of the people of Great Britain", while Sir John
Walsh (Liberal MP for Radnorshire) was confident that Britons
would defend the policy to the last, "even though it involved
the great alternative of war". The asylum policy was "writ
in characters of fire on the tablets of our Constitution".
54. Red Republican volume 1 (29 June 1850); The Times 19
September 1850, p.4 and 28 February 1853, p.4; and Anon, 'The
Refugees', Spectator volume 26 (1853), p.439.
The supply of such quotations is almost inexhaustible.
In a way, it was ideologically necessary for Britons to
support the asylum policy. For many Britons, the main lesson
of 1848, when many autocratic states had suffered revolution,
but liberal Britain had remained immune, was to confirm the
belief that liberalism was superior to autocracy. (This did
not necessarily follow, for the most autocratic state,
Russia, was also immune from revolution.) 54* Liberalism, or
the satisfaction of legitimate grievances by constitutional,
peaceful means, was held up as the only way to prevent
revolution. In contrast, autocracy bred discontent, for
legitimate grievances went unsatisfied: the only way to have
them rectified was through violent uprisings. Liberal
Britain was held to be unsubvertable, because there were no
serious legitimate grievances around which to foment
discontent. Britain therefore could not be threatened by a
few conspiring refugees. (Hume thought the idea that she
could be was "about as rational as to suppose that a bevy of
ourang-outangs should visit the country on a like
mission;") 7 in contrast, the continentals did feel
threatened by the refugees who, safe in England, continued
55. 3H,(C),98,c.560,(1 May 1848); 3HOL),115,c.662, (27 March
1851); 3H,(L),119,c.896„(27 February 1852); 3H,(C),120,cc.483
& 518,(1 April 1852);and N.W.Sibley and A. Elias op.cit.
p.125.
56. cf. David N. Petler, 'British Policy towards the French
Republic in 1848, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Hull University
(1984), pp. 167-7t.
57. 3H,(C),98,c.582,(1 May 1848). cf. David N. Petler,
op.cit. pp.168-9.
to plan the downfall of the autocrats. The way for the
autocrats to prevent revolution was to concede legitimate
reform, not by persecuting opponents abroad. Thus, Britain
could not participate in this persecution, for it was not in
the best interests of the autocrats for her to do so. To
admit that Britain did need to give aid against the refugees
would be to undermine the very basis of her own political
stability. It also suited Britain to believe she could not
be threatened by small numbers of refugees., If people
thought themselves free, discontent was less likely to arise
on a scale that would require overt repression. "Toleration
of foreign political refugees bolstered this mechanism, by
highlighting the openness, freedom and stability of Britain's
society by direct and stark contrast with her European
neighbours". m The asylum policy was therefore in a sense an
aspect of a complicated system of social control. On a more
basic level, the refugees were in any case rather sympathised
with, while the autocratic continental regimes were rather
disapproved of. There were therefore very sound reasons why
Britain maintained an inviolable asylum.
In the aftermath of the revolutions, apart from giving
shelter to the defeated, Britain was given an opportunity to
demonstrate her commitment to the twin principles of asylum
and the non-extradition of 'politicos'. After the defeat of
the Hungarian revolt by combined Austro-Russian forces in
58 B. Porter, 'British Government and Political Refugees'
Immigrants and Minorities volume 2 (1983), p.27. On the
general background to Britain's asylum policy, cf. B.
Porter, Refugee Question passim.
August 1849, the Hungarian leader, Kossuth, and many of his
comrades, took refuge in Ottoman territory. Almost
immediately, Russia and Austria demanded their extradition
under the terms of the treaties of Passarowitz (1718),
Belgrade (1739), Kutchuk Kainardji (1774) and Sistowa (1791).
However, on the advice of the French and British ambassadors
(Aupick and Canning), and armed with promises of Anglo-French
support, the Sultan refused extradition.'" On 2 October the
Cabinet met, and agreed to give the Ottomans "moral and
material" help. 4"a Palmerston secured further French co-
operation, and in November an Anglo-French fleet arrived in
the Dardenelles as a clear demonstration of support for the
Sultan. Faced with this show of strength, Russia and Austria
withdrew their demands for extradition.
In taking up the cause of Louis Kossuth and his fellow
refugees, Palmerston was pursing a dual purpose. He was
partly motivated by a desire to prevent Austro-Russian
domination of the Ottoman Empire (which was necessary if
British, mainly imperial and economic, interests in the area
were to be secured), but he was also anxious to ensure that
the refugees did not become yet further victims of the
retribution exacted by Russia and Austria upon captured
59. cf. Canning to Palmerston (No.267)(Therapia. 3 September
1849): FO 424/5, No.6; Palmerston to Canning (Private. 19
October 1848): Canning Papers, FO 352132A11: Palmerston to
Russell (Private. 14 & 28 September 1849): Russ.PP. PRO
30/22/8a, ff.167-8 & 272-3.
60. R.W. Seton-Watson„ Britain in Europe (Cambridge 1937)
p.267.
rebels.4"
There was also perhaps a third factor behind
Palmerston's policy. Given the lack of party discipline in
Parliament and the fluidity of support for governments, the
personal popularity of leading ministers was perhaps the
easiest way to ensure that a Cabinet stayed in office, and
during the mid-nineteenth century, Palmerston, more than any
other minister, deliberately sought and cultivated general
popularity. The simple fact was that helping Kossuth and his
fellow refugees was a popular policy among a very wide cross-
section of the popu1ace. 2 As Palmerston himself put it,
"there never was such unanimity in England upon a question
not directly affecting the immediate interests of England".
However, the most important aspect of this episode came
with a dispatch from Palmerston to his ambassadors at Vienna
and St. Petersburg. After stating that he did not believe
Turkey to be absolutely bound by treaty obligations to
surrender the refugees, Palmerston continued:
61. cf. Palmerston to Canning (Private. 28 October 1849),
quoted in C. Sproxton, Palmerston (1919) p.134; and in S.
Lane-Poole, Stratford Canning (1888) volume 2, p.202. cf.
Canning to Palmerston (Therapia. 16 September 1849): PP
(1851) LVIII: 'Correspondence respecting Refugees from
Hungary', p.421; and Palmerston to Russell (Private. 9
October 1849): Russ.PP. PRO 30/22/8B, ff.20-1.
62. cf. 3H0C),108,cc.480-51807 February 1850); The Times 3
October 1849,p.6; and Red Republican volume 59 (10 August
1850). During 1849-50, Palmerston's popularity saved him from
dismissal on a couple of occasions. His policy was not
universally popular: characteristically, the Queen "could not
understand why a British Government need be exercised about
the fate of a few Hungarian rebels": B. Connell, Regina V. 
Palmerston (1962) p.111.
63. Palmerston to Canning (FO. 6 October 1849), quoted in S.
Lane-Poole, op.cit. volume 2, p.199.
If there is one rule which, more than another, has
been observed in modern times by all independent States,
both great and small, of the civilised world, it is the
rule not to deliver up political refugees, unless the
State is bound to do so by the positive obligations of a
treaty... The laws of hospitality, the dictates of
humanity, the general feelings of mankind forbid such
surrenders; and any independent Government, which of its
own free will were to make such surrender, would be
deservedly and universallY stigmatised as degraded and
dishonoured.
No-one could have given a clearer expression of the political
offence exemption to extradition, and as such, the dispatch
deserves a central place in the early history of the British
extradition experience.
This episode is also of importance in view of the
pronouncements which it drew out of all sections of the
British press. The Times was perhaps the clearest: "The
Hungarian refugees may have violated laws, but that does not
justify a grosser violation of law in order to punish their
offence. This demand for their surrender is... a wanton
outrage." The Morning Herald asserted that their surrender
would have been "a monstrous perversion of all international
law, justice, and hospitality", while the Standard thought
64. Palmerston to Ponsonby; and same to Bloomfield (FO. 6
October 1849): PP (1851) LVIII: 'Correspondence respecting
Refugees from Hungary', pp.464-7. On this episode generally;
cf. E.F. Malcolm-Smith, Canning (1933) pp-216-21; and S.
Lane-Poole, op.cit. volume 2, pp.188-205.
the demand for extradition "utterly preposterous... wholly
ridiculous".
Of course, the autocratic continental regimes were not
at all favourably disposed toward British policy. For them,
liberalism was little better than socialism, and just as
dangerous. Furthermore, the autocrats did worry about the
activities of small groups of conspirators, who plotted in
the safety of their British asylum: British policy was
-
regarded as unfriendly at the least, not to say threatening.
She was part of the grand conspiracy: she harboured, armed,
and trained revolutionaries, perhaps using them to accomplish
what could not be done by her own relatively small army.
Britain was free from revolution in 1848 because the
revolutionaries were unlikely to attack their greatest ally.
In the aftermath of the revolutions, the autocrats
busily went about re-establishing their power, and because
they felt insecure (no-one knew how permanent their recovery
was) they tended to be more repressive then ever. This in
turn led them to view Britain's asylum policy even more
unfavourably. Normally, the continentals (however much they
resented it) were prepared to accept British policy as a fact
of life, but at this time of heightened fear for their own
security, their resentment grew and took on a more dangerous
form.
65. The Times 8 October 1849, p.4; Morning Herald 2 October
1849, p.4; and Standard 1 October 1849, p.2. cf. The Times 1
October 1849, p.4; 3 October 1849, p.6; and 23 January 1850,
p.6; Morning Post 3 October 1849, p.4; Daily News 5 October
1849, p.4; Lloyd's Weekly 7 October 1849, p.7; Morning 
Advertiser 2 October 1849, p.2; and Northern Star 6 October
1849, p.4.
Between October 1851 and January 1852, Britain received
diplomatic representations from France, Austria, the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies, Prussia, and several other Berman states
complaining of the activities of refugees resident in Britain
and calling for action. All this represented a concerted,
co-ordinated effort against Britain, and seemed very ominous.
With her (comparatively) weak European military power,
Britain's worst fear was always that she would be the victim
-
of a European alliance that left her isolated. Such a fear
was perhaps not very far from realisation, but still Britain
did not abandon her asylum policy, Rather, Foreign Secretary
Granville replied with a spirited defence of the right of
asylum. He assured the continentals that if any refugees
abused the asylum so generously granted to them, then
punitive action would be taken, but this proved to be
something of an empty promise. In time, the crisis passed:
as the autocrats became more firmly established and less
insecure, so their resentment towards Britain abated.
Nevertheless, at the time, the situation looked very gloomy
indeed, but the asylum policy had passed this acid test of
real pressure to put an end to it, and it was never to face
quite such a challenge again.'s45
***
To return to the Anglo-French negotiations that had been
suspended with the outbreak of revolution in France, they
were resumed late in July 1848, when the French government
was considered to be "sufficiently constituted for this
purpose". In September, the Foreign Office replied to the
French counter-draft of April 1847 in line with the Home
Office's views as expressed in February 1848. d..7 Nothing could
now happen until France responded, which (no doubt as a
result of her disturbed internal condition) she did not do
until April 1850. When it finally came, the response was much
the same as the counter-draft. Once again the expansion of
the list of extraditable offences was advocated, together
with a simple method of extradition coupled with the removal
of the need to give evidence on oath as to identity. Both
the Home Office and Law Officers were reasonably happy with
the proposal, but had reservations on the question of proving
identity..
Prior to April 1850, Palmerston had not taken a very
close interest in the negotiations, but the fact that their
end was in sight seems to have spurred him into taking a
deeper interest. In that same month he noted that he
presumed that the "fundamental Principle" of extradition was
that "the formal safety of a foreigner in England should be
substantially as secure as that of a British subject", and
66. On the crisis of 1851-2: cf. E. Hertslet, 'Memorandum on
the Remonstrances which have been addressed to this Country
by Foreign Governments against Incitements in England to
Assassination' (FO. 4 May 1883)(Printed for the Cabinet): CAB
37/10; FO 27/914; FO 64/336; Earl of Malmesbury„ Memoirs 
(1885 edition) p.235; B. Porter, Refugee Question chapter 3;
and C. Parry (ed.), op.cit. pp.50-5. There were other
isolated, less serious representations: cf. FO 70/218, CO
158/151-64; FO 68/75; HO 45/3263; HO 45/3272; and HO 45/3720.
67. Minute by Palmerston (FO. 19 July 1848): FO 27/826; and
Palmerston to de Beaumont (FO. 16 September 1848): FO 27/825.
David N. Petler, ap.cit. does not mention the extradition
negotiations.
68. Drouyn de Lhuys to Palmerston (5 April 1850): FO 27/954.
cf. Minute by Waddington (HO. n.d.); and Law Officers'
Opinion by Romilly (24 August 1850): HO 45/398, /22 & /23.
that no-one should be extradited "except for such an offence
and upon such proofs as would justify a magistrate in
committing a British subject and sending him to trial." The
Home Office maintained that the new method of extradition
could be accepted provided identity was proved by evidence on
oath, but Palmerston was clearly beginning to have his
doubts.4"'
In September Palmerston asked his officials if "there
,
would be any danger that a Political Refugee might be
claimed" under the extradition procedure proposed to be
included in the new treaty? John B. Bergne (Superintendent
of the Foreign Office Treaty Department) had to admit that
there was "no absolute security" against such an occurrence,
and that the only guarantee against it seemed "to rest upon
the good faith of the requesting party".	 Nevertheless, the
new method seemed to be the only way to make the treaty work
efficiently in Britain, and, in any case, Aberdeen had
already (in June 1846) agreed to it."
Presumably Palmerston had forgotten about Aberdeen's
undertaking of June 1846, or was never aware of its
existence. Further, he believed the new procedure had been
proposed by France, whereas in fact Hall had first suggested
it. In any event, Palmerston remained unconvinced, and gave
instructions for a letter to be written stating that there
69. Memorandum by Palmerston (FO. 28. April 1850): FO 27/954;
and Waddington to Foreign Office (HO. 29 August 1850): HO
34/9, pp.357-361. cf. D.F. Smith, op.cit. p. 119.
70. Memoranda by Palmerston (FO. 14 September 1850); and
Bergne, (FO. 5 & 9 October 1850): FO 27/954.
were "obvious objections to the French Proposal [sic]". He
recognised that the new method would make extradition
treaties very efficient, and that "in the majority of cases
it might inflict no injustice". However, he believed it to
be "objectionable in principle that a British Magistrate
should become the blind instrument for carrying into effect
in this country the decrees of a Foreign Magistrate".
Furthermore,
,
this arrangement might iii cases of political disturbance
be liable to abuse, and a Refugee whom a Foreign
Government wished to get possession of in order to
prosecute him for political offences might be claimed in
this manner upon some ill founded criminal charge.
As for Aberdeen's promise of 1846, no treaty had yet been
signed, so "Her Majesty's Government are of course at full
liberty to alter their mind".2.
In laying down his views, Palmerston articulated a
problem that was to confront successive governments: how far
were the procedures of extradition to be subordinated to the
need to safeguard political refugees? This was a fundamental
issue and conflict within the British extradition experience.
In this instance, it is clear that Palmerston believed the
first priority to be to safeguard the position of
71. Minute by Palmerston (FO. 6 October 1850): FO 27/954;
and Addington to Home Office (FO. 26 October 1850): HO
45/398, /24. Palmerston of course could not be blamed
for being unaware of all the details of the negotiation
with France; one could hardly expect him to be
intimately acquainted with all Foreign Office business.
'politicos', and uphold to the utmost Britain's traditional
asylum policy, despite the fact that as a result extradition
would be ineffective and inefficient, leading to foreign
dissatisfaction and resentment.
The Home Office did not, however, share Palmerston's
views. Permanent under-secretary Horatio Waddington believed
that if Aberdeen's promise was to be retracted, negotiations
might as well be abandoned, for it would be "a mere affront
-
to the French Govt. to propose to extend the Treaty (as it
now stands) to other crimes". The Foreign Office was
therefore informed that although Secretary Grey acknowledged
that "great caution" was needed when negotiating extradition
treaties, which could be abused, he believed that
Palmerston's objections were objections to any treaty at all,
rather than "an objection to the particular provisions which
are considered by the French Government absolutely
necessary". In negotiating any treaty it had to be assumed
that it would be used "honestly and fairly": Grey therefore
could see "no sufficient ground for retracting" Aberdeen's
promise.
	
Perhaps surprisingly, Palmerston agreed to be
bound by the Home Office view: faced with the fact of
Aberdeen's promise, the likely diplomatic problems that would
be caused by its withdrawal, and the strong line adopted by
the Home Office, Palmerston perhaps had no real choice. The
important fact is that on 5 December 1850 France was informed
that Britain would keep to Aberdeen's undertaking of 1846;
72. (Minute by Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/398, /24; and
same to Foreign Office (HO. 15 November 1850): FO 27/954.
Underlining in original.
France accepted the proposal, and in July 1851 de Faucheres
arrived in London to settle the actual terms of the treaty.
They were settled without any great difficulty, with
both sides compromising. More than 20 crimes were made
extraditable (an enormous increase), and the treaty was to
apply to convicted as well as accused persons. In order to
extradite fugitives from Britain, the French Embassy was to
present	 -
either a sentence of conviction (arret de condamnation)
or a warrant for apprehension (mandat d'arret) clearly
setting forth the nature of the crime... charged. Such
document shall be accompanied by the description of the
person convicted or accused, and by any other
particulars which may serve to identify him.
These documents were to be authenticated by the Home
Secretary, who would then direct a magistrate to have the
fugitive arrested by the police. All the magistrate then had
to do was satisfy himself
as to the identity of the individual.., either by the
confession or acquiescence of such individual, or by
other sufficient proof, which may be either direct, or
presumptive and circumstantial.
The fugitive would then be handed over. If the magistrate
was not satisfied as to identity, he was to notify the French
73. Palmerston to de Lhuys (FO. 5 December 1850): FO 27/954.
cf. Addington to Home Office (FO. 30 July 1851): HO 45/398,
/25.
Ambassador, and then detain the prisoner for a "sufficient
time", so as to enable the French authorities to gather
additional evidence of identity.
A further novel provision was Article VII, which ran as
follows:
No accused or convicted person who may be surrendered,
shall, in any case, be proceeded against or punished on
,
account of any political offence committed prior to his
being surrendered, nor for any crime or offence not
described in the present Convention which he may have
committed previously to his being surrendered; and proof
of having been so surrendered under this Convention
shall be a good and valid defence against any proceeding
on account of any political offence previously
committed, and shall entitle the party to an immediate
acquittal.
The wording of this article had been decided upon by Derby
(Prime Minister), Malmesbury (Foreign Secretary) and Walpole
(Home Secretary), and was introduced because the nature of
the treaty increased the potential for abuse."" . This was the
first time that an extradition treaty signed by Britain
contained a formal embodiment of the political offence
exemption: Britain certainly adhered to the principle in
74. cf. Derby to Malmesbury (Private. 5 May 1852): FO 27/954;
Addington to Home Office (FO. 7 May 1852) and minute thereon
by Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/398, /31; Derby to Malmesbury
(Private. 13 May 1852); and minute thereon by Malmesbury (F0
n.d.): FO 27/954. Copy of the treaty in: HO 45/398, /32.
The Derby ministry was formed in February 1852.
1842-43, but it was not made explicit in the treaties of
those years.
Meanwhile, Belgium (December 1849), Prussia (May 1850,
Holland (June 1851), and Sardinia (October 1851) had sought
extradition treaties. Drafts were offered to Belgium,
Prussia and Holland, but nothing was signed: talks were
suspended pending the completion of the new French treaty.
After it was ratified, similar treaties would be offered to
these other powers. The ratification of the French treaty
therefore came to be seen as something of a test case for the
progress of extradition in Britain.Th
All depended on whether Parliament would accept a treaty
which, although specifically exempting political refugees,
laid down a relatively simple extradition procedure. The
government was certainly fully aware that it might be
objected to. Waddington feared that the Treaty might be
"opposed by the ultra liberals", and noted that it was "not
unlikely" (originally he had written "very probable") that
75. The fact that he crimes for which extradition could be
granted were listed in the treaties of 1842-43 was intended
to exclude political offences. cf . for example, Ashburton to
Aberdeen (No.5)(Washington. 28 April 1842): FO 5/379, ff. 52-
7; The Times 13 April 1865, p.10; Anon, Emperor of the
French', Saturday Review volume 4 (1857), p.98. The
"principle that political offenders should not be subject to
extradition was felt to be so basic that it needed no formal
recognition": J.G. Castel and M. Edward, 'Political
Offences', Osiloode Hall Law Journal volume 13 (1975), p.90.
76. On these negotiations: cf. FO 10/146,161,162; HO
45/38290; and HO 34/10B, p.35 for Belgium; FO
64/324,325,326,337; HO 45/3829F; HO 34/9, p.269; and HO
34/10B, pp.33 & 48-50 for Prussia; FO 37/302; HO 45/38291;
and HO 34/10B, p.93 for Holland; and FO 67/181; and HO
45/3829H for Sardinia.
the "national feeling of hospitality towards foreigners
may... make Parliament very careful and guarded" when it came
to ratifying the treaty. Addington noted that it contained
"deviations from rigorous English law... which would be
likely to excite hostility". As another official put it,
"The Question now is Will Parliament sanction such a
departure from the protecting jealousy of British law? And
will the present ministry choose to submit the question to
Parliament?"	 -
The Cabinet did proceed with treaty, but with some
hesitation. Derby even suggested delaying the introduction
of the necessary bill for a while, presumably because the
furore over the foreign representations of 1851-52 had barely
subsided; in this atmosphere any measure which could be
represented as a threat to the right of asylum might be in
for a very stormy passage indeed. 	 Nonetheless, on 3 June
1852 Malmesbury introduced the ratifying bill in the House of
Lords.
On second reading (8 June), Malmesbury began by stating
that the only reason for the new treaty was that that of 1843
77. Minute by Waddington (HO. n.d.); Waddington to Faucheres
(n.d.): HO 45/398, /23 & /26; and Addington to Bergne
(Private. 20 April 1852): FO 27/954. cf. Waddington to
Foreign Office (HO. 29 August 1850); HO 34/9, pp.357-61;
unattributable minute (FO. 5 May 1852): FO 27/954; minute by
Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/398„ /30; and D.F. Smith,
op.cit. p.119.
78. His view was reported in Addington to Home Office (FO. 7
May 1852): HO 45/398, /31. cf. PP (1852) LIV: 'Foreign
Refugees in London', pp.47-80; ibid. 'Further
Correspondence', pp.81-102; and 3H,(L),119„cc.895-7, (27
February 1852); 3H,(C),120„cc.28-30 & 477-526 9 (23 March & 1
April 1852); and 3H,(L),120, cc.659-82,(5 April 1852).
was inefficient; he then emphasised the secure position of
'politicos', and reinforced the point by stating that the
French had agreed that "it was for their Lordships to
consider... whether they could... add to the provisions
proposed by the Bill for the security of political
offenders." The government was clearly very anxious to avoid
the Convention being portrayed as a measure which threatened
the right of asylum, and all its efforts in this, and
subsequent, debates, were directed towards this end.
Unfortunately, their Lordships were far from convinced. Even
though the treaty was substantially the same as that he had
agreed to in 1846, Aberdeen had his qualms, as did Lord
Brougham. Lord Campbell regarded the new extradition
procedure as a "very dangerous mode of proceeding" which was
"very liable to be abused", and feared that if the bill
passed "England would lose its distinctive character as
affording a safe asylum for political refugees of all
nations"."
It is a moot point whether France did want to attempt to
extradite 'politicos': before the 1850s she made no attempt
to do so. In 1855 she sought the surrender of Deron and
Vandomme for complicity in an attempt to assassinate Napoleon
III at Lille. Arrest warrants were issued, but neither
fugitive could be found. (m The interesting question as to
whether attempted assassination was a political offence under
79. 3H 0 (L).122,cc.193-4,197-9 & 20408 June 1852). Argyll,
Cranworth and Grey all felt likewise: ibid. cc . 205-7,207-8 &
211-2. The opposition to the bill crossed party-lines: it
was not the result of any party-political intrigue.
B. cf. FO 27/1092.
extradition law was therefore not tested.
More interesting was Galliard's case: in October 1852
France requested his extradition from Malta on a charge of
involvement in a plot to blow up Napoleon III at Marseilles.
Officials were convinced that the case was not one for
extradition, since the crime amounted to conspiracy (which
was non-extraditable) rather than attempted murder, as France
alleged. Nevertheless, they let the case go on:
I think at present in the existing state of affairs its
importance can scarcely be overestimated... It is of
great importance to avoid any reasonable ground of
complaint on the part of France - as long as we can
consistently with a rigid observance of our own laws..°1
In the atmosphere created by the representations of 1851-52
it was clearly wise to avoid annoying France unnecessarily.
The case therefore went to court, where Galliard was
soon freed. The question of the political nature of his
offence was not touched on, but at least one official thought
his offence was one "affecting public interest and the
internal safety of the State" - that is, a political offence.
Still, in a further attempt to avoid antagonising France,
Galliard was expelled to Liverpool. However, his passage was
paid, he was given £3 for personal use, and presumably
Britain would serve just as well as a base for his plotting
81. Unattributable minute (CO. 16 November 1852): CO
158/163.
as Malta had. Furthermore, in expelling Galliard, "special
care" was taken for "his personal safety, so as to preclude
any chance of his falling into the hands of the French".
This case therefore did not signal any great change in
British policy. It does not seem to have come to public
notice in Britain, so one can only speculate idly as to how
Briton would have reacted to their government's actions.e2
To return to the proceedings in Parliament, not one
,
speaker, other than members of the Cabinet, spoke in support
of the bill, but it was nevertheless allowed to pass onto the
committee stage, on the understanding that on that occasion,
the government would not oppose any amendments their
Lordships deemed necessary to make the bill acceptable.
Malmesbury would then attempt to persuade the French to agree
to any amendments to the treaty that were necessary.
In committee, Malmesbury undertook to alter the treaty
to require that France presented rather more evidence than
was provided for in the treaty: his proposal did not have a
definite shape, but was more a declaration of intent.
Furthermore, he announced that France was quite willing to
enact a law embodying the terms of Article VII, so as to
guarantee the protection it afforded to political refugees.
82. Crown Advocate of Malta to Lushington (17 November
1852)(Copy): FO 27/953; and minute by Addington (FO. 20
January 1853): FO 27/990. The Times (1 October 1652, p.4)
reported that Galliard had "avowed his share in the
fabrication of the infernal machine", but never referred to
his extradition or expulsion.
83. 3H,(L) 5 122„c.210„(8 June 1852). Malmesbury then sought an
interview with Walewski to see what concessions France would
make. An account of it may be found in: Unsigned memorandum
(FO. October 1652); FO 881/399, p.S.
Though many remained unconvinced, the debate was adjourned,
to give time for amendments to be framed and the bill
reprinted in amended form. m The precise nature of these
amendments will, however, never be known. When the question
was returned to (14 June), Malmesbury was faced with calls
for the immediate withdrawal of the bill. He then announced
that he had not come to the House to present a new bill:
rather he had come to announce the abandonment of the old
,
one.e,
This dramatic turn of events came about as a result of
events in France. Napoleon III had sponsored significant
changes in the 5th, 6th and 7th Articles of the French
Criminal Code. The essential thrust of the Projet du Loi was
the extension of French jurisdiction: French criminals and
non-Frenchmen who committed crimes against Frenchmen or the
French state outside France, were to be subject to trial and
punishment in France. e's The law had a direct bearing on
extradition, for fugitives were extradited for crimes
committed within the jurisdiction of the state seeking
extradition: if France extended her jurisdiction, then crimes
committed within this expanded jurisdiction would be
extraditable. Thus, France might seek the extradition of a
Frenchman who had committed murder in England. This was
enough of an insult to English law and sovereignty: what was
perhaps worse was the provision extending jurisdiction to
84. 3H,(L),122,cc.498-508,(11 June 1852).
85. 3H,(L), 122,cc.561-2,(14 June 1852).
86. Copy of the law in FO 881/399, p.B. cf. Cowley to
Malmesbury (Private. 1 & 13 June 1852): Malmesbury Papers
9M73/3„ ff.72 & 81.
crimes committed outside France against the French state, for
what was a crime against the French state if not a political
offence. As the Home Office saw it, any attempt to carry out
such a law would lead to "a serious breach between the two
countries". B7
In Parliament, Brougham stated that he had reacted with
"extreme astonishment" on hearing news of this
"extraordinary" law. Malmesbury himself admitted that it
made that passage of the bill . "impossible, for it had aroused
universal indignation". pe
 He had no option but to withdraw
the bill. It would not have passed in its original form
anyway: now it could not pass in any form whatsoever. The
Lords was hostile enough to it; imagine what would have
happened had it been submitted to the more radical, liberal
House of Commons.
As The Times saw it, the government had placed itself
"in a position of considerable embarrassment" by introducing
a bill which it should have foreseen would be unacceptable.e"7
However, Ministers had been aware of the possible objections,
but had decided to press on regardless. Their determination
to continue was perhaps as closely linked to the events of
1851-52 as was the opposition to the bill. In the summer of
87. Waddington to Foreign Office (HO. 11 June 1852): HO
34/108, p.241. cf. Stanley to Home Office (FO. 4 June 1852),
Addington to Home Office (FO. 8 June 1852); and minutes by
Waddington and Walpole (HO. n.d.): HO 45/4476; and Malmesbury
to Cowley (Private. 18 June 1852): Malmesbury Papers 9M73/50,
f.74.
88. 3HOL)„122„c.199,(8 June 1852); and Malmesbury to Cowley
(Private. 15 June 1852): Malmesbury Papers 9M73/50, f.73.
89. The Times 14 June 1852, p.4.
1852, Britain was still extremely unpopular on the continent,
and the crisis had not yet passed. In such a situation,
ministers perhaps hoped that an efficient treaty which,
although it did not touch political refugees, was at least a
sign of genuine goodwill, would pacify France somewhat.
The press reaction to the new French treaty generally
mirrored that of the House of Lords. The Daily News 
(Liberal) did not "undervalue the importance" of efficient
extradition, but felt that it
would be purchased too dearly by the slightest risk of
compromising the character of England as the inviolable
asylum of political exiles. There is nothing of which
we have a greater right to be proud of than our power to
protect the hapless champion of liberty and progress
from their proud oppressors.
The Globe (Liberal) asserted that the bill's extradition
procedure was "revolting to our most cherished notions of
justice and liberty", while the Leader (Radical) thought the
whole thing "monstrous".'"' Both the Daily News and The Times 
drew a distinction between the climate in 1852, and that
which had existed in 1843, when the original French treaty
passed without objection. Back in 1843, The Times asserted,
there was every reason to "treat the criminal laws and
90. Daily News 29 May 1852, p.5; Globe 11 June 1852, p.2; and
Leader 12 June 1852, p.549. cf. The Times 14 June 1852, p.4;
Morning Chronicle 10 June 1852, p.4; and Lloyd's Weekly 13
June 1852, p.7. The Morning Herald (12 June 1852„ p.4) and
Standard (10 June 1852, p.4) were virtually alone in
supporting the bill/treaty.
criminal Judges of France with the same deference" as was
accorded to those of Britain. However, since Napoleon III's
seizure of power December 1851, all this had changed:
of what French officer can it now be affirmed that he is
independent of the Executive?... we have seen criminal
justice made the instrument of political persecution...
every form of law violated... As France is now governed
... it would be safer to make a convention.. with Russia
or Turkey'
Under the new treaty, the risk of political persecution being
facilitated was simply too great.
By withdrawing the bill, the government had avoided
trouble on the domestic front, but here remained the unhappy
task of explaining the withdrawal to France. In a carefully
worded dispatch, Malmesbury explained that the Cabinet had
"found it expedient to withdraw the Bill", and added that the
French government had "a sufficient knowledge of this country
to understand and appreciate the Parliamentary difficulties
which Her Majesty's Government have had to encounter in
carrying out this important object." In the circumstances,
the Cabinet had done all it could to get the bill passed, and
had no real choice but to abandon it. Still, this did not
comfort the French. From Paris, Lord Cowley reported that
the French Foreign Minister, Turgot, had spoken "with some
91. The Times 14 June 1852, p.4. cf. Daily News 29 May 1852,
p.5. The significance of the coup was mentioned in
Parliament: cf. 3H„(L)„122,c.206,(8 June 1852); speech of
Argyll. After the coup, Napoleon persecuted his opponents,
driving or sending many abroad: cf. A.M. Lehning.
'International Association', International Review for Social 
History volume 3 (1938), p.201.
bitterness at the Extradition Bill having been thrown out",
and was "evidently very sore as to the doubts which have been
cast on the purity of the administration of French
justice."
Despite the problems of June, Malmesbury remained keen
on doing something to satisfy French complaints over
extradition.
The renewal of the Extradition Bill it certainly most
desirable and if we are strong enough to remain in
office after the Elections it would undoubtedly be our
duty and wish to carry out a convention which would act
fairly for both countries.
In Parliament there were calls for something to be done to
prevent Britain and France becoming asylums for common
criminals; a sentiment that was repeated in The Times.'".
However, the problem of the "odious Projet du Loi" remained,
and Malmesbury did not conceal this fact from the French. It
must therefore have come as something of a relief when, late
in June, Napoleon III decided not to implement the law. vo It
was too soon to bring extradition before Parliament again,
92. Malmesbury to Walewski (FO. 18 June 1852); and Cowley to
Malmesbury (Paris. 17 June 1852); FO 27/954
93. Malmesbury to Cowley (Private. 18 June 1852): Malmesbury
Papers 9M73/50„ f.74. cf. Cowley to Malmesbury (Private. 17
June 1852): ibid. /3, f.84; and Malmesbury to Cowley
(Private. 28 June 1852): ibid. /50, ff.78-9.
94. 3H,(L),122,cc.1282-3025 June 1852): speech of Normanby;
and The Times 14 July 1852, p.5.
95. Malmesbury to Cowley (Private. 28 June 1852); cf. same to
same (Private. 18 June 1852): PP. FO 519/196, ff.125-8 & 119-
22.
but his did not prevent the Foreign Office from considering
how best to proceed when it was deemed expedient to do so.
A long memorandum was compiled,'"' setting out the
options, which were twofold: either to continue as before
(concluding a treaty and then seeking Parliamentary sanction)
or to enact a statue enabling the government to conclude
extradition treaties, which would then be put into operation
by Order in Council. It would of course be difficult to
frame such a general Act in a form that would pass, but "it
would, on the whole, be the most convenient course, as it
would avoid the necessity of bringing each separate
Convention before Parliament, and the risk of Parliament
refusing to pass an Act to carry it into execution". The old
difficulty of what evidence was to be acceptable in Britain
was solved in the draft bill appended to the memorandum by
stating that accused fugitives were to be surrendered on the
production of whatever evidence or document was considered
necessary to establish "a reasonable presumption of guilt".'"
The document that was acceptable in Britain would vary
depending on which country was seeking extradition, and
according to the nature of the judicial process in such
country.
No specific written comment seems to have survived
regarding these proposals. However, even before they were
96. Memorandum on the Negotiations with France for the
Conclusion of a new Convention for the Mutual Surrender of
Criminals (Unsigned. FO. October 1852): FO 881/399, pp.1-12.
Copy in Malmesbury Papers 9M73/24, No.7.
97. 'An Act to enable Her Majesty to make and carry into
effect arrangements... for the mutual Surrender of
Criminals': ibid. pp.51-60.
formulated, one official noted that the events of June 1852
had "put a stop to Extradition Questions". The only comment
we do have is that written by J.B. Bergne sometime in March
1853, when he noted that "no formal decision" was ever
made. "3 In any case, Malmesbury fell from power in December
1852, and so had no time to do any thing, even had he wanted
to. He was succeeded as Foreign Secretary first by Russell,
and then, in February 1853, by Clarendon. When the subject
of extradition was subsequently raised in March 1853,
-Clarendon "expressed his disinclination to raise the
question".'"
***
As was mentioned above, the ratifying of the French
Convention had been regarded as something of a test case:
when it was rejected all thoughts of treaties with Belgium,
Holland, Prussia, and Sardinia were shelved. In fact,
memories of the rejection of the bill of 1852 acted as a
block to the extension of extradition for several years to
come. In February 1854, Sir Richard Pakenham, Minister to
Portugal, asked whether it would not be expedient to conclude
an Anglo-Portuguese extradition treaty. "ma Now back in
government at the Home Office, Palmerston was in favour of
the idea, for such a treaty could be used "as a model for
others".' 1 In contrast the Foreign Office felt that having
98. Murray to Blackwood (Private. 21 July 1852): CO 42/581;
and minute by Bergne (FO. n.d.): FO 5/556.
99. Reported in memorandum by Bergne (FO. 21 March 1854): FO
63/788. The matter was raised by Malet; cf. FO 208/58.
100. Pakenham to Clarendon (No.32)(Lisbon. 28 February 1854):
FO 63/780.
101. Minute by Palmerston (HO. 17 March 1854): HO 45/5741. D.
Roberts, 'Lord Palmerston at the Home Office', The Historian 
volume 21 (1958-59), pp.63-81, makes no reference to
extradition.
come so close to concluding a new treaty with France in 1852,
"they could scarcely now in fairness enter into
negotiations... with another Power, without in the first
place resuming the negotiation with France". In these
circumstances, "the difficulty there might not improbably be
in obtaining authority for carrying out such Treaty
stipulations as would be really effectual in their operation
in this Country" had to be considered.lam
-
In the light of this, Palmerston reviewed his position.
Since the defects in the Anglo-French Treaty only really
worked against France, and could not be overcome except by
"the concession of conditions at variance with the judicial
practice of this Country and liable to some political
objections", it therefore seemed wise "not to reopen the
discussion with France unless much pressed by the French
Government to do so".' 12 Since the government was very
anxious to avoid re-opening that can of worms, lwm Pakenham
was informed that his proposal could not be accepted."
Ministers were no doubt fortified in their desire to avoid
102. Wodehouse to Home Office (FO. 30 March 1854): HO
45/5741.
103. Minute by Palmerston (HO. 12 April 1854): ibid.
104. This was despite the fact that it was clearly recognised
to be a most unsatisfactory treaty: Waddington (22 September
1859) described it as "the most absurd Convention that ever
was entered into": HO 45/6852.
105. Clarendon to Pakenham (No.28)(FO. 12 April 1854): FO
63/779. A proposal made in June 1854 for a treaty that would
establish extradition between British Guiana and the Dutch
West Indies was similarly blocked in an effort to avoid
bringing extradition before Parliament: cf. FO 37/609.
bringing extradition before Parliament by constant reminders
of public devotion to the right of asylum. In February 1853
The Times stated that Austria was to demand the extradition
of Kossuth, Mazzini and others. If it was refused, Austria,
Prussia and France would remonstrate, so recreating in
substance the dangerous situation of 1851-2. The Times took
the offensive:
Every civilised people... must be fully aware that this
,
country is the asylum of nations, and that it will
defend the asylum to the last ounce of its treasure...
the last drop of its blood. There is no point whatever
on which we are prouder and more resolute... we shall
listen to no such demands... the statesman who lent an
ear to them would henceforth be doomed to political
disgrace."2"22
In fact, there could be no question of Austria demanding
extradition, for there was no Anglo-Austrian extradition
treaty, but that was not the point. Neither the British
press nor the people would stand for the extradition of
political refugees, or any treaty which threatened their
position, and this fact Ministers always had to keep in
mind.""
106. The Times 28 February 1853, p.4; cf. 3H,(C),124, c.805,
(1 March 1853); 3HOL)„124„cc.1050-9,(4 March 1853); 3H(C),
147,c.1972,(21 August 1857); Anon,'The Refugees and the
Government', Spectator volume 26 (1853), pp.439-40; Anon
'Emperor fo the French', Saturday Review volume 4 (1857),
pp.98-99: The Times 1 January 1861, p.10; and Morninq Star 11
March 1861, p.4.
107. cf. Addington to Colonial Office (FO. 8 March
1853)(Confidential): FO 5/576: memoranda by Bergne (FO. 12
March 1857): FO 5/684, f.191; and by Waddington (HO. 19
December 1857)(Copy): Clar.PP. c.70, ff.70-I.
The most important demonstration of British adherence to
the right of asylum came in 1858, and arose out of Orsini's
attempt to assassinate Napoleon III in Paris on 14 January.
Since the plot had been hatched in Britain, the bombs used in
the attentat had been manufactured in Birmingham, and British
subjects were among the conspirators, Britain received most
of the blame for it. In an attempt to pacify French opinion,
the Conspiracy to Murder bill was introduced, which made
conspiracy to murder a felony rather than i misdemeanour (so
I
increasing the maximum penalty from two years to life
imprisonment) and made it clear that the law covered
conspiracies to commit offences abroad as well as in Britain.
The bill was unobjectionable in itself, but complications
were caused by French complaints as to British policy and
threats of dire consequences if Britain failed to take action
against the refugees. Foreign Secretary Clarendon avoided
disputing French complaints and allegations, for to have done
so would simply have worsened matters, but his policy played
into the hands of the government's opponents.
The Cabinet was accused of subserviency to France, of
abandoning the right of asylum, and a motion was passed in
the Commons criticising the failure to met French
allegations. Palmerston's ministry resigned. The new
ministry (under Derby) did not persevere with the Conspiracy
Bill which had not actually been rejected by Parliament, but
it did sanction the prosecution of Simon Bernard, one of
Orsini's accomplices, on a charge of accessory to murder.
Bernard was quite clearly guilty, but was acquitted by a jury
that was determined to uphold the right of asylum and
accepted the arguments of Bernard's counsel that the very
survival of the glorious asylum policy depended upon the
prisoner's acquittal.ima
The importance of the Orsini/Bernard episode to this
study lies in its consequences. The "events of 1858 stood as
an example and a warning to all governments, British and
foreign, who came after": to attempt to do anything that did
(objectively) limit the right of asylum, or (subjectively)
could be portrayed as such, "was just not worth the candle".
The memory of 1858 acted as a significant factor in policy
making for years to come.14,"0
* * *
In March 1859, there came the first direct demonstration
of Britain's policy of the non-extradition of political
refugees. Venezuela sought the extradition of Jose Gregorio
Monagas (son of Jose Oregano Monagas, a former president of
Venezuela) from Trinidad on various charges of murder.
Government Keate referred the evidence to his law officers,
108. For fuller details of the events of 1858: cf.
especially B. Porter, Refugee Question pp-170-199. On the
Bernard trial: cf. DPP 414. Almost every edition of memoirs
or diaries for the period covers the episode, as do
contemporary journals and newspapers. cf . the bibliography in
ibid. Extradition was not an important issue in the episode:
on its minor role: cf. ibid.; Hon. F.A. Wellesley (ed.), The
Paris Embassy (1928) p.154; H.C. Payne and H. Grosshans, 'The
Exiled Revolutionaries', American Historical Review volume 68
(1962-63), p.969; Earl of Malmesbury„ op.cit. pp.428-9; Law
Officers' Opinion by Bethell and Keating (15 & 16 February
1858): HO 48/45; HO 45/65128; HO 45/6521C and FO 67/238-9.
The Home Office criminal paper on the case (1470A) has not
survived.
109. B. Porter, Refugee Question pp. 199 & 206-11.
who advised against even arresting Monagas. They found that
most of the evidence was "mere hearsay", and furthermore the
only murder charge that did seem convincing was a political
crime. Monagas was responsible for the death of one Vasquez,
but at the time of death (around 1654) the victim was under
the military authority of the accused, and therefore the
crime was not a true murder such as should give rise to
extradition. No suggestion had been made at the time of any
,
improprieties, and steps had only been taken against Monagas
once his father's regime had been overthrown. The clear
inference was that Monagas' extradition was being sought only
for political reasons.11w
Having duly refused the demand for extradition, Keate
forwarded the relevant papers to London, explaining that the
"provisions of the Ordinance were never intended to apply to
political offenders... if I had [granted extradition]. " I
should have laid myself open to the accusation of having
favoured a particular political party... in its projects of
110. Y. Lovera to Keate (3 March 1859)(Translation)(Copy);
and Keate to Lytton (No.90)(Port of Spain. 23 May 1859): CO
295/204, ff.277-80 & 262-4. Extradition was claimed under a
purely local arrangement, concluded by Trinidad and Venezuela
on 17 April 1848, authorising extradition between Venezuela
and Trinidad only. A copy may be found in CO 295/159, ff.88-
90-. It applied to murder, arson, poisoning, counterfeiting,
and fraudulent bankruptcy: the procedure mirrored that of the
treaties of 1842-3. Other such purely local arrangements
were: Hong Kong and China (1642), St. Lucia and Venezuela
(June 1848), Grenada and Venezuela (April 1849), Virgin
Islands and Venezuela (December 1849), Antigua and Venezuela
(January 1850), Labuan and Borneo (February 1857), Hong Kong
and China (1860), and Hong Kong and Macao (September 1870).
Each had to be approved by the Colonial Office before it
could come into operation.
vengeance against the former holders of power." 1 " The
Colonial Office was quite happy with Keate's actions, and,
indeed, permanent under-secretary Merivale believed it to be
"quite clear that the Venezuelan Government were endeavouring
to get hold of Monagas upon false grounds, and that the
charge of murder was trumped up for the purpose of bringing
the extradition law into operation."
The Venezuelans addressed a strongly worded complaint to
the Foreign Office. In reply, Russell (who had only recently
taken over) did not mince his words: "the Convention..., was
never intended to be used for the purpose of arresting
foreigners residing on British soil who are politically
obnoxious to Foreign Powers, and it is clear that the acts of
which the person in question was accused were done in his
political capacity." This ended discussion of the case.''
The Monagas case highlighted certain problems which
could be caused by future extradition cases. It was easy to
refuse Venezuela's demands and contemptuously dismiss her
complaints, but would it be so easy to do so if a powerful
state sought extradition on political grounds? For example,
a refusal to extradite a French political refugee would be
popular in Britain, but how would France react? If the
refugee was, for example, accused of assassinating a member
111. Keate to Lytton (No.90)(Port of Spain. 23 May 1859): CO
295/204, ff.262-4.
112. Minute by Merivale (CO. 27 June 1859): ibid. ff.264-5.
113. Rodriguez to Malmesbury (8 June 1859)(Translation); and
Russell to Rodriguez (FO. 25 July 1859): FO G0/141, ff.58-62.
of the French imperial family, France might well enter upon a
diplomatic offensive against Britain: an offensive that could
conceivably receive widespread support elsewhere in Europe.
It was precisely this sort of uncertainty and potential for
trouble which made extradition such a problematical and even
dangerous question.
* * *
Such was the rather difficult experience of successive
-
British governments with extradition during the 1840s and
1850s. The most important principle of extradition law and
practice had been laid down: political refugees were to be
exempt. As yet this was rather ill-defined policy: the bald
facts of it had been stated, but, for example, no real effort
had as yet been made to define what exactly was to be
considered a political offence under extradition law,
although, to be fair, no real need for such a definition had
arisen. During the 1840s and 1850s, what may be termed the
main battle lines of extradition had been drawn. The
essential conflict was, how far, if at all, would the
position of political refugees be compromised in the search
for efficient extradition. Thus far the advocates of
absolute security for 'politicos' had won (and as a result
Britain had a pathetically small number of extradition
treaties), but all they had won were the first few skirmishes
of what was to be a long, drawn out campaign. In future
decades, events brought the question of the position of
political offenders within extradition sharply back into
focus.
CHAPTER TWO: 
TEETHING TROUBLES (THE EARLY 1860's) 
Chapter Two:	 Teething Troubles (The early 1860s) 
During the first half of the 1860s, much of Britain's
practical extradition experience focused upon Canada and the
American Civil war. In October 1860, the United States
sought the extradition of a slave named John Anderson on a
charge of murder. Anderson had escaped in September 1853;
during his fight he killed Seneca Digges, who was attempting
to recapture him. L Anderson was arrested, and then brought
before the Canadian Court of Queen's Bench. On 15 December,
by a majority decision, the court found in favour of
extradition. ° Faced with the prospect of certain execution
if extradited (probably by being burnt alive), Anderson
appealed. During the time that elapsed before the hearing,
the case was fully discussed. "Reactions in Canada to the
court decision were almost entirely critical". In Britain,
opinion was unanimously against surrender. It might be
justified legally, but The Times saw it as "an obvious
impossibility as a fact... rather than give up that man
1. cf. Irvine to Russell (No.41)(Washington. 8 October 1860):
FO 881/1083, No.1; and H. Twelvetrees (ed.), Life of John 
Anderson (1863).
2. cf. CO 42/626 for a copy of the judgement and other
documents on the case; and PP (1861) LXIV: 'Correspondence
respecting the case of the Fugitive Slave, Anderson', pp.293-
346; R.C. Reinders, 'Anderson Case', CHR volume 56 (1975),
pp-493-515; and H. Catterall (ed.), Judicial Cases 
(Washington 1937) volume 5, pp.345-6.
3. R.C. Reinders., op.cit. p.398. cf. J.E. Farwell, 'Anderson
Case', Canadian Law Times volume 32 (1912), p.257; F. Landon,
'Anderson Fugitive Case', Journal of Negro History volume 7
(1922), pp-233-42; W.R. Riddell, 'Slave in Canada', p.356;
R.W. Winks. op.cit. p.175. The case has been cited as an
important factor behind Canadian anti-slavery feeling at the
start of the American Civil War: cf. F. Landon, 'Southern
Secession', CHR volume 1 (1920), pp.255-6.
England would go to war". 4. The Saturday Review declared that
if Article 10 authorised the extradition, it was "a disgrace
to the diplomacy that could have sanctioned so horrible a
compact".. 's Parliamentary opinion was equally solid. Collier
(Liberal MP for Plymouth) spoke for many when asserting that
"the decision of the Canadian Court was wrong... He killed
his pursuer in defence of his liberty ... that was not murder
according to the law of any civilised country". 6 Louis
Chamerovzow (secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-
Slavery Society) took out a writ of habeus corpus in the
London Queen's Bench: 7
 even if he lost his appeal in Canada,
Anderson would be sent to London for his case to be finally
decided.
4. The Times 5 January 1861, p.8; and 11 February 1861, p.B
5. Anon, 'The Extradition Case', Saturday Review volume 11
(1861), p.56. Several pages could be filled with references
to publications opposing Anderson's surrender. A selection
are: Morning Post 3 January 1861, p.4; Morning Star 3 January
1861, p.4; Anon, 'Canadian Extraditions' Spectator volume 34
(1861), p.12; Daily News 5 January 1861, p.4; Reynolds's 20
January 1861, p.12; Daily Telegraph 7 January 1861, p.4;
Anon, 'The Extradition Case in Canada' The Economist volume
19 (1861), pp. 32-3; and Free Press 6 February 1861, pp.20-1.
The case was well covered in legal journals: cf. Law Times,
Journal of Jurisprudence and Solicitor's Journal and 
Reporter.
6. 3H0C),161,c.219,(8 February 1861). cf. ibid cc-218-24;
ibid. cc.339-42 1 (12 February 1861); ibid. cc .821-8,(22
February 1861); and 3H,(C),162,cc.252-9,(22 March 1861). Not
one speaker advocated Anderson's surrender.
7. Not unnaturally, many Canadians (supposedly citizens of
self-governing colony) resented this interference with their
courts' jurisdiction. cf . R.C. Reinders., op.cit. pp.403-13;
J.E. Farwell, op.cit. p.261; Anon, 'The Case of Anderson',
Law Magazine volume 11 (1861), pp.42-73; and CO 42/626,
F.259. From 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c.20 prevented further such
interference.
What of Her Majesty's Government? Its response has been
characterised as "indecisive, or at least ambivalent", 13 but
this hardly seems justified. As Head (the Governor of
Canada, temporarily in London) saw it, Anderson's only crime
was "having killed another in defence of his own liberty".
Bethell (Attorney General) thought the judgement "erroneous".
Waddington viewed the Canadian decision with "much surprise
and regret", and noted that "the sooner instructions are sent
out not to deliver him up the better". Palmerston believed
that "no English lawyer" would hold Anderson to be guilty of
murder. Similarly, the Law Officers advised against
surrender.'"
On 9 January, Head's deputy was instructed to bear in
mind that the court's decision was not binding: the
government had to issue the final surrender warrant. He was
also informed that the London authorities were "not satisfied
that the decision... [was] in conformity with the view of the
Treaty which has hitherto guided the authorities in this
country".'	 Newcastle wished "to avoid
8. R.C. Reinders, op.cit. p.401. His inaccuracy may be the
result of the fact that he only uses published sources, and
not the records of the Colonial, Home and Foreign Offices, or
relevant private papers.
9. Head to Newcastle (No.150)(London. 7 January 1861) (Copy):
HO 45/7232; Bethell to Newcastle (Private. 15 January 1861):
CO 42/630, ff.3-4; memorandum by Waddington (Confidential.
HO. 15 January 1861) (Printed for the Cabinet): HO 4517238;
minute by Waddington(HO. 17 January 1861): HO 45/7232.
Underlining in original; 3H, (C),161,c.224„(8 February 1861);
and Law Officers' Opinion by Bethell and Atherton (20 March
1861): HO 45/7232. The opinion came after the case was
settled: it had been sought in January.
10. Newcastle to Williams (CO. 9 January 1861)(Copy): FO
881/1083, No.5.
appearing to influence the Canadian Tribunals"" (and indeed
could not afford to be seen to do so), but, working within
these parameters, he had made it as clear as he could that he
did not want Anderson to be surrendered.
Ultimately, on 16 February, Anderson won his appeal in
the Canadian Court of Common Pleas "on the ground of a
technical informality in the earlier stage of the process
before the committing Magistrates". 12 However / the substance
of the ruling masks the motives behind it: after giving
judgement, Chief Justice Draper stated that he was "not
afraid to avow that I rejoice at it". 23 Anti-slavery
sentiment was the motive, and the 'technical informality' was
but the vehicle used to give it practical expression: in its
absence, some other means would have been found of protecting
Anderson. Yet again British territory had proved to be a
secure haven for fugitive slaves.
The role played by the American government was minimal:
after seeking extradition, it did nothing. Looking at the
papers printed for Congress, it seems clear they never
expected Anderson to be surrendered. im Conscious of the
strong anti-slavery feeling which prevailed in Britain and
Canada, the government perhaps only sought extradition to
11. Newcastle to Russell (Private. 14 January 1861):
Russ.PP. PRO 30/22/25, ff.344-6.
12. Newcastle to Head (CO. 19 March 1861)(Copy): FO
881/1083, No.19.
13. Quoted in R.C. Reinders„ op.cit. p.411.
14. A copy of the papers may be found in FO 881/1083: cf.
especially Dallas to Black (16 January 1861).
satisfy the Missouri (Digges' home state) authorities and
Digges' family. Furthermore, the American domestic situation
militated against a hard line being taken. When Anderson was
liberated, Lincoln was in power, the secession crisis had
begun, and although as yet Lincoln was not committed to
abolitionism, he was far less likely to protest over the case
than a president from the deep-South. All this added up to a
fortunate escape for Britain, and the avoidance of what, in
other circumstances, might have been a very prickly
diplomatic dispute indeed.le,
* * *
During the American Civil War, Anglo-Union relations
were "strained by Confederate use of Canada as a sanctuary
from which to attack the Union," 14 and to return to
thereafter. The most notable of the Canada-based actions
were the 'Chesapeake' and 'Philo Parsons' affairs, and the
St. Albans raid. 1.7 The Union authorities sought the
15. This was the last 'slave extradition case': the
subsequent abolition of American slavery removed an important
source of Anglo-American friction.
16. M.R. Fallows, Irish American (Englewood Cliffs 1979)
p.121.
17. In December 1863, 16 Confederates seized the 'Chesapeake'
(a fast steamer on the New York-Portland route) with the
intention of using her to prey on Union shipping, but the
vessel was soon recaptured by a Union gunboat. However,
since the recapture was affected in British territorial
waters, the 'Chesapeake' and the conspirators were handed
over the the Canadian Authorities. In September 1864
Confederates seized the 'Philo Parsons' (a Lake Erie
streamer) on the American side of the lake, sailed her into
Canadian waters, and scuttled her. In October 1864, 25
Confederates raided St. Albans, Vermont, having set out from
a Canadian base. They robbed the town's banks, killed one,
and wounded several other townspeople, and put the town to
the torch. For further details: cf. R.W. Winks, Canada and 
the United States (Baltimore 1960) pp.246-62 & 288-335; and
L.B. Shipee, Canadian-American Relations (New York 1939)
Chapter 7.
extradition of those responsible, but they were almost
uniformly unsuccessful.
Several factors contributed to this failure, the most
significant being the claim made by the St. Albans raiders
that theirs was a legitimate act of war, and therefore not a
crime - even a political one - and non-extraditable. After
much argument, Judge Smith accepted that the raiders were
properly commissioned: the robbery for which their
extradition was sought was therefore not a crime in the sense
meant by the 1842 treaty. la On 29 March they were freed.
Naturally enough, the Union authorities and people were
far from happy. In November 1864, Secretary of State Seward
warned that "spontaneous hasty popular proceedings of self-
defence and retaliation" could be expected if Confederate
operations from Canada were not stopped. Lyons reported that
"there can be no doubt that considerable irritation exists in
the minds of the American people on the general subject of
these repeated raids from Canada, and I am afraid that Eif
they continue].., we may expect a very serious outburst of
feeling against Her Majesty's Government". It has been said
that Canada was "dangerously exposed to being forced into the
position of territory added to the general conflict"."'
18. (For an exhaustive account of the court proceedings: cf.
L.N. Benjamin, St. Albans Raid (Montreal 1865) passim.;
and C. Parry (ed.), op.cit. pp.657-8.
19. Seward to Lyons (3 November 1864): FO 881/1344; Lyons to
Russell (No. 680) (Washington.. 21 November 1864): FO 5/963;
and G.P. de T. Glazebrook, Canadian External Relations 
(Toronto 1966) p.66. cf. J.M. Callahan, oo.cit. pp.276-7;
and P.J. Parish, American Civil War (1975) p.450.
However, the danger of war was far more apparent than real:
only the Confederacy wanted war. 245
 As her position worsened,
war, or at least the diversion of Union forces to guard the
Canadian border, was regarded as one sure way of relieving
"the crushing pressure on the South".1
Although he did not want war, Seward did require the
"outward appearance of crisis - tension that he is reality
could control", 2° for he could then persuade the authorities
to take more effective anti-Confederate action. Seward fully
achieved his objective. After evading extradition, the St.
Albans raiders were prosecuted (although unsuccessfully) for
breaching Canadian neutrality, as were (in January 1865) some
of those involved in the 'Chesapeake affair'. In the face of
strict surveillance, Thompson (sent to Canada by Davis to co-
ordinate operations) became unwilling to go on, and in March
1865 was recalled and operations from Canada abandoned.0
Most importantly, in February 1865, Canada enacted a severe
neutrality law, which "effectively ended any further
Confederate efforts to embroil Great Britain in the American
war through her colonies".° 4. Still, the danger must have
20. Both Seward and Russell recognised this : cf. Seward to
Burnley (21 October 1864); Adams to Russell (23 November
1864); and Russell to Lyons (No.528)(FO. 26 November 1864):
FO 881/1344.
21. E.W. McInnis, Unguarded Frontier (New York 1942) p.255.
22. R.W. Winks, Canada and the United States p.335.
23. cf. J.M. Callahan, op.cit. pp.281-6. On his activities
generally: cf. W. Bovey, 'Confederate Agents's CHR volume 2
(1921), pp.46-57; and E.W. McInnis, op.cit. pp.226-30.
24. R.W. Winks, Canada and the United States p.335. cf. CO
42/646; FO 51056; FO 881/1344; and Russ.PP. PRO 30/22/97,
ff. 109-10
seemed very real. Canada's seeming inability to counteract
the machinations of the Confederacy could have been used by
the Union as a pretext for war or a punitive expedition.
This Britain wanted to avoid at all costs: perhaps as much by
good fortune as by good policy she did so. The only
Confederate to be extradited from Canada was Bennett Burley,
and in the long run this case was to have a significance
which transcended the controversy of the civil war years.
Burley's was the first British case to raise what is known as
-
the speciality principle, although as yet the principle had
not taken on its modern form. The modern version of the
principle states that an extradited fugitive is to be tried
only for the crime or crimes for which he was surrendered,
unless he is first given an opportunity to return to the
state from which he was surrendered.
25. Speciality was not specifically mentioned in either of
the treaties of 1842-3. In British circles it was first
discussed in a theoretical context in 1851. Then, the Home
Office had successfully opposed its inclusion in the treaties
being prepared for submission to Belgium and Prussia because
few crimes were made extraditable, and so its inclusion would
have given unwarranted protection to criminals (cf.
Waddington to Foreign Office (HO. 30 April 1851): FO 64/337).
The Anglo-French draft of November 1851 provided that
fugitives were not to be tried for non-extraditable crimes
committed prior to extradition (copy in HO 45/398,126). The
Law Officers objected: the clause gave "too large an
indemnity" to criminals, and suggested a clause under which a
fugitive would be given a opportunity to return to the
country from which he was surrendered before being tried for
additional offences (Law Officers' Opinion by Cockburn and
Ward (9 December 1851): HO 48/42, No.13). In January 1852
the Home Office changed its position, for the treaty was
extended to cover many crimes: the clause would now be no
great hindrance to the course of justice (Waddington to
Foreign Office (19 January 1852): HO 34/10B, pp.170-2). The
treaty as signed stated that extradited fugitives could not
be tried for any crime committed prior to surrender that was
non-extraditable (copy in HO 45/398, /32). Neither the
Danish treaty of 1862 nor the Prussian treaty of 1864
contained any article embodying speciality, but they applied
to few crimes: cf. below. The Burley case was therefore the
first occasion on which Britain displayed any real commitment
to a version of the speciality principle.
Burley was extradited in February 1865 on a charge of
robbery arising out of the 'Philo Parsons' affair: he had
stolen (for personal gain) property belonging to its
passengers.	 However, it was subsequently alleged that the
Americans intended to try him for piracy."7
The immediate government reaction was that if Burley was
tried for piracy (for which extradition might not have been
granted if sought) rather than robbery, "this would be a
breach of faith against which H.M. Goverment might justly
remonstrate". However, if he was tried for robbery, "it
would be difficult to question the right" to try him for "any
other offence". Seward was informed of this, but refused to
"admit the principle.., that the offender could not be
lawfully tried for... piracy under the circumstances of the
case. Nevertheless the question raised... has become an
abstraction", for at that time it was intended to try Burnley
only for the crime for which he was extradited, 2e The Law
Officers agreed with the Foreign Office view, but emphasised
Britain's "limited power of interference" if Burley was first
properly tried for robbery.	 All this became rather
irrelevant in practice, as Burley escaped: at the time he
was being tried for robbery, but it is unclear whether any
26. Copies of documents relating to the case may be found in
CO 42/647-8. cf. L.N. Benjamin, op.cit. pp.301-6; PP (1876)
LXXXII: 'Extradition of Bennett G. Burley', pp.174-6; and
C.S. Blue, 'Case of Bennett Burley', Canadian Magazine volume
45 (1915).
27. Dalglish (MP) to Russell (24 February 1865): FO 5/1101.
28. Russell to Burnley (No.72)(FO. 25 February 1865); and
Seward to Burnley (20 March 1865)(Copy): ibid.
29. Law Officers' Opinion by Palmer, Collier and Phillimore
(4 May 1865): CO 885/10, No.334.
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other charge would have been pressed.
No practical matter remained therefore, and
correspondence on the matter ceased. Given the somewhat
precarious state of Anglo-American relation arising out of
the civil war, there was nothing to be gained by pursing an
abstract principle. However, the basis of this important
principle - speciality - had been raised for the first time
in a British case, and, as will be seen, during the 1870s and
1880s, it once more became an issue, only to a far more
serious degree.
***
Back in Britain, in January 1860 Denmark had sought an
extradition treaty, proposing the Danish-Belgian treaty of
1850 as a model: it covered more crimes than did British
treaties, applied to convicted as well as accused persons,
used the method of extradition included in the abortive
Anglo-French treaty of 1852, and contained an article
exempting political offenders from its operation.
Waddington believed it to be a "very good Convention", but
predicted that Britain would "insist upon spoiling it" by
requiring the production of prima facie evidence. Home
Secretary Lewis disagreed: "its perversion to political
offences" was "carefully guarded against", and although
Parliament would probably object to the extradition
procedure, he thought it "quite right", and advised that "it
should be adopted".' As Bergne saw it, this was "rather a
30. Falbe to Russell (27 January 1860): FO 22/282, ff.22-3.
31. Minutes by Waddington and Lewis (HO.n.d.): HO 4517064„/1.
delicate matter"; Lord Wodehouse (Foreign Office
Parliamentary under-secretary) emphasised that "we shall have
to be very careful as regards Parliament"; while Russell was
unwilling to do anything before seeking the views of the Lord
Chancellor (Campbell), who had opposed the 1852 treaty in the
Lords..2
Campbell found the proposed treaty "very objectionable".
Although "there would be little danger of it being abused by
Denmark, yet it would be a precedent for sanctioning a
similar Treaty with France which would certainly be abused".
The Foreign Office therefore proposed offering Denmark a
treaty similar to those of 1842-43.
	
Lewis protested that
such a treaty would be "nugatory", and Waddington believed
that the Danes would not accept it, but Russell nevertheless
went ahead and made the of
Simultaneously, France had proposed the extension of the
1843 treaty to convicts, particularly those who escaped from
Cayenne to British Guiana. The Government opposed the
scheme: the necessary reference to Parliament "might give
rise to discussions and remarks which would be better
avoided", and as an alternative, suggested the enactment of a
purely local law in British Guiana, which did not require
Parliamentary sanction. Even this plan involved some
32. Memorandum by Bergne (FO. 22 February 1860): and minute
by Wodehouse (FO. 22 February 1860). cf. minute by Russell
(FO. n.d.): FO 22/282, ff.305-7.
33. Wodehouse to Home Office (FO. 3 May 1860): HO 45/7064„/2.
The Lord Chancellor's views were reported here.
34. Minutes by Lewis and Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/7064,
/2. cf. Russell to de Bille (FO. 15 April 1860): FO 22/282,
ff.85-8.
difficulties: it was feared that the British Guiana
Legislature might not sanction such a measure, for it was
well known that Cayenne was used as "a place of confinement
for political offenders".	 Nonetheless, provision was duly
made for the surrender of convicts to Cayenne and French
Guiana: to prevent the surrender of political prisoners, the
Governor retained a discretionary power to refuse
extradition. 6
 France continued to seek a formal treaty on
the subject, but the Foreign Office maintained its
objections.
Contrary to Waddington expectations, Denmark accepted
the offer, with slight modifications: the only one of any
significance was that the treaty should be extended to
convicts. a Although slightly unsure whether Parliament
would accept such an extension of extradition (which would
proceed simply upon the production of an authenticated copy
of the conviction and proof of identity) the government
accepted the Danish proposal, and the treaty was signed on 15
April 1862.
35. Hammond to Colonial Office CFO. 3 April 1860); and same
to same (FO. 11 May 1860): FO 27/1649.
36. British Guiana Ordinance No.2 of 1861: copy in ibid.
37. cf. Cowley to Russell (No.1248)(Paris. 18 October 1861);
and Russell to Cowley (No.1269)(FO. 23 November 1861): ibid.
38. cf. de Bille to Russell (19 September 1860): FO 22/282,
ff.186-92. Translation in HO 45/7064, /3.
39. cf. Wodehouse to Home Office (FO. 28 September 1860): HO
45/7064, /3; minutes by Bergne (FO. 19 October 1860): FO
22/282, ff.445-6; Hammond to Home Office (FO. 23 October
1860); and minutes thereon by Lewis (HO. n.d.): HO 45/7064,
/4. A copy of the treaty may be found in FO 22/297, ff.208-
11. It applied to four crimes only: murder, attempted
murder, forgery and fraudulent bankruptcy. D.F. Smith,
op.cit. p.122n wrongly dates the treaty as 1865.
The necessary bill was introduced on 10 July and
received the royal assent on 29 July. There was no debate
whatso-ever. Similarly, the measure received no press
attention.	 How is one to explain this complete contrast to
1852? Hammond wrote that it "slipped through Parliament,
probably because of the insignificance of the country".'"
This may be true, but the historian is bound to wonder
whether Parliament had suddenly lost all interest in
extradition vis-a-vis political refugees and the right of
asylum?
The answer to this question is emphatically in the
negative. During the early 1860s, discussion of extradition
centred upon the position of 'politicos'. The British Guiana
ordinance came to Derby's attention, and he enquired as to
the fate of political offenders under it: Newcastle assured
him that they were quite safe. A similar question was asked
by Patrick McMahon (Liberal MP for Wexford) in the Commons:
for the government, Chichester Fortesque answered that no
ministry would ever "sanction... any Bill having for its
object the rendition of political prisoners". Similar
questions were asked in 1863 regarding a proposed ordinance
authorising extradition between Malta and Italy.4.2
40. cf. 3H volume 168. The Times (5 June 1862, p.7) printed
the terms of the treaty, but made no comments. The bill
became 25 & 26 Vict. c.70.
41. Hammond to Cowley (Private. 17 January 1866): Cowl. PP.
FO
 519/192.
42. 3H„(L),161,cc.1526-7,(7 March 1861); 3H„(C),161,c.211,
(22 March 1861); cf. 3H,(C),169,c.727,(24 February 1863).
Foreign surrenders of 'politicos' attracted much adverse
comment: cf. for example, the extradition of Teleki from
Saxony to Austria: cf. The Times 1 January 1861, p.10; 8
March 1861, p.12; Morninq Star 11 March 1861, p.4; and PP
(1861) LXV: 'Papers Relating to the Arrest and Extradition of
Count Teleki', pp.1-11.
If Parliament had not relaxed its vigilance over
extradition, how is one to account for the events of 1862?
It was perhaps significant that the method of extradition for
accused persons returned to that of 1842-43, but the
extension of extradition to convicts was novel, and the
procedure for their surrender was very simple. One would
have expected Parliament to at least have queried that
provision, but it did not. The reason for all this
acquiescence was that the Danish treaty pbsed no threat
_
whatever to political refugees or the right of asylum: so
far as I am aware there were no Danish political refugees to
threaten. It was not the principle of extradition that was
opposed in 1852: it was the risk that this worthy judicial
process might be abused against politicos that was
unacceptable. When no such risk existed, there was no need
or desire for opposition.
VIE*
During the Danish negotiations, Portugal, Bavaria and
Prussia had sought extradition treaties.	 All the proposals
were accepted in principle, but each power was advised that
Britain preferred not to open negotiations until the Danish
treaty had been ratified.'" Shortly after its ratifications
the Netherlands asked for a similar treaty. 4. Again there
43. cf. Lavradio to Russell (22 November 1860): FO 63/866;
Wodehouse to Colonial Office (FO. 12 August 1861): FO 22/290;
and Brandenburg to Russell (26 June 1862): FO 97/454.
44. cf. Russell to Lavradio (FO. 8 December 1860): FO 63/866;
Russell to Cetto (FO. 19 June 1862): FO 9/155; and Russell to
Brandenburg (FO. 30 June 1862): FO 97/454.
45. cf. Bentinck to Russell (4 September 1862): FO 37/609.
were no objections in principle: the Home Office even hoped
that such a treaty might be made to cover rather more crimes
than previous ones, and that "further facilities in effecting
the Extradition" might be given.4"1'
There ensued a detailed discussion of what crimes and
what procedure should be included in the pending treaties.
The Home Office thought that burglary, robbery with violence,
and larceny or embezzlement by clerks or servants, at the
least, should be added to the list of extraditable crimes.
As for procedure, all that should be necessary was the
production of an arrest warrant or certificate of conviction:
all the British magistrate should have to do was satisfy
himself as to identity. Such a procedure was "undoubtedly...
in accordance with the true principle of Conventions of this
nature". As for the fear that it would endanger 'politicos':
This fear, whether at all well founded or not, was a
sufficient ground for refusing to sanction such a
change, at all events at that moment [in 1852], when
France had only just emerged from a state of revolution.
It does not appear probable that the same apprehensions
will be felt at the present moment.
However, it would be necessary to make special provision for
security of fugitive slaves.'"'
46. Waddington to Foreign Office (HO. 19 September 1862):
ibid.
47. Waddington to Foreign Office (HO. 16 January 1863): Ho
45/7386, /2. cf. D.F. Smith, oo.cit. p.I21.
In contrast, Layard (Foreign Office Parliamentary under-
secretary) noted that:
When the Judges and the Magistracy are entirely under
the control of the Government and not disinclined to do
what they may be told to do, we cannot be too careful in
not including offences... under which political
offenders might be given up... the Home Office goes too
far... it would be safer to leave matters as they are.
-
Russell was happy to augment the list of crimes, but not
to simplify extradition procedure, and expressed his:
sense of the danger of giving up assumed criminals
who may give offence to despotic Governments, and be
accused under warrant of servile or corrupt tribunals.
In this respect things must be left as they are.
Palmerston (now Prime Minister) agreed. The new procedure
"would open the Door to abuses of the most serious kind in
Europe, and in america (sic] we could hardly refuse similar
conditions and should have to give up every Runaway Slave".443
Two of the fundamental practical manifestations of mid-
Victorian liberalism were the protection of political
refugees and of escaped slaves: Russell, Palmerston and
Layard simply were not prepared to run the risk of offending
the susceptibilities of those devoted to these principles,
and indeed probably counted themselves among their number.
48. Minutes by Layard (FO. 17 January 1863); Russell (FO.
n.d.); and Palmerston (31 January 1863): FO 37/412. cf.
Layard to Home Office (FO. 2 February 1863): HO 45/7386, 13.
One cannot help feeling that Home Secretary Grey and his
officials were rather frustrated by all this. Waddington
noted that:
The answer to this is that you ought not to enter into
such Treaties with despotic governments, whose Tribunals
are servile and corrupt. The very basis of such
Treaties is mutual confidence - but the matter may as
well drop here.'"'
Home office objections were ignored, and in February
1863 the decision was taken to offer treaties to Prussia,
Portugal, the Netherlands and Bavaria. 	 The same treaty was
offered to each power: it was essentially the same as the
French treaty of 1843, with the addition of burglary, robbery
with violence, and larceny or embezzlement by clerks or
servants, to the list of crimes. Extradition was extended to
convicts, under the procedure used in the Anglo-Danish
treaty.m1
Portugal acknowledged receipt of the draft, but never
replied. °° The Netherlands insisted upon extradition being
granted upon the production of an arrest warrant and
49. Minutes by Waddington (HO. n.d): HO 45/7386, 13.
Underlining in original. cf . minutes by Grey (HO. n.d.):
ibid.; Waddington to Foreign Office (HO. 9 February 1863):
HO 34/16, p.317; and D.F. Smith, op.cit. p.118.
50. cf. Minutes by Bergne and Russell (FO. 12 February 1863):
FO 37/412.
51. A copy of the draft may be found in FO 97/454.
52. Russell to Lavradio (FO. June 1863): FO 63/904. Neither
the Foreign Office files, registers nor indexes make any
mention of a reply.
evidence of identity, so negotiations fell through.
Similarly, negotiations with Bavaria floundered because
Britain was unwilling to adopt a simple method of
extradition.e".
***
Only Prussia responded favourably to the draft, and a
treaty was signed on 5 March 1864. em All that remained was
for it to be sanctioned by Parliament.	 Presumably this
,
would be a formality: the procedure for extraditing accused
persons repeated that used in the unobjectionable French
treaty of 1843; the extension of extradition to convicts had
been sanctioned in the Danish treaty; and who could object to
a modest enlargement of the list of crimes? The bill was
introduced in the Lords on 15 July, and passed that House on
21 July. All the debate consisted of was a speech by
Brougham in which he expressed his approval of the treaty and
his hope that the:
time would soon come when we should have similar
conventions with all other countries, and when all
countries would have similar conventions with each
other.°4'
53. cf. Waddington to Foreign Office (HO. 10 June 1863);
Layard to Home Office (FO. 9 December 1863); and Russell to
Bentinck (FO. 8 July 1864): FO 37/609.
54. cf. Russell to de Cetto (FO. 8 June 1863): FO 9/161;
Waddington to Foreign Office (HO. 27 May 1864): HO 34/17,
pp-276-9; and Russell to de Cetto (FO 9 June 1864): FO 9/166.
55. cf. FO 97/45, which contains copies of the treaty and
ratifying bill.
56. 3H,(L),176„cc.1700-01,(19 July 1864).
However, when the bill went into committee in the
Commons it ran into heavy opposition. James White (Liberal
MP for Brighton) "looked upon the measure as one aimed
against political exiles... it was intended to prevent us
affording an asylum to patriots who fled here for refuge from
the persecution inflicted upon them in their own country".
He pointed out that in Prussia (and elsewhere on the
continent), fugitives (and especially political refugees)
were often convicted par contumace (that is, in their
absence): thus, a political refugee so convicted might be
extradited simply upon the production of proof of his
conviction and identity. This was nothing less than "a
flagrant and atrocious violation of the right of asylum which
was the boast of this country". °7' Lord Robert Cecil (the
Tory MP for Stamford, who was certainly no 'liberal') was not
"satisfied that the political element was excluded from the
treaty", and felt that the bill "was not drawn with that
caution and circumspection that was necessary, considering
the particular country with which we were dealing".ma
Government spokesmen attempted to reassure the House, but
failed, and Palmerston agreed to an adjournment: no vote was
taken.
Press reaction generally mirrored that of the Commons.
57. 3H0C),176,cc.2057 & 2067,(25 July 1864).
58. ibid. cc.2058-9.cf. speeches of Hennessy, Ayrton,
Goldsmid, Seymour, Fitzgerald, Locke and Ferrand: ibid.
c.2061-7. The Liberals, Radicals and Tories were represented
in this group.
59. cf. ibid. cc.2058„ 2059-62 & 2063-4.
The Times noted that MPs' "jealous watchfulness" had
"undoubtedly discovered a grave fault" in the treaty. "A
mere political offender... engaged in a fatal affray with the
police, and escaping, might, in his absence, be convicted of
murder, and there would be no answer to a demand for his
extradition"." The Saturday Review (independent) believed
the bill had been "incautiously framed", for Prussia was well
known for "habitually" seeking and granting the extradition
..
of political refugees. Only months earlier The Times had
publicised the Prussian surrender of Polish political
refugees to Russia.'
The day after the adjournment, Palmerston wrote
(regarding the extradition of convicts upon the production of
proof of their conviction):
nothing would be more easy or more likely, than that a
Prussian Court of law... would condemn a man even
unheard, for an alleged offence within the Category of
the Treaty, his real offence having been a political
one. If the Treaty is not clear and satisfactory on
this Point, it would be better to drop the Bill, and to
amend the treaty."
True enough, there was nothing in the treaty to prevent such
a proceeding, for it contained no clause protecting political
60. The Times 28 July 1864, p.10.
61. Anon, 'The Prussian Extradition Treaty', Saturday Review 
volume 18 (1864), p.135; and The Times 2 April 1863.
62. Palmerston to Layard (Private. 26 July 1864): Layard
Papers, Et Add. MS 38990, ff.295-7.
refugees. The government had failed to appreciate the
treaty's possible ramifications: the bill was withdrawn.
Thereafter, the government attempted to avoid raising
extradition with Prussia, and did so until January 1865, when
Bernstorff complained that his government had heard nothing
official (of course, 'unofficially', Prussia would have
noticed reports of the events in Parliament) about the treaty
since its signature. Russell initially stated that he and
_
his colleagues were still considering the matter, a4 but on 13
January, a more detailed reply was sent. Russell proposed
deleting that part of the treaty which referred to the
extradition of convicts; providing that oral evidence on oath
from actual witnesses was to be required in the case of
persons accused; and including an article expressly
forbidding the extradition of political offenders. The
proposal for the production of oral evidence went further
than the requirements of the 1843 treaty: in the Act
implementing that treaty, it had been clearly provided that
authenticated copies of depositions could be used as
evidence. Now only oral evidence would be acceptable.
Unsurprisingly, Prussia was not best pleased. The
article on political offences was regarded as "unnecessary",
63. cf. 3H0C),176,c.2130,(27 July 1864). The Prussian
reaction to the withdrawal is not recorded in surviving
British papers.
64. cf. Bernstorff to Russell (5 January 1865); and Russell
to Bernstorff (FO. 7 January 1865): FO 97/454. I can find no
evidence of such consideration.
65. Russell to Bernstorff (FO. 13 January 1865): ibid. cf . 6
& 7 Vict. c.75.
but not objectionable; the removal of convicts from the
treaty could "hardly of principle be justified", but would be
accepted "if necessary". However, the stipulation requiring
oral evidence to be given before the British court was
"entirely inadmissible". It was "obvious" that the
difficulties involved in getting actual witnesses to go to
Britain, together with the expense, could make it "almost
always nearly impossible" to extradite fugitives. Rather
,
than conclude a treaty that would be "necessarily illusory in
its practical operation", Prussia would prefer to abandon it.
Since the government saw no prospect of Parliament approving
an Anglo-Prussian treaty which did not require oral evidence,
the negotiations were indeed abandoned.4.6
Fears for the security of political offenders had once
again scuppered British efforts to conclude an extradition
treaty, but a memorandum of January 1866 suggests an
interesting variation to this theme: "no doubt the
successful opposition... was in a great measure owing to
the ill feeling existing at the time against the Prussian
Government on account of the war in the Duchies of
66. Bernstorff to Russell (14 February 1865)(Translation);
and Russell to Bernstorff (FO. 24 March 1865): ibid.
Similarly, negotiations with the Hanse Towns (initiated by
them in July 1864), for which Britain never showed any great
enthusiasm, came to nothing because of British insistence on
the need for oral evidence: cf. FO 33/186,1898(198; and HO
45/7777. In December 1865 the Prussians approached Layard
privately, proposing a draft which excluded convicts and
provided for extradition upon the production of "depositions
on oath". However, because of the events of December 1865
and after (on which, see below, Chapter 3), the proposal was
not accepted: Memorandum by Layard (22 December 1865):
Layard Papers, BL Add. MS 38992, ff.109-10.
Schleswig-Holstein".	 At the time, the Saturday Review had
picked up on this theme, asserting that "it was in truth
Schleswig" which lay behind the Commons reaction to the
treaty. 3 Prussia had recently humiliated Britain over
Schleswig-Holstein, and so MPs were hardly favourably
disposed towards her. It cannot be doubted that such
feelings of arising out of general foreign policy
considerations played their part in arousing opposition to
the bill, thus emphasising the need to take all extraneous
factors into consideration when examining the British
extradition experience.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to over-emphasise the
importance of the 'Schleswig factor'. The security of
political offenders remained the essential concern of MPs in
relation to extradition, and support for political refugees
and the right of asylum remained very strong. This was
clearly demonstrated by the reception accorded to Garibaldi
in 1864: H.M. Hyndman wrote that, "No such spontaneous or
enthusiastic reception was given by Londoners to any
foreigner either before or since". 4''9 The government of the
day certainly saw the question of the position of 'politicos'
as the main obstacle to the extension of Britain's extradition
67. Unsigned memorandum (FO. 25 January 1866): FO 27/1972.
68. Anon, 'The Prussian Extradition Treaty', Saturday Review 
volume 18 (1864), p.135.
69. Quoted in J.A. Davis, 'Garibaldi and England', History 
Today volume 32 (1982), p.23. cf. 3H,(L),174,c.1278,(19 April
1964); and 3H,(C),174, cc. 1290-1 9 (19 April 1864). Garibaldi
was, of course, not strictly a refugee, but the point holds
good nevertheless.
experience. Waddington noted that "the English are
extremely anxious to get their own delinquents back, but
object extremely" to making it easy for foreign governments
to recover criminals, while Bergne wrote that the
"parliamentary difficulties in the way of carrying out such
arrangements for extradition as would be effectual for their
professed object, are, as [the Cabinet1.., are well aware,
very great".'7°
'
It has been asserted that, "very rarely can public
opinion be shown to have positively diverted policy away from
paths which the foreign-policy-making elite was intent on
following otherwise". 1 This is no doubt true, but
extradition was one subject where public opinion certainly
diverted the path of policy. Had it not been for public
sensitiveness over the right of asylum, by the end of 1864,
Britain would certainly have been able to reap the benefits
of more than three extradition treaties.
Such was the position: some scheme had to be devised
under which extradition treaties could be made to work
effectively without arousing fears for the position of
political refugees. Such a scheme had not yet been devised,
and so not much could as yet be done to increase the number
of extradition treaties concluded by Britain. However, as
shall see, in the future, such a scheme was formulated.
70. Minute by Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/7781, /2; and
memorandum by Bergne (FO. 16 August 1865): FO 83/631.
71. B. Porter, Britain. Europe and the World pp.11-12.
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On 4 December 1865 France announced her intention to
terminate the 1843 treaty in six months time because it was
ineffective, and Britain refused to extend extradition to
convicts. i In fact, since 1852, the treaty had been wholly
inoperative in Britain: France had tried to extradite 23
fugitives, but, for a variety of reasons (not all Britain's
fault) in no case had extradition been granted. However, the
deficiencies of extradition were not one-sided: since 1852,
only two British requests for extradition had been
successful .2
1. Auvergne to Clarendon (4 December 1865): PP (1866)
LXXVI: 'The Extradition Treaty with France', p.374. Less
than a month earlier, Bergne had stated that he did not
"attach too much weight" to Schleiden's (minister for
Hamburg) belief that France was about to take this step:
Memorandum by Bergne (FO. 9 November 1865): FO 33/191.
Waddington, however, was "not at all surprised": Minute by
Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/7784, /1.
2. cf. Unsigned memorandum (FO. December 1865): FO 27/1972;
and minute by Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/7784, /6. Of
the 23 French requests for extradition, 15 are listed under
the heading 'Result not shown in correspondence', which
generally means that the fugitives concerned could not be
found. In one case the application was withdrawn, while in
the remaining seven, extradition was refused. In three
cases the crime involved was non-extraditable; in two
cases the evidence was judged insufficient; in one there
were difficulties in identifying the fugitive; and in the
other case there was a technical difficulty of an
unspecified nature. In HO 45/7784 it is stated that
Britain made a total of nine requests for extradition, but
this is inaccurate. Eighteen requests were actually made,
but the figure of two successes was accurate. Of the
sixteen unsuccessful requests, in five cases the reason for
failure is not shown; in three cases the crime involved
Was non-extraditable; in three cases the fugitive could not
be found; in two cases extradition was granted but then
the fugitive could not be found (this was the normal French
way of proceeding); one application was withdrawn; in one
case France made no reply to Britain's request; and in the
final case, extradition was refused because the fugitive
was a French subject, and France never surrendered Frenchmen.
Nevertheless, the government believed that "malefactors
and criminals not being aware of the difficulties attending
the execution of its stipulations were deterred from seeking
a shelter in the two countries... The probable and immediate
consequence of the cessation of the... Treaty... will be to
inundate the two countries with criminals".	 This could not
easily be proved, but the government was sufficiently
convinced of the value of the treaty to state that the
disadvantages of ending it were "too evident not to make it
incumbent on both [countries] to give their best attention to
maintaining it for their mutual advantage"..
The Times mirrored the governmental reaction to the
news, bemoaning the prospect of the two nations becoming the
"inviolable asylum for the criminals of the other". The
Saturday Review was not surprised by the French decision: it
was surprising that it "was not taken long ago, for the
complaints of France against the treaty, as one-sided and
totally ineffectual for the protection of French interests,
have never ceased since it was made".°
The Pall Mall Gazette (Liberal), Reynolds's (working
class) and the Daily News (Liberal) believed French policy
3. Cowley to Clarendon (No.18)(Paris. 4 January 1866): FO
27/1972; and Clarendon to Cowley (FO. 10 January 1866):PP
(1866) LXXVI: 'The Extradition Treaty with France', p.375.
cf. The Times 15 June 1866, p.9.
4. Clarendon to Cowley (FO. 19 January 1866): PP (1866) LXXVI:
'The Extradition Treaty with France', pp.377-8.
5. The Times 25 December 1865, p.6; and Anon, 'The
Extradition Treaty with France', Saturday Review volume 20
(1865), p.798. cf. Daily Telegraph 3 January 1866, p.4.
was "dictated by a hope... of obtaining from us a new
Convention extending to political offences". Lloyd's 
Weekly (working class) suspected "a plot to overthrow the
asylum for political refugees". 4' The Times, The Economist 
(Liberal) and Saturday Review disagreed. The latter
speculated that Napoleon III had revived the question
because he could now:
provoke a fair discussion of... extradition, without
fearing that the reproach may be cast on him of trying
in a circuitous way, to secure the surrender... of
political adversaries of whom he is afraid. He is,
to all appearance, so firmly seated on his throne
that... he can now assert that he has no more reason
to fear political refugees than the Queen has."'
The Pall Mall Gazette made it clear that extradition
could not proceed simply upon the production of a French
arrest warrant. The Times, The Economist, and Saturday 
Review thought likewise, but believed procedure could be
improved. m The Times was "quite certain that any demand
which the French... may make, which is consistent with
6. Pall Mall Gazette 28 December 1865, p.5; and Lloyd's 
Weekly 14 January 1866, p.6. cf. Reynolds's 7 January
1866, p.1; and Daily News 2 January 1866, p.4.
7. cf. The Times 25 December 1865, p.6; Anon, 'The French
Request'., The Economist volume 24 (1866), p.121; and Anon,
'The Extradition Treaty with France', Saturday Review 
volume 20 (1865), p.798.
8. Pall Mall Gazette 1 January 1866, p.1; The Times 29
December 1865, p.6; Anon, 'The French Request', The
Economist volume 24 (1866), p.122; and Anon, 'The
Extradition Treaty with France' Saturday Review volume 20
(1865), p.798.
those ideas of liberty the least of which no Parliament or
Government in this Country dare surrender, would be very
cheerfully complied with".''
The French expected "concessions to be made to them",
and it was recognised that "something must be done", but what
could be conceded?"' Whilst this was discussed, France was
assured that Britain would give her "best consideration" to
the matter, and in Paris, Cowley conducted some private
diplomacy. He drew an admission that had it been known that
Britain was prepared to do what it could to improve matters,
the denunciation would not have been made." Hammond saw
this as yet another demonstration of the "inconvenient"
French habit of "asking us to help them out of difficulties
of their own creation". Clarendon regarded the denunciation
(without any fresh attempt first having been made to improve
the treaty by diplomacy) as "an unneighbourly not to say
unfriendly proceeding"." Hammond feared that if the treaty
was terminated, "there can never be another. Parliament will
not pass an Act to give validity to one". 1	However, by
9. The Times 25 December 1865. p.6. The Times advocated
making more crimes extraditable: ibid., as did the Morninck 
Post 30 December 1865, p.4.
10. Cowley to Clarendon (No.18)(Paris. 4 January 1866): FO
27/1972; and Clarendon to Cowley (Private. 4 January
1866): Clar. PP. c.144, ff.26-8. Underlining in original.
11. Clarendon to Cowley (No.40)(FO. 10 January 1866): FO
881/1446, No.2. cf. Cowley to Clarendon (Private 5, 6, 12 &
16 January 1866): Clar. PP. c.95, ff.88-93 & 117-25.
12. Hammond to Cowley (Private. 27 January 1866): Cowl.
PP. FO
 519/192; and Clarendon to Cowley (Private. 4
& 15 January 1866): Clar.PP. c.144, ff.26-8, 42-5 & 133-9.
13. Hammond to Cowley (Private. 13 February 1866): Clar.
PP. c.95.
February, Cowley persuaded the French not to press for the
extension of extradition to convicts, and, later, not to
enforce the denunciation, so as to give Britain time to try
to make it operative."
Cowley had bought time, but what was to be done? The
main problem was that "people are convinced that there is
some political object at the bottom of the denunciation and
that we shall be called upon to deliver up Louis Blanc,
,
Victor Hugo or Mazzini". The manner of the French
denunciation had raised suspicions which would be "very
difficult to allay". 13 Clarendon emphasised that:
Parliament will be inflexible as to any loophole through
which political refugees might be dragged... it is at
all times a delicate matter to ask for a change in our
law to meet foreign requirements... We must not mention 
a desire to meet the wishes of the French Govt.
(Here he clearly had in mind the events of 1858).
Parliament is so sensitive upon the subject that we must
take care never to have a word in writing that will not
bear hostile criticism in the H of C, but on the other
hand we must only give up having a treaty when upon a
careful comparison of our respective legislative and
14. cf. Cowley to Clarendon (Private. 13 February 1866):
Clar.PP. c.95, ff.206-10; and Auvergne to Clarendon (11
May 1866): FO 27/1973. The treaty was due to expire on 5
June: the French suspended termination for a further six
months, to December 1866.
15. Layard to Cowley (Private. 6 January 1866): Cowl.PP.
FO
 519/195 5 ff.626-7; and Hammond to Cowley (Private. 3
January 1866): Cowl.PP. FO
 519/192.
other requirements it is found they are like two
parallel lines and cannot be made meet.
Clarendon regarded Parliamentary sensitivity as "to a certain
extent unreasonable but it is so strong that it must be
respected"."'
From numerous ideas, two possibilities were isolated: to
improve the 1843 treaty, or negotiate a new one, which would
apply to more crimes and encompass convicts.' 	 The latter
option was, however, ruled out, for it would necessitate
seeking from Parliament "a new power altogether, and
therefore the whole question in regard to extradition under
any shape or under any circumstances would have to be
submitted to Parliament, which would for various reasons be
undesirable". It was certain that France would again insist
that extradition should proceed simply upon the production of
an arrest warrant. Waddington thought it "useless to hold
out any hope" that Parliament would agree to such a treaty,
16. Clarendon to Cowley (Private. 13, 15, & 17 January
1866): Clar.PP. c.144, ff.40-1 & 42-7. Underlining in
original.
17. Waddington recommended that any new treaty "should
expressly stipulate that the extradition of a political
offender should in no case be asked for, even though he may
be accused of the crimes mentioned in the Treaty": Minute
by Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/7784, /3.
while Hammond viewed any such idea as "perfectly absurd"."3
It was therefore decided to try to adapt the 1843
treaty. Initially it was intended to do so "without... fresh
legislation", thus avoiding "the intervention of
parliament"."' However, it became clear that this would not
be possible. The sticking point was the "mistrust of the
French Magistracy" which France felt was "implied by
-
18. Unsigned memorandum (FO. 9 February 1866): FO 27/1972;
minute by Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/7784, /1; and
Hammond to Cowley (Private. 23 January 1866): Cowl.PP. FO
519/192. Layard (Foreign Office Parliamentary under-
secretary) proposed a more far-reaching scheme, similar to
that which had been outlined in 1852. A general Act should
define British extradition policy and enable governments to
conclude treaties without the need for further Parliamentary
sanction. When a draft bill was settled, it could be
submitted to a Commons Select Committee, before which the
matter would be "thoroughly ventilated": Layard to Palmer
(Private. 7 February 1866): Layard Papers, BL Add. MS
39118, ff.252-7. Roth Russell and Clarendon thought the idea
"well worthy of consideration" (ibid.), and Cowley and the
Law Officers supported it: Cowley to Layard (Private. 23
February 1866): ibid. ff.413-4; and Layard to Cowley
(Private. 3 March 1866): Layard Papers, BL Add. MS 39119,
ff.28-34. cf. Cowley to Clarendon
(No.445)(Confidential)(Paris. 9 April 1866): FO 27/1973. A
letter to The Times (7 March 1866, p.10) also supported a
scheme such as this. Layard preferred to begin "de novo"
rather than attempt to "patch up" the French treaty, and
thought the time was "altogether opportune for passing a good
measure": Layard to Cowley (Private. 3 March 1866): Layard
Papers, BL Add. MS 39119, ff.28-34. Others did not agree,
particularly Hammond, who insisted on getting "the French
Treaty into shape before doing anything else", and presumably
persuaded Clarendon to his way of thinking, for Layard's plan
was rejected: ibid. The plan was perhaps also opposed by
Grey (Home Secretary), who was "so afraid of trouble and
opposition that he is always inclined to resist anything
new": Clarendon to Cowley (Private. 24 January 1866):
Clar.PP. c.144, ff.52-5. W.N. Bruce (ed.), Sir A. Henry 
Lavard 2 volumes (1903) makes no reference to Layard's
important plans.
19. Hammond to Cowley (Private. 24 January 1866): Hammond
Papers FO 391/6; and same to same (Private. 11 & 15 January
1866): Cowl.PP. FO 519/192.
the requirement of the production of depositions, the further
necessity, even when those depositions are given, of having
the Magistrate's signature to the authenticity certified by
an agent subordinate to the Magistrate himself and finally
the obligation of sending over a French police Agent to
identify the accused party".. 2° It had already been decided
that extradition upon the production of an arrest warrant was
unacceptable: equally, the need for sworn evidence of
,
identity could not be dispensed with. However, something
could be done regarding the authentication of depositions.
The dignity of French Magistrates was 'affronted' by the need
to have depositions (certified by them to be authentic)
certified once more (and by a subordinate official) in the
British court, and consequently they often failed to send
them when seeking extradition. s. The French Minister of
Justice (Baroche) suggested that depositions might be
"certified diplomatically": in France by himself and the
Foreign Minister, and in Britain by a secretary of state.
Depositions would thus be verified by a "superior and not by
an inferior authority".2
20. Cowley to Clarendon (No.183)(Confidential)(Paris. 20
February 1866): FO 27/1973. This second authentication, on
oath, was required by 6 & 7 Vict. c.75, 2: it was not
required in other proceedings which involved foreign judicial
documents: cf. 1843 'Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act';
3H 4 (L)„184,c.1056,(19 July 1866); ibid. cc.1367-8024
July 1866); and 3H,(C),1134,cc.2017 & 2021,(3 August
1866): speeches of the Lord Chancellor, Collier and the
Attorney General.
21. cf. The Times 4 August 1866, p.8.
22. Cowley to Clarendon (No.183) ( Confidential)(Paris. 20
February 1866): FO 27/1973. cf. same to same
(No.445)(Confidential)(Paris. 9 April 1866): ibid.
Although Waddington feared Parliament would "very
probably object to the diplomatic mode of verification", it
was decided to proceed,	 and in April 1866 a short bill was
drafted. It provided that arrest warrants and copies of
depositions signed by or taken before or by a competent
foreign magistrate were to be accepted as evidence if
authenticated by the Minister of Justice.	 No longer would
oral testimony as to their accuracy be required. This was
quite a concession: Clarendon clearly saui it as such, and
wrote that if the treaty still remained inoperative, he would
ensure "the blame shall be saddled on the right horse".
Even though the bill was purely procedural (it was
"nothing in itself"), some were by no means confident of
its prospects. Hammond did not think there was "much chance"
of it passing "in the present temper of the House", but
nevertheless thought it should be introduced. If Parliament
would not agree to it, it would "certainly agree to nothing"
more: "if they do we may next year try them with a
supplemented enumeration of crimes".2
23. Minute by Waddington (HO. n.d.): HO 45/7784, /17.
24. A copy of the first draft may be found in FO 27/1973.
The final version was ready by June: cf. ibid. Also in
June, the government changed, with Stanley becoming Foreign
Secretary, but the measure was continued with. K. Bourne
'Foreign Secretaryship of Lord Stanley'. Unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis, London University (1955), makes no reference to
extradition.
25. Clarendon to Cowley (Private. 26 March 1866):
Clar.PP. c.144, ff.130-3.
26. Hammond to Cowley (Private. 4 August 1866): Cowl.PP.
FO
 519/192.
27. Same to same (Private. 18 April 1866): ibid.; and
minute by Hammond (FO. 2 0 April 1866): FO 27/1973.
The 'Extradition Treaties Act Amendment Bill' was first
sent to the Lords. The Lord Chancellor (Chelmsford)
emphasised that it did not threaten political refugees, and
indicated that in the future the government intended to try
and augment the number of crimes for which extradition could
be sought and granted.°B For the opposition, Clarendon
welcomed the bill, and hoped that the list of extraditable
crimes would be expanded. The only opposition to the bill
,
came on third reading, when_Lord Teynham asserted that its
effect would be that instead of no-one being surrendered,
hereafter, every fugitive whose extradition was sought would
be. However, as Chelmsford pointed out, Teynham did not
"understand in the least the object of the Bill": it was a
purely procedural measure, and did not alter the nature of
the evidence required to justify extradition.	 No further
objections were raised, and the bill passed on to the
Commons.
On second reading in the Commons, Stanley emphasised
that the bill was "a matter of legal procedure". Notice had
been given that in committee, a clause would be proposed to
"exclude all offences which are considered to be of a
political character". Stanley had no objection in principle,
provided "you define" political offences. This could be done
in "a rough and popular way": for example, if someone was
killed during a "popular insurrection, that probably would
28. 3H,CL),184,cc.1056-8,(19 July 1866).
29. ibid. cc .1058-9; and 3H,(L),184,cc.1366-8„(24 July
1866).
be regarded as a political offence". However, difficulties
would arise:
in cases where you have to deal with attempts at
assassination.., we desire to retain inviolate the right of
exemption from arrest for political offences [but] it is
monstrous to say, on the other hand, that if any private
person is assassinated in... Paris... and the murderer
escapes to England, he may be punished; but if the person so
assassinated is invested with any political character
then the offence becomes a political offence, and the
law of England declares that he shall not be given up to
justice. This position appears to me to be utterly
untenable.
Stanley preferred to rely upon the discretionary power held
by the Home Secretary (he had to issue the final warrant of
surrender), but if any MP could "succeed in establishing a
distinction between the case of a purely political offence
and an offence against morality", he would consider accepting
such a clause. Nevertheless, he thought it would be
"difficult to draw such a distinction".
William Torrens (Liberal MP for Finsbury) alleged that
the new procedure amounted to extradition simply upon the
production of a French warrant, and was an attack on the
right of asylum, but as Robert Collier (Liberal MP for
Plymouth) pointed out, he was under a "great misapprehension
as to the object of the Bill". The established principles
30. '31-1,(C),184,cc.2004-803 August 1866).
of extradition law and practice were not affected in any way:
it was "perfectly well understood" that political offenders
were not to be extradited, and "he did not think it would be
possible to make that understanding more clear by any
language they could introduce into the Bill". Collier hoped
MPs "would not be deterred by imaginary evils from reaping
the substantial benefits" of efficient extradition.'
Sir Francis Goldsmith (Liberal MP for Reading) asserted
that these benefits would be "purchased very dearly" if they
"seriously impaired" or "practically destroyed" the right of
asylum. The bill should only pass if it contained an
"express declaration" that 'politicos' were exempt from
extradition. If it was impossible to frame a definition of
political offences, "that was a strong argument against
passing the Bill". The Attorney General replied that it was
understood that political offences were not subject to
extradition, and defining them "would involve great
difficulties".
In committee, Goldsmid emphasised that while all agreed
political offences were exempt from extradition, the existing
treaties contained no such provision. Their definition was
"clear enough to the ordinary intelligence", and he suggested
the following clause:
nothing in this Act, nor in any previous Act relating
to Treaties of Extradition, shall be construed to
31. ibid. cc-2008-1S.
32. ibid. cc .2019-20.
authorise the extradition of any person in whose case
there shall be reasonable grounds for belief that his
offence, if any, had for its motive purpose the
promotion or prevention of any political object, nor to
authorise the extradition of any person the requisition
for the delivery of whom shall not contain an
undertaking on the part of the sovereign or Government
making such requisition, that such person shall not be
proceeded against or punished on account of any offence
which he shall have commited before he shall be
delivered up, other than the offence specified in the
requisition.
Charles Newdegate (Tory MP for North Warwickshire)
"sympathised" with Goldsmid, but felt "to require the courts
to define political offences was to require them to
undertake a duty beyond their competency". Charles Neate
(Liberal MP for Oxford) feared the clause would give
underserved protection to assassins like Orsini: it was
important to distinguish between "political offences
generally and political assassination. The one was an
offence against the Government of a country; the other an
offence against the universal morality of all nations". He
also felt the time had come for a revision of "the whole
subject of Extradition". Acton Ayrton (Radical MP for Tower
Hamlets) feared that if the clause was accepted, "any one
holding a public office might be murdered with impunity".
33. 3H,(C),184,cc.2108-1206 August 1866).
34. ibid. cc.2112-3 & 2123.
Stanley was unhappy with the clause: it would "include
every political assassination whatever, and would prevent the
extradition of such men as... Booth, the assassin of
President Lincoln". J.S. Mill "did not think it impossible
to define political offences", and defined them as "any
offence committed in the course of or in furtherance of any
civil war, insurrection, or political movement. That he
thought would not include political assassination". He
,
wanted political offences to be specifically exempted, but
came up with a compromise solution. Since the bill was an
"experiment... Would the noble Lord limit the duration of the
Act to twelve months?" They would then be in a better
position to judge its merits. Mill's proposal was supported
by Kinglake, and accepted by Stanley: "In the course of the
next Session the House would have an opportunity of carefully
and deliberately considering the subject". Goldsmid withdrew
his clause and the bill passed as introduced,
	 with its
duration limited until 1 September 1867.4'
Stanley felt he "might perhaps" have carried the bill
without the time limit, but "with difficulty". Hammond was
"not sure" whether he would "not have withdrawn it rather
than let it come up for debate again". It was of course
35. ibid. cc .2114-7 & 2124. Mill (to Christie: 20 April
1868) later defined political offences as acts which
"formed part of an armed insurrection, or an attempt to
excite an armed insurrection for the purpose of effecting
changes in the Government": F.E. Mineka and D.N. Lindley
(eds.), Collected Works (Toronto 1972) volume 16, p.1387.
36. It became 29 & 30 Vict. c.121: 'An Act for the
Amendment of the Law relating to Treaties of Extradition'.
Mill regarded the time limit as a victory: cf. J.S. Mill,
op.cit. p.177.
"out of the question" to try for an extension of the list of
extraditable crimes, and he thought it unwise to "moot that
question" until after the Act had been renewed.
What of the reaction to the bill outside Parliament? The
Times reported that the modifications it enacted were
"reasonable enough", and hoped it would not encounter
"serious opposition". Similarly, the Morning Post (Tory) had
not expected it to be opposed, for it had "every principle of
justice and fairness in its favour". That it was opposed
furnished an "extravagant and warning illustration of the
ridiculous lengths of perversity to which principles
venerable in themselves may lead". There was nothing wrong
with protecting the right of asylum, but the bill did not
even make an "appreciable difference" to procedure. "There
are few Englishmen, we imagine, who desire that the right of
asylum should prostituted for the protection of murderers and
forgers". The Standard (also Tory) felt that a bill which
had been "framed by the Liberals and adopted by the
Conservative Ministry can by no rational man be suspected of
a secret tendency to... facilitate the designs of despotism".
On the other hand, the Working Man remarked that MPs would
have to ensure that it "in no way invalidates the proper
security we naturally pride ourselves on affording to
exiles". The Morning Star (Liberal) preferred to have no
treaty at all rather than "deny, even by accident, that right
of asylum which it has always been our pride to hold sacred".
37. Stanley to Cowley (Private. 7 August 1866): Cowl.PP. FO
519/182, ff.59-62; and Hammond to Cowley (Private. 7 August
1866): Cowl.PP. FO 519/92.
The Daily News reported that Louis Blanc considered the bill
"mischievous and dangerous", but was pleased that the debates
had demonstrated that "the national jealousy of any sideways
approaches to an infringement of the right of asylum... is
not yet lulled into indifference"..
So much for the press reaction to the bill itself. What
of the other question that was raised: the definition of
political offences? As Saturday Review saw it, the:
real danger is that, in avoiding too great vagueness of
expression we might easily err on the side of over-
preciseness. It is certainly not desirable in the
interest of political refugees to have a too rigid
definition of... political crime.
The Daily News thought it difficult to "draw the exact line
between simple homicide, and homicide committed in
furtherance of a political movement". The Standard believed
the matter was "perfectly intelligible between men of honour
and common sense", but:
incapable of that preciseness of expression which is
required when... made a matter of legal obligation..., it
is all but impossible to frame any definition of
political offences... which shall not either fail of its
purpose altogether or endure for the benefit of all
political assassins.
38. The Times 21 July 1866, p.9 & 4 August 1866, p.8;
Morning Post 2 August 1866. p.4 & 4 August 1866, p.4;
Standard 4 August 1866, p.4; Working Man 4 August 1866, p.54;
Morning Star 4 August 1866, p.4; and Daily News 4 August
1866, p.4. cf. Morning Herald 4 August 1866, p.4.
The Pall Mall Gazette suggested the following definition:
acts of homicide committed in the prosecution of
organised resistance on a large scale to the
Government... and which if they had taken place in a
public war would have been considered lawful according
to the practice of civilised belligerents. Isolated
political assassinations noone would wish to protect.
-
However, it later admitted that it was "practically
impossible to draw the line between political and common
offences. There is hardly any offence which... may not take
a political colour".
There were of course sound objections to all the
definitions offered. However, their non-inclusion should not
be taken as an indication that Britain had suddenly abandoned
political refugees. There was absolutely no chance of
public, Parliamentary or governmental opinion standing for
their extradition. This was perhaps best expressed by
Reynolds's:
Not until the character of this nation has been
completely revolutionised-not until from being the most
courageous and liberty-loving people on the face of the
earth, we shall have become the most craven,
contemptible and despot-loving people under the sun,
39. Anon, 'The Extradition Treaty Bill', Saturday Review 
volume 22 (1866), p.161; Daily News 7 August 1866, p.4;
Standard 7 August 1866, p.4; Pall Mall Gazette 6 August
1866, p.2 & 19 August 1867, p.1. cf. The Times 26 September
1866, p.8.
will we agree to part with that which is the noblest
boast and proudest tradition of our sea-girt isle-that
of being an inviolable sanctuary for political exiles
and refugees of every description."'
The events of the summer of 1866 highlight the extreme
difficulty of defining political offences. 4.1 This was the
first occasion upon which such definition had been attempted,
and therefore this episode is of some imPortance. 42 No
_
solution was found, but that is no surprise. What
constitutes a political offence can only be judged on a case
by case basis, when and if such cases arise. Only then can
all the infinite variables be taken into account. Thus far,
no-one had attempted to extradite a political refugee, so
even a partial case-based definition had not emerged. In
later years, such cases would arise, but for the moment, the
government had achieved its immediate objective of improving
the French treaty. However, the debates had made "so
unfavourable an impression" in France that Cowley did not
40. Reynolds's 7 January 1866, p.1. cf. The Times 28
December 1865, p.7; Anon, 'The Extradition Treaty with
France', Saturday Review volume 20 (1865), p.799; Morning 
Post 30 December 1865, p.4; Daily News 2 January 1866, p.4;
Standard 4 August 1866. p.4: Pall Mall Gazette 6 August
1866, p.1; and Anon, 'The Extradition Treaty with France',
Spectator volume 39 (1866), pp.852-3.
41. cf. PP (1867-68) VII: 'Minutes of Evidence', pp.165 &
181; and Stanley to Cowley (Private, 26 October 1866):
Cowl.PP. FO 519/182, ff.137-8.
42. The question of what was a political offence had been
discussed and remarked on before, but not specifically in
the context of defining what acts were to be exempt from
extradition: cf. 3H,(C),176,c.2063,(25 July 1864); and
3H,(L)022,c.504,(11 June 1852): speeches of Palmerston and
Cranworth.
press the French to withdraw their threat to terminate the
treaty, but sought a further suspension of its
implementation, which was given.4.
* * *
There did not appear to be any insuperable obstacles to
securing the renewal of the 1866 Act when necessary.
Further, convicts might be made liable to extradition, and
more crimes might be made extraditable. All that MPs worried
about was the abuse of extradition: provided no such abuse
occurred, there should be no problems. However, very soon
after the bill became law, events occurred which led
ministers to gravely doubt their chances of success.
On 22 August 1866, in Canada, one Lamirande was
committed to gaol on a charge of forgery. He sought a writ
of habeus corpus, the judge indicated that he intended to
release the prisoner next day, but that night, he was (under
a warrant issued by the Governor) placed on a boat for
France. It was bad enough that the provisions of habeus
corpus had been flouted: what was worse was the fact that the
Canadian judges would not have granted extradition anyway.4"4
43. Cowley to Stanley (No.402)(Paris. 9 November 1866): FO
881/1529, No.l. The suspension was periodically renewed until
a new Anglo-French treaty was signed in 1876. W.W. Fifield,
op.cit. p.32 erroneously states that the treaty was actually
terminated.
44. cf. The Times 17 September 1866, p.10. On the matter
generally: cf. PP (1867) XLVIII, 'Correspondence
respecting... M. Lamirande', pp.633-726.
From the first it was feared that the case would have
dire consequences for extradition policy. Cowley felt that
"this affair... will knock the extradition treaty on the
head". Stanley even considered abandoning the treaty
forthwith:
In matters of police, France and England never will
understand one another: and the risk of diplomatic
difficulties is a worse evil than the occasional
-
escape of an assassin.., there is no moment at which the
refugee question may not become troublesome.
He did, however, decide against such a step: it should only
be done at Parliament's behest, and in any case, "to drop it
now would look like haste and temper, which does not become a
great nation".•*"
In 1852 a Foreign Office official had warned that, "so
much clamour might be raised if any person were
surrendered... without every condition imposed by the
Convention and Acts of Parliament having been... fulfilled",
and he was proved right. The case was soon "exciting such
attention" in Britain. 4"1' The Pall Mall Gazette observed that
it could hardly be said that "the legal formalities were
observed by a prisoner being carried off while an application
for habeus corpus was in course of hearing". The Spectator 
45. Cowley to Hammond (Private. 30 October 1866): Hammond
Papers, FO 391/6; Stanley to Cowley (Private. 26 October &
21 November 1866): Cowl.PP. FO 519/182, ff.137-8 & 177-9.
cf. Hammond to Cowley (Private. 21 October 1866): Cowl.PP.
FO 519/192.
46. Unsigned memorandum (FO. 4 November 1852): FO 881/399,
p.45; and Carnarvon to Monck (Private. 28 September 1866):
Carnarvon Papers, PRO 30/6/151, ff.100-1.
asserted that the incident was "scandalous... Had the story
been told in a work of fiction by a novelist of the
sensational school all the critics would have characterised
it as improbable, and would have laughed at the ignorance of
the author". The Daily News thought the proceedings
"monstrous": if they happened in Britain, public opinion
"would soon put an end to extradition... altogether". The
Times saw the case as a "flagrant abuse", but hoped it would
,
not "bring the policy of Extradition into discredit".4-7'
Lamirande demanded British intercession on his behalf,
but Britain could not demand his release as "of right".
Lamirande had been surrendered under the authority of the
Governor and it was not France's fault that the Canadian
officials had made a mess of things, but everything possible
was done on his behalf- 4.9 The government saw no hope that
Lamirande would be freed, but had to be able to "show that we
have done our best". Stanley felt that the only hope of
success lay in the French "unwillingness to lose the treaty",
and although Cowley made it clear that the case threatened
the treaty's survival, Stanley refrained from using that
argument by way of "menace", as it would "only put their
47. Pall Mall Gazette 1 October 1866, p.9; Anon, 'How to
Work an Extradition Treaty', Spectator volume 39 (1866),
p.1046; Daily News 25 September 1866, p.4; and The Times 26
September 1866 5 p.8.
48. The Times 18 September 1866, p.8; and Stanley to Cowley
(No.319)(FO. 21 November 1866): FO 881/1491, No.4. The
Canadian authorities were (rightly) blamed: cf. Carnarvon
Papers, PRO 30/6/138, 1139, /151, /154, /158; Cowl.PP. FO
519/182; and FO 27/1647.
backs up".4-5'
In December 1866, Lamirande was convicted. Britain
still worked on his behalf, but in February 1867 there came a
surprising end to the matter. Lamirande withdrew his request
for aid. The government had no option but to cease its
efforts on his behalf, and did so, whilst stating that
Britain did not accept the validity of Lamirande's
extradition. The Times welcomed the end of a "troublesome"
,
Anglo-French dispute, but "in any other light" it could
"hardly be regarded... as quite satisfactory".0
This was perhaps as good an outcome as ministers could
reasonably have hoped for. They had done all they could for
Lamirande, there was no permanent damage to Anglo-French
relations, and they could not be blamed for what had
happened. Nevertheless, the incident had occurred at a very
inconvenient time: before 1 September, the 1866 Act would
have to be renewed, and ministers were very concerned as to
what impact the case might have. Stanley feared the Commons
might not only "refuse to renew" the Act, but even "require
the Government to put an end... to the Treaty of 1843, if not
to all Extradition Treaties whatever".1
49. Stanley to Cowley (Private. 13 & 19 November 1866:
Cowl.PP. FO 519/182, ff.165-6 & 175-6; Cowley to Stanley
(No.409)(Paris. 13 November 1866): FO 881/1491, No.9; and
Stanley to Cowley (Private. 15 November 1866): Cowl.PP. FO
519/182, ff.169-70.
50. Fane to Stanley (No.216)(Paris. 25 February 1867); FO
881/1491; Stanley to Cowley (FO. 20 March 1867): ibid.
No.42; and The Times 26 March 1867, p.7. Surviving British
papers do not explain the reason for Lamirande's change of
heart.
51. Stanley to Fane (No.23)(FO. 9 January 1867): FO
881/1491, No.29.
However, MPs took "the matter more quietly than one
might have expected". Stanley had cause to be pleased that he
had not "forced" the Act "by a small majority through a
reluctant House", for if the "Lamirande case had occurred
when there was a strong feeling of dissatisfaction in
consequence, where would have been now our chances of getting
the treaty continued?'0
William Torrens (Liberal)) drew attention to the
Lamirande case, but, rather than demanding an end of
extradition, advocated the enactment of a wide-ranging
statute on the subject: he had not come "to make mischief out
of the past; but to draw good out of evil for the future".
He recommended providing that in extradition, the accused
should have a definite time (perhaps three months) after
committal for extradition, in which he would be allowed to
seek a writ of habeus corpus. Further, when the appeal was
heard, he should have the right to ask the court to judge
"the bona fide of the whole proceeding, and specially to
inquire, if the prisoner desire it, whether he has ever made
himself obnoxious to the Government that claims him by acts
of a political nature". Torrens did not think Parliament
should lay down any definition of political crimes, but
trusted the courts to deal with the matter when it arose. He
had hoped that there would have been time for a fuller
discussion of extradition than was now possible (again it was
late in the session), but as an alternative. Torrens called
52. Stanley to Cowley (Private. 13 October & 14 December
1866): Cowl.PP. FO 519/182, ff.145-7 & 221-2.
for the establishment of a Royal Commission or Select
Committee, which would fully consider the subject.
A.H. Layard (Liberal MP for Southwark) supported
Torrens' call (this was the sort of thing he had advocated in
the past, when in office), as did Neate (also Liberal). Mill
did not dispute the value of extradition, but questioned
whether it was possible to trust all nations. Lamirande's
case had shown that extradition could be'abused, "but at
the same time everyone was aware that Lamirande was a
scoundrel, and probably the consciousness of that fact went
far to prevent any prolonged discussion upon the subject of
the treaty, such as would have taken place had it been the
case of the extradition of a political offender". Still, he
would prefer that principles should be laid down which would
"apply to all extradition treaties". Stanley agreed: "to
appoint a Committee to investigate the whole matter would be
the most satisfactory mode of proceeding".4.
In December 1867 the Foreign Office instructed its
representatives abroad to gather information on foreign
extradition law and practice, which could be submitted to the
forthcoming committee.	 When, in January 1868, Belgium
sought an extradition treaty, she was informed that Britain
could do nothing until the committee had met and
53. 3H,(C),189,cc.961-7606 August 1866).
54. 3H0C),189„cc.976-9 & 984-906 August 1866). The Daily 
News (7 August 1867, p.4) thought likewise. Layard
developed his ideas in a letter to The Times: 10 August
1867, p.8.
55. Foreign Office Circular (28 December 1867): FO 27/1973.
reported.	 Finally, on 20 March 1868 a motion was made to
appoint a Commons Select Committee to "inquire into the state
of our Treaty relations with Foreign Governments regarding
Extradition, with a view to the adoption of a more uniform
and permanent policy on the subject"." Its Report was
submitted on 6 July.
* * *
The Report of the Select Committee is of vital
I
importance to the history of British extradition policy. It
was the first comprehensive British statement on the issue,
and was the essential precursor of the statute which in all
its essentials survives today to govern Britain's extradition
relations. Briefly stated, the recommendations were as
follows.
The Committee found that it was "desirable that greater
facilities [for extradition] should be given than now exist",
and the number of extraditable crimes could be increased
"with advantage to the public interests". A "general Act"
should be passed, "enabling Her Majesty, by Order in
Council, to declare that persons accused, upon proper and
duly authenticated prime facie evidence, of the
56. cf. FO 10/283-4.
57. 3H 1 (C),190,c.1954020 March 1868). The Select Committee
consisted of: W.M. Torrens (Liberal), Spencer Walpole (a
former Home Secretary), A.H. Layard (a former Foreign
Office parliamentary under-secretary), William Edward
Forster (a former Colonial Office parliamentary under-
secretary), Sir R. Baggallay (the Solicitor General), Sir
Francis Goldsmid (Liberal), Sir J.E. Gorst (Tory), J.S.
Mill (Liberal), Bouverie (Liberal), Charles Neate
(Liberal), Robert Collier (Liberal), Thomas Baring (Tory),
Percy Wyndham (Tory), Egerton (Tory), Samuel Graves (Tory),
Baxter (Liberal), and Schreiber (Tory).
commission of any of the crimes to be enumerated in such Act,
should be surrendered" to the foreign government in whose
jurisdiction the crime had been committed, and with which an
extradition treaty had been concluded, "provided that the
evidence should... be such as would justify the committal of
the offender for trial, if the crime had been committed in
England".
Every treaty made under the Act should "expressly"
exempt fugitives accused of crimes which are "deemed" by the
surrendering country "to be of a political character",
provided that anyone "accused of a crime which is deemed", by
the surrendering country "to constitute assassination, or an
attempt to assassinate, shall not be included in this
exception". Every treaty was also to contain a full
embodiment of the speciality principle.
Every fugitive committed for extradition was to be
allowed to seek a writ of habeus corpus. Upon its hearing,
"it shall be open to the accused, to question the bona fides 
of the demand for his extradition, upon the ground that his
surrender has, in fact, been sought for political reasons".
All extradition proceedings were to originate "before the
principal metropolitan police court".ems
The Report was well received. The Foreign Office
believed that "the principle on which those recommendations
were based is... well calculated to place the matter on a
satisfactory footing".	 The Saturday Review (independent)
thought the Report "highly competent" and remarked that
nations were unlikely to sign treaties unless the "Government
has previously obtained full powers to conclude the necessary
stipulations". The Economist (Liberal) viewed it as "clear
and explicit": its adoption would bring "uniformity in
policy" and the difficulty as to political offences was
overcome "in a very simple way". The Spectator (Liberal)
felt the recommendations would "put matters on a right
footing"."w
Plans were soon laid for the Report's implementation: a
draft bill was completed by February 1869. 4". All the
suggested restrictions upon extradition were included, the
most important being the political offence exemption:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered who is
accused or convicted of any offence which is one of a
political character; but a murder or an attempt or
conspiracy to murder shall not, by reason only that if
the like offence had been committed in England it might
be tried as treason, be deemed to be an offence of a
political character.
More than 20 crimes were specified as extraditable.
58. PP (1867-68) VII: 'Report of the Select Committee on
Extradition', pp.131-2; reprinted in C. Parry (ed.), op.cit.
pp. 804-5.,
59. Hammond to Home Office (FO. 26 September 1868): HO
45/8166, /1.
60. Anon, 'Extradition', Saturday Review volume 26 (1868),
p.379; Anon, 'The Select Committee', The Economist volume
26 (1868), pp.1077-8; and Anon, 'The Proposed Law',
Spectator volume 41 (1868), p.1068. Anon. 'Laws of
Extradition', Law Times volume 45 (1868), p.361, reprinted
the Report.
61. A copy of the bill may be found in FO 27/1973.
Hammond feared the bill was "after all rather longer
than will find favour", and noted that: "According to my
view... the point we need to provide for is what will be
accepted by Parliament, rather than what will be accepted by
a foreign Government". Clarendon (Foreign Secretary once
more) worried that the extension of the list of crimes would
be felt "objectionable", and doubted "whether all the old
objections will not be produced in the H of C against this
,
mode of legislation".2	
...
Before the terms of the bill were finally settled, it
was altered in one very significant respect. The Law
Officers advised that "section 4 subsection 1 should stop at
'character' as we do not see our way to any definition of
'offences of a political character' which is not open to
grave objection; we are disposed to think it better not to
attempt to define them". This "left it to the Courts to
determine whether the murder of Sovereign is a crime of a
political character in all cases". The bill was therefore
not to incorporate a version of the 'Belgian attentat
clause', which was routinely inserted in continental
62. Hammond to Jenkyns (Private. 11 March 1869): HO
45/8166, /14; and minute by Clarendon (FO. 17 April 1869):
FO 27/1973. Hammond was always rather pessimistic (or
"trembly" as he put it: Hammond to Cowley (Private. 4
August 1866): Cowl.PP. FO 519/192), which may have been a
result of the fact that he got himself into "a great
fidget" about the matter: Layard to Cowley (Private. 17
January 1866): Cowl.PP. FO 519/195, ff.644-7.
extradition treaties.
The bill was more or less settled by June 1869, but
"over whelming" pressure an Parliamentary time meant that its
introduction was "unavoidably postponed" until 1870. Like
"many another Bill", it fell "victim of the slowness of
Parliamentary Procedure, and the time occupied in a
session... by such monsters as the Irish Church and
Bankruptcy Bills". Furthermore, its introduction had to
-
await a gap in the Commons timetable, as it was "considered
inexpedient to introduce the... Bill in the Lords-for fear of
exciting prematurely the jealous alarm of the Commons".64.
63. Law Officers' Opinion by Collier, Coleridge and Twiss
(12 April 1869); and memorandum by Thring (n.d.): HO
45/8166, /8 & /9. The 'Belgian attentat caluse' arouse out
of the Jacquin case. In 1854, Celestin and Jules Jacquin
attempted to blow up a train carrying Napoleon III of
France. The attempt failed, Cèlestin fled to Belgium, and
France sought his extradition, which was refused in court
because the offence was political. To placate France,
Belgium enacted a law which stated: an "attempt against the
person of a foreign head of state or against the person of
his family members, whether... by means of murder,
assassination or poisoning" would not be treated as a
political offence: C. Van den Wijngaert, op.cit. pp. 14-15.
Britain was perhaps the only nation not to include such a
provision in her extradition treaties. Copies of foreign
treaties incorporating it may be found in: FO 6/491; FO
7/1014; FO 10/700; FO 64/1058; FO 72/2129; The Times 23
October 1856, p.9; Anon, 'Political Offence in Extradition
Treaties', American Journal of International Law Supplement
to volume 3 (1909), pp.144-52; and Harvard Research,
op.cit. p.260.
64. Clarendon to Lyons (Private. 20 July 1869): Clar.PP. FO
361/1, ff.187-8; Bruce (Home Secretary) to Clarendon
(Private. 20 July 1869): Clar.PP. c.499„ f.95. cf.
3H,(L),198,c.558,(23 July 1869): speech of Clarendon. The
delay was not caused by lack of enthusiasm: cf. Spring-Rice
to Home Office (FO. 15 January 1870), and Knatchbull
Huggessen to Foreign Office (HO. 18 January1870): FO
27/1973. Gladstone (Prime Minister) had "no objection" to
the bill: Bruce to Clarendon (Private. 16 May 1870):
Clar.PP. c.499„ f.72. Torrens and Lord Chelmsford
encouraged the government to implement the Select
Committee's Report: cf. 3H,(C)„194,c.1462,(16 March 1869);
and 3H„(L),198,cc.554-8,(23 July 1869). H.A. Bruce, Letters 
2 volumes (Oxford 1902) makes no reference to the bill.
It was introduced on 23 May 1870, and discussed in June
on second reading in the Commons. The Attorney General
(Collier) asserted that the advantages of extradition were
"obvious", that the bill closely followed the Select
Committee's Report, and emphasised that political offenders
were more than adequately protected. They had found it
impossible to define political offences, and "had left the
matter to the Courts". No-one spoke against the bill;
Wheelhouse (Tory MP for Leeds) welcomed it as a "step in the
right direction", while Edward Bouverie (Liberal MP for
Kilmarnock) believed it would "remove a defect" in "criminal
jurisprudence which was a disgrace to... a civilised
country".	 The bill passed unopposed: it had "escaped the
shoals of the House of Commons", and Bruce hoped it would not
"be wrecked on the Bar of the Lords".' 4) In the Lords,
however, here was no debate. .6.7 On 9 August 1870, the
'Extradition Act' received the Royal Assent.'be A problem that
haunted governments for more than twenty years was thus
solved. The easy passage of the 1870 bill indicates a major
shift in Parliamentary opinion (which to an extent reflected
public opinion) vis-a- vis extradition, and such a shift must
be closely analysed.
65. 3H,(C)„202,cc.300-5,(16 June 1870).
66. Bruce to Granville (Private. 29 July 1870: Granv.PP.
PRO 30/29/65.
67. On second reading the Lord Chancellor outlined its
provisions, but no-one else spoke: cf. 3H,(L)„203,c.1268,(1
August 1870).
68. 33 & 34 Vict. c.52. The Act was amended in 1873 (36 &
37 Vict. c.60), 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c.33) and 1906 (6 Edw.7
c.15): these Acts added further crimes and made minor
changes in procedure. Also, the 1873 Slave Trade Act (36 &
37 Vict. c.88, S.27) made slave trade offences extraditable.
* * *
It is difficult to analyse shifts in Victorian opinion,
but several factors may be suggested. In the first place,
one must look to the Act itself. Never before had
'politicos' enjoyed such a privileged, protected position in
statute law. The "Act... rests on the importance of
preserving.., the right of political asylum"."'
-
Section 3(1) provided that:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the
offence in respect of which his surrender is
demanded is one of a political character, or if he
prove to the satisfaction of the police magistrate
or the court before whom he is brought on habeus
corpus, or to the Secretary of State, that the
requisition for his surrender has in fact been made
with a view to try or punish him for an offence of
a political character.
As Piggott noted, this gave " a great actuality to the right
of asylum"."1
Section 3(2) stated that a:
fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered to a
foreign state unless provision is made by the law
of that state, or by arrangement that the fugitive
69. Lord Radcliffe in, "Zacharia v. Republic of Cyprus'
(House of Lords, 17 April 1962), All England Law Reports 
(1962) volume 2, p.447.
70. F. Piggott, Extradition (1910) p.50.
criminal shall not, until he has been restored or
had an opportunity of returning to Her Majesty's
dominions, be detained or tried in that foreign
state for any offence committed prior to his
surrender other than the extradition crime proved
by the facts on which the surrender is grounded.
Such a provision was vital: otherwise, a political refugee
might be extradited for non-political crimes but tried for
political offences. 7". This was the embodiment of the
speciality principle.
Sections 3(4) and 11 provided that a fugitive "shall not
be surrendered until the expiration of fifteen days from the
date of his being committed... to await his surrender", thus
giving the accused an opportunity to appeal against
extradition on political offence grounds. Section 7 gave the
Secretary of State the power to prevent extradition at any
stage during the process if he thought the offence was
political. Section 26 provided that persons convicted par 
contumace were not to be regarded as convicts: they were to
be treated as an "accused person". Section 9 provided that
at any time, the courts were obliged to receive evidence
tending to show that the offence at issue was in fact
political.
Sections 10, 14 and 15 laid down the procedure for
extradition. Accused persons were to be surrendered upon the
71. Such things had happened in the past, although not in
cases involving Britain: for example, in 1829 Galotti was
surrendered by France to Naples for common crimes but tried
for his part in the revolt of 1820.
production of evidence that would justify their committal if
the offence had been committed in Britain. Convicted persons
were to be surrendered upon the production of evidence that
would "according to the law of England, prove that the
prisoner was convicted" of an extraditable crime. Such
evidence was to be tendered in the form of: "Depositions or
statements on oath, taken in a foreign state, and copies of
such... and foreign certificates of or judicial documents
-
stating the fact of conviction... duly authenticated". These
documents were to be authenticated either on oath by a
witness, or by the seal of a foreign minister of justice or
other minister of state. To round everything off, Section
4(2) affirmed that all treaties had to be in conformity with
the provisions of the Act, "and in particular with the
restrictions on the surrender of fugitive criminals".
There is, therefore, absolutely no justification for
asserting, as does Austin Stevens, that:
the Extradition Act of 1670 gave the government power to
deport criminals wanted by other countries. It was
hedged around with exceptions which were supposed to
keep the right of asylum alive... The given target of
this legislation was the anarchist, but the net was
really set to catch someone much more vulnerable; the
Jewish immigrant from Russia and Eastern Europe.72
This really can only be described as complete and utter
nonsense. Alien immigration was not an issue in 1670, and
72. A. Stevens, The Dispossessed (1975) p.46.
there were not any anarchists about in 1870. The "term
anarchist... did not come to be deliberately adopted until
1876 and not on any scale until... 1877". 7 In Britain, there
was no consciousness of an 'anarchist problem' until the
1890s.
The Extradition Act was not directed against political
refugees generally, or any class of political refugees in
particular: Parliament would not have stood for it if it had
been. Furthermore, there is evidence that the bill passed
precisely because it gave more than adequate protection to
'politicos'. Mill's view of the safeguards inserted in the
Act was that with them, "the cause of European freedom
Ewas]... saved from a serious misfortune, and our country
from a great iniquity". 74 The easy passage of the Act may
also have been partly the result of a recognition that he
existing situation was unsatisfactory. Within government
circles, such dissatisfaction had always been implicit. On
occasion, this was made more explicit. As Hammond told the
Select Committee, "it was no use signing a treaty if
Parliament was to throw out the Bill enabling it to be
brought into operation"..751 As the years passed, it does seem
that this feeling came to be rather more widespread.
73. M. Fleming, The Anarchist Way to Socialism (1979)
p.119. cf.pp.6-16.
74. J.S. Mill, Autobioqraphy (1971) edition) p.177. It was
later asserted that the Act was "passed to protect
political offenders": Anon, 'Winslow Extradition Case',
Spectator volume 49 (1876), p.581.
75. PP (1867-68) VII: 'Minutes of Evidence', p.151. cf.
ibid. p.150; and Layard to Palmer (Private. 7 February
1866): Layard Papers, BL Add. MS 39118, ff.252-7.
In his important work of 1868, Frederick Gibbs (a well
known legal writer) was quite clear upon this point:
At present the Foreign Office has to feel its way,
uncertain as to the policy likely to be approved of by
Parliament. It prepares a Convention... [which] is
exposed to rejection, not so much on the ground of
actual faults, as because... the subject is imperfectly
understood; because the Foreign Minister of the day does
not command confidence, or because Parliament entertains
at the moment a suspicion of the country with which the
Convention has been made... The labour of the Foreign
Power is thus thrown away, as well as as our labour...
the... Government... is placed in the helpless condition
of having held out expectations which it is forbidden to
fulfil. Discredit is throw on our policy, and the
influence of our Foreign Office is weakened.Th
Fear of Parliamentary opinion was the main reason why
Britain had so few extradition treaties. In 1870 she had
just three: most European countries had more, the United
States had 13, while France had more than 50. 77' Britain's
relationship with extradition was undoubtedly more democratic
than that of France (where extradition was more of an
executive function) but led to unsatisfactory results.
Surviving government records contain more than 25 examples of
British criminals fleeing abroad and escaping prosecution,
and several foreign criminal doing likewise by going to
76. F.W. Gibbs, Extradition Treaties (1868) pp.63-4.
77. Copies of many of these treaties may be found in: HO
45/1968,3829C,4453„47300732,4733,5723,5728,5781 & 5828.
Britain. These were no doubt just the tip of the iceberg.m
Such a situation could not be tolerated indefinitely.
Furthermore, the situation was worsening: extradition
was becoming more of a necessity than a luxury. Mid-
nineteenth century advances in transportation made fleeing
from justice a far simpler affair. "In our day... when
communications constantly become more rapid, and facilities
for escape proportionately increase, this question assumes a
far more serious importance". Extradition "has acquired a
very different importance since steam has been applied to
locomotion, and men can pass from one country to another with
more ease and celerity than they could pass from one parish
to another, a hundred years ago". 7 In earlier times, it was
difficult for criminals to escape, and "equally
troublesome"ew to bring them back. Similarly, with the
changes in social fabric wrought by the industrial
78. cf. for example, FO 27/685; FO 5/443; HO 45/1263,
1621,2389 & 5739. British criminals usually went to
Belgium, Holland or Germany.
79. 3H0C),184„c.2005,(3 August 1866): speech of Stanley;
and P.B. Maxwell s
 'Extradition'. Westminster Review volume
89 (1868), p.120. cf. Thornton to Stanley
(No.330)(Washington. 9 November 1868)(Copy): HO 45/8166,
/3; Addington to Home Office (FO. 1 April 1847): FO
64/281; The Times 15 June 1866, p.9 & 29 June 1870, p.12;
Daily Telegraph 3 January 1866, p.4; Anon, 'Extradition',
Saturday Review volume 29 (1870), p.594; 3H1(C)„184,cc.2018
& 2030,(3 August 1866): speeches of Collier and Bowyer; and
PP (1867-68) VII: 'Minutes of Evidence', p.207. The
importance of improved transportation to the development of
extradition has always been recognised; reference is made
to it in most of the general works listed in the
bibliography, cf. for example: J.B. Moore, Treatise on 
Extradition and Interstate Rendition (Boston 1891) volume
1, pp.5-6; and Captain W.L.M. Lee, History of Police in 
England (1901) pp-363-4.
80. Harvard Research, op.cit. p.108.
revolution and the new ease of travel, great cosmopolitan
cities sprang up all over Europe: fugitives fleeing abroad
were now quite likely to be able to find small pockets of
their own countrymen wherever they went, so making exile from
home a less daunting prospect.
The commercial and business community in particular
seems to have suffered because of Britain's meagre collection
of treaties, and pressured government to takeaction. For
example, in 1865, the Leeds Chamber of Commerce approached
the government, "calling attention to the evil to which the
Mercantile Community are subjected in consequence of the
great facility with which unprincipled Tradesmen can evade
their Creditors by quitting this Country, and taking refuge
in Foreign States, and suggesting the propriety of her
Majesty's Government taking measures for providing a remedy
for the evil in question. 81 Clarendon later noted that "the
subject has taken such a hold on the Mercantile Mind", while
Sir Thomas Henry thought that, "on commercial grounds", it
was "very important for us to obtain back persons who
abscond from this country". Extradition treaties were "in the
81. Hammond to Home Office (FO. 14 July 1865): HO 45/7781,
/1. A similar approach from the Glasgow and West of Scotland
Society for the Protection of Trade may be found in ibid. /2.
In 1852 Canadian bank "Presidents, Cashiers and Managers" had
petitioned the government regarding the poor state of British
provision for extradition: Elgin to Pakington (No.28)(Ouebec.
31 March 1852): CO 42/581, f.266. Chambers of Commerce
continued to press for more efficient extradition throughout
the 1870s: cf. HO 45/9497/6953, /32. In later years, when
experience of particular extradition treaties showed up
defects which worked to the disadvantage of the commercial
community, bodies such as the Incorporated Trade Protection
Society of Liverpool pressed for their amendment: cf. FO
5/2478.
nature of Mercantile Treaties, and are intended to afford
protection chiefly against dishonest Clerks and Fraudulent
Bankrupts". An analysis of extradition cases shows a strong
bias towards 'commercial offences', such as fraudulent
bankruptcy. The value of extradition to British economic
life therefore cannot be doubted.132
It was also perhaps significant that at the same time as
transport was revolutionised, the 'commercial classes' were
becoming more important in the political life of nations.
This "brought definite changes in the outlook of people on
the very concept of crime". B	In previous times, when
political power was held exclusively by monarchs and their
feudal magnates, the only crimes that really mattered to
governments were political crimes and crimes against the
person, such as murder. However, merchants and traders
viewed crime from a different perspective: what concerned
them were crimes against bankruptcy laws, frauds by bankers
and the like. As the traders came to hold political power,
they brought their new ideas on crime into government, and so
governments became more concerned with the suppression of
ordinary crime.
82. Clarendon to Cowley (Private. 15 January 1866):
Clar.PP. c.144, ff.42-5; PP (1867-68) VII: 'Minutes of
Evidence', p.167; and Henry to Home Office (Bow St. 4
January 1876): HO 45/9379/42220, /46. cf. minute by
Merivale (CO. 16 February 1E152): CO 42/581, ff.269-70; Fane
to Stanley (No.117)(Paris. 28 January 1867; E.S. Roscoe,
'Extradition', Fraser's Malaazine volume 94 (1876), pp.164-
5; 3H,(L),122,c.1283,(25 June 1852); 3HOL),184,cc.1055-
7019 July 1866); and 3H,(C),184,c.203003 August 1866):
speeches of Normanby, Chelmsford and Taylor. It was no
doubt significant that one of the experts examined by the
Select Committee was Richard Mullens, Solicitor to the
Association of Bankers.
83. S.D. Bedi, Extradition (Rotterdam 1966) p.17.
Extradition was perhaps more important to Britain than to
other nations. Throughout the Victorian era immigration
into Britain was unrestricted, and governments had no power
to expel aliens. This lack of power markedly distinguished
Britain from almost all other nations, which, if they could
not get rid of criminals through extradition, could always
expel them. Extradition was the only means by which
Britain could rid herself of foreign criminals: in its
,
absence, she might well become an asylum for many foreign
criminals.a'l
So highly did government value extradition, that it was
decided not to make reciprocity a condition of concluding
treaties:
in this and similar cases (e.g. reduction of duties) we
do what we do for our own sakes as well as for that of
France-and ask France to do what is good for her as well
as for us. What good will it do us to keep in England
the filth which France sends us because France refuses
to give us the filth we sent to her? The point seems to
me to be of considerable importance in principle.
The Law Officers noted that "the extradition of foreign
84. cf. 31-1 1 (L),198,c.558,(23 July 1869): speech of
Clarendon. There was the question of expelling aliens
under the royal prerogative, but the matter was "so
uncertain and undefined, that no Government could attempt
to call it into action, even in extreme circumstances":
G.C. Lewis, Foreign Jurisdiction (1859) p.74, cf. W.F.
Craies, 'Right of Aliens', Law Quarterly Review volume 6
(1890), pp.27-41; and T. Haycraft, 'Alien Legislation',
ibid. volume 13 (1897), pp.165-86.
criminals is of itself a benefit to us, whether or not
foreign states agree to surrender to us our criminals", and
advised that "the Bill should not... insist on reciprocity as
a sine qua non of any extradition Treaty being concluded".Em
It does seem that by the late 1860s the principle of
extradition was fully accepted in Britain. In 1842 the
Morning Herald asserted that, "If a nation cannot punish
those by whom it is not aggrieved, far less can a state seize
the subjects of another state to deliver them up for
punishment", and in 1857, A.V. Kirwan referred to extradition
as "a foreign and un-English word... an un-English thing",
but these are the only examples I have come across of
opposition to extradition per se.. mdi More common was Clarke's
assertion that although it could not be "scientifically
described as a duty of perfect obligation", it was "certainly
a duty of political morality". m Of course, there was much
distrust of, and opposition to, extradition with particular
states, but this was very far from opposition to extradition
itself. Those who had opposed previous extradition bills had
not opposed the principle itself.em
85. Farmer to Jenkyns (Private, 10 March 1869); and Law
Officers' Opinion by Collier, Coleridge and Twiss (12 April
1669): HO 45/8166, /5 & /B. Underlining in original. This
was echoed by Anon, 'Extradition of Criminals', The
Economist volume 30 (1872), p.1261.
86. Morning Herald 24 September 1842, p.4; and A.V. Kirwan,
'A Few Words on France', Fraser's Magazine volume 56
(1857), p.161.
87. E. Clarke, Treatise upon the Law of Extradition (1867)
pp.106-7. cf. P.B. Maxwell, op.cit. passim.; and Working 
Man 18 August 1866, p.78.
88. Torrens "did not know any man" who opposed the
principle: 3H,(C),184„c.2014,(3 August 1866). cf. Lloyd's 
Weekly 14 January 1866, p.6; and Morning Star 4 August
1866, p.4.
To a degree, the passing of the Act may have been a
consequence of the tightening up of party discipline in
Parliament. As party ties strengthened from the mid-1860s
onwards, notable 'independents' such as J.S. Mill, became
ever more absent from the Commons; governmental support
became a far less fluid affair. This led to the emergence of
"a new phenomenon, which was to weaken Parliament's already
limited powers in relation to the making of treaties... the
,
introduction of the practice of passing legislation to enable
governments to make treaties of a certain specified type in
future without further reference to Parliament".'" The
Extradition Act was perhaps the most important illustration
of this trend: other legislation of a similar type enabled
governments to make agreements concerning seamen deserters,
postal conventions and industrial property. The new
procedure was less democratic than its predecessor, and
further weakened MPs control of foreign policy, but as such
was part of a wider trend: "It is literally true to say that
as Parliament became more democratic its control over foreign
policy declined".""'
On a more intangible level, it is possible to detect a
shift in opinion in favour of extradition. "With the gradual
realisation of the interdependence of States and of the
89. V. Cromwell, 'Private Member'. Liber Memorialis Sir 
Maurice Powicke (Dublin 1963) p.209, cf. Anon, 'Proposed
Law on Extradition's Spectator volume 41 (1868), p.1068,
which felt this new phenomenon was a sign of "strong rule"
which should be "largely extended".
90. H. Temperley and L.M. Penson„ A Century of Diplomatic 
Blue Books (Cambridge 1938) p. ix.
existence of an international community"" there was a
growing awareness of the value of extradition in more general
terms. A "communion of feeling in the main elements of
social existence teaches all nations that they have the same
essential interests and must aid each other in supporting the
elementary laws of society".
This shift in opinion among the political-educated
classes (from the mid-1860s) was perhaps best expressed by
The Times:
Our Extradition Treaties have been passed discontentedly
and suspiciously, and with a sort of sulky acquiescence.
Most good Englishmen thought them very dangerous
experiments. Nothing but the flagrant and yearly
increasing evils of the old state of things induced them
to acquiesce in the demand of jurists that nations
should abandon their isolation and combine for the
repression of the worst forms of crime.
By the late 1860s it could be confidently asserted that "the
principle of Extradition is sound, humane, and just...
91. Harvard Research, op.cit. p.109.
92. The Times 9 September 1872, p.7.
93. The Times 4 August 1866, p.8. cf. Lloyd's WeeklY 14
January 1866, p.6; Morning Star 4 August 1866, p.4; Morning 
Herald 4 August 1866, p.4; Daily News 7 August 1866, p.4;
Anon, 'Extradition', Saturday Review volume 26 (1868),
p.380; Anon, 'Extradition', The Economist volume 30 (1872),
p.1261; Morning Post 23 November 1872, p.4. By the mid-
1870s, popular reference works included small sections on
extradition: e.g. B. Vincent, Haydn's Dictionary of Dates 
(15th edition, 1876) p.272; and C.E.H. Vincent., Police Code 
and Manual of the Criminal Law (5th Edition, 1886) pp.68-
70.
its extension and establishment on a firm basis is one of
those tasks which civilisation imperiously demands should be
accomplished".". As the mid and late 1860s passed, fewer and
fewer people would have disagreed.
It may be that the passing of the Extradition Act
signalled the beginning of a convergence of ideals between
liberal-capitalist Britain and an increasingly liberal and
capitalist continent. This could perhaps be called that
start of the "Europeanisation of the British".. 5	 There was
nothing sinister in it: the right of asylum still remained
more than secure, and British extradition policy was markedly
more 'liberal' than that of her neighbours, but Britain and
Europe were beginning to come together.
One might suggest that 1870 was a convenient time for a
wide-ranging extradition law to be passed. American slavery
had been abolished, and it was a few years since the
continent had experienced the upheavals which sent political
refugees flooding into Britain. Refugees were therefore not
a particularly visible phenomenon in 1870, which made it
easier to pass legislation which, although it in no way
threatened them, might have been (mis)represented as such,
had it been introduced at a time when foreign regimes were
keen to persecute political offenders who had taken refuge in
Britain. Just prior to 1870, therefore, the things which
made MPs sensitive about extradition were less prominent.
94. Times 9 August 1867 p.9.
95. B. Porter, Britain. Europe and the World p.51.
Had the bill been introduced later, things might have been
very different, for, as we shall see, in 1871-72, British
protection of 'politicos' refugees once more became an issue.
Finally, it is possible to see the passing of the lem
Act as part of Britain's gradual return to fuller
participation in European affairs under Gladstone's first
administration (1868-74). After the humiliations suffered
over the Polish revolt and Schleswig-Holstein in 1863-4,
-
Britain almost completely abstained from participation in
European affairs. However, Gladstone favoured playing a more
positive role, and under his leadership, Britain became more
actively involved in foreign affairs.
In 1870, then, the time was ripe for the introduction
and easy passage of the Extradition Act. The time had come
when British extradition policy needed to be put on a sound
footing, and the confusion and hesitancy of the 185s and
1860s left behind. The Act did not mark the end of Britain's
adherence to her right of asylum: rather, it marked Britain's
assumption of her responsibilities in the punishment of
crime. By 1880 Britain had 20 extradition treaties, and 42
by 1900. Similarly, the numbers of fugitives extradited to
and from Britain increased rapidly. 9'4' Within a relatively
short time after 1870, criminals had to try quite hard to
escape the extended arm of the law, and no longer was Britain
an asylum for common criminals.
96. cf. Appendices 1 and 2. .pa
CHAPTER 4 
CHALLENGES TO THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM (THE 1870s) 
Chapter Four: Challenges to the Right of Asylum (The 1870s) 
Despite the Extradition Act, Britain's extradition
experience after 1870 was perhaps just as difficult as ever.
Problems arose almost at once. After the defeat of the Paris
Commune in 1871, thousands of Communards fled abroad:
perhaps 3,500 men, women and children eventually arrived in
Britain. 1 The question was, would extradition be sought, or
granted?
-
In fact, ministers decided against extradition before
the fighting ended, ° even though this would cause "very
great... irritation" (even an "outburst of anger and
indignation") in France, and bring Britain "into ill repute"
with "most" European governments. 	 However, in Britain the
decision was popular. The Economist (Liberal) thought it
could "hardly be questioned for a moment" that the Communards
were political offenders. The Reformer (Radical) believed
the government's "business" was to "maintain inviolate our
laws of sanctuary", while Reynolds's asserted that any
Communard extradition "would be an eternal blot, an indelible
1. P.K Martinez, 'Paris Communard Refugees in Britain',
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Sussex University (1981), p.54.
2. The negotiation of an expanded treaty was shelved because
"persons implicated" in the Commune were likely to go to
Britain: Lyons to Granville (No.678) (Versailles. 29 May
1871): FO 27/1973.
3. Lyons to Granville (No.678)(Versailles. 29 May 1871): FO
27/1865; and same to same (Private. 2 & 30 May 1871):
Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/85. cf. Granville to Lyons (Private. 4
June 1871): Granv.PP. FO 362/4, ff.221-2; and Lyons to
Hammond (Private. 5 June 1871): Hammond Papers, FO 391/13.
stigma upon the English character"..4
Opinion was not, however, unanimous. The Tory Standard 
was especially strident: "To give up such men... is our
duty... To extend to creatures like these... shelter... is to
pollute the name of liberty". Lord Elcho stigmatised
Communards as "authors of... the greatest crime on record",
and called for them to be treated as "ordinary criminals".'
Privately, Bruce "distinguished himself from his colleagues
-
by his violent dislike of the refugees": he regarded Pyat as
a "scOlerat„ no more and no less"..6
Opposition to the extradition of Communards was not
generally due to any sympathy for their political beliefs or
aspirations. (The welcome they received "was characterised,
in the main, by hostility, reservation and indifference"..7)
Rather, it was based upon three factors.
4. Anon, 'The Extradition Question', The Economist volume
29 (1871), p.656; Reformer 3 June 1871, p.4; and
Reynolds's 4 June 1871, pp.4-5. cf. Morning Post 1
June 1871, p.4; Eastern Post 3 June 1871, p.4; Pall 
Mall Gazette 31 May 1871, p.2; The Times 1 June 1871,
p.9; Bee Hive 3 & 10 June 1871, pp.10 & 12; and
Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Documents of the First 
International (Moscow 1964) volume 4, p.471.
5. Standard 29 & 30 May 1871, p.4; and 3H,(C)„
206„c.1327,(26 May 1871).
6. P.K. Martinez, op.cit. p.426; and C. Gavard. Une
Diplomate A Londres Lettres et notes (Paris. 1895)
p.44, quoted in ibid. p.426. cf. E. Clarke, letter in
The Times 31 May 1871, p.6; Daily Telegraph 30 May
1871, pp.4-5; and Anon, 'The Commune', Saturday Review 
volume 31 (1871), p.683.
7. P.K. Martinez, op.cit. p.39. cf. Anon, 'The Commune',
Saturday Review volume 31 (1871), p.682; Reformer 3
June 1871, p.4; and Pall Mall Gazette 29 May 1871 5 p.1.
Firstly, they were political refugees, entitled to asylum.°
Secondly, a certain sympathy for them arose, engendered by
the atrocities committed by the Versailles authorities.
Perhaps 30,000 men, women and children were killed, and this
had a considerable impact: "wholesale executions... sicken
the soul... [They] seem inclined to outdo the Communists in
their lavishness of human blood"."' Thirdly, ministers
displayed a "sympathetic concern" for the fate of some of the
more prominent individual Communards."'
In all official statements, ministers emphasised they
had "no power to go beyond the laws which have been passed to
enable us to fulfil our obligations with respect to
extradition."" Granville thought the government position
"impregnable, whether as regards French complaints, or Tory
8. cf. Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 19 March 1872): HO
45/9303/11335, /1.
9. The Times 31 May & 1 June 1871, p.9. cf. P.K. Martinez,
op.cit, pp.13 & 53; and Editorial comments, 'Paris Commune',
Marxism Today volume 15 (1971), p.69. Most publications
remarked on this: cf. for example, Pall Mall Gazette 26 & 29
May 1871, p.1; and Eastern Post 3 June 1871, p.4.
10. P.K. Martinez, op.cit. p.6. Gladstone wrote of his
concern for Rochefort and Grousset: Gladstone to Garibaldi
(Private. 23 June 1871): Glad.PP. BL Add. MS 44431, f.49;
copy in H. Matthew (ed.), Gladstone Diaries (Oxford 1982)
volume 7, p.513. cf. Lord Newton, Lord Lyons (1913) volume 1,
p.383; Lyons to Granville (Private. 9 & 12 June 1871):
Granv. PP. PRO 30/29/86; same to same (No.1015)(Paris. 19
August 1871): FO 27/1870; and Lyons to Hammond (Private. 15
September 1871): Hammond Papers, FO 391/13.
11. Gladstone to Granville (Private. 2 June 1871): Granv. PP.
PRO 30/29/60. cf. Lyons to Granville (No.692) (Versailles. 3
June 1871): FO 27/1865; Hammond to Granville (Private. 5
June 1871): Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/104; Granville to Paget
(No.99)(FO. 28 May 1871): FO 146/1520; and
3H,(C),206,cc.1327-8,(26 May1871): speech of Bruce.
objections 11 . 12 In fact, "No claim was made by the French
Government against any person for having taken part in the
affairs of the Commune".'
	
France did issue a circular
instructing its representatives to seek extradition and call
on governments to take action against the refugees, but never
communicated it to Britain." "Barely a week" after the
Commune's defeat, France abandoned all hope of extraditing
its leaders, let alone the refugees generally. Such was
"imposing determination of Gladstone's Cabinet and British
opinion, the French embassy could not summon up the courage
to ask for the surrender of the refugees". Gavard "recorded
his bitterness" at British policy, but nothing could be
done.1
France was not the only power to have her designs against
12. Granville to Gladstone (Private. 3 June 1871): Glad.PP.
BL Add. MS 44168,ff.107-12.
13. Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 17 March 1876): HO 134/2,
pp.29-30. This was prompted by an Austrian enquiry as to
what policy Britain had adopted towards the Communards. The
Home Office file on the matter (53797) is "no longer extant":
D.J. Blackwood (HO Departmental Record Officer) to myself (31
October 1986). Y. Kapp, Eleanor Marx (1972) volume 1, p.157,
wrongly states that France sought the extradition of
Lissagaray and others. P.K. Martinez, op.cit. pp.6-7,
erroneously states that France did not seek extradition
because the sympathies of British juries for 'politicos'
would make it difficult to secure it: juries had no role in
extradition!
14. cf. P.K. Martinez, op.cit. p.55, giving its location in
the Paris archives. Details of the circular may be found in
The Times 29 May 1871, p.5; and Pall Mall Gazette 29 May
1871, p.7. Most nations responded favourably: cf. The Times 
26-31 May 1871; Pall Mall Gazette 29 May-3 June 1871; W.
McClellan, Revolutionary Exiles (1979) p.180; and S.
Bernstein, 'The First International', Science and Society 
volume 16 (1952), pp.253-67.
15. P.K. Martinez, op.cit. pp.7 & 55.
Communards and the 'International' frustrated. Russia,
Austria and Germany in particular advocated repression. For
example, in 1871, Bismarck sought "common defence against
common the danger", but Britain would have none of it.14*
Gladstone thought the case made against the 'International'
was "nil". 17. In 1872, Spain called for joint action against
the 'International', which "menaced" society "in its deepest
foundations", and advocated making membership of it an
extraditable offence. Britain replied with a spirited
defence of the right of asylum: she rejected what she
regarded as the paranoid continental fear of the
'International'. Existing British laws were sufficient to
meet the case, and "this opinion" was "shared both by the
Parliament and Public of this Country". 19 The Saturday 
Review thought it "wholly out of the question" 	 to amend
extradition law "in the manner... suggested". Britain was
"not in the habit of driving away anyone who chooses to come
here", and there was no need "to be in the least afraid of
16. Memorandum communicated by Bernstorff (1 July 1871):
FO 64/731. cf. Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 12 July
1871): FO 64/735.
17. Minute by Gladstone (29 April 1870): FO 27/1844. cf.
Bruce to Granville (Private. 12 July 1871): Granv.FP.
PRO 30/29/65; W. Taffs, 'Unprinted Documents',
Slavonic and East European Review volume 8 (1929-30).
pp.702 & 705; A.F. Meyendorff, 'Unprinted Documents'.
Slavonic and East European Review volume 8 (1929-30),
p.405; S. Bernstein., op.cit. pp.269-70; and J.
Braunthal, History of the International (1966 edition)
p.159.
18. De Blas to Villanueva (9 February 1872), communicated
on 24 February: PP (1872) LXX: 'Correspondence...
respecting the International', pp.715-22; and
Granville to Layard (No.22)(FO. 8 March 1872): FO
72/1308. "Never before had a workingman's association
been the focus of so much attention and... hysteria":
S. Bernstein, op.cit. p.247.
the Communists". 15' The reply gave Spain a "rude shock", and
"incurred the strong displeasure of Bismarck", 0 but what
else could have been expected?
* * *
In 1872-73 (during the course of treaty negotiations)/
Italy and France proposed articles to cover the case of
fugitives extradited to them by American nations. It was to
be possible (without formalities) to bring them to, say,
Liverpool, go on to a Channel port, and then the continent.21
Such a provision was important if continental-American
treaties were to be truly effective. As most trans-atlantic
shipping docked in Britain, it was convenient to send
fugitives from the Americas to Europe via Britain.
The 1870 Act did not authorise transit: a fugitive
brought to Britain in pursuance of a foreign treaty would (if
he disputed the foreign authorities' power to detain him)
have to be released, or extradited in the normal way,
necessitating the trouble and expense of a second proceeding.
New legislation was needed, and the Law Officers, the Foreign
19. Anon, 'Legislation against the International', Saturday 
Review volume 33 (1872), pp.327-8; and Anon, 'Banished
Communists', ibid. volume 33 (1872), p.651. cf. The Times 15
April 1872, p.11. In contrasts Baillie Cochrane (Tory MP for
the Isle of Wight) called for the suppression of "this
monstrous and detestable Association": 3H,(C),
210,cc.1183-98„(12 April 1872).
20. Layard to Granville (Private. 21 April 1872): Granv. PP.
PRO 30/29/100; and J. Braunthal, op.cit. p.163.
21. Copy of Italian counter-draft in HO 45/9292/7003, /11;
and cf. Lyons to Granville (No.941)(Paris. 18 November 1873):
FO 83/631.
Office, and Henry (chief magistrate) advocated its enactment
without delay..
Home Secretary Lowe, however, saw "insuperable
objections" to the plan, but their nature was not made
explicit.	 His successor, Cross, thought likewise, and made
his objections quite explicit: "I have had no scheme laid
before me... which effectively.., secures the right of
asylum": a political refugee might arrive in Britain, and she
-
would be powerless to prevent him being sent off to Europe.
Unless some such scheme was found, Cross refused to agree to
a bill providing for safe transit. °4. The Foreign Office
asked him to change his mind and schemes were proposed which
attempted to protect 'politicos", 	 but their authors
admitted they gave "no guarantee", as states might try to
"conceal" the "real nature of the offence" in question.	 In
addition, the schemes "would not answer the purpose", for in
attempting to protect 'politicos', they failed to
22. Law Officers' Opinion by Coleridge, Jessel and
Archibald (4 October 1872): HO 45/9292/7003, /12;
Tenterden to Home Office (FO. 5 June 1874): HO
45/9324/17828A, /3; and Henry to Home Office (Bow St.
26 December 1872): HO 45/9510/17179, /6. The problem
was known about before 1872: cf. HO 45/8163.
23. Reported in Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 16 July 1873):
FO 83/631.
24. Minute by Cross (HO. n.d.): HO 45/9324/17828A, /3. cf.
Memorandum by Lushington (HO. 24 June 1874): ibid. /4a.
25. cf. Tenterden to Home Office (FO. 5 June 1874);
memorandum by Lushington (HO. 24 June 1874) and Jenkyns (4
July 1874); Law Officers' Opinion by Baggallay and Holker (3
December 1874): ibid. /3, /4a & /6; and memorandum by Jenkyns
(14 July 1874): HO 45/9740/A55548B, /3.
26. Memoranda by Lushington (HO. 24 June 1874) and Jenkyns (4
July 1874): HO 45/9324/1782A, /4a.
provide for easy, quick transit.. "7 They were therefore
abandoned. Once more they needs of efficient criminal
justice clashed with the need to protect 'politicos', and
again the latter were given first priority.
It was perhaps of no great concern to Britain that the
failure to provide for transit meant that foreign fugitives
were rarely sent via her, and had to go by less direct
routes,
	 but in retaliation, foreign countries declined to
-
allow criminals extradited to Britain to pass through their
territories. Criminals surrendered by land-locked countries
such as Switzerland could only be sent home via some other
European country, and if her neighbours refused to allow
transit through to Britain, the Swiss treaty would be quite
valueless. Even with countries that did have ports, it was
easier and cheaper to return them by way of /and to either
Hamburg or a Channel port, and then home by sea. This fact
had clearly been in the minds of those who advocated
providing for transit.
In 1876, Britain abandoned Kusel's extradition (after it
was granted) because Switzerland's neighbours refused to
allow his transit. 	 It was feared that when it became
27. Henry to Home Office (Bow St. 8 July 1874): ibid. /6.
28. Few cases are mentioned in Home Office papers: cf. HO
45/9378/41682.
29. cf. Henry to Home Office (Bow St. 8 July 1874): HO
45/9324/17828A, /6; and memorandum by March (FO. 14 May
1874): FO 83/631.
30. cf. FO 100/213-4 & 219; and HO 45/9423/59730. The
British authorities clearly believed that Switzerland's
neighbours refused to allow Kusel's transit as a measure of
retaliation for British policy: cf. Tenterden to Home Office
(FO. 19 January 1877): ibid. /14.
known that criminals could take refuge in Switzerland "with
impunity the encouragement to crime may have very serious
results", but Cross held that "the same difficulties remain
that existed... before".. 1 Again his view prevailed. Cross
was clearly thoroughly devoted to the right of asylum, and it
was perhaps the fact that his position as Home Secretary
involved him in such matters which led him to write: "I
think the work here very interesting and like it very
-
much". I
* * *
In September 1870 the Foreign Office had circularised
the Extradition Act, and followed up with a model treaty in
March 1871. It was emphasised that Britain could not
dispense with or alter the provisions included in the Act
regarding the security of political offenders, 	 but not all
governments were willing to accept them without question. In
1873, Russia proposed to qualify the political offence
exemption by the insertion of an 'attentat clause'. Backed
by the opinions of Henry and the Law Officers, the government
31. Tenterden to Home Office (FO. 19 January 1877); and
minute by Cross (HO. n.d.): ibid. /14. In 1880 it was noted
that difficulties over transit made it "almost impossible" to
extradite from Switzerland: Minute by Liddell (HO. 14 May
1880): HO 45/9511/17179, /56. On transit generally, cf. S.D.
Bedi, op.cit. p.158. The problem has now been solved by air-
travel.
32. Cross to Salisbury (Private. 22 June 1878): 3M/E. F.J.
Dwyer, 'Rise of R.A. Cross', Unpublished B.Litt. Thesis,
Oxford University, (1955), makes no reference to his strong
views on extradition.
33. cf for example, FO 100/242.
refused to accept the proposal, 4 both because it was
contrary to the terms of the Act and because they did not
wish to do so. It would appear that this was all Russia was
after, for here negotiations ceased.
In 1871, Belgium suggested that fugitives be allowed to
waive their right not to be tried for additional offences:
the Foreign Office replied that the proposal was
inadmissible.	 Incidentally, one other Belgian proposal was
-
accepted: that extradition was not to be granted for 'acts
connected with political offences'. Such a provision was
"quite in accordance with the spirit of our law", which was
"to make the exception for Political Offences as wide as
possible".
Belgium accepted Britain's position with good heart, and
the matter went no further. However, in the mid-1870s more
serious difficulties arose over speciality, concerning
Bourdiol and Anglo-American extradition.
Bourdiol was extradited to Belgium in 1874, and in March
1875 (in response to a Belgian enquiry), the Foreign Office
(on the Law Officers' advice) stated that Britain had no
34. cf. Henry to Home Office (Bow St. 14 October 1873); Law
Officers' Opinion by Coleridge, James and Bowen (6 November
1873): HO 45/9523/26329, /2 & /3; and Granville to Loftus
(FO. 27 December 1873): FO 65/1325. For a discussion of the
'attentat clause', see above, chapter three.
35. cf. copy of the Belgian counter-draft; and Granville to
Lumley (No.5)(FO. 21 February 1872): HO 45/9500/8589, /2 &
/5. In 1873 Germany asked British consent to trying
Theilkuhl for additional offences: it was refused, and the
further trial did not take place: cf. FO 64/790 & 794.
36. Copy of counter-draft; and Henry to Home Office (Bow St.
8 December 1871): HO 45/95000/8589, /2 & /3.
objection to his re-extradition to France on fraud charges at
the end of his sentence (in 1878).
	
However, in May 1876,
Bourdiol's lawyer protested against the prospective re-
extradition. Surprised, the Foreign Office turned to the
Home Office for advice.B
The Home Office (which, strangely, had not been asked
its opinion before) in turn consulted Henry, who held re-
extradition "would be contrary to the recognised principle of
Extradition". In July the Law Officers reconsidered, and now
advised against re-extradition unless Bourdiol was first
given an opportunity to return to Britain.
Cross agreed, so placing the Foreign Office in a very
"awkward" position. Anderson thought the second opinion
"right but what must we do?". '"a The opinion of the Lord
Chancellor (Cairns) was sought: re-extradition would be
"contrary to the spirit and letter" of the law, but a
difficulty was caused by the wording of the Belgian treaty,
which did not quite match that of the Act. The former held
that fugitives were not to be tried for additional offences
"committed in the other country, that is to say, in
37. cf. Solvyns to Derby (15 March 1875): FO 10/365; Law
Officers' Opinion by Baggallay„ Holker and Deane (24 March
1875): FO 881/4370, No.9; and Derby to Solvyns (FO. 31 March
1875): FO 10/365.
38. cf. Tenterden to Home Office (FO. 12 May 1876):F0 10/374.
39. Henry to Home Office (Bow St. 19 May 1876); and Law
Officers Opinion by Siffard„ Holker and Deane (10 July 1876):
HO 45/9372/38729, /16 & /18.
40. cf. Lushington to Foreign Office (HO. 22 July 1876); and
memorandum by Anderson (FO. 23 July 1876): FO 10/374. 41.
Memorandum by Cairns (15 August 1876): FO 881/4028, No.12.
Belgium". This did not prohibit re-extradition for an
offence committed in France: "by departing from the words of
the Act", the Treaty "left a loophole by which the obvious
purpose of the Act... is frustrated". If re-extradition were
allowed, 'politicos' were placed in a vulnerable position:
France might extradite a fugitive for a criminal offence, but
then re-extradite him to Russia for a political offence.
However, because of the treaty's wording, Cairns did not see
,
how Britain could interfere.'"
Bourdiol's lawyer was informed that Britain could do
nothing, but it was also stated that in 1875 (so the Foreign
Office believed) the Brussels Court of Appeal had ruled
against the re-extradition to France of a fugitive extradited
from Holland to Belgium. It should therefore have been
possible to prevent re-extradition in Belgian courts. Here
the correspondence ended, with no definite indication as to
Bourdiol's ultimate fate: speculation would be somewhat
idle.'42
Britain tried to sign a new Anglo-American treaty on the
basis of the 1870 Act, 4 but various factors inhibited
progress. Most significantly, a difference of opinion arose
over speciality. Secretary of State Fish wanted a less
restrictive provision than that inserted in the Act, but it
would have to be amended to allow this, and "it would be in
vain to ask the... Commons to dispense with any of the
safeguards". 44 The 1842 treaty therefore continued, and
under it, the different approaches to speciality received
practical expression. One Caldwell was extradited for
forgery and uttering forged paper, but tried for bribery
also. As they had in 1865, the Law Officers advised there
was nothing in the treaty to prevent such trial, and the
government did not intervene. 	 However, differing
perspectives on speciality later turned into a practical
disagreement which embittered Anglo-American relations.
Lawrence was extradited in 1875 for forgery, but it was
later learned he was likely to be tried for other offences.4"s
-
The Home Office wanted to protest at once: such trial would
be "contrary to be implied understanding on which he was
surrendered", and had the magistrate known of American
intentions, he would have refused extradition: to have
granted it would have been contrary to the terms of the 1870
Act. Foreign Office officials were less sure. The treaty
contained no stipulation on speciality, and it was "difficult
to see" what relevance the Act could have to the treaty. The
Law Officers considered the legal aspects of the matter, but
were unable to agree with one another:
42. Derby to Cornelius (FO. 19 September 1876): FO 10/374.
However, in 1881 Belgium sought to amend the Anglo-Belgian
treaty so as to allow re-extradition, seemingly indicating
that she felt it was not authorised: cf. HO 45/9501/8589,
/80-81.
43. cf. Thornton to Fish (22 September 1870): HO
45/9324/17828, /1.
44. Thornton to Granville (No.403)(Washington. 10 October
1870): ibid. /1; and Henry to Home Office (Bow St. 16
February 1874): HO 45/9497/6953, /22.
45. cf. Law Officers' Opinion by Collier, Coleridge and Twiss
(14 April 1871): CO 885/11, No.699; Kimberly to Young (CO. 16
May 1871): PP (1876)	 LXXXII: 'Extradition of Caldwell', p.
197; and J. George, 'The Principle of Speciality'. Cornell 
International Law Journal volume 12 (1979), p. 314n.
46. Thornton to Derby (Telegraphic. Washington. 28 August
1875); and same to same (Telegraphic. Washington. 4 September
1875): HO 459370/4220, /24 & /27.
Henry gave a further different opinion.4'7
Lister felt it was time "to take a more general and
extra-legal view". Lawrence was a "scoundrel", but "we
must... be careful not to establish a precedent which might
be used to the prejudice of some more estimable member of
society". Bourke thought it "better to denounce the treaty
altogether than to give up the principle": Derby agreed.4e
,
The Home Office concurred, stating the "Cross feels.. this
question of the right of asylum is one above all others upon
which public opinion would with justice be highly sensitive",
and that "it has always hitherto been assumed" that America
accepted the speciality principle. The Burley and Caldwell
cases showed that this was nonsense, but no-one seems to have
recognised their importance. Ministers and officials were
perhaps unaware of their existence: none of those involved in
the decisions of 1875 had been involved in them.45'
47. Memorandum by Liddell (HO. n.d.): HO 45/9379/42220, /24;
Unattributable memorandum (FO. 22 September 1875): FO
5/1708; Law Officers Opinion by Bagga/lay, Holker and Deane
(25 October 1875): HO 45/9401/52942, /15; and Henry to Home
Office (Bow St. 22 November 1875): H045/9379/42220, 	 /33.
cf. 3H,(L) 1 230,cc. 171-4 9 (24 July 1876): speech 	 of
Granville.
48. Memorandum by Lister (F0.27 October 1875)); Memorandum
by Bourke (FO. n.d.); and minute thereon by Derby (FO. 2
November1875): FO 5/1780.
49. Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 25 November 1875): FO
414/35, No.62. Critics of government policy later seized on
this point: "we knew at least 10 years ago that the U.S.
disputed the view of the treaty now contended for":
Harcourt to Granville (Private. 19 July 1876): 	 Granv.PP.
PRO 301/29/29. cf. Granville to Hammond (Private.
	 25 May
1876): Hammond Papers, FO 391/27; 3H,(L),230 9 cc. 1779.1803
& 1805,(23 July 1876): speeches of Granville, 	 Hammond and
Coleridge; and 3HOL),231,c.398,(3 August 	 1876): speech of
Selborne. When forced to recognise past policy, the
government merely answered that it had been wrong: cf.
ZHOL),230,c.1790,(24 July 1876); and 3HOL),231, c.386,(3
August 1876); speeches of Derby and Cairns.
Thornton was instructed to discover whether Lawrence was
to be tried for additional offences, and if so, to protest.
Fish stated that the treaty made no reference to speciality,
and claimed the right to try Lawrence for additional
offences, but could not "yet say whether be will be". He
would be tried for forgery: a decision would then be taken as
to other charges.w
The Foreign Office faced conflicting pressures: on the
,
one hand there was the importance of good American relations
and extradition itself, while on the other, Cross continued
to press for vigorous action, "as he himself entirely shares
the sensitiveness of the country as to the question of the
right of asylum". Thornton was instructed to protest "as
strongly as possible" if Lawrence was tried for additional
offences,'". but indications began to appear that he would not
be, It seemed likely that he would be convicted of forgery,
in which case he would not be tried for other crimes.
Thornton had heard that the Attorney General was opposed to
any further trial, and that Fish and the President were
"being converted".
50. Derby to Thornton (Telegraphic. FO. 26 November 1875:
FO 414/35; and Thornton to Derby (Telegraphic. Washington. 27
November 1875: HO 45/9379/42220, /35. It would perhaps have
been wiser not to have approached Fish until Lawrence had
been tried for additional 	 offences: cf. 3H,(L),230,cc.1779
& 1796,(24 July 1876):	 speeches of Granville and Kimberley.
51. Ibbetson to Foreign Office (HO. 7 December 1875): FO
414/35, No.74; and Derby to Thornton (Telegraphic. FO. 7
December 1875) HO 45/9379/42220, /41.
52. Thornton to Derby (No.319)(Washington. 6 December
1875): FO 414/35, No.81; cf. same to same (Telegraphic.
Washington. 11 January 1876): HO 45/9379/42220 5
 /48; and
(Private. 18 January 1876): Thornton Papers, FO 933/99,
ff. 1-6.
However, Lawrence's fate was now not the only issue.
Fish's claim rendered it "impossible for the English
Government to surrender another fugitive until a new treaty
or engagement shall have been entered into".
	 The 1870 Act
stipulated that fugitives were not to be surrendered "unless
provision is made by the law of the state, or by arrangement"
that speciality would be observed. '54. In the meantime,
America sought the extradition of another fugitive, Winslow,
for forgery, and Fish was informed that before he could be
surrendered (extradition was granted), an undertaking would
be required as to speciality. Fish refused ("pride alone"
would prevent him from making the concession), and regarded
its requirement and the non-surrender as violations of the
treaty. Thornton was "inclined to think that even without
the condition no attempt would be made to try" Winslow for
additional offences, 	 and Fish stated he would not be, but
Cross refused to accept "a mere verbal statement" as the
'arrangement' required by the Act.6
A question of principle was at issue:
53. Henry to Home Office (Bow St. 4 January 1876): HO
45/9379/42220, /46.
54. The government was almost severely embarrassed when a
magistrate stated that a fugitive before him, Carr
(extradited from Germany), could be tried for any offence.
Cross acted quickly to prevent trial for any but the
extradition offence. cf. Liddell to Hadley (HO. 28
February 1876): HO 134/1, p.718; and The Times 25 February &
14 March 1876, p.12.
55. Thornton to Derby (Telegraphic. Washington. 18
February 1876) (Copy): HO 45/9401/52942,12.
56. Same to same (Telegraphic. Washington. 5 March 1876);
and Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 7 March 1876): HO
45/9401/52942v/10. The surrender of two further prisoners
(Brent and Grey) was granted but delayed.
Britain did not think America would desire or seek the
surrender of political refugees, but the construction of
Treaties of this kind must be general... the same words
cannot have different meanings when applied to different
contries... [the] surrendering country... must be the
judge of whether the offence is, or is not, political...
if a prisoner is surrendered on the one charge and tried
on the other, the political ingredient is withdrawn from
the judgement of the surrendering cotintry.
The "only safeguard" of "the right of asylum" was "the
maintenance" of the speciality principle. 	 The government
did not view the issue in the narrow context of Anglo-
American extradition. If the point was conceded to America,
it could hardly be refused to less trustworthy regimes.
By this time, the dispute had become public knowledge:
there was some support for the government. If speciality was
abandoned, "what would there to be prevent a prisoner being
tried for a political offence" after extradition on a
criminal charge, and the same policy had to be applied to all
nations.. 0 Still, The Times could not give "unreserved
approval" to the actions of either government. The Saturday 
Review (independent) thought criminals should be tried for
57. Derby to Hoffman (FO. 30 June 1876): LXXXII: 'Further
Correspondence', p.145; and Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 29
April 1876) FO 414/35 , No.185. cf. Henry to Home Office (Bow
St. 14 March 1876): HO 45/9401/52942, /13.
58. Pall Mall Gazette 25 February 1876, p.4. cf. Anon,
'Inside... the Extradition Difficulty', Nation (New York)
volume 23 (1876), p.101; Anon, 'Winslow's Case', American Law 
Review volume 10 (1876), pp.617-25; and The Times 5 & 17
April 1876, pp.9 & 10.
every offence they had committed, while the Spectator 
(Liberal) doubted the "legal skills" of those responsible for
British policy: they were "wrong" in their interpretation of
the law and the treaty. Furthermore, the dispute was "wholly
unnecessary", for America was as devoted to the right of
asylum as Britain.e",
Although it looked increasingly unlikely that anyone was
to be tried for additional offences„ e"'' a cast iron guarantee
,
as to speciality was insisted upon. It was also asserted
that Britain has "always" maintained the principle, and that
the 1870 Act was not relevant, for simply under the treaty
and the "general law of extradition", Britain would have
upheld speciality:' again this was at variance with past
practice.
However, since the Americans were unlikely to give way,
and the consequences of ending extradition would be
disastrous (especially for Canada), Derby suggested
59. The Times 16 June 1976, p.9; Anon, 'Extradition Dispute'
Saturday Review volume 41 (1876, p.507; Anon 'Winslow...
Case', Spectator volume 49 (1876), pp.5680-2. cf. Anon,
'Extradition Treaty', Nation (New York) volume 22 (1876),
p332. The Saturday Review thought it "impossible to dispute
"Fish's interpretation of the treaty: Anon, 'Extradition
Difficulty', The Economist volume 34 1876), p.535, agreed.
60. It seemed that Lawrence was not to be tried at all:
the prosecution was considering allowing him to turn States'
evidence. He later pleaded guilty to forgery, no sentence
was imposed, and he was released on bail. In June, Fish
unofficially stated that Lawrence was only to be tried for
forgery. cf . Thornton to Derby (Private. 23 May & 6 June
1876); Thornton Papers, FO 933/99. ++.83-91 & 100-6; and same
to same (Telegraphic. Washington 26 May 1876)(Copy): HO
45/9379/42220, /60.
61. Derby to Hoffman (FO. 30 June 1876): PP (1876) LXXXII:
'Further Correspondence respecting Extradition', p.144; and
Derby to Hoffman (FO. 4 May 1876): FO 414/35, No.204.
resuming negotiations. Fish agreed, but "would not venture
to submit a Treaty to the Senate" whilst Britain continued to
refuse to surrender fugitives whose extradition had been
properly granted. A compromise was needed, and Derby had
undertaken to try and find one.4'2
After some debate, a plan put forward by Tenterden was
adopted. As a "temporary measure", until a new treaty was
signed, Britain would resume "without asking for any
I
engagement" on speciality. Fish was, however, reminded that
Britain had the power to terminate the treaty whenever she
wished: the implication being (it was made explicit
elsewhere) that it would be if the speciality principle was
actually infringed-6
To facilitate the conclusion of a treaty, the government
would amend the law so as to allow a fugitive to be tried for
any crime "covered by the facts proved" when extradition was
demanded, or for any extraditable offence, provided British
consent was "asked and given", and evidence was furnished
that would have justified extradition for the additional
62. Derby to Hoffman (FO. 11 April 1876): Thornton to Derby
(Telegraphic. Washington. 8 June 1876): HO 45/9401/52942,
/18 & /64; and 3H,(L),230,c.1794. (24 July 1876). cf.
Thornton to Tenterden (Private. 2 May 1876): Tenterden
Papers, FO 363/4, ff.248-9; Carnarvon to Derby (Private. 13
August 1876): ibid. /6, ff.72-3. Granville called for some
means to be found of resuming extradition:
3HOL),230,cc.1781-2,(24 July 1876).
63. cf. Memorandum by Tenterden CFO. 7 August 1876): FO
5/1675, f.125.
64. Derby to Thornton (No.267)(FO. 14 October 1876). cf.
same to same (No.236)(FO. 19 August 1876): FO 881/3069, Nos.
27 & 67; and 3H, (L), 232, c.252,(13 February 1877): speech
of Derby.
offences. 8t5
 This would give "the widest possible facilities"
for the punishment of criminals "consistent with the strict
maintenance of the right of asylum".'D.6
Fish agreed to the temporary arrangement, and
extradition resumed, as did negotiations. 7 He proposed that
fugitives be liable to trial for any extraditable offence,
but made no provision for consent. This did not "so
effectually guarantee the... right of asyrum" as the British
proposals. Fugitives surrendered for crimes might be tried
for political offences, and the only remedy would be to
denounce the Treaty: "it would be undesirable to frame a
Treaty with so palpable a blot in it". Furthermore,
acceptance of Fish's proposal would lead to "great additional
difficulty" in Parliament, and render the success of the
measure "very doubtful". 4"3 It was rejected.
The idea of amending the 1870 Act in some way was
popular. The Spectator felt the "policy of the Act" was
65. Same to same (No.237)(FO. 19 August 1876): FO 881/3069,
No. 28.
66. Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 3/1/77): HO 45/9498/
6953, /65A.
67. cf. Thornton to Derby (Telegraphic. Philadelphia.
	 1
November 1876): FO 881/3069, No.75; and Thornton to
Tenterden (Private. 10 October 1876): Tenterden Papers,
	 FO
363/4, ff.262-4. This departure was generally welcomed in
Britain: cf. Pall Mall Gazette 29 December 1876 p.4; 	 The
Times 26 December 1876, p.7; and 3HOL),232,c.250,
	 (13
February 1877): speech of Granville.
68. cf. Thornton to Derby (Telegraphic. Washington. 13
December 1876): FO 881/3069, No.103; Tenterden to Home
Office (FO. 18 December 1876): HO 45/9498/6953,/68;
Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 3 January 1877): ibid.
/65A.
	 cf. Minute by Liddell (H0.20/2/76): ibid. /62.
"by no means so clearly beyond doubt, that it should be
treated as if it were part of the Constitution... A proviso
forbidding extradition without a pledge" that there would be
no prosecution for political offences "would be amply
sufficient". The Economist thought the Act's provision on
speciality "a mistake, and that we should do well to dispense
with it". There "should clearly be a limit to the sacrifice
this country is willing to make for the sake of protecting
the asylum for political refugees". The Saturday Review hoped
it would not be "beyond the scope of legislative ingenuity"
to find a way of protecting 'politicos' and not criminals,
but noted "public opinion would condemn with irresistible
force" any measure which "seemed to infringe" on the right
of asylum. It suggested the government should retain a
discretionary power to refuse extradition in cases involving
"a confusion between ordinary.., and political offences". In
Parliament, Staveley Hill (Tory) proposed amending the Act to
allow fugitives to be tried for any extraditable offence, and
other speakers supported him, or at least wanted the idea to
be debated.6°7
The Times felt insuperable problems were caused by the
fact that any concession made to the United States could
not be refused to other nations. Whilst the Act could be
69. Anon, 'Winslow... Case', Spectator volume 49 (1876),
p.581; 'Extradition Difficulty', The Economist, volume 34
(1876), p.535; 'Extradition Quarrel', The Economist volume
34 (1876), p.735; 'Extradition Controversy', Saturday 
Review volume 41 (1876), volume 41 p.607; and 'Extradition
Deadlock', Saturday Review volume 41 (1876), p.667. 3H,(C),
230,c.500027 June 1876). cf. 3HOL),230„cc.1782, 1794,
1798 & 1807024 July 1876).
"criticised in some particulars", its "main lines cannot be
altered in the present temper of the English people... the
right of asylum is as dear to the citizens of this country
as it was... twenty years ago": any trial for additional
offences should depend upon the consent of the government.
Even this change might have to wait "a couple of Sessions"
before it could be passed. The right of asylum had to be
maintained "whether the ordinary criminal benefits... or
not", but whether such protection or ordinary criminals was
,
unavoidable had not yet "received half enough
consideration".7"1"
Attempts to frame a treaty were made more urgent by the
occurrence of a case in which it seemed likely that Britain
would have to act on her threat to terminate the 1842
treaty. 1 Cairns suggested a "special treaty" with America:
"I dare say Parliament would not agree to alter the general
Art: but as far as I can judge... there would be no objection
to a concession to the extent proposed to the United States".
However, the Cabinet decided on "no concession to the Yankee
and no special Legislation".
70. The Times 25 July 1877, p.9: 4 August 1876, p.10; 16
February 1877, p.9; and Pall Mall Gazette 17 July 1876
p.1; and 26 July 1876, p.2.
71. Hawes was surrendered for forgery but it was feared that
he would also be tried for embezzlement. In the event, he
was acquitted of for gery and a local American court refused
to allow his trial for embezzlement. The court was not
however, of sufficient standing for its judgement to be used
as a precedent in other cases: cf. HO 45/9434/63510; and FC
5/1713.
72. Cairns to Tenterden (Private. 22 February 1877): FO
5/1677, ff.217-9; and Liddell to Tenterden (Private. 9
March 1877): FO 5/1677, ff.238-9. cf. Carnarvon to Cross
(Private. 2 March 1877): Cross Papers. BL Add. MS 51269;
Cross to Carnarvon (Private. 2 March 1877): Carnarvon
Papers, PRO 30/6/9, f.64; and Liddell to Foreign Office
(HO. 31 March 1877): FO 881/3456, No.56.
In April, Evarts (Fish's successor) proposed that
fugitives should be liable to trial for any extraditable
offence, provided that at least 60 days notice was given to
the surrendering country of the intention to prosecute for
additional offences. British consent would not be required,
but the 60 days' notice would "give time for representation
and remonstrance".	 The proposal met with varying
reactions. It would be a sufficient security as regards
America, but; "There might obviously be ,a danger with a
European power". Cross agreed. Tenterden did not think this
"would really be of any good". Only Governments instituted
political prosecutions, and they "would not be scrupulous in
concealing... facts... a man surrendered... to Cuba... would
no doubt have been shot long before the Spanish gave an
intimation of the trial of the second offence"..74 Carnarvon
thought it could "safely be accepted", and Blake (Canadian
Justice Minister) could see "no good reason why" Britain
should prevent the trial of fugitives for "any non-political
crimes", but they were in a minority, and Evarts' propcsal
was reiected. 7 Thornton feared Evarts would "never" agree
that consent should be required for a trial for additional
73. Thornton to Derby (Telegraphic. Washington. 24 April
1877): FO 881/3456, No.69. cf. Plunkett to Tenterden
(Private. 10 July 1877): Tenterden Papers, FO 363/3.
74. Memoranda by Cairns (27 April 1877): FO 5/1677, ff.72-4;
by Lushington (HO. n.d): HO 45/9498/6953, /72, reporting
Cross' view: and by Tenterden (FO. 2 July 1877): ibid. /104.
75. Herbert to Foreign Office (CO. 1 May 1877): FO 881/
3456, No.73, reporting Carnarvon's view: and Blake to
Carnarvon (7 August 1876): HO 45/9497/6953, /46. cf. Derby
to Thornton (Telegraphic. FO. 5 May 1877): FO 881/3456,
No.76.
offences: Britain regarded this stipulation as essential.
Complete deadlock had been reached.
The matter was "drifting into a very awkward position",
and again it was Tenterden who came up with a possible
solution. The 1870 Act was passed on the recommendation of a
Select Committee, and it would be "very difficult" for
ministers to "override that... and propose a new Act" of
their "own notion". However, if a Royal Commission
considered the issue, ministers "would then be in a position
either to amend the Act... in the sense advocated by the
Americans (if the Commission adopted that view), or to tell
the Americans point blank that having again examined the
whole question we could only do what the Commission advised".
Whilst it sat, the 1842 treaty could be kept in force.
* * *
The Royal Commission was established on 18 August
1877,'7a and met in closed session between 11 November and 1
May 1878. In a report issued in June, the Commissioners held
that extradition was "founded on a twofold motive": that it
was in everyone's interest for criminals to be punished, and
that states' had no interest in sheltering foreign
76. Thornton Derby (Private. 1 May 1877): Thornton Papers,
FO 9331101, ff.515-20; and Liddell to Foreign Office (HO.
29 June 1877): HO 45/949816953, /99.
77. Minutes by Tenterden (FO. 27 & 30 June & 7 July 1877);
Tenterden to Liddell (Private. 28 June 1877); and minute by
Derby (FO. n.d.): FO 83/580.
78. The commission under which it was established was
reprinted in the Morning Post 22 August 1877; copy in
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States for 1877 (Washington 1877) pp.288-9.
criminals. In outlining what may be termed the 'philosophy
of extradition', the Report made explicit the assumptions and
premises which had implicitly lain behind the support found
in government circles for extradition since the 1840s.
Extradition should cover all offences "which it is the
common interest of all nations to suppress", but a country:
can scarcely be said to have.. an interest in the
particular form of government, or in the particular
ruling dynasty, of another, as that it should be called
upon to make common cause with it
against 'politicos'. Civil war and rebellion cause death and
destruction:
yet both from history and our own experience we know
that there are exceptional instances in which resistance
to usurpation or tyranny may be inspired by the noblest
motives, and ...command sympathy... the general
sentiment of mankind is against the surrender of the
political exile.
However, the Commissioners were unwilling to leave the
political offence exemption as it stood. There were "forms
of revolting crime" which lost "none of their atrocity from
their connection with political motive". It should be
enacted that the authors of acts which would be regarded as
criminal were it not for the existence of a political motive,
should not be exempt from extradition "unless the act, to
which a political character was sought to be ascribed,
occurred during a time of civil war or open insurrection".
Since genuine political crimes might be committed outside
such a situation, the government should retain a
discretionary power to refuse extradition for such acts.
To illustrate their conception of 'forms of revolting
crime', the Commissioners cited the examples of the
assassination of a reigning sovereign, and the destruction of
a prison or the murder of police in an attempt to rescue
political prisoners. They were clearly influenced by
Britain's experience of Fenian 'outrages'. In September
1867, a leading Fenian named Kelly was arrested at
Manchester, but the police van taking him to prison was
attacked, Kelly rescued, and one of the guards killed. In
December 1867, in an attempt to rescue Burke (one of the
organisers of the Manchester rescue), Fenians blew up an
outer wall of Clerkenwell prison, London. The rescue bid
failed, but the bomb was hopelessly overstrength: houses were
flattened, and men, women and children killed and maimed.7''
This demonstrates the arbitrariness of the definition of
political offences: had these events not occurred, it is most
unlikely that the Commission would have singled them out as
being outside the political offence exemption. The
definition of political offences is very personal, dependent
upon experiences and perceptions, rather than being any hard
79. cf. HO 45/7799; Gathorne-Hardy Papers, BL Add. MS 62537,
ff.16-20; W. D'Arcy, Fenian Movement (New York 1947) pp-268-9
& 276; F.L. Crilly, The Fenian Movement: The Story of the 
Manchester Martyrs (1908); J. Devoy, Recollections (Shannon
1969 edition) p.244; T.E. Hachey,'Political Terrorism', in Y.
Alexander (ed.), International Terrorism (New York 1976)
p.101; N.E. Johnson (ed.), Diary of Gathorne Hardy (Oxford
1981) pp.49-57; N. McCord, 'Fenians and Public Opinion', in
M. Harmon (ed.), Fenians and Fenianism (Dublin 1970) pp.46-
54; and L. O'Broin, Fenian Fever (1971) pp.193-202 & 210-12.
and fast legal maxim.
As for speciality, "Political offences... excepted",
there was "no reason" why fugitives should not be tried for
any offences whatever. To prevent trial for political
offences, it could be stipulated that fugitives were only to
be tried for offences of "an extradition should be refused
unless a "binding engagement" was obtained from the state
seeking extradition that he would only be - tried for non-
political crimes.
However, it is significant that this was the only issue
on which the Commissioners were not unanimous: Tarrens
submitted a minority report. The recommendation - he wrote -
if implemented, "might be misunderstood as an invitation to a
foreign Government to deprive its subjects of the right of
asylum". Political refugees could be persecuted without
being tried for political crimes: persecution could take the
form of prosecution for any number of bogus common crimes.
Maintaining the speciality principle as it stood was the only
means of guaranteeing the right of asylum.
One other recommendation deserves mention. The lack of
provision for safe transit constituted "a defect, by which
extradition is liable to be frustrated ", and should be dealt
with. Justices of the Peace (on the application of the
Consul of the state to which the fugitive had been
surrendered, and upon the production of proof that the
fugitive had been duly extradited for an extraditable
offence), should be empowered to issue a warrant authorising
the fugitive's detention and conveyance through Britain.E"a
The government reaction to the Report was detailed in a
memorandum prepared for submission to the Cabinet. The
implementation of the recommendation on transit would be
"most useful", but Liddell (perhaps mindful of Cross'
previously expressed views) hesitated from advising its
immediate adoption, noting that this would be "very
desirable... if possible".
,
Liddell believed the Commission's views on political
offences to be "substantially in accordance with the view the
Government has always taken as to the relative gravity of the
offences committed by the Fenian convicts... It would
therefore seem desirable that some declaration should be made
in any new Act that such offences... should not be considered
as political". However, defining political offences as those
committed 'during a time of civil war or open insurrection'
required:
graver consideration. Those are wide terms. For
instance: Supposing a landing of American Fenians in a
remote part of Ireland, and an arming of 200 or 300
peasants, an attack on a police-barrack, and some
constables murdered. Would that be civil war or open
insurrection? Would it not be more like the Manchester
case?
Even when people wished to exclude the same offences they
80. Copies of the Report may be found in: PP (1878) XXIV,
pp.903-17; CO 323/362, ff.32-9; and C. Parry (ed.), op. cit. 
pp.805-19. On the selection of its members, cf. Cross
Papers,
	 BL Add. MS 51271, f.189.
could not agree on a definition. el 	Liddell noted that the
Commission's recommendations on speciality were "very
important", but made no comment. He did, however, note that,
"Attention is particularly drawn to the protest of Mr.
Torrens". It is significant that this was the only
recommendation to receive ministerial comment: Cross foresaw
"the gravest political difficulties" in carrying it out.8
Unfortunately, no record survives of the Cabinet
reaction to the Report. The Americans thought the Commission
was established "for the purpose of producing a change in the
act of 1870",	 but it appears that the Report, in so far as
it referred to speciality, was not to the government's
liking. The scheme advocated bore no relation to that which
the government advocated, and did not correspond to what it
was believed Parliament would accept. Torrens' minority
report was probably significant: had the Commissioners been
81. His example related to a planned Fenian rising of 1865,
in which "a body of 200 men was to attack every police
barracks slaughter the police and seize their arms": L.
O'Broin, op. cit. p.12. The majority of Britons never
regarded Fenian criminals as 'political' in the sense of
deserving protection: "The recent atrocities... have
outraged the moral sense of the whole community, and drawn
upon the perpetrators an amount of disgust seldom bestowed in
this or any other country upon political offenders": Anon,
'Fenianism', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine volume 103 
(1868), D.222. 
82. Memorandum on the Report of the Royal Commission on
Extradition. Printed for the use of the Cabinet. (21
February 1879): HO 45/9498/6953, /1t4. What press reaction
there was was generally favourable to the Report:
	 cf. Anon,
'Extradition', Saturday Review volume 45 (1878),
	 pp.774-5.
83. Pierrepont to Evarts (London. 22 August 1877): Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States for 
1877 (Washington 1877) p.288. Thornton assumed the Report
would be implemented: cf. Thornton to Tenterden (Private.
11 November 1879): Tenterden Papers, FO 363/4, ff.296-7.
unanimous it would have been easier to persuade Parliament to
amend the Extradition Act. Anglo-American extradition
therefore remained in the same unsatisfactory position, even
though the Americans would have happily signed a treaty based
upon the Report.".
The conduct of the government from 1875 onwards could
hardly be described as wise. It acted with a lack of
political judgement and without a full appreciation of all
,
the relevant facts: the 1B7 Act could have no relevance to a
treaty signed in 1842, and the American view of speciality
had been known about for years. Furthermore, neither
Lawrence nor Winslow was actually tried for additional
offences. Had Britain avoided approaching Fish until a
fugitive was actually tried for an additional offence, the
controversy might never have arisen. By approaching Fish when
they did, ministers gave the appearance of attempting to
interfere in American affairs: this was resented bitterly by
Fish, and made an amicable solution of the matter all the
more difficult. Britain would certainly have resented, and
not tolerated, a similar approach had the roles been
reversed. Em Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that
ministers acted from the best and noblest of
84. cf. Welsh to Evarts (London. 22 June 1878): Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United states for 
1878 (Washington 1878) p.268.
85. In addition, after the establishment of a Commission had
been decided on, it was found that the favoured British
proposal (British consent to trial for additional offences),
was unworkable: "the delay would be fatal to justice-the
witnesses could not be detained, 	 great expense etc.":
memorandum by Tenterden (FO. 2 July 	 1877): HO
45/9498/6953, /104. It was then suggested that fugitives
should be given the right to show they would be tried for
political offences after trial for the extradition offence,
but nothing was done: ibid.
motives: the maintenance of the right of asylum. 941' As a
result, despite strong pressures to the contrary, the
absolute protection accorded to political refugees in the Act
remained undiluted.
* * *
As a postscript to this chapter, here (in view of the
mention made by the Royal Commission of Fenian crimes) it is
,
appropriate to discuss the attitude adopted by Britain
towards her own political offenders (principally Fenians) in
extradition law and practice. By and large, Britain avoided
attempting to extradite such men, and as a result, before the
1880s, the extradition of fugitives to Britain was not an
issue of historical or political importance. However, that
is not to say that the potential for such importance had not
existed, or that there were no British political offenders
around.
In 1837 Canada sought the extradition of Mackenzie (one
of the leaders of the Canadian rebellion) from New York for
complicity in murder. Governor March refused to surrender
him on the grounds that he was a political refugee. 9.7
 The
86. Not all contemporaries were so charitable. Hammond (now
retired) wrote that the only way to account for the
controversy was "accumulated misinterpretation,
misunderstanding and obstinacy on the part of our Home Office
and their legal advisers.., and blind submission
	 without
reflection on the part of the Foreign Office":
	 Hammond to
Thornton (Private. 12 December 1876): Thornton
	 Papers, FO
933/100, ff.29-40.
87. cf. I.D. Spencer, 'William L. Marcy'. Mississippi Valley
Historical Review volume 31 (1944), p.217. L.N. Benjamin,
op. cit. pp.182-3; and C.C. Hyde, 'Notes on the Extradition
treaties of the United States', American Journal of 
International Law volume 8 (1914), p.491.
case, however, did not become an issue between Britain and
the United States.
There were, of course, plenty of Irish fugitives around
before the 1880s. After the abortive rising of 1848, the
Fenian leader, Stephens, fled to France but no attempt was
made to extradite him.'m In 1852, Thomas Meagher (a
"convicted Irish rebel") escaped from Van Diemen's Land and
arrived at New York, but again there was no attempt at
,
extradition.9"'
In 1852 Thomas Kaine's extradition was sought from
America for attempted murder (in (Ireland), but it was
refused on a technicality. Surviving British papers do not
detail the nature or circumstances of the crime, but it seems
clear there was something political in it. When discussing
the case, Crampton asserted that:
"public sympathy... attaches to Irish Fugitives, who
are invariably represented to be the victims of
political persecution, or, if Criminal, to have been
driven to the commission of crime by want or
oppression".
The Times reported there was "much excitement... among a
portion of the Irish population, and a strong feeling was
exhibited adverse to Kaine being surrendered... large
gatherings took place". 'm After extradition was refused,
88. cf. M. Davitt, Fall of Feudalism (1904) p.73.
89. Addington to Home Office (FO. 15 June 1852): FO 5/557.
90. Crampton to Clarendon (No.77)(Washington. 3 April 1853):
FO 5/564; and The Times 13 July 1852, p.8.
Britain took the matter no further.
In 1865 Stephens was arrested in Ireland, but escaped
and eventually returned to Paris. There he was put under
surveillance, and the French police even offered to arrest
him, but yet again extradition was not sought.'" Similarly,
after the Fenian raids into Canada of 1866 and 1870, no
attempt was made to extradite those responsible.
In 1868 the government gave very ser=ious consideration
to seeking the extradition of Captain Murphy from France for
the part he had played in organising the Clerkenwell bomb of
1867. The statements of Patrick Mullany and Nicholas English
disclosed that he had taken a leading role in the affair, and
Giffard advised that the evidence was quite sufficient to
justify extradition.
However, despite the fact that Home Secretary Hardy
noted that "much blood will be shed unless some of the
[Fenian] leaders are taken", and Murphy's extradition would
have been "a great shock to the party of violence",*".
extradition was not sought. The reason for this decision is
91. cf. Hammond to Cowley (Private. 7 & 11 April and 23 May
1866): Cowl.PP. FO 519/192; and L. O'Broin„ op. cit. 
pp.116 & 122.
92. On the raids: cf. E.R.R. Green, 'Fenians Abroad', in,
T. Desmond Williams (ed.), Secret Societies (Dublin
	 1973)
pp.85-7.
93. The evidence may be found in HO 12/179/8170A; and Law
Officers' Opinion by Giffard (17 February 1868): HO 48/53,
No. 176.
94. N.E. Johnson (ed.). op. cit. p.53: Hardy's Diary for 8
November 1867; and Memorandum to the Law Officers 	 (n.d.):
HO 48/53, No.176. A.E. Gathorne-Hardy (ed.). Gathorne 
Hardy (1910) has nothing on this.
not made explicit, but some indications are given. Giffard
asserted that "in view of future applications by the
French... I should have thought it a serious question whether
extradition should be asked". If Britain started seeking the
extradition of 'political offenders', France would do
likewise, and expect results, especially if Murphy was
surrendered. Hammond told Liddell that "on no account
whatever would he ask for the extradition", 	 presumably for
the same reasons.
More generally, there was a disinclination on the part
of ministers to take action against Fenians abroad. They
avoided asking America to prevent Fenian plotting on the
grounds that to do so would make the movement seem more
important then it was and unite the Fenians and Irish-
American opinion against Britain. '74' It also seemed to	 be
generally acknowledged that Fenians would "never" be
extradited: if the Manchester murderers had escaped abroad
"they would certainly not have been practically liable to
extradition".'"
95. Law Officers' Opinion by Giffard (17 February 1E168);
and memorandum by Liddell (HO. n.d.): HO 48/53, No.176.
96. cf. L. O'Broin, op. cit. p.55.
97. Anon, 'The Extradition Debate'. Saturday Review volume 42
(1876), p.190; and Anon, 'The Extradition Controversy's
ibid. volume 41 (1876), p.606.
CHAPTER 5
'NIHILISTS' AND FENIANS (THE 1880s) 
Chapter Five: 'Nihilists' and Fenians (The 1880s) 
When Gladstone returned to power in 1880, his choice as
Home Secretary was William Harcourt, and for the next five
years the government attitude to extradition was to be very
much dictated by him. One of his earliest decisions was that
the recommendations of the Royal Commission (on which he sat)
should be implemented, and Granville agreed..'
Before anything was done, attention was diverted by Czar
Alexander II's death (13 March 1881) at the hands of
'nihilist' assassins, and the news that Russia intended to
propose some form of international cooperation against
nihilism.	 Despite the fact that Germany, Austria and Queen
Victoria supported the Russian move, ministers unanimously
decided to have nothing to do with it, even before it terms
were known.. 4. Several factors led to this decision.
In dealing with any question which touched so sensitive
a subject as the right of asylum, no government could afford
to ignore Parliamentary and public opinion. Despite "every
care", any proposal "would be regarded with suspicion by
people who, without the slightest sympathy for assassins
1. Minute by Harcourt (HO. 24 November 1880): and Tenterden
to Home Office (FO. 11 December 1880): HO 45/949816953,
1117a & /118.
2. Duff erin to Granville (Private. 7 April 1881): Granv.PP.
PRO 30/29/185.
3. cf. Elliot to Granville (No.224)(Vienna. 26 April 1881):
FO 7/1014; Granville to Harcourt (Private. 1 April 1881); and
Ponsonby to Granville (Private. 11 April 1881): Granv.PP.
PRO 30/29/130 & 138.
4. cf. Gladstone to Queen Victoria (Private. 4 May 1881): CAB
41/16/25.
were intensely jealous of their country's right of asylum and
prone to resent any appearance of an attempt to interfere
with it". Ministers could only accept if they "could reckon
upon a general concurrence of opinion.., as to its necessity
or propriety", 6 and while horror at the Czar's assassination
was a fairly general feeling, British opinion was in more
general terms firmly Russophobe, both on national and liberal
grounds.
-
Although refusal might produce dangerous anti-British
feeling on the continent (it would be "unintelligible in
Russia"), she did not stand alone. It was known that France
would reject any proposal, as would Italy and Switzerland.?
The diplomatic repercussions of refusal could therefore be
lived with, but not discounted: Bismarck was "dreadfully
upset".6
5. Elliot to Granville (No.224)(Vienna. 26 April 1881): FO
7/1014; and Selborne to Granville (Private. 10 April 1881):
Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/141. Granville later stated he was
"convinced" acceptance "would not have been approved by
Parliament or by the nation": 3H„(L),261,c.789,(19 May
1881).
6. Granville to Duff erin (Telegraphic. FO. 11 April 1881): FO
181/644.
7. cf. Lyons to Granville (No.377)(Paris. 25 April 1881): FO
27/2492; Granville to Ampthill (No.186)(FO. 16 April 1881):
FO 181/644; Minute by Pauncefote (FO. 22 April 1881): FO
27/2484; Dufferin to Granville (Private. 23 April 1881):
Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/185; Ampthill to Granville (Private. 7
May 1881): ibid. 1177; Wyndham to Granville (Private. 12
May 1881): ibid. /186; Dilke Diary, 9 April 1881: Dilke
Papers, BL Add. MS 43924, f.46; and D.W.R. Bahlman (ed.),
Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton (Oxford 1972) volume 1,
p.136.
8. Ampthill to Granville (Private. 14 April 1881): Granv.PP.
PRO 30/29/177.
No-one seems to have held out any hope of any Russian
proposal doing any good: "It has now become practically
impossible to prevent these dreadful acts". There was "no
possible method of preventing a repetition of such a crime...
The bowling has permanently beaten the batting". Indeed, it
was believed that it would be counter-productive. If
ministers thought the law needed amending, "they would be far
more likely to carry any measure... if it were spontaneously
proposed by them, than if it were the result of any concert
and agreement with Foreign Powers". Any proposal "would
create a reaction against the Excellent feeling which now
exists", and "refusal would be a great encouragement to those
whom it is desired to put down"..
However, it would be wrong to regard ministers as wholly
motivated by expediency. Granville, Gladstone and Dike, and
perhaps others, were disposed on principle to refuse any
Russian approach. Granville noted that acceptance was
"impossible in the face of all the traditions" of the
country, and Gladstone agreed."'
Initially Granville tried to prevent the Russian
proposal being made at all, but to no avail: on 28 April
9. Lewis Harcourt Diary, 15 March 1881, WVH.PP. Box 348, f.7;
Anon, 'Precautions Against Assassination', Spectator volume
54 (1881), p.374; Selborne to Granville (Private. 10 April
1881): Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/141; and Granville to Dufferin
(Telegraphic. FO. 11 April 1881): FO 181/644.
10. Granville to Gladstone and Gladstone to Granville
(Private. 11 April 1881): Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/124. On Dilke,
see below.
Britain was invited to an anti-nihilist conference." Her
refusal to attend was very carefully worded, emphasising that
she shared continental horror of the assassination, that her
existing laws were more than adequate, and that of course she
had no sympathy for terrorists..' ° In order to supplement
these assurances with something more practical, the British
government pursued certain policies and made certain
statements which were designed to conciliate Russia.
-
The prosecution of Johann Most for incitement to
assassination was partly intended as an attempt to show that
it was unnecessary for Britain to attend the conference. The
"credit which would accrue from" the prosecution "to the
government abroad" was "one of the chief motives" for it, and
it produced the "desired result". Most's conviction was
"considered equal" to attending the conference.'
Of more direct concern to this study is the discussion
prompted by Woronzoff telling the Queen that one of the
11. cf. Granville to Duff erin (Telegraphic. FO. 11 April
1E181): FO 181/644: Giers to Lobanoff, communicated on 28
April 1881: FO 65/1126; and Granville to Wyndham
(No.176A)(FO. 29 April 1881): FO 65/1108. Dilke was not
lying when he said no approach had been made to Britain:
3H„(C),260„c.1312,(28 April 1881). The invitation arrived
after he made his statement.
12. Granville to Wyndham (No.188)(FO. 10 May 1881): FO
181/644. cf. B. Porter., Vigilant State (1987) p.40.
Since any measures against political refugees were pointless
if Britain (their main asylum) did not participate / the
proposal ended here. Informal approaches on the same
subject were made by Bismarck in 1883-4, but rebutted: cf.
Ampthill to Granville (Private. 14 April 1883): Granv.PP.
PRO 30/29/178; and Granville to Harcourt (Private.
4 September 1884): WVH. PP. Box 721, f.378.
13. B. Porter, 'Freiheit Prosecutions', Historical Journal 
volume 23 (1980), pp.846-8.
assassins had claimed they would have been safe if they had
reached Britain, as:
although the murder of any individual would come under
extradition law, yet the murderer of a sovereign was a
political criminal and therefore excluded from the
provisions of that law.
The Queen was horrified at this, and asked "what is the real
state of the law".".
 (In fact, any conspirator who reached
Britain would have been quite safe, for no Anglo-Russian
extradition treaty had yet been signed, and nothing could be
done in the absence of such a treaty.)
Selborne believed there was:
nothing in our Extradition Laws or Treaties, or in the
principles on which we administer them, to take the
murder of a sovereign out of their operation, only
because it is a sovereign who is murdered... it is
reasonable to believe, that so atrocious an act as the
assassination of the late Emperor of Russia, would be
regarded as a simple murder.
However, the issue would have to be decided by the courts,
and could not be pre-judged by the executive. Gladstone
noted: "How could the ridiculous idea be entertained for a
moment in this country that in the case of a Sovereign
killing would be no murder", while Harcourt later wrote that
murder was "not dispunishable because it is directed
14. Ponsonby to Granville (Private. 9 April 1881): Granv. PP.
PRO 30/29/38.
against a Sovereign".'	 Granville informed the Queen that in
extradition law, "the murderer of a sovereign would stand
under the same rule as the murderer of an individual". She
no doubt passed this on, but to make certain, Granville made
the continentals aware of Selborne's views..
It is easy to see why ministers fell upon their
interpretation so readily. They may have believed what they
wrote, but they also wanted to show that 'existinglaws were
sufficient to deal with nihilism, and so held assassination
to be extraditable. This interpretation was very much
intended for foreign (and royal) consumption, and must be
viewed in connection with the Most prosecution and other
assurances given by Britain that her laws needed no
amendment.
The clear implication was that ministers were certain
that had any of the assassins come under a British treaty,
they would have been extradited. However, with good reason,
they held back from saying this directly. The views of
ministers were irrelevant: it was the courts opinion that
15. Selborne to Granville (Private. 10 April 1881); Gladstone
to Granville (Private. 12 April 1881): ibid. /141 & /124; and
Harcourt to Granville (Private. 21 July 1881): WVH.PP. Box
721, f.201. The press generally agreed: cf. The Times 8
March 1880, p.11. In 1879, the then Foreign Secretary,
Salisbury, had expressed the opinion that "an accomplice in
an attempt at murder of a Sovereign or any one else would be
surrendered... but... Conspirators to murder would not be so
surrendered in the absence of complicity in... that act", and
Cross had agreed: Salisbury to Cross (Private. 1 January
1879): Cross Papers, BL Add. MS 51263, ff.20-21; and Cross
to Salisbury (Private. 4 January 1879): 3M/E, f.71.
16. Granville to Queen Victoria (Private. 13 April 1881):
Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/38. cf. Granville to Ampthill
(No.187)(FO. 18 April 1881): FO 65/977.
mattered, and their views had never been tested. The only
even remotely relevant case was the Bernard trial of 1858, in
which, despite being guilty of complicity in Orsini's attempt
to assassinate Louis Napoleon, the prisoner was acquitted by
a jury that was determined to uphold the right of asylum. It
has been asserted that this "cannot in any sense justify the
conclusion" that assassins would be exempt from extradition,
but elsewhere it was held that if Orsini had come to Britain
and been extradited, the government would have been "exposed
to troublesome clamour". The case of course gave no clear
precedent against the extradition of assassins, but showed
there was room to doubt whether British opinion would in all
cases tolerate it.1'7
Selborne later added that if the Royal Commission's
Report was implemented the point would be "more clear". "3
Furthermore, a proposal to qualify the political offence
exemption in a manner which would have excluded regicide was
removed from the first draft of the 1870 Act. If it was so
self evident that assassins were not political offenders, why
had this been done? "It would no doubt be possible to put
extreme cases" when the "justice" of an assassination "would
hardly be questioned". In the right set of circumstances, a
magistrate, court, or even the Home Secretary might well
judge an assassin to be a political offender worthy of
protection. The executions of Charles I and Louis XVI
17. N.W. Sibley and A. Elias op.cit. p.136; and Anon, 'The
Extradition Dead-Lock', Saturday Review volume 41 (1876),
p.668.
18. Minute by Selborne (30 April 1881): Granv.PP. PRO
30/29/143.
amounted to assassination, "Yet who can deny that these acts
helped the cause of liberty in the countries in which they
were perpetrated?" 1 Russia was often regarded as a special
case. There was "always a considerable fund of popular
hostility" towards her government, no doubt partly because
she was the chief threat to British imperial interests, "but
strengthened too by a purer liberal distaste for autocracy".
If Russians advocated reform, "the reply of the Government is
,
Siberia, and the rejoinder of the people is dynamite".2"'
Russia had sought an extradition treaty in January 1881.
The idea had been accepted in principle, ° 1 and was now
returned to, partly as a means of further conciliating her.
The Queen urged its conclusion, and Gladstone was "sorry to
hear" one did not exist.
	
At the same time,
19. W. Dillon, 'Assassination', Fortnightly Review volume 41
(1884), p.513; and S. Stepniak, 'Terrorism', Contemporary 
Review volume 45 (1884),p.327.
20. B. Porter, 'British Government and Political Refugees',
pp.25-6; and Reynolds's 29 February 1880, p.4. cf. Ouida,
'Legislation of Fear', Fortnightly Review volume 56 (1894),
p.553. In 1889, at a breakfast party held in Spencer's
honour at the Gateshead home of Robert Spence Watson, a
leading north-east Liberal, "there was some little defence
for assassination on the ground that it was the only weapon
left to the Russian people, and that unless they could
intimidate the powers there was nothing else they could do.
They had tried reason and appeals to justice and the like in
vain": A.B. Cooke and J.R. Vincent, 'Lord Spencer on the
Phoenix Park Murders', Irish Historical Studies volume 18
(1972-73), p.588. In 1973, a British Law Lord asserted that
the 1870 Act could be regarded as "positively encouraging the
political assassinations of oppressive despots": J.K. Bentil,
'Extradition Law', Solicitor's Journal volume 117 (1973),
p.825.
21. cf. Pauncefote to Tenterden (Private. 3 January 1881):
FO 65/1325; and Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 7 February
1881): FO 181/644.
22. Ponsonby to Granville (Private. 11 April 1881); and
Gladstone to Granville (Private. 12 April 1881): Granv.PP.
PRO 30/29/38 & /124.
Harcourt repeated his desire to introduce a bill to implement
the Royal Commission's Report.
	 Dilke thought it "clear
that it would be foolish to introduce it now", while
Kimberley and Chamberlain "fought against the whole thing".24.
Dilke opposed offering Russia a treaty at all, for "in this
present state of things, a vote of censure will be carried in
the H of C... I would stick to the promise to do it some
day".
-
However, Granville thought it "a great anomaly" that
there was no treaty between "two great European countries".
The decision to conclude a treaty with Russia was confirmed,
and Lobanoff was informed that it would be better to delay
conclusion until the law had been
23. cf. Minute by Harcourt (HO. 11 April 1881): HO
45/9498/6953, /118. Harcourt wanted to "legislate on
extradition to please the Russians": Dilke Diary, 3 May
1881, Dilke Papers, EIL Add. MS 43924, f.49. This was perhaps
true, but he had expressed his desire to implement the Report
before the matter was raised. The Russian desire for a
treaty was not sparked off by the Czar's death: it was
perhaps prompted by the Hartmann affair. Implicated in an
attempt to assassinate the Czar (1879), he escaped to France,
and Russia sought extradition, which was refused for lack of
evidence. Hartmann then went to London, and Russia asked
whether, if they produced sufficient evidence, he could be
extradited. The government replied that nothing could be
done as there was no extradition treaty: cf. Dufferin to
Salisbury (No.136)(St. Petersburg. 16 March 1880): FO
65/1079: and Salisbury to Dufferin (No.126)(FO. 31 March
1880): FO 65/1076.
24. Dilke Diary, 4 May 1881: Dilke Papers, BL Add. MS 43924,
ff.49-50. cf. Cabinet minutes for 4 May 1881: Glad.PP. EC
Add. MS 44642, #.178.
25. Dilke to Granville (Private. 23 September 1881); and same
to same (Private. 26 September 1881): Granv.PP. PRO
30/29/121, ff.193-4 & 202-3. Although a treaty would not
need ratification by Parliament, a copy of it had to be
published, and Parliament could debate it if it wished.
reformed.''' How Parliament and the public would have reacted
to either the treaty or bill is unclear, for no bill was
drafted, and no treaty signed. Pressure of business meant
that there was no time for the bill, so Russia was offered a
treaty on the basis of the 1870 Act. 	 However, Russia now
expressed her desire to "await the passing of the proposed
amendments", and so the idea was dropped for the time
being.B
-
One 'extradition' law that did pass in 1881 was the
Fugitive Offenders Act (44 & 45 Vict. c.69), which regulated
extradition within the empire, and replaced the outmoded 1843
'Act for the better Apprehension of certain Offenders' (6 & 7
Vict. c.34). It was quite unlike the Extradition Act: it
contained no political offence exemption (indeed, treason was
one of the specified offences), no embodiment of the
speciality principle, and so on. 2°' The Act moved
26. Granville to Dilke (Private. 25 September 1881): ibid.
ff.195-6. cf. Granville to Wyndham (No.185)(FO. 4 May 1881):
FO 65/1325.
27. Granville to Wyndham (No.185)(FO. 4 May 1881): and
Liddell to Foreign Office (HO. 24 May 1881): ibid. cf . Minute
by Harcourt (HO. 22 May 1881): HO 45/9523/26329, /7.
28. Wyndham to Granville (No.289)(St. Petersburg. 8 June
1881): FO 65/1112. cf. Thornton to Granville (Private. 20
October 1881): Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/185. In April 1882, the
Russians changed their minds once more and asked for a treaty
based on the 1870 Act. Signature was delayed by Russian
requests for amendments to the safeguards provided for
political refugees. Britain rejected them, but in 1886 a
treaty was finally signed: cf. CAB 41/16/25; FO 65/1325; and
HO 45/9523/26329.
29. cf. CO 323/315; and HO 45/9324/17828A, /1 & /2. Fugitives
were frequently tried for additional offences: cf. HO
144/84/A7289; HO 144/540/A51139; HO 144/669/X86278; and R.E.
Clute 'Commonwealth Extradition', American Journal of 
Comparative Law volume 8 (1959), p.23.
through Parliament quickly, but in the Commons Arthur
O'Connor (an Irish Nationalist MP) tried to take treason out
of its operation:
It was altogether contrary to the usual practice for
fugitives to be extradited for political crimes... Why
should a different practice be introduced in their
relations with Colonial Governments to that which
obtained in their relations with Foreign Nations?
Ministers "could not possibly agree to this": if they did,
"a person in this country might pass over to a Colony and yet
not be made answerable to a law general to both the Colony
and the Mother Country". The amendment was defeated without
a division.
The government could hardly have adopted any other
attitude. "It would have been absurdity itself for a
politically disaffected Indian to have escaped the just
maternal wrath of the Queen-Emperor by embarking at Madras
and disembarking at Tilbury". 1
 Say the Queen was
assassinated in London: why should the killer be safe simply
because he had fled to another part of the empire? Treason
was treason throughout.
There was, perhaps, a less tangible factor behind the
absence of any safeguards for 'politicos'. There existed
30. 3H,(C),265,cc.598-9,(20 August 1861). The reply came
from Collier.
31. C. Thornberry, 'Armah v. Government of Ghana', Modern Law
Review volume 30 (1967), p.197.
the widespread belief that people were driven to political
offences by just causes. Foreign regimes suffered from
political crime because they were illiberal, it was their own
fault: "autocratic Government is an incentive to sedition,
to rebellion, to conspiracy /
 to plot, and to murder".
	 The
logical corollary of such beliefs was that as a liberal
nation, ever on the march of liberal progress, Britain had no
political crimes, and no political prisoners in her goals.
Such a belief, and the foundations upon Which it rested,
appear smug and self-satisfied to the modern eye (a sign of
"the usual hypocrisy of the English in not giving anyone
political treatment and then being able to say that alone
among the Empires she had no political prisoners"), but to
view them as such is rather unfair. Victorians believed the
British system was the best available: they may have been
wrong, but that is no reason not to respect their beliefs.
In a curious sort of way, therefore, the absence of any
safeguards within the Fugitive Offenders Act may be viewed as
a reflection and embodiment of the dominant liberal ethos of
the time.
* * *
The Anglo-American dispute remained unresolved in 1880,
and constituted the most serious practical problem vis-à-vis 
extradition. The policies adopted on speciality generally,
and American cases specifically, may seem inconsistent, but
in fact had a certain logic behind them.
32. Reynolds's 3 April 1881, p.5. cf. A.V. Kirwan, op.cit.
p.160; and B. Porter, 7 Freiheit Prosecutions', p.838.
33. B. Behan, Borstal Boy (1958) p.271.
With respect to post-1870 treaties, speciality was fully
upheld,	 but a similar policy was not adopted in American
cases.	 The inexpendient policy adopted by the previous
government was abandoned. Granville and Harcourt always
rejected the argument that speciality could be insisted upon
under the 1842 treaty,	 and simply returned to the policy
adopted before 1875. It was "undesirable that any official
communication should be made... which would tend to revive
-
the controversy".. 7
 Only criminals could have welcomed that,
and ministers planned to implement the Commission's
recommendation on speciality anyway. There was nothing to be
gained by causing trouble over a principle which they were
convinced ought to be made less strict.
During Harcourt's Home Secretaryship two interesting re-
extradition cases cropped up. Hamel was surrendered to
Germany, but in 1882 France applied for re-extradition.
Maconochie and Liddell thought it illegal, but the Law
Officers disagreed, and held that British consent was not
required. No-one seems to have remembered Bourdiol, and
Germany was informed of the Law Officers' views.m
34. See the cases of: Payen (HO 144/54/90515; and FO
27/2525); Chariot (HO 144/83/A6535); and Janck (HO
144/117/A27191; and FO 100/254 & 256).
35. See the cases of: Miller (HO 144/96/A15388); Watts (HO
144198/A16462; and HO 144/109/A23384); and Vanderpool and
Jones (F0 5/1842).
36. cf. Harcourt to Liddell (Private. n.d.): HO
144/117/A27191, /11a.
37. Minute by Harcourt (HO. 4 January 1883): HO
144/96/A15388, /3.
38. Minutes by Maconochie and Liddell (HO. 4 August 1882):
HO 144/83/A64178, /1; Law Officers' Opinion by James and
Herschell (11 August 1882): ibid. /2; and Granville to
Stumm (FO. 17 August 1882): HO 144/666/X81244, /25.
In conclusion, the Law Officers had added:
Circumstances may occur such as the obtaining of the
extradition of a prisoner in order to deliver him over
to a third Country to be tried for a political offence
which might give this Country a right to complain.
However, if British consent to re-extradition was
unnecessary, how could she protect a political refugee?
,
Complaints would be of little use after the event. The
opinion given really raised more questions than it answered,
and the confusion over re-extradition remained, and was even
magnified.
In 1883, a re-extradition case occurred which may well
have involved a political refugee. Ganz was surrendered to
the Netherlands on fraud charges, and Germany applied for re-
extradition. Bergne noted that "however unworthy an object
he may be", it should not be allowed, but Maconochie minuted:
"He is a socialist and a writer in the Freiheit EMost's
journal] and wishes to keep out of the hands of the German
authorities. He has no claim I think to the interference of
the British Government".'"' It was quite likely that Ganz was
a political refugee (he was "formerly connected with the
Socialistic Party and their Propaganda in Germany""), but
the Home Office took no account of this. No attempt was made
39. Law Officers' Opinion by James and Herschell (11 August
1882): HO 144/83/A6417B, /2.
40. Memorandum by Bergne (FO. 13 March 1883): FO 371629: and
minute by Maconochie (HO. 20 March 1883): HO 144/90/A11390,
/28 cf. Minutes by Lushington (HO. 21 March 1883); and
Harcourt (HO. 22 March 1883): ibid.
41. Petition by Ganz (n.d.): FO 371629.
to discover for what offence Germany sought extradition, and
no indication is given in surviving papers. 4	 However, in
April 1883 came the news that the Netherlands had refused
extradition on the grounds that it would have been contrary
to the terms of the Anglo-Dutch treaty. The nature of Dutch
objections to the re-extradition are also unclear, but in any
event, the manner in which the Home Office dealt with the
case was hardly worthy of a nation which had such a long
tradition of protecting 'politicos'.
* * *
Thus far, we have dealt almost exclusively with
extradition from Britain or her colonies, but in 1882-3, for
the first time, extradition to Britain became an issue of
political and historical importance. This new departure
arose from British efforts to extradite persons implicated in
the 'Phoenix Park Murders'.4
On 6 May 1882 0 Cavendish and Burke (the Chief Secretary
of Ireland and his secretary) were murdered in Phoenix Park,
Dublin. Early in 1883, 44
 those directly responsible
42. The nature of the offence is clearly crucial: it might
be discovered from German or Dutch archives.
43. On pre-I882 cases involving British 'political'
offenders, cf. Chapter four.
44. Between June and December 1682, attention centred on the
extradition of Westgate (who had confessed to being one of
the murderers) from Venezuela. However, even before he
arrived back in Britain, it was clear that his confession was
bogus. cf . FO 80/281-3; HO 144/98/A16380; WVH.PP. Boxes 39-
4; Althorp Papers, K17 & K39; 3H 5 (L),272 5 c.1904, (27 July
1882); 3H,(C),272 1 c.1974027 July 1882): 3H,(C),
274,c.940 1 (7 November 1882); The Times 19 December 1882, p.4;
and T.H. Corfe, Phoenix Park Murders (1968) p.228.
were convicted, chiefly on the evidence of James Carey, a
conspirator turned informer. His evidence also implicated
four men (Byrne, Tynan, Sheridan and Walsh) as the organisers
of the crime, and their extradition was duly sought from
France and the United States. However, for two basic
reasons, none were surrendered.
Firstly, the necessary evidence was entirely lacking.
The authorities only had Carey's evidence; and it could not
be hoped that foreign courts would accept "the evidence of an
informer.., as sufficient". Reynolds's asserted that "an
honest jury would not hang a dog upon his testimony" and the
Irish authorities later admitted they would not have been
able to convict the men if extradited.4 4'
Furthermore, there was the political nature of the
crime. Mexico questioned whether Tynan was accused of
"actual Director of the French Foreign Ministry) went
further: it was "the first time England has ever asked for
the Extradition of a man for a political offence". 4. "7 There
45. On the cases generally, cf. HO 144/113/A25252; HO
144/113/A25071; HO 144/113/A25070; HO 144/113/A25251;
HO 144/98/A16380C; 3H,(C),276,c.1417,(5 March 1883);
3H,(C),278,c.435,(17 April 1883); ibid. c.621,
(19 April 1883); 3H0C),282,c.133602 August 1883);
P.J.P. Tynan, Irish National Invincibles (1894)
pp.548-59; and T.H. Corfe, op. cit. pp. 248-53. They are
exhaustively covered in the private papers of Granville,
Harcourt and Spencer.
46. Edwards to Granville (No.4 Treaty)(New York. 23 March
1883): FO 5/1849; Reynolds's 4 March 1883, p.4; and
Hamilton to Home Office (Dublin Castle. 19 June 1883): HO
I44/113/A25252. /19. cf. Granville to Spencer (Private.
6 March 1883): Althorp Papers, K16.
crime" or "a mere political offence". Billot (Political
47. Currie to Home Office (FO. 28 April 1883): HO
144/113/A25252, /11; and Plunkett to Lyons (Paris. 24
February 1883): HO 144/1131A25071, /2b.
was a "strong feeling" in America that the fugitives were
political offenders, and the same opinion seems to have
prevailed in France.	 As a result of Irish terrorism,
Britain was placed in the same position as that routinely
faced by continentals, who perhaps looked upon British
failure with some ironic pleasure. In France, there was "an
evident tendency to rejoice", while elsewhere, foreigners
viewed the episode "with a certain malicious satisfaction".4.7
,
Almost from the first, the authorities had been aware
that extradition was unlikely to be granted..m
Notwithstanding repeated advice that attempts at extradition
were pointless (Edwards reported that he had no means of
identifying Sheridan nor evidence which could be produced in
court: "I more than ever believe that to attempt an
Arrest... would be impolitic, precipitate, and futile"1),
Harcourt pressed on. It is perhaps unfair to criticise
unduly his dogged determination. Carey's evidence was given
in open court, so ministers had to do everything they could
to get hold of the four men. To have done otherwise would
have laid them open to the charge of being 'soft' on Irish
terrorism, and they had already had to suffer more than
enough criticism of that kind. Making foreign governments
49. The Times 1 & 3 March 1883, pp.5 & 9. cf. West to
Granville (Private. 13 March 1883): Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/154.
British opinion disagreed, except for Reynolds's (15 April
1883, p.4): they were political because the assassins held
no private grudge against the victims.
49. The Times 3 March 1883, p.9. cf. 12 April 1883, p.5.
50. cf. Spencer to Harcourt (Private. 26 February 1883):
WVH.PP. Box 353, f.82.
51. Edwards to Granville (New York. 27 February 1883): HO
144/A25070, 110.
responsible for non-extradition made it easier to counter
criticism of the failure: "it is not our fault. We have
done all we could". The Times commented that ministers were
trying to "show the public that they are not idle or asleep,
but still working with vigilance and zeal in the pursuit of
their object".2
It was suggested that after extradition failed, certain
extra-legal means were tried: there were reports of various
attempts to trick the fugitives into returning to Britain.
The Daily News thought they might have been practical jokes,
the authors of which were simply "humorists bent on a little
bit of fun",°4 and no evidence exists to substantiate the
claims. However, one would not expect to find it. They must
be left as open questions, but possibilities, for it was by
no means certain that agents involved in anti-Fenian work
always worked strictly within the law.
As an interesting postscript to the Phoenix Park affair,
two notable cases (involving Michael O'Donnell and 'Red Jim'
McDermott) occurred under the Fugitive Offenders Act: one
public, one secret; one success, one failure.
52. Harcourt to Granville (Private. 11 March 1883): WVH.
PP. Box 721, ff.318-9; and The Times 26 February
1883, p.6.
53. cf. The Times 26 March 1883, p.3; Daily News 27 March
1883, p.5; and F.M. Bussy„ Irish Conspiracies (1910)
pp. 114-6.
54. Daily News 27 March 1883, p.5.
55. cf. HO 144/478/X27302; B. Porter, Vigilant State pp.94 &
135-6; 'British Government and Political Refugees', p.37;
Origins of Britain's Political Police (Warwick 1985) passim. 
and 'Early Special Branch'. Intelligence and National 
Security volume 1 (1986), pp.382-4.
Once the trials in Dublin were over, it was important
that Carey be protected, and it was decided to send him to
Africa, there to start a new life. However, a Fenian named
Michael O'Donnell was on the ship carrying Carey, and on 29
July 1883 (off Cape Colony) he killed
Since the crime had been committed on the 'high seas',
O'Donnell could either be tried in Cape Colony, or sent back
to Britain under the Fugitive Offenders Act. Without
hesitation, the authorities plumped for trial in Britain,
which was "important in the interests of justice". 	 It was
"feared he would not be convicted in the Colony... Irish and
Dutch elements, which might affect the jury", sympathised
with O'Donne11. 9 There may be some truth in this: Spencer
wrote that if he was "likely to be acquitted" he should be
brought back.	 However, to return O'Donnell to Britain was
quite proper. There was no question of legal procedure being
perverted to political ends. (He was later executed).
The case demonstrated the usefulness of the Fugitive
Offenders Act. Had O'Donnell murdered Carey within the
jurisdiction of a foreign country, he would no doubt have
contested extradition on political offence grounds. It is
56. Tynan claimed he was sent to implement the verdict of
"the revolutionary court-martial that sentenced him to
death": P.J.P. Tynan, op.cit. p.332. On the case generally,
cf. HO 144/122/A30424; HO 144/122/A30424B; M. Davitt op.cit.
pp.454-5; and F.E. Gibson, Attitudes of the New York Irish 
(New York 1951) pp.360-2; and J.P. O'Grady, Irish Americans 
(New York 1976) pp.190-4.
57. Wingfield to Home Office (CO. 18 August 1883): HO
144/122/A30424, 17.
58. P.J.P. Tynan., DO.cit. P.335.
59. Spencer to Jenkinson (Private. 11 August 1883): Althorp
Papers, K39.
a matter of conjecture whether such a plea would have been
accepted, but at the least, one has to say that it was by no
means certain that O'Donnell would have been surrendered.
The McDermott case was an altogether curious affair."
In June 1883, Jenkinson (who led anti-Fenian operations)
asked Harcourt to instruct the Canadian authorities to arrest
him. The ostensible reason for the arrest, and subsequent
return to Britain under the Fugitive Offenders Act, was his
involvement in Fenian bombing campaigns. Although Jenkinson
had "plenty of proof" that McDermott was "mixed up in the
Dynamite business" it was "not for the purpose of getting him
convicted" that he wanted him arrested.4"-
McDermott was one of Jenkinson's many informers, but had
"brought... suspicion on himself" by "indiscreet conduct",
and had been "sentenced... to death"." Jenkinson hoped that
having McDermott arrested might remove this suspicion, for it
was important that he was not 'executed'. The anti-Fenian
campaign largely depended upon informers, and the "flow of
information" would stop if potential informers felt they were
likely to be discovered and murdered. There must be no
repetition of Carey's fate.41
60. On the episode generally, cf. K.R.M. Short, Dynamite War 
(Dublin 1979) pp.156-8; and B.Porter, Vigilant State pp.57-8.
61. Jenkinson to Harcourt (Private. 17 & 18 June 1883): WVH.
PP. Box 103, ff. 82-7.
62. Jenkinson to Harcourt (Private. 17 June 1883): ibid.
ff.82-4. On his career as an informer, cf. L. O'Broin,
Fenian Fever (1971) p.62: W. D'Arcy, op.cit. pp.41, 140, 153;
and M. Davitt, op. cit. pp.428-35.
63. Spencer to Harcourt (Private. 8 September 1883): Althorp
Papers, KI8. cf . Jenkinson to Spencer (Private. 4 August
1883): ibid. K39; Jenkinson to Harcourt (Private. 18 June
1883): WVH.PP. Box 103, ff.86-7.
Harcourt approached the Colonial Office, which initially
agreed to order the arrest, but then refused. Proceedings
under the Fugitive Offenders Act were ruled out, but the
problem remained of dealing with McDermott. 6'4 However, in
August, he unexpectedly arrived at Liverpool, and was
charged. It is clear the prosecution was not bona fide: he
was "legally freed after he had doubtless been suborned", and
"there is nothing to suggest that he met his end in
retributive violence".
Jenkinson solved his problem, but the real importance of
the McDermott case lies in that it demonstrated that although
the Fugitive Offenders Act did not contain the safeguards of
the Extradition Act, regular, legal procedures had to be
complied with. Jenkinson realised that the bogus extradition
could not have been attempted from a foreign state, but had
thought "it could be managed" as McDermott was in Canada.
He was wrong, and Harcourt acknowledged that "the processes
of the law ought not to be employed for prosecutions which
are not bona fide". 's4a The Fugitive Offenders Act should not
64. cf. Harcourt to Jenkinson (Private. 18,19,20 & 21 June
1883); and Jenkinson to Harcourt (Private. 19 June 1883):
ibid. ff.85-92.
65. K.R.M. Short, op.cit. pp.157-8. In 1886 a strange case
occurred which involved another of Jenkinson's agents:
Winter. His extradition from France was sought for perjury
and bigamy: if prosecuted, he threatened to set up a defence
that the prosecution was maliciously brought by the
Metropolitan Police as part of its struggle with Jenkinson
for control of anti-Fenian operations, to call ministers and
officials as witnesses to prove his case, and to reveal
details of anti-Fenian measures. However, extradition was
refused because it was more than 3 years since the offence
was committed. cf . HO 144/470/X10996; Iddesleigh Diary, 6
August 1886: BL Add. MS 50044, +.1; and B. Porter, Vigilant 
State p.60.
66. Jenkinson to Harcourt (Private. 18 June 1883); and
Harcourt to Spencer (Private. 10 September 1883): WVH.PP. Box
103, ff.86-7 and Box 42, f.122.
be regarded as an oppressive instrument of British rule. It
perhaps enabled Britain to recover criminals from colonies
whom she might not have been able to extradite from foreign
countries, but the Act was by no means a universal cure all.
The necessary legal forms could not be evaded or abused even
in so urgent and important a case as that of 'Red Jim'
McDermott.
* * *
-
In November 1882 the American government expressed its
desire to resume negotiations to replace the limited
arrangement of 1842. As the Americans maintained their
objections to the Extradition Act's provision on speciality,
Harcourt returned to his plans to implement the Report of the
Royal Commission, which was also desirable "on general
grounds".. 67
On 20 October 1883, Thring was instructed to prepare the
bill,'s" and it was ready by April 1884. Harcourt's bill was
designed to put British extradition policy on an entirely new
footing. Section 2(b) stated that a fugitive should not be
surrendered if accused of a political offence which was
committed by him during a time of (and in furtherance of)
civil war or open insurrection. Speciality was abolished in
Section 2(a). Fugitives were to be liable to trial for any
offence, but were not to be surrendered if there was "good
ground for suspecting" they might be tried for a political
offence.
67. Currie to Home Office (FO. 22 December 1882); West to
Granville (No.57 Treaty)(Washington. 16 April 1883); and
minutes by Harcourt (HO. 31 December 1662 & 11 May 1883): HO
144/109/A23384, /1 & /10.
68. cf. ibid. /17.
Section 2(e) maintained the fifteen day interval between
committal and surrender, but gave the fugitive the right to
waive this delay. Section 24 provided for the transit
through Britain of Fugitives surrendered by foreign states to
one another, under a very simple procedure in which the
fugitive was not given an opportunity to seek liberation on
the grounds that he was a political offender. The only
significant addition to the schedule of crimes was of
,
offences under the 1883 Explosives Act 4°? . The ensuing
discussion of the bill revealed significant divergences of
opinion.
Thring was unhappy with the political offence clause he
had drafted, and suggested his own new version. Political
offences were not to include assassination or attempted
assassination, or:
any other crime of violence committed otherwise than in
furtherance of existing civil war, or existing open
insurrection, and shall not include any crime of
violence.., as would not be justifiable in open war,
according to the laws of war as understood by civilised
nations."'
Pauncefote thought Thring's own definition "excellent", as
did Granville, and Ingham (chief magistrate at Bow Street)
advocated its adoption."
69. Copy of the bill in HO 45/9606/A2566, /17. The bill left
extradition procedure and the nature of the evidence required
to justify extradition unaltered.
70. Memorandum by Thring (1 April 1884): ibid. /17.
71. Memoranda by Pauncefote (FO. 7 June 1884); and Bergne
(FO. 12 August 1884): FO 5/1896. cf. FO 5/2042.
In contrast, Harcourt was "not satisfied", and
suggested:
No crime of violence.., shall be deemed... Political
merely by reason of the motive from which it is alleged
to have been committed if such crime be in itself
punishable by law, unless... connected with an existing
condition of open warfare or insurrection.
The 1880s were in fact a time when the definition of
political offences "attracted considerable attention". De
Hart asserted that those who resorted to terrorism should be
treated like "other murderers": offences "directed against,
or endangering human life" should not be considered political
unless they occurred "in the actual course of an insurrection
or political disturbance".	 At its September 1880 meeting
at Oxford, the Institute of International Law resolved that
crimes committed with a political motive should not be
exempted simply because of that motivation, while in dealing
with acts done during a rebellion, it was "necessary to
inquire whether they are excused by the customs of war"."74.
However, more common than attempts at definition were
assertions like that of the Daily News that it was unlikely
the matter could ever be "authoritatively decided".
72. Harcourt to Selborne (Private. 22 February 1885): HO
45/9606/A2566„ /17a.
73. E.L. de Hart, 'Extradition of Political Offenders', Law
Quarterly Review volume 2 (1886), pp-177-87.
74. The resolutions are reprinted in Harvard Research,
oo.cit. epp.300-1.
75. Daily News 3 March 1883, p.4. cf. Pall Mall Gazette 1
March 1883„ p.1; Anon, 'The Extradition Treaty', Saturday
Review volume 62 (1886), p.110; and Reynolds's 4 March 1883,
p.4
To return to the bill, Thring had abolished the
restrictions on trial for additional offences as recommended
by the Commission, but argued they should be retained. Since
the definition of political offences was a:
matter of opinion... I cannot see any other means by
which any security can be obtained that a man
surrendered for a non-political offence will not be
tried for a political offence.
-
The Law Officers reported that while agreeing "with the view
of the Commissioners generally", they thought "the person
surrendered should not be tried for any additional offence
other than an extradition offence".'
Selborne thought clause 2(a) was "sufficient security",
and Granville agreed. Harcourt regarded Thring as "too timid
in these matters". There should be no restriction: the "real
security is the power of diplomatic remonstrance against the
abuse of the Treaty".7-7
On transit, Thring again disapproved of the clause he
had been instructed to draft. The "proposition involved" was
that a political refugee surrendered to Russia might be taken
through Britain "to be executed in Russia" without having a
chance to show that his crime was political. "Such a
proposition seems to be contrary alike to the law of England
and to the traditions of English legislation". He suggested
76. Note (a) on p.2 of the bill; and memorandum on the Draft
Extradition Bill (n.d.): HO 45/9606/A2566, /17 & /24.
77. Memorandum by Selborne (3 May 1884): FO 511896; and
Harcourt to Selborne (Private. 22 February 1885): HO
45/9606/A2566, /17a. cf . FO 5/2042.
an alternative scheme, under which a transit warrant would
not be issued unless the fugitive was given an opportunity to
show he was a political offender. If this was established,
he should be released immediately. Selborne agreed with
Thring, Granville concurred, but Harcourt did not..7m.
Gladstone's ministry came to an end in June 1885 without
Harcourt's bill coming before Parliament, but it is
nevertheless important to examine his attitudes, and why they
Oli
were not translated into legislation. It was quite natural
for him to want to implement the Report of a Commission on
which he had served, and the need to enact fresh legislation
as a precursor to a new American treaty was also a quite
logical factor pushing him in this direction, but other
factors may also have influenced his thinking.
There was royal pressure regarding political offences.
The Queen "did not see why sovereigns should be less taken
care of or more exposed to assassination than other people",
and thought it would be wise "to include sovereigns, as well
as their more fortunate fellow creatures, among those whose
murder is considered a crime". Prince Albert Edward asserted
that the law did not give sufficient "Protection to the
78. Note (a) on p.12 of the draft bill: copy in HO 45/9606
1A2566, /17; Memorandum by Selborne (3 May 1884): FO 5/1896;
and Harcourt to Selborne (Private. 22 February 1885): HO
45/96061A2566, /17a. cf . FO 5/2042. Selborne later agreed to
the provision, provided it was "limited to countries.., which
have the same principles of criminal jurisprudence" as
Britain: reported in Mackenzie to Home Office (Lord
Chancellor's Office. 27 May 1884): HO 144/1091A23384, /27.
This was hardly any use: the whole bill had to be applied to
all nations. Discrimination would only cause diplomatic
offence.
Sovereign's Person"'.. Royal influence can never be
discounted.
In any case, it is clear that from a personal
standpoint, Harcourt believed the political offence exemption
included in the 1870 Act to be too wide. He advocated the
adoption of the 'attentat' clause, and "never allowed...
[himself] to be the dupe of the mischievous fallacy that
assassination plots by secret societies are... to be
tolerated or extenuated as political of fences".
Harcourt's attitudes were perhaps conditioned by the
circumstances of the time. The first half of the 1880s were
generally unhappy times for many Britons. Irish terrorism
was particularly worrying for a people that was not
accustomed to such things. el In addition, for the first
time, Britain faced serious challenges to her near monopoly
in both European and colonial markets, social unrest grew
throughout the decade, and forceful native socialism re-
emerged. Things just did not seem to be going along quite as
well as they had in the past: the "old liberal equations no
longer worked out as they had used to". e2 Liberal values
79. Lewis Harcourt Diary, 2 April 1881: WVH.PP. Box 348,
f.30; Ponsonby to Granville (Private. 11 April 1881):
Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/38; and memorandum by Prince Albert
Edward (n.d.): WVH.PP. Box 2, ff.22-6.
80. Minute by Harcourt (HO. 2 May 1881): HO 45/9339/21820,
/3; and 3H,(C)„260,c.1841,(5 May 1881).
81. cf. K.R.M Short, op.cit. pp.259-60 and passim.; J.P.
O'Grady, op.cit. pp.170-202; and B. Porter, Vigilant State 
chapters 3 & 4.
82. B. Porter, Origins of Britain's Political Police p.5.
were questioned in a way that had been considered heretical
for years.
However, it is significant that though liberal values
were questioned, they were not thrown overboard. Concrete
signs of illiberalism are elusive. The only illiberal
legislation was the Explosives Act (which in some cases
shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defence, and required the accused to prove his innocence),
,
but it was rather mild when compared with laws passed
elsewhere. It is more significant that Britain did not pass
other illiberal laws. British liberalism was not so weak as
to be overturned by a few bombs and some competition.
Nevertheless, Irish terrorism was the most serious practical
problem faced by Harcourt: it would have been astonishing had
he not been influenced by it. The decision to make
explosives offences extraditable was the clearest indication
of this. It was obviously desirable that in any new treaty
with the United States (the main Fenian sanctuary) explosives
offences should be extraditable.a
It is an open question whether the American courts would
have viewed the bombers as political offenders, but Harcourt
had no doubts. Dynamite offences "ought to be clearly
83. Britain could have sought extradition for murder or
attempted murder, but did not. Bombers "had to be caught in
the act or recognised immediately, for there was no
possibility of convicting them [in Britain] otherwise. If
they escaped... there was insufficient evidence to support a
case for extradition": K.R.M. Short clo.cit. p.189. After the
Mansion House bombing (March 1881) the police failed to
arrest Coleman and he escaped to America. No request for
extradition was made: it was "thought best to let them see
that they are known and then they will not attempt to come
back": Lewis Harcourt Diary, 26 March 1881: WVH.PP. Box 348,
f.22.
distinguished from the category of political crimes". Indeed,
he was sure that none of the activities of Fenians and their
sympathisers should be considered political. To do so would
be "an abuse of terms... Whatever may be the motive by which
they are inspired they amount to private crimes of the most
flagrant description".1114
It is less easy to account for Harcourt's general
,
disposition to enact a bill which was so very far removed
from the spirit of the 1870 Act. However, one can say that
in general terms, Harcourt was a rather illiberal Liberal,
and far less liberal than others of his generation or party.
He had no sympathy with the sort of radical, xenophobic,
patriotic liberalism which dictated Britain's earlier
attitude towards extradition. Dilke noted that Harcourt "was
wrongheaded about the right of asylum".
Turning to the question of why no bill was introduced,
the reason given was pressure of business. ebs However, even
had there been time, it is unlikely that the bill would have
been introduced. Its terms were far from agreed upon, and
although Harcourt was quite willing to ignore the views of
84. Harcourt to Granville (Private. 8 September 1884):
Granv.PP. PRO 30/29/29; and same to same (Private. 17 June
1881): WVH.PP. Box 721, f.188. The British press agreed, and
the view found some sympathy in America: cf. for example:
Morning Post 15 December 1884, p.4; Daily News 26 January
1885, p.5; and J.B. Angell et al. 'Extradition of Dynamite
Criminals', North American Review volume 141 (1885), pp.47-
59.
85. S. Gywnn and G.M. Tuckwell. Life of Dilke (1917) volume
1, p.387.
86. cf. Harcourt to Selborne (Private. 22 January 1884): HO
144/109/A23384, /24; and Harcourt to Gladstone (Private. 9
July 1884): WVH.PP. Box 696, ff.224-5.
colleagues and advisers, it seems very doubtful that he would
have been allowed to proceed under such circumstances.
Furthermore, whilst Harcourt thought Parliament was "in a
very favourable condition for passing a good strong Bill",
others were not so sure. Bergne believed it to be "at least
doubtful" that any bill containing the limited provision on
specially advocated by Harcourt would be passed, while
Selborne was sure the bill would not pass "without much
-
discussion, or without some altering"w7.
As the bill was not introduced, one cannot be sure how
it would have been received, but some indications exist. Sir
John Rose (a retired Canadian official) regretted that the
Royal Commission's Report had not been implemented, but
wondered whether a time when the government was "open to the
imputation of panic" (it was the height of the Fenian bombing
campaign) was right for doing so. The Times though the
Report an example of "the wisdom which lies buried in Blue-
books", but "society would only be playing into the hands" of
the terrorists if it allowed them to be the means of
overthrowing public liberties and of checking the legitimate
political enterprises of persons who are in no manner
associated with them". Any attempt to "interfere" with the
right of asylum for bona fide political refugees would "most
justly call forth a storm of indignation, and meet with
determined opposition". w63 Harcourt's bill would have worked
87. Harcourt to Selborne (Private. 22 February 1885): HO
45/9606/A2566, /17a; minute by Bergne (FO. 15 May 1883): FO
5/1865, f.80; and Selborne to Harcourt (Private. 20
September 1884): FO 5/1896.
BB. Letter to the The Times 20 April 1883, p.4; The Times 20
April 1883, p.9; and 7 February 1885, p.9; and Anon,
'Freiheit Prosecution', Saturday Review volume 51 (1881),
p.418.
to the disadvantage of 'legitimate' political offenders as
well as terrorists, so perhaps even The Times might have
opposed it.
What is quite clear is that although old liberal values
were being questioned, there were plenty of people left who
were prepared to defend the traditional asylum policy to the
last, and who might well have opposed Harcourt's bill. The
continued strength of this feeling was most clearly
demonstrated by the Maceo case. In 1882, a Cuban rebel named
Maceo escaped from Spanish custody, reached Gibraltar, but
was handed back illegally by local officials, despite his
protests that he was a political refugee.Ev7
Such were the bare facts of the case. Its importance is
that the storm of protest which was aroused demonstrated that
the right of asylum was still:
without the least doubt, the one chord in the heart of
the British nation which was most quickly set vibrating,
which vibrated the most powerfully, and which continued
vibrating the longest... It was a deep and profound
passion, coextensive with that love of political liberty
which dominated an Englishman's entire life from the
cradle to the grave.5'm
* * *
89. cf. The Parliamentary Papers listed in bibliography; FO
881/4761,5152,4813,4974; FO 72/1701-3; CO 885/12; CO 91/34-
5; and CO 883/2.
90. Morier to Granville (No.148)(Madrid. 12 November 1882):
FO 881/4761, No.36. cf. especially: The Times 4 December
1882, p.9; Standard 6 November 1882, p.4; and Anon, 'Cuban
Refugees', Saturday Review volume 54 (1882), p.623. The
matter was referred to extensively in Parliament, cf.
especially, 3H,(C),279,cc.535-61,(11 May 1883).
Nevertheless, Harcourt's bill did not have to die there.
Extradition was not a party issue, and Victorians did not
share the addiction of modern politicians to doing the exact
opposite to their predecessors. The need for a new American
treaty remained, so the new Home Secretary (Cross again)
resumed discussions.
There was even less agreement than under Harcourt,'" but
,
the debate was rendered irrelevant by Cross's decision to
abandon a general bill. The Commission's recommendations
were "useful.., but not indispensable, and any Bill which
embodies them will... give rise to long discussion in
Parliament". A new American treaty was "most urgently"
needed, and for this purpose the law only had to be altered
with respect to speciality. Therefore, Cross decided to
introduce a short bill, authorising extradition if it was
provided that fugitives would not be tried "for any prior
non-extradition offence", unless given an opportunity to
return to Britain, "or under any circumstances for any
political offence". The other recommendations made by the
Commission were to be "dealt with at some subsequent
period".'72
However, a new treaty had been needed for decades; the
extra wait for a new general Act would hardly have made a
91. cf. Memorandum of points which remain for consideration
and settlement (n.d): FO 5/2042; Law Officers' Opinion by
Webster and Clarke (28 January 1886): HO 45/9606/A2566, /22;
and Hamilton to Home Office (Dublin Castle. 30 November
1885): ibid. /24.
92. Memorandum by Cross (HO. 12 January 1886)(Printed for
the Cabinet): ibid. /24. Copy of the bill in /25.
difference. One has to look rather deeper for Cross's
motivation. He adhered very strongly to that brand of mid-
Victorian liberalism which held up Britain's protection of
political refugees as the embodiment of national greatness:
this was clearly shown by his attitude towards extradition
during the 1870s and the part he played in the Maceo
agitation. Harcourt may have been a Liberal, and Cross a
Conservative (in party terms), but such labels are
meaningless. On most issues, Cross was far more liberal than
Harcourt, and for purely personal reasons, he could never
have agreed to a bill along the lines wanted by the latter.
As in 1885, the government changed before the bill was
introduced, but Childers - Cross's successor - was happy to
press on."' However, on 23 February 1886, the Americans
proposed a treaty which, surprisingly, contained a full
embodiment of speciality. The bill was dropped: there might
have been "some difficulty" in passing it anyway." On 25
June the new treaty was signed.
93. cf. Lushington to Childers (Private. 19 February 1886);
Lushington to Murdoch (Private. 20 February 1886): HO
45/9606/A2566, /26; and Lushington to Foreign Office
(HO. 24 February 1886): FO 5/2042.
94. Copy of draft in FO 5/1973; Lushington to Childers
(Private. 29 March 1886): HO 144/109/A23384p /64.
95. Copy in FO 5/1973. Any remaining doubts over the
American attitude were removed by the Supreme Court decision
in the Rauscher case (1886), in which the speciality
principle was fully upheld: the decision was repeated in the
Hibbs case (1886): cf. HO 144/146/A38041; FO 5/1907; F.
Kopelman, op.cit. p.608; and J.Seorge, op.cit. p.314n.
Although it was some time before the new treaty came into
operation, British courts accepted the Rauscher decision as
proof that American law respected speciality. Therefore,
when in 1888, Alice Woodhall attempted to avoid extradition
on the plea that American law made no provision for
speciality, her appeal was refused: cf. HO 144/475/X18533;
and Law Times volume 59 (1888), pp.549-54.
The sudden reversal of American policy appears curious
to say the least. The Americans may have despaired of the
1870 Act ever being amended, but there is evidence that their
change of heart was the result of more positive
considerations. Phelps urged the inclusion of speciality in
any forthcoming treaty: cases involving political offenders
were "not unlikely to arise hereafter", and a fugitive
surrendered to Britain might be tried for , an additional
offence which America considered political.'"' (Here he was
no doubt thinking on Irish offenders). In addition, the
American business and banking community pressured its
government to frame a new treaty in order to prevent
criminals finding easy immunity in Canada.'"
In Britain the treaty could be implemented without
reference to Parliament, but the necessary ratification by
the American Senate was not forthcoming: after much delay,
the treaty was rejected in February 1889. Several factors led
to this turn of events. Most conspicuous was the claim that
the treaty was directed against Irish political offenders.
The Irish World asserted that if it was ratified, "the United
96. Phelps to Bayard (No.143)(London. 23 November 1885):
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 
for 1888 (Washington 1889) pp.1730-40.
97. cf. New York Times 6 June 1885: extract in HO
144/109/A23384, /43; A.G. Sedgwick, 'Extradition', North 
American Review volume 36 (1883), pp.497-505; Anon,'The
Extradition Treaty', Nation (New York), volume 43 (1886),
p.130; G.H. Adams, 'Our State Department and Extradition',
American Law Review volume 20 (1886), pp.540-52; and J.P.
O'Grady, op.cit. pp.209-14. There were also calls in Britain
for the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-American extradition to
be rectified on commercial grounds: cf. Reynolds's 25 July
1886, p.4; 3H,(C)„306,c.307,(28 May 1886); and
3H,(C),310,cc.1405-6,(14 February 1887).
States will be rendered merely an outpost of British
despotism"; a claim that was alarmist and had little basis in
fact. The treaty contained full protection for political
refugees, and there was no reason to suppose that American
courts would be found wanting when it came to protecting
Irish offenders. Still, those who made the claim were aided
by the language of the British press, which thought the
treaty "ought to become a potent engine for putting down the
cowardly crimes of the dynamite party"..'
However, despite the loudness of the Irish-American
campaign, it alone was not strong enough to defeat the
treaty. Some opposed it because its provisions to combat
banking crimes were not deemed stringent enough; others
doubtless did so in an effort to avoid alienating the Irish
vote. However, perhaps the most significant factor was a
strong, general, (but temporary) anti-British feeling,
aroused by serious fisheries disputes. Nevertheless, one
cannot help noting, with some irony, the parallels between
this and the situation in Britain before 1870. Then,
treaties with France and Prussia had been rejected because of
fears for the security of political offenders: now, the
Anglo-American treaty had been rejected partly because
Senators did not trust Britain vis-à-vis Irish political
refugees.
The American government, however, remained keen on a new
treaty, and in July 1889 a second treaty that conformed to
98. Quoted by The Times 24 July 1886, p.7; and The Times 20
July 1886, p.9. cf. Anon. 'The Extradition Treaty', Saturday 
Review volume 62 (1886), p.109.
British law was signed.
	 In February 1890 it was duly
ratified: at last, Anglo-American extradition was placed upon
a satisfactory footing.100
* * *
The 1880s were an important phase in British extradition
history. The most important practical difficulty remaining
,
from the 1870s (the dispute with the United States) was
settled, and no new disputes arose. Under Harcourt's
auspices, several definitions of political offences were
suggested, but none had been acted upon. No case had
occurred in which the courts had been called upon to give a
judgement as to what constituted a political offence, so the
matter remained unsettled. However, during the 1890s, a
number of cases occurred in which the courts were so called
upon. It is in the resolution of these cases that the
crucial importance of the 1890s to British extradition
history lies.
99. Copy in FO 5/2104.
100. On the progress of the treaties in Congress: cf. J.P.
O'Grady, op.cit. pp.220-83; R.J. Dangerfield, In Defence of 
the Senate (Oklahoma 1933) p.240; F.E. Gibson, op.cit.
pp.401-3 & 420-6; R. McElroy, Grover Cleveland (New York
1923) volume 1, p.294; W.S. Holt Treaties defeated by the 
Senate (Baltimore 1933) pp.142-3; and J.M. Callahan op.cit. 
p.413.
CHAPTER 6 
POLITICAL OFFENCES AND TERRORISTS (1890-1903) 
Chapter Six: Political Offences and Terrorists (1890-1903) 
In 1890 an abortive revolt occurred in Bellizona in the
canton of Ticino, Switzerland, during which a state
councillor named Rossi was killed. It was believed that
Angelo Castioni fired the fatal shot, and when it became
known he was in London, the Swiss requested his extradition.
On 24 October, Castioni was committed for extradition,
the magistrate finding the murder was unnecessary, and
accepting some rather doubtful evidence that it was inspired
by non-political motives. The Swiss alleged that Castioni
held Rossi responsible for the death of his brother, and had
killed him as an act of private revengel.
However, Castioni appealed to the Queen's Bench, which
released him on 10 November. In doing so, Chief Justice
Denman held that it was not "necessary or desirable" to give
an "exhaustive definition" of political offences: "to exclude
extradition for such an act as murder... it must at least be
shown that the act is done in furtherance of... with the
intention of assisting" a revolt. Denman rejected the
suggestion that Castioni had killed Rossi for private
reasons. Justice Hawkins agreed, pointing out that although
not every act committed during an insurrection would be
considered political, everyone knew that "men hot in their
political excitement" did things "which may be deplored and
lamented... by those who can calmly reflect upon it after the
battle is over", but which nevertheless remained political
1. F. Lushington to Home Office (Bow St. 24 October 1890): HO
144/479/X29665, /8.
offences. Rossi's murder was such an act.
The Saturday Review welcomed the nature of the
judgement, but doubted the wisdom of its being applied to
Castioni: he had "an extremely lucky escape".	 The Spectator 
(now Unionist) accepted the test used but noted that cases
might arise in which it would be difficult to apply. These
would "have to be argued out on their merits" . ". The Pall
Mall Gazette (now Tory) had criticised Castioni's committal
and welcomed his liberation, as did Reynolds's. the Star, the
Echo, the Daily Graphic and the Daily Chronicle. Justice,
Freedom and Commonweal (socialist and anarchist respectively)
regarded it as "a triumph" for the right of asylum. A. As the
The Times saw it, it was "the intention of Parliament and is
"the desire of the English people" that rebels "should not be
surrendered to their victorious opponents". The Daily News 
asserted that Castioni's offence was "political or nothing,
and a clearer case never came
2. The judgement is reprinted in British International Law 
Cases volume 5 (1967), pp.556-66.
3. Anon, 'Political Offenders', Saturday Review volume 70
(1890), pp.548-9. cf. Morning Advertiser 12 November 1890,
p.4; St. James's Gazette 12 November 1890; and Globe 12
November 1890, extracts in HO 144/479/X29665, /14.
4. Anon, 'Political Offences', Spectator volume 65 (1890),
p.678.
5. Pall Mall Gazette 25 October 1890, p.2; and 12 November
1890, p.2; Reynolds's 16 November 1890, p.5; Star 12 November
1890; Echo 12 November 1890, p.2; Daily Graphic 12 November
1890; Daily Chronicle 12 November 1890, extracts in HO
144/479/X29665, /14. The latter five represented the
Radical/Liberal wing of the press.
6. Justice 22 November 1890, p.1. cf. Freedom December 1890,
p.56; and Commonweal 22 November 1890, p.371.
before a Court of Justice"7.
Modern legal authorities have generally approved of the
Castioni decision. However, one modern authority, Valerie
Epps, claims that it is difficult to understand:
what possible interest Britain thought it was serving in
offering refuge to Castioni... [There is] no evidence to
suggest... [that] Britain supported Castioni's group,
nor that the canton government was regarded as unduly
repressive or otherwise unacceptable.9
Such a comment reveals a complete lack of understanding of
the situation in Britain in 1890. The Queen's Bench was not
trying to serve any 'interest': that was not the point of
political offence exemption. It was an unselfish policy,
intended to protect the individual liberties of political
refugees, even if it may have suited British interests to do
otherwise. The political offence exemption was the
embodiment of mid-Victorian liberalism, and such liberalism
was not selfish or interest serving.
What of the government reaction? Bergne (superintendent
of the Treaty Department at the Foreign Office) asserted:
"To many it may seem regrettable that we are obliged to
shelter and shield" a murderer, "whatever motives may have
impelled him to the deed". Godfrey Lushington (Home Office
permanent under-secretary) thought "the whole question"
7. The Times 12 November 1890, p.9; and Daily News 12
November 1890, extract in HO 144/469/X29665, /14. For
comment in legal journals: cf. E.L. de Hart, 'Notes', Law
Quarterly Review volume 7 (1891), pp.1-2.
8. V. Epps, op.cit. pp.64-5.
required "much more consideration". Troup (senior clerk at
the Home Office) observed that "not much harm has been done.
The case itself is not very important, as compared with other
'political' cases that may hereafter arise". Still, he
"regretted that considered judgements were not given. The
law is still incompletely settled"?. Sir F. Lushington (the
committing magistrate) regarded the Court's views on
political offences as "ambiguous", and looked forward "to a
-
better eventual solution of the difficulty". The chief
magistrate, Sir John Bridge, pointed out that the judgement
was "not strictly a definition, but merely a description of
some of the crimes which are of a political character". Any
definition was "good for a particular case but not for all
possible cases"lw.
In reality, then, the Castioni decision solved nothing.
A partial definition of political offences had been given,
but it only applied to Castioni's case (and perhaps similar
cases), and should not be regarded (as it often is) as
embracing a 'definition' of political offences. The decision
could be used as a precedent in future cases, but, given its
9. Memorandum by Bergne (FO. 15 November 1890); minute by G.
Lushington (HO. 20 November 1890); and memorandum by Troup
(HO. 5 December 1890): HO 144/479/X29665, /14 & /16.
10. Memorandum by F. Lushington; and Bridge to Home Office
(Bow Street. 18 & 21 July 1891): ibid. /21. Underlining in
original.
somewhat limited scope, it did not have to be adopted".
For Bergne, the importance of the case was that it
highlighted the magisterial power to discharge 'political
offenders'. It was "entirely wrong that the final decision
on such a very important point, involving possibly grave
international or political issues, should under any
circumstances be left without review to the decision of the
police magistrate". He thought the magistrate should be
stripped of this power, and the question left to the Queen's
Bench and ministers. 12 Troup suggested the plan be borne in
mind if legislation was contemplated, while Godfrey
Lushington though it "important". 1	 The magistrates
themselves objected. Lushington was "not convinced.., it
would be advantageous having regard to the rights of the
prisoner or to public policy", and Bridge agreed. Such a
plan would be "inexpedient", and would "so alter the scheme
of the Act that there would be no probability of its being
11. Although this was the first case in which political
offences were seriously discussed and considered, it was not
the first occasion upon which the political offence exemption
had been raised. Huguet (1873) and Berson (1878) had made
unsubstantiated (and unjustified) claims that their
extradition was sought for political reasons, and both were
surrendered: cf. FO 27/2032 & 2033; The Times 12 June 1873,
p.9; HO 45/9344/23725; and The Times 5 August 1878, p.4. The
Home Office file on the former case (20549) has not survived.
In 1882 a curious case occurred. Britain extradited Novitsky
from Germany for theft as quickly as possible "as another
state [was]... seeking his surrender on political grounds".
No other details survive: cf. HO 144/103/A20842.
12. Memorandum by Bergne (FO. 15 November 1890): HO
1441479/X29665, /14. A similar scheme had been discussed in
1884-5, but was not included in Harcourt's bill: cf. FO
5/1896 & 2042; and HO 45/9606/A2566.
13. Memorandum by Troup (HO. 5 December (1890); and minute by
G. Lushington (HO. 9 July 1891): HO 144/479/X29665, /14 &
/14a.
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adopted by Parliament". The idea was shelved.".
* * *
The dust had hardly settled on the Castioni case when
France sought the extradition of Jean-Pierre Francois for
complicity in the April 1892 bombing of a Paris café.' 	 (Its
owner, Very, had assisted in the capture of Ravochol -
perhaps the most notorious anarchist terrorist - and was
killed as revenge). Hertslet (Foreign Office Librarian)
thought the case promised to be "interesting", while Troup
had to doubt the crime was non-political.'
On 16 November 1892, Bridge committed Francois for
extradition, even though the evidence was rather
circumstantial, and he claimed to have an alibi. 1-7 As for
14. Memorandum by F. lushington (Bow Street. 18 July 1891);
and Bridge to Home Office (Bow St. 21 July 1891): ibid. /21.
cf. G. Lushington to Foreign Office (HO. 29 July 1891); and
minute by Bergne (FO. n.d.): FO 100/310.
15. The investigation leading to his arrest by the Special
Branch is detailed in: The Times 15 October 1892, p.10; and
P. McIntyre, 'Scotland Yard. Its Mysteries and Methods',
Reynolds's 21 April 1895, p.5.
16. Minutes by Hertslet (FO. 22 October 1892): FO 27/3101;
and Troup (HO. 25 October 1892): HO 144/4851X37842A, 14.
This file had been missing for several years, but the author
found it at the Public Record Office, Kew, in July 1987,
bundled together with one on a different case.
17. Francois was later acquitted (E.A. Vizetelly, Anarchist 
(1911) p.123), indicating the evidence was unsatisfactory.
However, magistrates were not supposed to judge a fugitive's
guilt: simply whether there was enough evidence to justify
committal for trial. There was "abundant evidence to go
before a jury": St. James Gazette 2 December 1892, p.4. It
was by no means unheard of for extradited fugitives to be
acquitted: cf. Karlsen (1897: HO 144/514/X66691); Thomas
(1898: HO 144/514/X67389); Gries (1899: HO 144/525/X77430);
Witjas (1899: HO 144/525/X77163); and Lee (1909: HO
144/1033/175623).
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his claim to be a political refugee, Bridge was "sure" the
offence was not political, rather it was an offence "of a
diabolical character. The motive of the offence is not
political, but to revenge something done to Ravochol". To
call that political "would, to my mind, be an absolute abuse
of languageu.19
Francois appealed on grcunds of insufficient evidence
and that his only real offence was being an anarchist. The
j udges considered the arguments only "for a moment", and
dismissed the appeal."' The case did little as far as the
clarification of the political offence exemption was
concerned since Francois did not claim the bombing was a
political offence (he denied involvement). However, Bridge's
comments, and the fact that the Queen's Bench so easily
passed by the claim that the extradition was being sought for
political reasons carried the clear implication that
anarchists did not come within the exemption.
***
This implication was made explicit just two years later
in the case of Theodule Meunier, who was accused of
complicity in the same cafe bombing, and the bombing of the
Lobau barracks in Paris. 20 From the first, officials were
18. The Times 17 November 1892. p.11.
19. The Times 2 December 1892, reprinted in British 
International Law Cases (1967) volume 5, pp.566-70.
20. On his arrest (again by the Special Branch): cf. The
Times 45 April 1894, p.10; and 6 April 1894, p.14; and B.
Porter, 'Early Special Branch', p.385. Commonweal(13 April
1894 (no page numbers)) thought it strange that Melville was
alone when he arrested Meunier, and suggested he had
engineered this to ensure he would not have to share the
£2,000 reward rumoured to have been offered by France: "how
mean... to cheat some of his pals of their share! But what
can one expect from a pig but a grunt!" Special Branch
officers were generally rather illiberal and especially anti-
anarchist: cf. R.J. Johnson, 'Okhrana Abroad', Unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University (1970) p.71; and B. Porter,
Origins of Britain's Political Police pp.14-15.
P -C..1- 9 and 12 May
convinced that "This cannot be regarded as... political
crime". 1
 Meunier denied all the charges, but the real
defence offered was that the barracks bombing was a political
offence. He was "simply making war upon the French
Government... It was an atrocious act... but... it was a
political act". Bridge rejected the plea ("an enmity to all
Governments could not be called" political), found the
evidence sufficient, and committed Meunier.22
-
Meunier lost his appeal: Justice Cave held that for an
offence to be political, there had to be:
two distinct parties, each seeking to impose the
Government of its choice upon the other... offences
incidentally committed in the course of an attempt by
one party to impose the Government of its choice on the
other, are to be regarded as so connected with the
political contest as to amount to political offences.
Anarchists did not advocate a form of government which they
sought to impose. Anarchism was "the enemy apparently of all
Governments, and its operations are directed... primarily
against.., the citizens, and apparently only casually against
the Government or governing body". 	 This interpretation of
21. Minute by Troup (HO. 16 August 1892): HO 144/485/X37842,
/2.
22. The Times 5 May 1894, p.19; 7 May 1894,
1894, p.16; and Reynolds's 6 May 1894, p.5
23. The Queen's Bench hearing of 11 June is reprinted in Law
Times volume 71 (1894-5), pp.403-6. Meunier was convicted in
France and sentenced to "perpetual forced labour in Cayenne":
H. Oliver International Anarchist Movement (1983) p.82.
political offences was "obviously" directed against
anarchists, and constituted "the first judicial rejection
of... terrorism as a legitimate international political
method of protest". 24- The decision established "a new and
very important canon" in international law, and the notion
that anarchist crimes were non-political soon became a
commonplace in books and reference works.
The extraditions were, predictably, resented by
anarchists: they showed how "bias against unpopular opinions
influence[d]... legal functionaries" Th . Some were rumoured
to be plotting to give their resentment practical effect: it
was reported that a group calling themselves 'Individual
Initiative planned to bomb "the residences of English judges
and magistrates".° 7 Freedom (perhaps the leading anarchist
journal) feared the cases might have ramifications beyond the
24. L.L. Deere, 'Political Offences', American Journal of 
International Law volume 27 (1933), p.268; and C.L.
Cantrell, 'Political Offence Exemption, Marquette Law Review 
volume 60, (1977), p.786.
25. Law Times 16 June 1894: extract in HO 144/485/X378424,
/15. cf. H.E. Boyle, 'Extradition', Twentieth Century volume
1 (1895), p.218; H.C. Biron and K.E. Chalmers, Law and 
Practice of Extradition (1903) p.12; J.E.P Wallis,
'Extradition', in, Encyclopaedia Britannica (19th edition.
1902) volume 28, p.367; N.W. Silbey and A. Elias, op.cit. 
p.136; J.R. Clark et.al . 'Nature and Definition of Political
Offences', Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law (April 1909) pp.131-3; Editorial Comment,
'Political Offence in Extradition Treaties', American Journal 
of International Law volume 3 (1909), p.460; 'A Solicitor',
op.cit. p.631; and Hon. Sir A. Muddiman, Law of Extradition 
(2nd edition. Calcutta 1927) p.27.
26. Freedom June 1894, p.33; and July 1894, p.41; and
Anarchist (London) 3 June 1894 (no page numbers). cf. Liberty 
June 1894, p.44.
27. Globe 5 December 1892: extract in HO 144/485/X37842B,
/1.
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security of anarchists: "once violated" the right of asylum
"very soon becomes a mere fiction: it simply ceases to
exist". Persecution always began "with the numerically
weakest party", but would soon extend to the extradition of
other left wingers. There were "plenty of people who will
not fail to say; They are only Anarchists'. But every
intelligent person in the land must understand that the
Anarchist Meunier is simply used as a precedent for
abolishing 'de facto' the right of asylum."2D The 'Committee
for the Defence of the Right of Asylum' issued a pamphlet
entitled An Appeal on Behalf of the Right of Asylum5 calling
for the maintenance of one of Britain's "chief glories". A
fund was raised to finance Meunier's appeal, to which William
Morris contributed £2.2';
The Law Times,, quite reasonably, thought the Meunier
decision could be "criticised as to the accuracy of its
findings of fact", for not all anarchist 'outrages' were
directed against private citizens, and anarchists wished to
establish a new society, which amounted to a form of
government even if that was not what they called it. J.E.P.
Wallis thought the Castioni test "more satisfactory" than
28. Freedom June 1894, p.33. In the event, they need not
have worried, for Meunier was the last anarchist or left-
winger of any description whose extradition was sought. In
1897, Britain extradited George Potts from Spain; the
Foreign Office thought he might "very possibly be an
anarchist", but the Home Office thought the notion "absurd".
He was "a prudential insurance agent and a dishonest one":
HO 144/514/X67474.
29. Copy of the pamphlet in HO 144/485/X37842A,/13; and
Liberty June 1894, p.44. The committee consisted of
anarchists.
that adopted in Meunier's case, and M.J. Farrelly thought it
"at least arguable that to describe Anarchist outrages as
non-political is to apply to the term an unusual and forced
construction... It would be simpler to say that although
political they are extraditable".3w
On the other hand, The Times thought the idea that
Francois was a political offender "quite untenable", and even
the liberal Daily News asserted that anarchists deserved "the
utmost rigour of the law, and should be treated... like the
wild beasts they really are".' Asquith (Home Secretary)
asserted he had not had "a moment's hesitation" before
authorising Francois' extradition: anarchists were "outside
the pale of political offenders". Designating anarchist
crimes as non-political was also in accordance with the
resolutions of the 1892 meeting of the Institute of
International Law.	 Anarchists were the only group to be
discriminated against in British extradition law and
practice, and it is necessary and important to analyse the
reasons for it.
* * *
30. Law Times 16 June 1694: extract in HO 144/485/X37842,
/15; J.E.P. Wallis, op.cit. p.367; and M.J. Farrelly,
'Anarchists and Asylum', Law Quaterly Review volume 10
(1894), p.270.
31. The Times 2 December 1692, p.9; and Daily News 2 December
1692, p.4. cf. Daily Chronicle 2 December 1892, p.4.
32. 4H„(C),8„cc.954-5,(9 February 1893); the resolutions are
reprinted in 6. Tosti, 'Anarchistic Crimes',Political Science
Quarterly volume 14 (1899), p.415. cf. minute by Lushinqton
(HO. 8 December 1893): HO 45/10254/X36450, /8; and G. Diena,
Les Dêlits Anarchistes et L'Extradition (Paris 1895).
Anarchists were not the sort of revolutionaries most
Britons would wish to protect. The refugees who had been
revered and sheltered earlier in the century (such as Kossuth
and Mazzini) had been 'respectable'. They fought to free
their nations from the chains of 'despotism', generally used
acceptable methods, and their cause was as 'liberal' as it
was justifiable and popular. Britons could sympathise with
nations struggling to be free: much of what these rebels
sought was the kind of political liberty which Britons took
,
for granted: free speech, representative government, and the
like. It was with such men in mind that the political
offence exemption had been framed: "To compare the
Anarchists and other villains of the same type to men like
Kossuth and Mazzini is the merest claptrap".
While the respectable revolutionaries of the middle
decades of the nineteenth century had been loved and
respected, anarchists were widely despised. Public speakers
found "abuse of anarchists... an unfailing passport to
popular favour". Anarchism "came to represent for many the
fearsome evil forces which menaced the peace and security of
mankind... The dominant image of the anarchist as it emerged
in the press and even in works of reference provided a simple
schematic drawing of a mischievous and mad criminal".
Furthermore, while Britons had long looked in horror at
anarchist outrages abroad, the phenomenon seemed to be
33. The Times 18 July 1894, p.10.
34. E. Reclus, 'Anarchy', Contemporary Review volume 45
(1884), p.627; and H. Shpayer, 'British Anarchism',
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, London University (1981) 1 pp.5 & 9.
ri,	 .71.p.rmar..., and Anarchist 
spreading to their own doorstep. In 1692 a bomb factory was
discovered at Walsall: in 1894 a bomb went off in Greenwich
Park, London, and a plot to bomb the Stock Exchange was
nipped in the bud. There was quite a panic over anarchist
terrorism: Tit-Bits feared they would soon turn to
biological warfare.	 Freedom remarked that the "increase of
Anarchism in England" was "chiefly responsible" for Francois'
extradition, while the Anarchist thought Meunier's fate was
"simply the illustration of the way in which the police are
using the dynamite scare... as a means of handing political
refugees into the hands of the despotic Governments of the
Continent".
It was perhaps the indiscriminateness of anarchist
terrorism which did most to engender anti-anarchist feeling,
which had a certain element of morality in it. It was one
thing to assassinate kings and emperors (which was bad
enough), but much worse to kill and maim 'innocent'
civilians. Although anarchists assassinated particular
personages (such as President Carnot of France in 1694), many
of their 'outrages' seemed to be directed simply at society
in general. In 1886 several policemen were killed at Chicago
and a bottle of vitriol was dropped from the galleries of the
Paris Stock Exchange; in 1894 a Parisian café was bombed and
the Liceo theatre in Barcelona was attacked. Bombs went off
all over Paris and in other parts of France.
35. B. Porter, Origins of Britain's Political Police p.7.
36. Freedom January-February 1893,
(London) 3 June 1894.
No-one seemed safe. "The secret murder of unsuspecting
individuals, the reckless slaughter of any number of
neighbours or bystanders... are crimes against the universal
conscience... they do not cease to be criminal because they
may be political.., political offences... are distinguished
by a wide and clear line from the misdeeds of the
anarchist". 7 Furthermore, such terrorism was distinctly
unsporting and un-British. Should the English decide that
revolution was necessary, they would not resort to terrorism:
they "would come out into the open and fight like
Englishmen".0
The perceived nature of anarchism seemed to threaten
Britain in a way that the 'politicos' of former years had
against unjust rulers. Britain had had nothing to fear from
this type of revolutionary because her liberalism made her
unsubvertable: "the glory of this country Cis] that we can
rectify.. evils by the force of argument
37. The Times 21 March 1892, p.9. cf. Daily Telegraph 13
November 1893, p.4; Daily News 11 December 1893, p.4; St.
James's Gazette 11 December 1893, p.3; Observer 18 February
1894, p.4; 4H0C),22,c.232,(13 March 1894); and R.B.
Jensen, 'International Anti-Anarchist Conference', Journal of 
Contemporary History volume 16 (1981), pp.324-5.
38. Clarion 8 June 1906, p.6. cf. 4H,(C),8,cc.954-5,(9
February 1893).
39. Perceived, because not all anarchists indulged in
terrorism, indeed, the majority did not. However, few were
prepared to condemn them, so all were tarred with the same
brush: cf. G.D.H. Cole, History of Socialist Thought volume 2
(1969) pp.317 & 415; and H. Oliver, op.cit pp.85-6. Not
everyone succumbed to this view of anarchism: cf. H.
Chisholm, editorial note on 'Anarchism', in, Encyclopaedia 
Britannica (11th edition. New York 1910) p.916; W.
Donisthorpe, 'In Defence of Anarchy'. New Review volume 11
(1894), p.283; and B. Porter, Vigilant State pp.105-7.
not. Men like Kossuth had rebelled with good reason steadily
applied... without invoking the destructive aid of popular
passions or urban revolutions".' 	 In contrast, anarchists
did not seem to be protesting against any particular
legitimate or illegitimate grievance. They committed
outrages in both liberal and illiberal states, and seemed to
attack and seek to destroy everything and anything that was
established and accepted. How could one satisfy irrational
grievances, pursued by unholy means? Victorians believed
that "men, being rational, would see that the system worked
to everyone's advantage", but anarchists were not rational.
Continentals surrendered political offenders because they
were a "source of terror": perhaps Britons came to share
this 'terror', although not to the extent that was so
prevalent elsewhere.4.1
Although Britain's anarchist 'outrages' were "very tame
stuff" compared with those experienced abroad, 4 she was not
immune. Anarchists could not be ignored. In the same way as
the Fenian menace bred an illiberal tendency in Britain, so
too did the 'anarchist threat' (although more marginally),
40. A. Alison, 'Continental Revolutions', Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazine volume 64 (1848), p.492. cf. A. Alison,
'Year of Revolutions', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine volume
65 (1849), p.9; and 3HOL),119,cc.895-6,(27 February 1852):
speech of Derby.
41. B. Porter,Britain. Europe and the world p.43; and 'A
Solicitor', op.cit. p.631
42. B. Porter, 'British Government and Political Refugees',
p.26. The only casualty of anarchist violence was the
Greenwich Park bomber himself (Bourdin). His fingers were
scattered as the bails "fly off at cricket": M. McNaghten,
Days of my Years (1914) p.80, quoted in F.G. Clarke. Will-O'--
the-Wisp (Melbourne 1983) p.23.
even though it was far less real or immediate: "Men do not
need to be threatened in order to feel threatened". The
'anarchist threat' combined with other factors (economic
depression, the revival of socialism and militant trade
unionism at home, and so on), to make Victorians fee/ less
self-confident and self-assured than in former years. More
generally, these factors contributed to a "movement of
political reaction which seized Britain during the 1890's".'4
* * *
However, the impact of anarchism can be exaggerated.
Officially, British anarchist 'outrages' were treated as
ordinary crimes, not anarchist crimes. This may have been
because ministers wanted to treat them as such rather than
admit that 'political crimes' could be committed in Britain,
but nonetheless the distinction remains important. In more
concrete terms, Britain passed no anti-anarchist laws, which
distinguished her sharply from France, Spain, Italy, Germany,
Switzerland, America, Austria, Belgium and Denmark. Anti-
anarchist provisions were also inserted in foreign
extradition treaties, such as that between the United States
and sixteen Latin American nations of 1902.44
Victorian liberalism retained a great resilience: as
'007' might have put it had Ian Fleming ever written a
43. B. Porter, 'British Government and Political Refugees',
p.27; and Origins of Britain's Political Police p.7.
44. cf. Harvard Research. op.cit. pp.278-81; J. Quail. Slow 
Burning Fuse (1978) p.157; and R.B. Jensen, op.cit. p.325
The Spain-Venezuela treaty of 1894 also contained such
provisions: copy in FO 72/2129.
history of Britain, it was 'shaken, but not stirred' into
strong repressive action. Throughout the 1890s and
succeeding decades, Britain remained an asylum for
anarchists, socialists and others: many leading
revolutionaries (including Kropotkin, Malatesta, Reclus, Most
and Stepniak) spent time safe in the British haven. Indeed,
as the 1890s passed, she became more or less their only
asylum, for others were increasingly closed to them.
Furthermore, on three occasions governments deliberately
turned down suggested anti-anarchist measures. In 1893
Britain rejected a Spanish scheme for anti-anarchist
international cooperation;	 in 1894 the government opposed
Salisbury's anti-anarchist alien bill; 4"b and in 1897 an
Italian proposal to specify anarchist crimes as non-political
was rejected.4-7"
Despite the perceived nature of anarchism, Britain was
not prepared to take exceptional measures; claiming that her
existing laws were sufficient. 43
 The right of asylum
remained substantially secure. Anarchist terrorists were
45. cf. FO 72/1927 & 1938; FO 881/6427; HO 45/10254/%36450;
CAB 41/22/51; J. McCabe, Life and Letters of Holyoake (1908)
volume 2, p.170; and G.J. Holyoake, 'Anarchism', Nineteenth 
Century volume 50 (1901), p.686, on his conversations with
Gladstone on this subject; and B. Porter, Vigilant State 
pp. 108-115.
46. 4H,(L),26,cc.1047-59,(6 July 1894); and 4HOL),27,
cc.117-156,(17 July 1894). cf. G.E. Buckle (ed.), Letters of 
Queen Victoria (1931) 3rd Series, volume 2, pp.414-5; and B.
Gainer, Alien Invasion (1972) pp.104 & 155-7. Asquith and
Grey had previously stated they opposed anti-anarchist alien
laws: cf. 4H,(C) 1 19,c.1370,(14 December 1893);
4H,(C),21 1 c.205,(22 December 1893); and ibid. c.722, (19
February 1894).
47. cf. HO 45/19169/A55312, /17.
48. cf. 4H,(C),28,c.1246,(16 August 1894).
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not safe, but even they could only be extradited upon the
production of evidence of actual crime. Anarchist opinions
were not made illegal and anarchists were still free to seek
refuge in Britain. That is not to say that Britain took no
part in the fight against anarchism. There were a couple of
prosecutions for seditious libel (Burtsev in 1898 and
Antonelli in 19054"), "but these represent only a tiny
fraction of the seditious labels that were actually
published". mn Away from the public eye,_ measures were
adopted (such as the exchange of police information, and the
surveillance of suspects at the request of foreign
governments) which would have been unthinkable in the 1850s
or 1860s, but all this was very far short of what was wanted
by Britons such as Salisbury, and foreign governments more at
the 'sharp end' of anarchist terrorism.1
* * *
The vague political offence exemption inserted in the
Extradition Act was slightly clarified on one further
occasion during the 1890s. In 1895 Emile Arton was
49. cf. CRIM 1/49/5; DPP 4/32; HO 144/272/A59222B; HO
144/795/131464; A. Kimball, 'Harassment of Russian
Revolutionaries', Oxford Slavonic Papers volume 6 (1973),
pp-48-65; D. Saunders, 'Vladimir Burtsev', European Studies
Review volume 13 (1983). p.40; and B. Porter. Vigilant State 
pp. 116-7.
50. B. Porter, 'British Government and Political
Refugees', p.25.
51. cf. 4H,(C),18,c.889,(14 November 1893); and B. Porter,
Origins of Britain's Political Police pp.8-26; 'British
Government and Political Refugees', pp.33-8; and Vigilant 
State chapters 7 & 8. In a way, the prosecutions and the
secret measures were undertaken so that Britain could avoid
any more formal, far-reaching engagments.
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committed for extradition to France on numerous charges of
fraud, larceny and embezzlement. He then appealed on the
grounds that the request for his extradition "was not made in
good faith": it was made for "political purposes". At his
trial he would be "asked to disclose political secrets": if
he refused he would be punished for contempt of court, which
in this case would amount to punishment for political
offence.
The appeal was dismissed. If Artorr had shown that the
crimes for which extradition was sought were political, the
court could have intervened, but he had not attempted to do
so. Similarly, Arton had failed to show that if surrendered
he would be tried for a political offence. Contempt of court
was not a political offence, and the allegation that
political motives might lead to punishment for this offence
could not be entertained by the court; that was the
government's province. To escape extradition, a fugitive had
to do more than simply allege that it was sought for
political purposes.
The case was taken to the Home Secretary, before whom
the basis of the charge of bad faith became clearer. Arton
claimed that he was suspected of possessing information on
the Panama Canal scandal (which caused "a great outcry" in
1892) that would enable the French government to embarrass
it political opponents. It was to force this information
52. Times Law Reports volume 12 (1895-6), pp.131-3. cf.
Anon, 'Extradition of Arton", Law Times volume 100
(1896), p.12.
out of Arton that extradition was sought. 	 However, Ridley
was not convinced.
It is difficult to tell how much truth there was in the
allegations: the circumstances surrounding Arton's
extradition were at least peculiar. In the Chamber of
Deputies, the French Premier, Bourgeois, asked members not to
discuss the case in a manner "which might prevent
extradition". 4 It does seems that Arton was questioned as
to his political knowledge, and that he gave certain
-
information, but it was perhaps less significant than he
tried to make out, for no prosecutions resulted.
Insufficient evidence is available in Britain to enable the
historian to sustain the allegation that extradition was
sought merely for political reasons.
That, however, was not the end of the case. In 1896,
France announced that Arton had agreed to be tried for
additional offences, but did not request British consent to
such trial.
	
Such a course was illegal under the treaty of
1876. As a "matter of principle", individuals could not
waive the terms of a treaty. That could only be done with
the agreement of Britain, France and the prisoner, but if
British consent was sought, it might be given, "on the
53. Transcript of notes taken at the meeting: HO
144/486/X38150, /20a.
54. The Times 13 December 1895, p.5.
55. cf. The Times 26 March 1897, p.5 ;
 and 26 April 1897,
p.6
56. cf. Unattributable minute (FO. 14 November 1896): FO
97/560.
grounds that Arton himself desires to be trie&. 7 France
was duly informed of British views, but refused to accept
their validity. An impasse was reached. 	 Surviving British
papers do not mention Arton's fate. The Times and the
Standard followed the case quite closely but made no mention
of Arton being punished for offences other than those for
which he was extradited.
Whatever was Arton's fate, the important point was that
Britain upheld speciality, not in a pedantic, rigid manner,
but on grounds of principle. 	 Britain wanted to control
what extra offences a fugitive was tried for. In this way
she could prevent any injustice being done, or any trial for
political offences. It was "obvious" that if unrestricted
trials for additional offences were allowed, these offences
"might be of a political character".'" Ministers were
entitled to waive speciality if the accused so wished: if he
did not, they were "morally bound to enforce it for his
benefit". The consent of the prisoner alone could not be
57. cf. Minute by Davidson (FO. n.d.); and Law Officers'
Opinion by Webster and Finlay (25 November 1896): FO
97/560.
58. Salisbury to Geoff ray (FO. 2 December 1896): HO
144/486/X38150, /29; Geoff ray to Salisbury (24 December
1896): FO 97/560; and Salisbury to de Courcel (FO. 24
February 1897): HO 144/486/X38150, /33.
59. cf. The Times 26 June 1896, p.5; 8 July 1896, p.7; 26
March 1897, p.5; and 26 April 1897, p.6; and Standard 26
February 1897, extract in HO 144/486/X38150, /33.
60. France sought British consent in future cases: cf.
Berger (1901: HO 144/526/X79440); and Houpliere
(1909: HO 144/1040/182339).
61. J.H.G. Bergne„ op.cit. p. 182.
sufficient, for this was "obviously capable of the gravest
abuse".
The attitude adopted in the Arton case sums up that
taken by successive governments to speciality during the
1890s and after. It was not enforced absolutely: rather, a
certain degree of latitude (consistent with the interests of
justice) was allowed. However, in no case did the government
act in manner which subjected the fugitive to any substantial
injustice, and in no case were political offences involved.
-
The letter of the law was not rigidly adhered to, but the
spirit of the 1870 Act lived on, and that was probably more
important.
* * *
In 1896, Britain once again attempted to extradite Irish
terrorists. On 12 and 13 September, a conspiracy to
perpetrate bombings in Britain was broken up by the arrest of
Bell at Glasgow, Wallace and Haines at Rotterdam, and P.J.P.
Tynan at Boulogne. Bell was safely in custody in Britain,
and as for the others. Ridley thought Tynan's extradition
should be sought both on the grounds of his involvement in
62. Law Officers' Opinion by Webster and Finlay (8 February
1897): FO 97/560.
63. cf. The cases of Harfeld (1890: HO 144/478/X27124);
Underwood (1897-1901: FO 5/2156); Sinzheimer (1898: HO
144/511/X64250); Lindemann (1901: HO 144/665/X77744);
Frohlich (1902: HO 134/30); McIntire (1906: FO 372/35);
Kampmann (1907: FO 372/56); and Friberg (1910: 372/234).
Britain was generally very scrupulous in observing speciality
regarding fugitives surrendered to her: cf. Pooley (1880:
HO 144/61/93718); Davies (1885: HO 144/469/X6650);
Lamontagne (1891: FO 881/6267); Daintrey (1894: HO
144/496/X42447); Bosch (1898: HO 144/265/A57391); and Ramsay
(1904: HO 134/32).
-,-)E3.. ...,_
the 'Phoenix Park Murders' and for explosives offences, and
that of Wallace and Haines for the latter only. Extradition
for explosives offences was not sanctioned by any British
treaty, for explosives offences were non-extraditable under
British law, but Ridley hoped the "exceptional circumstances
of the case" might nevertheless prompt Holland and France to
surrender the men.6"F
Salisbury was ready to "make any application the Home
Secretary likes" but would "not answer for their being
accepted". d'e5 Evidence against Tynan had been lacking in
1883, and it was no better now. As Dublin informed the Home
Office, if he was extradited, available evidence was
"altogether insufficient to secure his conviction". 4-s In the
event, extradition for explosives offences was not requested
(it would have been "useless" to have done su sfl, and Wallace
and Haines went free. Tynan's extradition was sought on the
Phoenix Park murder charge only, but was refused as there was
"no proof" that he "took a direct part" in the murders, and
the charge was "covered by ten years prescription according
to French law".'"3
64. Digby to Villiers (Private. 17 September 1896), enclosing
a draft which expressed Ridley's views: FO 5/2348.
Ridley's private papers contain nothing on this episode, or
any of the other matters of interest which arose during his
Home Secretaryship.
65. Minute by Salisbury (FO. n.d.): FO 5/2348.
66. Dougherty to Home Office (Dublin Castle. 18 September
1896): HO 144/533/A58213, /4. cf. Pall Mall Gazette 1
October 1896, p.3; and The Times 15 September 1896, p.7.
67. Digby to Foreign Office (HO. 23 September 1896 ):
 FO
5/2348.
68. Howard to Salisbury (Telegraphic. Paris. 14 O ctober
1896): ibid.
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Why did ministers press on? From the first, the arrests
were public knowledge: the press and public knew Tynan's
extradition had been sought in 1883, and expected it to be
sought once more.'"' Pressure on the government was increased
by the Pall Mall Gazette's revelation that the manuscript (in
Tynan's own hand) of the chapter of his book which dealt with
the murders, and his part in them, was held "under lock and
key in London, should the need for it arise"."' Ridley
thought the appearance of the articles "which may mean the
production of evidence to aid conviction... supplies..., a
strong additional reason, for going on: and renders it I
would almost say impossible not to do so. Failure may
result, and probably will: but at all events we shall have
done all we can".'
As a result of the failure to extradite the
'dynamitards', detailed consideration (by the Foreign Office,
Home Office and the Law Officers) began of what could be done
under existing laws to prevent the preparation in Britain of
dynamite plots to be executed abroad, and what might be
69. cf. The Times 14 September 1896, p.3 and 15 September
1896, p.7; and Pall Mall Gazette 16 September 1896, p.7
70. Pall Mall Gazette 19 September 1896, pp.1-2. Anderson
(head of C.I.D. at Scotland Yard) pressured the Home Office
not to abandon the claim for extradition. cf . memorandum by
McDonnell (6 October 1896): 3M/E, f.9. The government did
get hold of the manuscript, but not until November, and so
too late to be of any practical use. It is preserved in the
Anderson papers, HO 144/1537, No.3. The means by which it
came into his possession may be traced in ibid.; Anderson to
McDonnell (Private. 30 September - 12 December 1896): 3M/E,
ff.7-20; and Balfour Papers, PRO 30/60/13/3.
71. Ridley to Digby (Private. 20 September 1896): HO
144/533/A58213, /16. Underlining in original.
done to make them more effective "if foreign states would
make similar enactments". By persuading foreign governments
to do so, an international arrangement for the "suppression
and punishment... of dynamite plots" would be arrived at.
The Law Officers were in favour of the idea and suggested
that explosives offences be made extraditable and "included
in supplemental extradition treaties".
	 Before instructions
were given to prepare a bill, Ridley placed the proposals
before the Cabinet. 7
 However, all discussion seems to have
ended here: the proposals were quietly dropped. Surviving
papers give no definite reason for this, but several likely
reasons may be suggested.
Ridley noted it might be "thought expedient" to de/ay
enactment of the scheme. Bell's prosecution had recently
been abandoned because it was not clear whether or not the
agent who informed on the plotters had not acted as an agent 
provocatuer. Introducing any 'dynamite legislation' would
only draw attention to the matter and might lead to unwelcome
debates about the legality of police anti-Fenian measures.4.
The proposal that Britain should organise international
cooperation against 'political terrorism' was
72. Sanderson to Home Office (FO. 29 October 1896); Digby to
Murdoch (Private. 29 October 1896); and Law Officers' Opinion
by Webster and Finlay (23 December 1896): HO 144/270/A58394.
73. cf. Ridley to Salisbury (Private. 5 February 1897):
3M/E; and Memorandum for the Cabinet (20 February 1897): CAB
37/44, No.9.
74. ibid. cf . Sir R. Anderson. Sidelights on the Home Rule 
Movement (1906) pp.127-131; and 4H,(C),45,cc.152-3, (20
January 1897). On the Bell case generally, cf. GRIM 1/46/5;
HO 144/507/X60692; and HO 144/508/X60692.
revolutionary. Britain had always refused to take part in
any such schemes, and the Cabinet may have been reluctant to
abandon this traditional stance: it was perhaps significant
that Cross (as Lord Privy Seal) was still a member.
Furthermore, approaching foreign countries with the scheme
would have been a 'tricky' business to say the least.
Continentals had always resented Britain's attitude to such
things, and might not have been exactly well disposed to
accept an initiative proposed by her. If she could not be
bothered to help them in the past, why should they help
Britain now that she felt threatened by terrorism?
There was also the question of British opinion. In 1892
Sanderson had noted that "public opinion will not sanction"
such a scheme except "under the immediate pressure of alarm
and indignation at the perpetration of Eoutrages3... here".
Furthermore, there was the "difficulty as to the exemption of
Political Offences from the Extradition Act". 	 The
authorities may have feared that the plot of 1896 was a sign
that the 'dynamite war' of 1880-1885 was about to resume, but
it seems to have been an isolated incident. Revelation of
the plot may have panicked ministers into considering un-
British actions, but when she was not hit by any new wave of
bombings, their panic perhaps subsided, and caused them to
question whether un-British, and potentially controversial,
legislation was necessary.
It seems doubtful whether the proposal would have been
75. Sanderson to Salisbury (Private. 31 March 1892): FO
27/3102; and minute by G. Lushington (HO. 23 March 1892):
HO 45/10254/X36450, /1.
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accepted in the absence of any pressing domestic need. It
could easily be represented by critics as an attack upon the
right of asylum. In addition, the fact that the police had
broken up the plot before it came to fruition could be taken
as a sign that Britain at least had no reason to join any
international scheme against dynamitards. Her police were
quite equal to the task. -742' Clearly, it would have been
easier to 'sell' the scheme if a few bombs had gone off and
killed some innocent bystanders.
* * *
On 10 September 1898, an Italian anarchist named Lucheni
assassinated Empress Elizabeth of Austria by Lake Geneva. It
was not the first time that an Italian had been responsible
for an anarchist atrocity, and Italy assumed responsibility
for trying to ensure there were no more. At first she
proposed a collective approach to require Switzerland to take
effective action against the anarchists who found an asylum
there,'" but before precise details were formulated, this
proposal was transformed (as a result of Austro-German
pressure -79) into something more. On 6 October, Britain was
invited to attend an anti-Anarchist conference at
76. cf. The Times 16 September 1896, p.7; Anon, 'Dynamite
Plot', Spectator volume 77 (1896), p.358; and Pall Mall 
Gazette 16 September 1896, p.7.
77. cf. Bonham to Salisbury (Rome. 17 September 1898): FO
45/783; memoranda by Sanderson (FO. 19, 21 & 24 September
1898): FO 45/793; Salisbury to Costa (FO. 29 September 1898):
FO 45/791; and Salisbury to Bonham (FO. 3 October 1898): FO
45/781.
78. cf. Bonham to Salisbury (No.206)(Rome. 18 October 1898):
FO 45/784.
Rome.. 7-7 By mid-October, most European nations had agreed to
send delegates to the Conference, as did Britain on 27
October. em	In the light of her past attitude towards such
proposals, this decision appears at least surprising.
Correspondence does not deal in any detail with the reasons
behind it, but a number of factors may be suggested.
General foreign policy considerations no doubt played
their part. The Anglo-French Fashoda crisis remained
unsettled, and Britain could not afford to be dangerously
-
isolated by refusing to attend. el The list of participants
was impressive: Italy, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary,
France, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Luxemburg, Monaco,
Montenegro, Serbia, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden
and Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. As the other great
powers agreed to attend, Britain "could not refuse to take
part".em
It was known that Britain was likely to have to "meet a
determined attack" over the freedoms she allowed political
refugees. It would be easier to deflect such an attack if
she attended the conference. In her absence, there was no
telling to what level anger at British policy might rise. As
Queen Victoria put it, non-participation would "have a bad
79. Canevaro to Costa (29 September 1898), communicated to
Salisbury on 6 October 1898: FO 45/791.
BO. cf. Salisbury to Currie (27 October 1898): HO
45/10254/X36450, /40.
81. cf. R.B. Jensen, op.cit. p.326; and P. Hayes, The
Twentieth Century (1978) pp.74-8.
82. Salisbury to St. John (FO. 12 October 1898): HO
45/10254/X36450, /31.
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effect and look as if we were indifferent" to anarchist
outrages. p	On a more positive level, Anglo-Italian
relations were in a very healthy state. Britain felt certain
of Italian support in the Fashoda crisis, and such support
had not been forthcoming from elsewhere. "Salisbury was
inclined to do Italy a favour, attending the conference if
only as a simple act of courtesy".'3.4
It is perhaps significant that the Tories, under
Salisbury, were in power in 1898. Previ-ous proposals had
been made to Liberal governments which were more sensitive
over the right of asylum and other traditional policies than
Salisbury. He was thoroughly anti-anarchist, and the
government's favourable disposition towards international
cooperation against terrorism had already been demonstrated
in 1896-1897. (Whether a Liberal government would have
attended is an open question).
There was at least one topic due for discussion which
intimately concerned Britain: the expulsion of anarchists.
If the conference agreed on sterner measures for expelling
anarchists, many would be likely to turn up in Britain (no
other country would let them in) and she had no power to get
rid of them. If she attended the conference, Britain might
be able to limit the unwelcome consequences of any agreed
policy on expulsion.e Lastly, there were the
83. Plunkett to Salisbury (Brussels. 17 November 1898): ibid.
/58; and Queen Victoria to Salisbury (Private. 23 October
1898): 3M/E.
84. R.B. Jensen. op.cit. p.326.
85. cf. Report by Vincent (17 December 1898); and memorandum
by Anderson (15 December 1898): ibid. /92 & /77.
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wishes of the Queen to be considered. She "urged the Prime
Minister to take action... and pressed for acceptance of the
Italian invitation". Cross informed Salisbury that she was
"very anxious that something should be done". For the first
time, Her Majesty was "really nervous": she was afraid to go
abroad, wanted to avoid London, and was even apprehensive
about "driving about" at Balmoral.a4s
The conference met from 24 November to 21 December.w7
Britain was represented by Sir Phillip Currie (ambassador to
Italy), Sir Godfrey Lushington (former head of the Home
Office), and Sir Howard Vincent (former head of C.I.D. at
Scotland Yard). They were generally acknowledged to be well-
suited to the task, but Keir Hardie's Labour Leader begged to
differ. Of these "capitalistic Knights", Lushington was "an
old Johnnie of sixty-seven", Currie was 65 and "not a
genius", while Vincent was "comparatively a youngster" at 50,
but "somewhat muddleheaded" and "as fit to pronounce an
opinion on Anarchism as I am to enter the Kingdom of
Heaven".'="3
Several matters were discussed with a view to repressing
anarchism, but here we will concentrate upon discussion of
extradition law and practice. Various resolutions were
86. R.B. Jensen, op.cit. p.326; and Cross to Salisbury
(Private. 23 September 1898): 3M/E, ff.718-9. cf. Queen
Victoria to Salisbury (Private. 13 September 1898): 3M/E; and
Salisbury to Queen Victoria (Private. 27 October 1898): CAB
41/24/43.
87. On it generally, cf. J. Quail, op.cit. p.216; E.A.
Vizetelly, op.cit. pp.238-9; and R.B. Jensen, op.cit. passim.
88. Labour Leader 10 December 1898, p.401.
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passed, the object of which was to exclude "anarchical
crimes" and every attack on a sovereign, head of state, or
member of their families from the political offence
exemption. e"' Britain was unable to support such resolutions,
but as an alternative, Currie suggested "something might be
done" to counter a widely-held continental "misconception"
that under British law assassination was necessarily
political. He asked permission to state that the law would
be amended so as to provide that assassins would not
,
necessarily be exempted from extradition.'"°
The Home Office thought legislation was unnecessary to
establish that point. The fact that a sovereign was the
victim might be "an element" in proving a crime's political
character, but if it were the sole evidence of that
character, extradition would probably be granted. It was
"impossible to suppose" that the Empress of Austria's
assassin would have been exempted, but the Czar's killers
might have been. Still, if they had, that would not have
been done simply because their victim was an Emperor, but
because the assassination was committed "with a political
object, and as part of a political movement". Deciding what
was a political offence depended on "considering such matters
as the object and motive of the combination of which the
accused, the extent and character of the rising, movement or
89. Currie to Salisbury (Rome. 30 November 1898): HO
45/10254/X36450, /73; and same to same (No.244)(Rome. 13
December 1898): FO 45/784; and same to same (Telegraphic.
Rome. 14 December 1898): HO 45/10254/X36450, /97.
90. Currie to Salisbury (Telegraphic. Rome. 5 December 1898):
ibid. /72.
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crime is the outcome, and all the other circumstances of the
case".'71
The proposal that every assassination was to be regarded
as non-political could not be agreed to. Assassins could
already be extradited, but only if "the circumstances of the
offence were not such as to give it a bona fide political
character... it would be impossible to exclude from
consideration the circumstances in which the offence was
committed"."*2	 -
In order to clarify the British position on extradition,
and other matters, Currie addressed the conference on 18
December. He emphasised that Britain sympathised with the
aims of the other powers, but that she could not accept
measures which punished opinions rather than actual crime,
and the political offence exemption had to be maintained.
Although British laws were believed to be sufficient to deal
with the criminal aspects of anarchism, the government was
prepared to amend them in certain respects. Explosives laws
were to be extended to cover conspiracies to bomb foreign
targets, explosives offences were to be made extraditable,
91. Memorandum by Digby (HO. 7 December 1898): ibid. 172.
Underlining in original. In 1893, Lushington had also not
been sure whether the Czar's killers would have been exempt
from extradition: Minute by Lushington (HO. 8 December 1893):
ibid. /8. J.H.G. Bergne (oo.cit. p.183) thought they would
have been extradited. In 1900, Maycock thought it "extremely
improbable" that the assassin of the King of Italy would be
considered a political offender by "any Civilised Court":
Minute by Maycock (FO. 20 October 1900): FO 45/826. cf. FO
65/16954 f.327; HO 45/9734/A53955, /7; FO 5/2190; FO 65/1449,
ff.81-7; and HO 45/18080/681045, /15.
92. Digby to Foreign Office (HO. 15 December 1898)1 HO 15116,
pp.249-51.
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and consideration would be given to whether anything could be
done about publications which incited violence. Extradition
law was to be amended "by the addition of words making it
clear" that the political offence exemption "should not apply
(as in point of fact there has never been any intention of
applying it) to the crime of wilful murder, whether of a
Sovereign, a Chief of a State, or of any other individual".
This statement of intent was very much intended for
foreign ears. Britain could not bring herself to agree to
the conference's conclusions, and to sweeten such a bitter
pill, she promised to amend her laws. It "made a very good
impression... The Russian, German and Austrian Ambassadors
acknowledged... it was the most important result" of the
Conference.9'.4
On 4 January 1899, Ridley gave instructions for the
necessary bill to be prepared.
	 Three versions of the
political offence exemption were suggested, but all were
rather unclear.""' The problem was that "assassination has
not in England any precise legal meaning". A clause similar
to those suggested by the Royal Commission and Thring in
1878 and 1884 could be adopted, but they were unsatisfactory.
Their insistence on political offences being committed during
93. Precis of the Proceedings of the Conference: HO
144/757/118516, /15.
94. Currie to Salisbury (Telegraphic. Rome. 21 December
1898): FO 881/7179; and same to same (Rome. 22 December
1898): HO 45/10254/X36450, /92.
95. cf. Minute by Ridley (HO. 4 January 1899): ibid. /91.
96. Copy of bill in HO 45/9758/A62185.
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a time of 'civil war or open insurrection' would exclude
offences committed in preparation for an insurrection, and
cases where people met to discuss "a legitimate attempt to
remedy oppression", were "dispersed by the police and used
violence in their own defence".'"
In April 1899 the bill was revised: it stipulated,
"Assassination or an attempt or conspiracy to assassinate
shall not be deemed to be an offence of a political
character". 'Assassination' was to be interpreted by the
courts, in the same way that they interpreted 'offence of a
political character'. 'Ps In the Queen's Speech of February
1899 it was announced that as a result of the Rome Conference
"some amendments" of the law "appear to be required", but for
reasons that are unclear, that was the last heard of the
matter.. 3"P Sanderson noted that he thought the bill failed
"in consequence of the block in legislation", but he was
unsure, and the explanation hardly seems sufficient.""2
It was by no means certain that Parliament and the
public would accept the bills. Horror at the Empress of
Austria's death was widespread, but calls for international
97. Memorandum appended to the bill (12 January 1899): ibid.
98. Copies of the bills and accompanying memoranda in ibid.
99. 4H,(L),66,cc.3-4,(7 February 1899). Jensen (ga. cit.)
gives no real explanation for the failure to legislate.
100. Memorandum by Sanderson (FO. 6 December 1901): FO
83/1970. The general factors previously mentioned with
regard to the non-enactment of special anti-anarchist laws
and the failure to legislate in 1896-7 are equally applicable
here.
cooperation against anarchism, although made, lial were by no
means unanimous. The Times thought the idea
"impractical". 1m When discussing the measures believed to
be under consideration at the conference (closer police
cooperation and other police measures) The Times asserted
they had "one good feature": there was "no question of any
fresh legislation", the implication being that legislating
would be difficult."" The Labour Leader (exhibiting an
adherence to the old mid-Victorian liberal position) thought
governments should concentrate on removing "the causes which
produce the assassin".' oa The Economist was prepared to
cooperate to put down actual crime, but would brook no
interference with the political offence exemption. The
Metropolitan Radical Federation called on the government to
"safeguard the liberties of political refugees", and
Reynolds's believed the right of asylum had to be maintained
"at all costs"."5'
Calls for anti-anarchist action were far less widespread
than earlier in the 1890s, when it seemed Britain might
101. cf. Pall Mall Gazette 12 September 1898, p.1.
102. The Times 13 September 1898, p.3. cf. Clarion 15 October
1898, p.330; Reynolds's 23 October 1898, p.4; Freedom March
1899, p.21; and Labour Leader 19 November 1898, p.379.
103. The Times 30 November1898, p.5. cf. The Times 19
December 1898, p.5; Evening News 15 October 1898, p.2; and
Anon, 'Murder of the Empress of Austria', Spectator volume 81
(1898), p.363.
104. Labour Leader 19 November 1898, p.379.
105. Anon, 'International Movement Against Anarchism', The
Economist volume 61 (1898), p.1515; Wade to Salisbury (19
December 1898): FO 45/793; and Reynolds's 18 September 1898,
p.4. cf. Justice 8 October 1898, p.1.
fall victim to anarchist terrorism. Then, calls for such
action had been common.' 6
 After 1894, anarchist 'outrages'
in Britain subsided: by 1899 it was almost impossible to
argue any real British need for anti-anarchist measures. The
identity of interest with continentals given to Britons by
the 'outrages' of 1892-4 had all but disappeared, as,
perhaps, had support for anti-anarchist measures. In
political terms, Britain had most in common with the United
States, which enacted severe anti-anarchist laws. However,
it did so in the wake of serious anarchist outrages: a
_
bombing in Chicago and the assassination of President
McKinley. 12v7 Britain had no such experiences. 18
Earlier in the 1890s, proposals for extradition
legislation had been abandoned for fear that they would
arouse controversy over the right of asylum. In 1891 a bill
that would have allowed fugitives to waive the 15 day
106. cf. Anon, 'Anarchist Wave', Spectator volume 71 (1893),
p.425; Anon, 'Aliens and Anarchists', Saturday Review volume
78 (1894), pp.63-5; The Times 28 December 1893, p.7; Pall 
Mall Gazette 7 July 1894, p.1; and Z, 'Anarchists', New
Review volume 10 (1894), pp.1-9. Opinion was still not
unanimous, and some believed there were limits as to how far
Britain could go: cf. for example, Anon, 'The proposed
Outlawry of Anarchism', The Economist volume 50 (1892), pp.
374-5; Justice 21 July 1892, pp.4; and Anon 'Lord.
Salisbury's Aliens Bill', Spectator volume 73 (1894), pp.37-
8. This difference between the mid and late 1890s is
mirrored in Hansard. The main references are listed in B.
Porter, Origins of Britain's Political Police pp.32-3n.
107. cf. H. David, History of the Haymarket Affair (2nd
edition. New York 1958); J.P. Clark, Deportation of Aliens 
(New York 1931) pp.216-7; and W.C. Van Vleck, Administrative 
Control of Aliens (New York 1932) p.9.
108. When an anarchist attempted to kill the Prince of Wales
in 1900, calls for anti-anarchist action temporarily revived:
cf. Anon, 'Musings without Method', Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine volume 168 (1900), pp.402-4.
interval between committal and actual surrender was abandoned
because it was feared introduction might provoke discussion
of more controversial matters, and there was a chance that a
'politico', ignorant of the law and the English language,
might agree to be surrendered at once before more
knowledgeable people could appeal.' 	 During 1894-7, making
provision for transit and implementing the Royal Commission's
Report was discussed once more. Again, nothing was done.
Making provision for transit might endanger political
refugees, and amendment of any of the significant provisions
of the Extradition Act would be "highly ontroversial", and
"obviously bristle with difficulties".'' a The right of
asylum was a "very delicate" matter, and ministers who
interfered with it "would have a very serious question on
their hands and evoke an outburst of public opinion which
would probably considerably shorten their existence". 211
Traditional factors therefore blocked extradition legislation
right into the 1890s, even when it did not directly affect
109. cf. HO 45/9501/8589; HO 45/9836/B10270; FO 83/1429; and
especially Law Officers' Opinion by Clarke (15 July 1891):
FO 83/1429.
110. Memorandum by Simpson (HO. 12 February 1897): HO
45/9740/A555488, /16. More generally, cf. FO 83/2189; and HO
45/97401A55548B.
111. O'Conn to Lansdowne (Constantinople. 10 February 1902):
HO 144/608/B32482, /16. In 1901, negotiations for an
extradition treaty with Venezuela were abandoned because
Venezuelan political refugees frequently sought refuge in
Britain's West Indian colonies and Venezuela was likely to
attempt to abuse extradition to get hold of them: cf. FO
881/8071, No.25. The 1906 Extradition Act simply made
bribery an extraditable offence: the only fear in laying the
bill before Parliament had been that objections might be
raised to it on the grounds that bribery at elections was a
political offence, but such fears proved groundless: cf. FO
5/2602; and FO 372/35.
political refugees. What chance was there that legislation
which did directly affect them would be introduced or
accepted?
Salisbury had hoped to persuade the Cabinet to "consent
to some form of Alien Bill", but feared causing "difficulty
with some of our Liberal Unionist friends, who still cling to
what is, in my judgement, an exaggerated view of the right of
asylum". Cross "reminded [the Queen]... that we were
powerless without an act of Parliament and that there would
-
be probably great difficulties in getting such an act
_
passed". The "sole question" in the Lord Chancellor's mind
was "how far will the House of Commons go, and how far is it
safe to produce proposals to which they would object".11
The views of other ministers are unclear, but it is clear
that some officials would have been unhappy with the
extradition bill. In December 1898 the Home Office had
expressed the view that the provision included in the April
bill, that assassination was extraditable irrespective of
circumstances, could not be agreed to. One can only guess as
to why the bill was so drafted in spite of this, but it
perhaps indicates that there was disagreement as to how the
bill should be drawn: disagreement that was perhaps strong
enough to prevent submission to Parliament.
112. Salisbury to Cross (Private. 25 September 1898): Cross
Papers, BL Add. MS 51264; Cross to Salisbury (Private. 23
September 1898): 3M/E, ff.718-9; and Mackenzie to Digby
(Private. 13 March 1899), reporting the Lord Chancellor's
views: HO 45/10254/X36450, /102. The Queen asked Salisbury
for his views on the conference and the proposed legislation
(Queen Victoria to Salisbury [Private. 14 January 1899]:
3M/E), but the latter's private papers do not contain a copy
of his reply. The original is presumably in the Royal
Archives at Windsor, and might give specific reasons for the
failure to legislate, but I have been refused access to that
archive.
Before the conference had begun, not much had been
expected to come of it. Salisbury did "not anticipate that
Pant will be willing to make any legislative changes". 1.2.
Lushington was told that the British system would be "much
attacked", and that his "main duty" would be "to give good
reasons for refusing to change it in any essential
points".1"F
Legislation was not strictly necessary to give effect to
Currie's promise on extradition. 'Wilful murder' was by
-
implication, even by definition, non-political: the
extradition of a sovereign's assassin was quite possible
under existing laws. There was also some opposition to
changing the law, and doubts as to the efficacy of the
proposed changes. Simpson did not believe "the law as now
interpreted requires further definition by statute". As
Anderson saw it, since assassins were usually prepared to
die, "making them clearly extraditable will have but little
effect... the intended legislation will have no practical
value". 115
Finally, in subsequent discussion of anti-anarchist
113. Minute by Salisbury (FO. 27 October 1898): FO 45/781.
cf. Currie to Salisbury (Private, 19 October 1898):
3M/A/125/21; same to same (Private. 2 November 1898): ibid.
A/125/22; Salisbury to Currie (FO. 27 October 1898): HO
45/10254/X36450, /40; and Salisbury to St. John (FO. 12
October 1898): ibid. /31.
114. Salisbury to Lushington (Private. 23 November 1898):
3M/A/99/87. cf. Vincent to Ridley (Private. 10 November
1898)(Copy): 3M/E.
115. Minute by Simpson (HO. n.d.); and memorandum by Anderson
(14 January 1899): HO 45/10254/X36450 5 172 & /92.
cooperation, xl.s. mention is made of the general difficulties
raised by such proposals. In 1900 it was noted that
Parliament and the public were "excessively suspicious" of
any measure which might appear to threaten the right of
asylum. It was easy to agree that measures against anarchism
were desirable: "the difficulty is to carry such measures
into practical effect, especially in this country". In 1901
Lansdowne wrote that "our failure to give effect even to our
modest proposals" of 1899 "is not encouraging". 117 Britain
did cooperate against anarchism to a certain extent
(surveillance of suspects and the like), but generally away
from the public eye, even secretly. 11	 It was feared that
Parliamentary and public opinion would not have approved of
such a policy, let alone anything more far reaching, and
public, such as stringent new extradition and explosives
laws.
The adoption of any of the clauses proposed in 1898-99
would have amounted to a severe delimitation of the political
offence exemption, but it remained intact. It is worth
mentioning that the implication that an assassin might be
considered exempt from extradition was made explicit in
116. On these, which did not directly concern extradition,
cf. FO 83/1970; FO 371/364; FO 412/68; FO 881/7711; HO
45/10254/X36450; R.B. Jensen, op.cit. pp.337-8; and B.
Porter, Vigilant State chapters 8, 9 and 10.
117. Salisbury to Hatzfeldt (FO. 9 August 1900): FO 64/1507;
minute by Murdoch (HO. 4 December 1901): HO 45/10254/X36450,
/120; and minute by Lansdowne (FO. n.d.): FO 83/1970. cf. his
undated minute on a memorandum of 26 November 1901 in ibid.
118. cf. B. Porter, 'British Government and Political
Refugees', pp.33-8; Origins of Britain's Political Police 
passim; and Vigilant State passim.
the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1898. The murder of a sovereign or
a member of his family was made extraditable, "provided that
the crime is not of a political character".1".
* * *
In concluding our discussion of political offences
around the turn of the century, we come to the Lynchehaun
case, in which one last attempt was made to extradite an
Irish 'political offender'. In 1902 James Lynchehaun escaped
from prison in Ireland, having been sentenced in 1895 to life
imprisonment for the attempted murder of his landlady (Mrs.
Macdonald) and for arson. 1
	In August 1903 he was arrested
at Indianapolis.
Almost immediately, "considerable feeling" was
"manifested by the Irish party in Indianapolis" over the
case. In court, Lynchehaun claimed that the crime of which
he had been convicted was political. 11 Maycock minuted that
the claim that "tearing out a woman's eyes and setting her on
fire is a political offence, ought not to succeed if there is
any justice in Indiana", while Sanderson thought there was
"nothing in the evidence which would tend in the least to
establish such a contention". 2- 2 In court, Britain asserted
that extradition was not sought for any offence at
119. Copy in FO 88117286, p.135.
120. cf. The Times 18 July 1895, p.9.
121. Bayley to Raikes (New York. 18 September 1903); and
Sanderson to Landsdowne (No.101 Treaty)(New York. 9 October
1903): FO 5/2568. cf. Bayley to Lansdowne (New York. 213
September 1903): ibid.
122. Minute by Maycock (FO. 8 October 1903); and Sanderson to
Lansdowne (New York. 16 October 1903): ibid.
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all: Lynchehaun was a convict and was not convicted of a
political offence, therefore "no further inquiry can be had".
In any case, the attack on Mrs. Macdonald was "purely
personal... A much more cowardly, dastardly and despicable
crime than the assault upon this helpless old woman cannot be
imagined". The claim for political offender status was
"ludicrous". 12
On 1 November Commissioner Moores gave his judgement.
He held that "the disturbances which existed in Ireland at
the time when the prisoner's offence was committed were of a
political nature... Disgraceful though an assault on a woman
must always be, I am convinced that this was a political
offence, for which, under the terms of the treaty, the
prisoner can not be surrendered. Let him be discharged".
Sanderson thought the judgement was "contrary to law and
unsupported by evidence", while Simpson viewed it as a "most
interesting disquisition" on the nature of political
offences." The Times reported that in Ireland, both the
Nationalist and Unionist press expressed "astonishment and
regret at the decision".1241'
It seems clear enough that Moores had some sympathy for
the Irish cause: he compared it to the French and American
123. Memorandum by Fox (n.d.): ibid.
124. Indianapolis News 31 October 1903, extract in ibid.
125. Sanderson to Lansdowne (New York. 4 November 1903): FO
5/2568; and minute by Simpson (HO. 17 November 1903): HO
144/977/100676, /135. This file had been missing since 1965,
but the author found it at the Public Record Office, Kew, in
July 1987, bound together with an unrelated file.
126. Times 3 November 1903, p.4.
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revolutions. How far these were Moores' personal
convictions, or how far he was influenced by the 'Irish
lobby' is unclear, but the Irish factor played a considerable
part in American politics and society, and its influence can
never be discounted in such cases. In Indianapolis in 1903,
there was much pro-Irish and anti-British feeling: such
feelings could not be left out of the equation, and were
perhaps more important than the circumstances of the crime
itself.1.7
-
Irish-Americans regarded the matter as a test case, and
made much use of the British contention that since Lynchehaun
was a convict the court had no need to examine the nature of
his crime. If it were accepted, a "precedent would be
established, which would... deprive many a soldier of liberty
from securing shelter". Since it was difficult to defend
Lynchehaun's crime, it was emphasised that "this battle was
fought out on principle to establish a sacred right, the
right of asylum for political offenders... Ethe3 only motive
was to guard the high principles of American liberty
established by the fathers, who held that America should
never surrender political offenders to tyrannical
governments".	 Lynchehaun's release was certainly a
triumph for Irish influence, and a long pamphlet entitled An
Irish-American Victory Over Great Britain was published.
127. One could imagine a British magistrate giving a similar
decision with respect to a continental political refugee in
the 1850s.
128. Anon, An Irish-American Victory Over Great Britain 
(Indianapolis 1903).
The Irish government believed that "the case should be
pursued to the fullest possible extent not only in the
immediate interests of justice but also because omission to
have the matter rectified now may prejudice future cases"..1
The question of making a renewed effort at extradition was
considered, but dropped. The case would be
heard where Lynchehaun was arrested: as he stayed in
Indianapolis, Moores would again hear the case, and there was
little prospect of his reversing his decision. Sanderson
attempted to have Lynchehaun deported as an undesirable
alien, and in December reported he was to be expelled, but
all this came to nothing. im° Maycock noted with some
bitterness that, "every one, whether judicial or Immigration
officer, are afraid of the Irish".''
All proceedings against Lynchehaun were abandoned. For
all their exertions (and expenses of over £1,00012), the
British authorities had got nowhere. Once again, the
attempted extradition of a fugitive connected with the 'Irish
problem' had failed. It would appear that the authorities
despaired of ever extraditing 'Fenians', for, before 1914, no
further attempt was made. In 1907 Lynchehaun left
Indianapolis, so raising the possibility of bringing him
before a more sympathetic judge, but the Irish
129. Macdonnell to Home Office (Dublin Castle. 7 November
1903): FO 5/2568.
130. Sanderson to Lansdowne (No.135 Treaty)(New York. 17
December 1903): ibid. cf . same to same (No.4 Treaty) (New
York. 12 January 1904): FO 5/2569. On the practice of
deportation in lieu of extradition, cf. chapter 8.
131. Minute by Maycock (FO. 22 January 1904): FO 5/2569.
132. cf. FO 5/2469.
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authorities informed the Home Office that it was "not
considered expedient" to attempt extradition. 	 The
embarrassment caused by such cases, together with the
encouragement given to the 'Fenians' by their failure, meant
that they were simply not worth the trouble which they
caused.1.4
133. Howard to Grey (No.143)(Washington. 20 June 1907); and
Troup to Foreign Office (HO. 13 July 1907): FO 372/86. In
1918, Lynchehaun turned up in Ireland to visit friends after
having given good service in the Canadian army. His fate is
unclear: cf. HO 144/9771100676, /197-1198.
134. In 1917 the extradition of Michael O'Callaghan was
sought from the United States for killing a boy and two
policemen when resisting arrest. Predictably, the attempt
failed. He claimed political offender status, but that was
not the reason for non-extradition. The evidence sent by
Britain was authenticated incorrectly by the American embassy
in London, quite possibly by design rather than accident.
The case was abandoned: cf. FO 372/1063. The Home Office
file on the case (351101) has not survived.
CHAPTER 7 
THE COLONIAL DIMENSION 
Chapter Seven: The Colonial Dimension 
Thus far, Britain's colonies have been referred to
almost incidentally and only sporadically, essentially
because they did not deserve any fuller consideration than
they have received. However, from the 1890s colonial
extradition l becomes both more interesting historically and
more important intrinsically. Before we move on to this
however, it is necessary to give a few words of explanation
of colonial extradition law.
By Section 17 of the Extradition Act of 1870, when an
Order in Council was made implementing an extradition treaty
between Britain and a foreign country, that treaty extended
"to every British possession in the same manner as if
throughout this Act the British possession were substituted
for the United Kingdom or England". The procedure for, and
restrictions on, extradition from a British colony to a
foreign country, or the colony of a foreign country, were
thus exactly the same as those governing extradition from
Britain herself, with, of course, some inevitable
modifications.. Requests for extradition were to be made to
the governor of the British colony by a competent foreign
authority, who might be the consul general or vice-consul of
a foreign country, or the governor of a foreign colony. When
1. Colonial extradition did not involve any special
problems: simply the same ones as were experienced vis-à-vis 
extradition to and from Britain.
2. Extradition to Britain from a British colony, and to a
British colony from Britain was of course governed by the
Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881.
the request for extradition had been made:
all powers vested in or acts authorised or required to
be done under this Act by the police magistrate and the
Secretary of State, or either of them, in relation to
the surrender of a fugitive criminal, may be done by the
governor of the British possession alone.
The usual course of events was therefore for the 1870
Extradition Act to apply within colonies as it did in
Britain. However, Section 18 of the 1870 Act provided that:
If by any law or ordinance, made before or after the
passing of this Act by the Legislature of any British
possession, provision is made for carrying into effect
within such possession the surrender of fugitive
criminals. ..Her Majesty may, by... Order in Council
suspend the operation of the 1870 Act in that colony, or
provide that the colonial law be regarded as a part of the
1870 Act in that colony.
Local conditions in a colony sometimes dictated a need
to vary certain of the procedural provisions of the 1870
Extradition Act, and several colonies did so: Australia
(1904), Barbados (1878), Bermuda (1879), British Guiana
(1E06), Ceylon (1878), Gibraltar (1877), Grenada (1880)„ Hong
Kong (1877), India (1895), Jamaica (1877), Malaya (1877),
Malta (1878), Mauritius (1877), New Foundland (1900), North
Borneo (1877), St. Lucia (1878)„ St. Vincent (1880), Sierra
Leone (1878), Singapore (1877), South Africa (1913), Tobago
(1880), and Trinidad (1877).
Far less common was the enactment in a colony of a
comprehensive extradition law which necessitated the
suspension of the 1870 Act in that colony. In fact, Canada
was the only one to do so. In 1877 Canada passed an Act (40
Vict., c.25) "providing a procedure for the surrender of
fugitives to any country with which Her Majesty had entered
or would subsequently enter a treaty for the purpose". The
Canadian Act was "modelled largely" on the 1670 Act, "with
such changes as were necessary to adapt it to local
requirements". In 1682 the British Act was suspended in
_
Canada.
One further provision of the Extradition Act of 1870
should be mentioned. Section 23 stipulated that:
Nothing in this Act shall affect the lawful powers of
Her Majesty or of the Governor-General of India... to
make treaties for the extradition of criminals with
Indian native states, or with other Asiatic states
conterminous with British India... or to carry into
execution the provisions of any such treaties made
either before or after the passing of this Act.
* * *
In 1890, Natal drafted a bill which was to be enacted as
a prelude to signing an extradition agreement with the
Transvaal. The bill did not contain any safeguards for
political offenders: Natal wanted to avoid offences
committed during "native troubles" being designated
3. G.V. LaForest, oo.cit. pp.6-7.
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political. If natives killed a Transvaal Boer, refusing
extradition on political offence grounds "would probably
endanger the peace of this Colony". However, London insisted
the bill contain the usual safeguards, and the final
legislation duly did son.
In 1896 the Governor of Hong Kong (Robinson), the
British minister at Peking (Macdonald), and the consul at
Canton (Fraser) proposed making sedition extraditable between
Hong Kong and China. The Chinese generally, and the Canton
authorities particularly, regarded sedition as "the most
heinous of crimes against the Emperor", and the protection of
those guilty of it as "proof of unfriendly feeling... no
measure would more conciliate [them]... than the inclusion of
sedition amongst extraditable offences". It might persuade
them to grant further territory to Hong Kong.
The reaction to the proposal is interesting. Officials
thought it "objectionable", and were "surprised" it should
have been made, but Salisbury had "no scruples in the
matter". It would be "a capital bargain" to get rid of "a
few of the scoundrelly leaders of Secret Societies" in return
for territory. However, the scheme "might raise a
Parliamentary row or foreign complications, and should
therefore be considered from the point of view of expediency
4. Mitchell to Knutsford (No.63)(Natal. 4 April 1892): FO
83/1188. cf. Fairfield to Foreign Office (CO. 14 May 1892):
ibid. Copies of the bills in ibid. and FO 83/1102.
5. Macdonald to Robinson (Peking. 25 April 1896); Fraser to
Macdonald (Canton. 9 April 1896); and Robinson to Macdonald
(Hong Kong. 1 June 1896); CO 129/272, ff. 303-9.
alone". Chamberlain (Colonial Secretary) disagreed. Hong
Kong needed more territory, "but I would rather go to war
with China for it than agree to such a bargain". It was
wrong to surrender political offenders to anyone, but "most
of all to the Chinese who would crucify them or cut them in
pieces". The proposal was negatived.
In 1903, Senegal sought Mousa Mollah's extradition from
Gambia for "numerous acts of violence". Governor Denton
thought the French had "failed to make any charge... that
-
would take the offences committed by Musa [sic] out of the
political purview". The Colonial Office agreed with Denton's
assessment, and Mousa was not surrendered.7.
In 1910, Russia attempted to extradite Fedorenko from
Canada for murder. In October he was committed for
extradition, the judge holding that although he was a
political refugee, the murder was not committed in
furtherance of a political object. 8 "An agitation in the
man's favour immediately arose throughout Canada... Great
6. Minutes by Lucas and Wingfield (CO. 14 August 1896);
Salisbury (15 August 1896); and Chamberlain (CO. 18 August
1896): ibid. f.300. cf. Wingfield to Foreign Office (CO. 20
August 1896): ibid. ff.312-3. In 1896, China sought Sun Vat
Sen's extradition from Hong Kong, which was refused on
political offence grounds, but he had already left the
colony. He arrived in London and was kidnapped by the
Chinese Legation, but the Foreign Office intervened to force
his release: cf. T.H. Sanderson Papers, FO 800/1,	 ff.206-
11; FO 881/6918, No.13; FO 881/6854; and HO
144/935/A58272.
7. Antrobus to Foreign Office (CO. 23 May 1903); and Denton
to Chamberlain (Bathurst. 8 August 1903): FO 27/3649. cf.
Minute by H.J.R. (CO. 4 September 1903): CO 87/169. .pa
8. cf. J. Castel and M. Edwardh, op. cit. pp.98-9; N.
Mackenzie and L. Laing, Canada and the Law of Nations 
(Toronto 1938) pp.311-3; and G.V. LaForest, op.cit. pp.44-6.
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meetings" opposed his extradition. g' In December, Justice
Robinson discharged Federenko on appeal on a technicality,
but it seems that his motive was to protect a political
refugee from persecution in Russia'.
In 1912 the Philippines requested Vicente Sotto's
extradition from Hong Kong for abduction; it too was refused
on a technicality, but more interesting was his claim that it
was sought with the intention of punishing him for a
,
political offence. He had faced numerous prosecutions for
,
sedition and libelling government officials and claimed that
if surrendered, he would again be tried for a political
libel. The court recognised that he was a political refugee,
but since extradition was to be refused anyway, did not deal
in any detail with the allegations. However, it did hold
"mere suggestions" of a political motive would be
insufficient". Finally, in 1913 Mexico attempted to
extradite Brito from British Honduras on a charge of robbery
with violence, committed during a rising against the Mexican
government. Governor Collet refused to entertain the
request. The offence was committed "during an organised
rebellion", Brito's only crime was political, and his
extradition "should never have been asked for."
9. The Times 4 January 1911, p.10.
10. cf. Report of the Committee of the Canadian Privy
Council (22 May 1911); and minute by Davidson (FO. 20 June
1911): FO 372/303, ff.440-8.
11. Copy of the report of the court hearing in CO 129/390,
ff.5-9.
12. Collet to Harcourt (British Honduras. 31 July 1913): FO
371/1675.
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In so far as the political offence exemption was addressed
in these cases, the decisions given in the Castioni and Arton
cases were confirmed. All this, while worthy of mention, had
no great importance. However, the some could not be said for
the controversy which arose over extradition between Cape
Colony and German South West Africa during 1904-8. During
the first decade of the twentieth century, the indigenous
peoples of German South West Africa were almost permanently
in rebellion, and rebels frequently passect from one colony to
the other. As a result, extradition became an issue.
* * *
The controversy began in March 1904 with the German
request for the extradition of twelve Bondelzwarts for
murder, arson, attempted murder, burglary and robbery with
violence. Governor Hutchinson noted they were "implicated in
the recent rising of the Bondelzwarts", but referred the case
to his advisers, who found the crimes were "perpetrated in
furtherance of the revolt", and therefore political. "To
murder German males liable to, or expected to render military
service, and the breaking into houses and obtaining supplies
or arms are... crimes of this nature". 1 Hutchinson informed
London that unless otherwise instructed, he would refuse to
arrest the fugitives, and the Colonial Office accepted his
decision.' At the Foreign Offices Maycock thought it wrong
13. Hutchinson to Lyttelton (No.95)(Cape Town. 16 March
1904); and Report by Sampson (17 March 1904): CO 48/575.
Hutchinson left no private papers of any value.
14. Hutchinson to Lyttelton (Cape Town. 30 March 1904). cf.
Lucas to Foreign Office (CO. 6 April 1904): FO 64/1611.
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for the Cape government to "decide off hand" that the
offences were political: a court should have considered the
matter. The course adopted was, however, quite lawful,
although in Britain the usual practice was to let the courts
decidel.
Before the Foreign Office expressed its official view of
the case, Hutchinson reported that as he had received no
instructions, extradition had been refused on political
offence grounds."' With Foreign Office agreement, Lyttelton
,
approved the course adopted, if the Cape government was
satisfied that the offences were political. 17' On this,
Davidson noted they could "hardly be brought within the
category of political offences... How the Ministers of the
Cape Colony arrived at such a conclusion I cannot
conjecture". Furthermore, the Germans would "contest the
view of the Cape Ministers" and "make a row about it"18.
Shortly after the Bondelzwarts case, the Germans sought
David Juli's extradition for murder, and on the advice of his
ministers (but without consulting London) Hutchinson refused
to order his arrest as it was a "crime committed in
15. Minute by Maycock (FO. 7 April 1904). cf. minute by
Davidson (FO. 12 April 1904): ibid.
16. cf. Hutchinson to Lyttelton (Telegraphic. Cape Town.
13 April 1904): FO 64/1645.
17. Lyttelton to Hutchinson (Telegraphic. CO. 21 April
1904). cf. Villers to Colonial Office (FO. 14 April 1904): FO
64/1611.
18. Minutes by Davidson (FO. 12 & 22 April & 16 July 1904):
FO 64/1611 & 1645; and Maycock to Davidson (Private. 2 April
1904): FO 64/1611.
connection with, and in furtherance of a revolt against
German sovereignty, and therefore in reality a political
of fence".
	 Davidson thought the decision "in all probability
quite wrong" and the German semi-official National-Zeitunq 
viewed it as "more than incomprehensible".
Since German protests were expected, the Foreign Office
asked for a fuller explanation'. At present, it had
"practically nothing to say" in defence of the decision
except that it was legal: Germany would "hardly rest
,
satisfied" with that.
	 The Cape explained that the evidence
was insufficient, and had it been sufficient, the murder was
committed by a party of rebellious Hereros, of which Juli was
a member: therefore the crime was political.
Foreign Office officials were still dissatisfied. At
their request (and because the case had been "taken up by the
German press") the Cape authorities were asked to bring
19. Hutchinson to Lyttelton (Cape Town. 13 June 1904): FO
64/1645
20. Minute by Davidson (FO. 30 December 1904): ibid. Others
agreed: cf. Unsigned minute (FO. 15 July 1904); minute by
D.W. (FO. 28 December 1904); ibid.; and National-Zeitunq S
December 1904, extract in ibid.
21. cf. Villers to Colonial Office (FO. 21 December 1904):
ibid.
22. Minute by Davidson (FO. 30 December 1904): FO 64/1645;
and Villers to Colonial Office (FO. 11 January 1905): CO
879/86/766, No.2.
23. Ministers to Governor (Prime Minister's Office. 27
March 1705): FO 64/1646.
24. cf. Minutes by D.W. (FO. 5 April 1905) and Davidson
(FO. 8 & 11 April 1905): ibid.
Juli before a court, and to do likewise in future cases.
They replied with a strong defence of their practice. It was
authorised by the Extradition Act, and was necessary. Juli
was at Walfish Bay, where no lawyer lived: it would therefore
have been impossible for him ("an illiterate bastard native")
to get legal advice or to defend himself adequately. The
Resident Magistrate would probably have granted extradition,
and the Governor would have had the "invidious" duty of
overruling him. It was better to refuse arrest in the first
place. The idea of establishing a central xtradition court
at Cape Town to hear all cases was considered but rejected
because of "the circumstances of the Colony". There was a
dearth of magistrates or judges who knew anything of
extradition law, and transporting prisoners hundreds of miles
from the extremities of the colony to Cape Town would be
expensive and hardly fair on them.4s
Hutchinson answered London's scarcely concealed doubts
as to the validity of his adviser's findings. If the
fugitives were "civilised white men", he would have agreed,
but natives "cannot be expected to distinguish between the
soldiers and other Germans. They are fighting the Germans,
and their idea is, to kill any Germans who resist them".
Furthermore, the natives had been "driven into rebellion by
cruel treatment". Cape arguments were accepted in London,
25. Villers to Colonial Office (FO. 18 April 1905): CO
48/582, ff.192-3; minute by E.J.H. (CO. April 1905): ibid.
+.191; and Lyttelton to Hutchinson (No.61)(CO. 27 April
1905): CO 879/86/766, No.37.
26. Reports by Sampson and Graham (Attorney General's Office.
7 & 24 June 1905): CO 48/580, ff.301-7; and Ministers to
Governor (Prime Minister's Office. 13 September 1905): CO
48/581, ff.53-4.
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although the Foreign Office perhaps only did so because
Germany had not made the much expected protest.27
That was not the end of the matter. In 1907 yet more
rebels took refuge in the Cape. When the Germans (who
expected London to "interfere with the Cape Government in
favour" of surrender) sought extradition, it was "most 
desirable" that the matter be judged in court, for they would
then have no cause for complaint. a Cape ministers replied
that their practice had been accepted in August-September
.0
1905. The authorities had presumably changed their minds
because they hoped leaving matters to the courts would "avoid
possible diplomatic complications", but these were likely to
arise "in still more acute form" if the courts dealt with
extradition. Fugitives might be committed for offences which
ministers thought political, so putting them in a position of
"extreme difficulty": they would either have to overrule the
courts or allow the surrender of a political offender. 2'5'
In the meantime, Germany requested the extradition of a
native leader named Morenga. Again, ministers advised
27. Hutchinson to Lyttelton (Private. 9 July 1905): CO
48/580, ff.295-7. cf. Minutes by Pearson, Cox and Lyttelton
(CO. 8 & 12 August 1905): CO 48/580, ff.293-4; Cox to Foreign
Office (CO. 16 August 1905): ibid. f.308; Minutes by Hurst
(FO. 23 August 1905): FO 64/1646; and Villers to Colonial
Office (FO. 6 September 1905); CO 879/86/766, No.102.
28. Minute by Cox (CO. 26 January 1907): CO 48/594, f.197.
cf. Minute by Maycock (FO. 7 February 1907); memorandum
communicated by von Stumm (17 April 1907): FO 367/63; and
Elgin to Hutchinson (CO. 2 February 1907): CO 879/94/868,
No.29. R. Hyam. Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office 
(1968) contains no reference to this matter.
29. Ministers to Governor (Prime Minister's Office. 30 April
1907): CO 48/592, f.323.
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against extradition on political offence grounds: he also
had "no means to defend himself" if taken before a court, and
they were not prepared to "risk" him being committed.
Hutchinson decided to confer with the Prime Minister, but if
he too advised against extradition, he would be
"constitutionally bound" to refuse
The Colonial Office reaction was mixed. In "ordinary
cases" Cape procedure did not matter, but Morenga's case was
of a "far more important character". Grindle acknowledged
the fear that "incompetent magistrates will hand over
political offenders", but Morenga could be brought before the
Cape Town magistrates: however, if this was done, the
Germans would complain if subsequent cases were not decided
in court. It would therefore perhaps be better to let
ministers have their way: "the worst course of all" would be
for ministers to overturn the decision of a court in favour
of extradition. Lambert did not see how the Cape could be
forced to change a procedure that was fully sanctioned by
law. If the Prime Minister advised against extradition, "it
would be difficult to press the Cape Government in the
matter". 1
 Foreign Office officials were far from happy.
They had assured Germany that Morenga's extradition would be
dealt with in the 'normal way', and had thought this meant
30. Von Humboldt to Hutchinson (10 April 1907): CO 48/592,
ff.325-6; and Hutchinson to Elgin (Cape Town. 29 May 1907):
CO 879/941868, No.162.
31. Minutes by Pearson (CO. 30 May 1907); Grindle (CO. 30 May
1907); and Lambert (CO. 30 May 1907): CO 481592, ff. 389-90;
and Just to Foreign Office (CO. 7 June 1907): CO 879/94/868,
No.151.
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before a court.3
The Cape Prime Minister advised against extradition,
Hutchinson was asked to delay replying to the Germans, but
the reply had already been sent.
	 Pearson observed it was
"perfectly obvious that there is no case for Morenga's
extradition", while Winston Churchill (Colonial Office
Parliamentary under-secretary) thought "the surrender of
Morenga to suffer death would be unworthy of a Government
under the British flag". H.B. Cox (assistaiit under-
secretary) noted that the "mischief is done and it only
remains for the F.O. to deal with the Germans as best they
can. I wish them joy of their job".A
The Foreign Office could not see "anything political" in
Morenga's crimes, and expected Germany to register serious
complaints.
	 The Cape procedure was "to be strongly
deprecated": executive administration of extradition law was
"undesirable on constitutional grounds". It exposed the Cape
government to "adverse foreign criticism, and to
misconstructions being placed upon its actions". The
procedure was "inexpedient as a matter of policy, even
32. Minute by Clarke (FO. 12 June 1907); FO 367/63. cf.
minute by Hurst (FO. 13 June 1907): ibid.; and Barrington to
Colonial Office (FO. 25 June 1907): CO 879/94/868, No.165.
33. cf. Hutchinson to Elgin (Cape Town. 4 June 1907): CO
48/592, ff.422-3; Elgin to Hutchinson (Telegraphic. CO. 26
June 1907): CO 879/94/868, No.166; and Cameron to Von
Humboldt (Cape Town. 6 June 1907); CO 48/592, ff.476-7.
34. Minutes by Pearson (CO. 25 June 1907); Churchill (CO. 4
July 1907); and Cox (CO. 28 June 1907); CO 48/592, ff.421,592
& 595.
35. Minute by Warner (FO. 2 July 1907): FO 367/63. cf.
Minutes by Kenrick (FO. 11 July 1907); and Clarke and Langley
(FO. 8 July 1907): ibid.
though it may be legally justifiable". In any colony where
there was "an organised judicature", extradition should be
dealt with by the courts, and the Cape should therefore be
asked to change a procedure that had "already proved a source
of considerable embarrassment to the Imperial Government and
may on some future occasion involve them in difficulties even
greater than those which have attended Morenga's case". The
best solution would be the establishment of an extradition
court at Cape Town.'s
Hutchinson was asked to put the idea to his ministers,7
but meanwhile, Germany had sought Baird's extradition, which
had been refused on political offence grounds. e At the same
time, the request for Juli's extradition was renewed. As new
evidence was submitted which threw doubt on the political
nature of his offence, he was sent before the Cape Town
magistrate, who then discharged Juli on political offence
grounds.
On the general question of procedure, Hutchinson pressed
his ministers to accept London's view, but to no effect.
36. Langley to Colonial Office (FO. 2 August 1907): CO
48/594, ff.477-85.
37. Elgin to Hutchinson (CO. 10 January 1908): CO
879/97/896, p.9.
38. cf. Hutchinson to Elgin (No.6)(Cape Town. 20 January
1908); and Fife to Von Humboldt (Cape Town. 20 January 1908):
CO 48/596, f.20. The Germans had enquired as to Baird's
extradition in 1906: ministers were sure he was a political
offender, but at the time he was in gaol in Cape Colony, so
no communication in that sense was made: cf. co 48/587/592.
39. cf. Hutchinson to Elgin (No.4)(Cape Town. 8 January
1908); and same to same (No.58)(Cape Town. 24 March 1908):
CO 48/596, ff.4-8 & 357-60.
While recognising the "force" of Foreign Office views, "in
the peculiar circumstances" of Cape Colony it was
"impracticable to establish a system of special tribunals" to
deal with extradition.. '"a The Foreign Office maintained its
position: it was "obvious" that in the absence of a judicial
enquiry, refusal to extradite "will be liable to be treated
as an act of policy and not of justice", and any surrender
"will be attributed to weakness". However, nothing could be
done.'"
,
In subsequent cases (both_ 'political' and 'non-
political') the Cape authorities acted as follows. If
extradition was justified, fugitives were sent before a
court: if not, ministers refused to arrest them. They never
granted extradition: that was left to the courts.	 It is
hard to see how their motives could be challenged throughout
the episode. All they were trying to do was protect
political offenders and that had always been the mainspring
of British extradition policy, although their refusal to
appreciate the need to conciliate Germany was perhaps rather
naive. The Foreign Office's main concern throughout was to
conciliate, even appease. Germany, and such an attitude was
consistent with that adopted in other colonial
40. Hutchinson to Crewe (No.112)(Cape Town. 1 June 1908);
and Ministers to Governor (Prime Minister's Office. 1 June
1908): CO 48/597, ff.4-8.
41. Campbell to Colonial Office (FO. 14 July 1908): and
Antrobus to Foreign Office (CO. 25 July 1908): CO
879/97/898, pp.132-3 & 149.
42. cf. The following cases: Bondelzwarts natives (1908: CO
48/597-8); Rolf (1909: CO 48/601-4); Antiate (1911: CO
551/32); Rodat (1911: CO 551/10); Kapsopoulos (1912: CO
551/26); and Ribeiro (1913: CO 551/43).
questions.
That Foreign Office views were dictated purely by
expediency is confirmed by the fact that in 1909 it adopted
the 'objectionable' Cape procedure. In December 1908, the
Haitian President, Nord Alexis, resigned and fled the
country, and in January 1909 the new government sought his
extradition from Jamaica for the murder of persons involved
in an abortive coup of March 1908. 4-* The Colonial Office
felt that in a case where the offence was "so obviously
,
political", it might "be proper to depart from the usual
practice" and to refuse to bring the matter before the
courts. 4	Foreign Office Officials agreed: Maycock even
cited Cape practice as a precedent for the decision. 4.4' Nord
Alexis was not taken before a court. It would perhaps be
going too far to accuse the Foreign Office of naked
hypocrisy, but it was hardly consistent.
* * *
It was perhaps inevitable that controversy over
political offences in extradition should focus upon the
colonies rather than Europe in the early years of the
twentieth century. By and large. Europe was in a fairly
43. cf. B. Porter, Britain. Europe and the World p.78.
44. cf. Murray to Grey (No.4)(Port-au-Prince. 21 January
1909): FO 372/165; and same to same (No.5)(Port-au-Prince. 31
January 1909): FO 371/680.
45. Antrobus to Foreign Office (CO. 12 March 1909): FO
372/165.
46. cf. Minutes by Maycock (FO. 13 March 1909); Campbell (FO.
13 March 1909); Mallet (FO. 15 March 1909); Davidson (FO. 17
March 1909); and Campbell to Colonial Office (FO. 20 March
1909): FO 372/165. No-one had complained when ministers and
governors other than those of Cape Colony decided an offence
was political: cf. above for the cases of Mousa Mollah and
Brito.
stable condition, with few revolutionaries (except
anarchists) needing or seeking asylum. In contrast, Europe's
colonial possessions and nations that would now be termed
members of the 'third world' were frequently disturbed by
rebellions and political disorder. Similarly, British
colonies had to deal with their own 'political offenders'.
In 1889 the (British) Gambia sought the extradition of
Sheikh Momodoo Low from Senegal for murder. The authorities
thought the offence "cold blooded", 47 but the French
disagreed and refused extradition on political offence
grounds- 445' The Governor of the Gambia was "unable to see
than controversy. Britain accepted the decision, whilst
making how this conclusion could have been arrived at", but
rather it clear to the French that she did not agree- 4-'7 In
1908 a political offender (Charu Chandra Roy) was extradited
from Chandernagore (a French enclave in north-eastern India)
to British India, but, at France's request, 'political'
charges were dropped and he was prosecuted for criminal
offences only.61
More important was the Savarkar case, in which the
Fugitive Offenders Act again proved its worth. During the
late 1900s and 1910s, Britain faced serious unrest in India
itself and among Indians living in London: in 1909 Sir
47. Minute by A.W.H. (CO. 27 December 1889): CO 87/136. cf.
minute by Bergne (FO. n.d.): FO 27/3026.
48. Pellegrin to Carter (14 February 1890): ibid.
49. Carter to Knutsford (No.5)(Bathurst. 14 February 1890):
ibid.; and Sanderson to Lytton (No.28 Treaty) (FO. 31 March
1890): FO 27/3008.
50. cf. FO 372/106.
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Curzon Wyllie was assassinated in London and Collector
Jackson at Nasik.° 1 One of the leading Indian nationalists
was Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, and in 1910 a warrant was
issued for his extradition to British India from Britain
under the Fugitive Offenders Act on various charges of waging
war on the King, conspiring to do so, collecting arms with
the intention to do so, sedition and abetment of murder.
Savarkar appealed to the King's Bench and the Court of Appeal
on the grounds that to return him to India would be "unjust
and oppressive", but to no avail.
When the ship carrying Savarkar back to India docked at
Marseilles, he managed to slip out of a porthole and swim
ashore. However, he was caught by a French policeman,
restored to the ship, and the journey to India was completed.
In the meantime, the French government protested. Savarkar
was a political offender and when he landed on French soil he
was entitled to claim asylum: he should not have been handed
back to the British authorities without first being formally
extradited. The French therefore asked for Savarkar's return
to France: they would then consider any British application
51. cf. Sir Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest (1910) pp.57-60 &
146-9; D. Garnett, The Golden Echo (1954) pp.143-62; S.R.
Wasti, Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement (Oxford
1964) p.92; and S.A. Wolpert„ Tilak and Gokhale (Berkeley
1962) pp.123 & 168-9.
52. cf. Rutzen to Home Office (Bow St. 12 May 1910): HO 144/
1063/189349, /4; The Times 25 May 1910, p.4; British 
International Law Cases (1967) volume 5, pp.598-9 & 614-26;
Times Law Reports volume 26 (1909-10), pp.512-6 & 516-4.
There was some support for Savarkar: cf. Justice 25 June
1910, p.1; Anon. 'The Right of Asylum', Nation (London)
volume 7 (1410), p.661; and volume 8 (1910), pp.43-4; and 5H,
(C),16,c.44406 April 1910).
for extradition. Since the government felt it was under no
obligation to return Savarkar (for a French official had
handed him over), and it was most unlikely that extradition
from France would be granted, Britain refused. However,
general foreign policy considerations dictated that a
damaging controversy with France must be avoided at all
costs, and so Britain agreed to arbitration by the Hague
Tribunal. In February 1911 the arbitrators decided in
Britain's favour, and the controversy came to an end.	 As
for Savarkar, he was sentenced to transportation for life,
and remained in prison or internment until 1937.
53. cf. HO 144/1063/169349; FO 372/210,211 & 278; Grey
Papers, FO 800/52,/89,/93/98/99,/107; Bertie Papers, BL Add.
MS.63025; The Times 20 July & 7 October 1910, pp.5 & 9; Anon,
'Savarkar Case', American Journal of International Law volume
5 (1911), pp.208-10; Anon, 'Savarkar Case', Law Magazine and 
Review, volume 36 (1911), pp. -326-30; 5H,(C),19,c.844,(18
July1910); ibid. c.1417,(21 July 1910); 5H,(C)„63,c.5031(11
June 1914); and ibid. cc .909 & 1628, (16 June 1914); D. Keer,
Veer Savarkar (2nd edition. Bombay 1966); C. Gupta, Barrister 
Savarkar (Madras 1926); P. O'Higgins, 'Unlawful Seizure',
British Yearbook of International Law volume 36 (1961),
pp.286 & 315-6.
CHAPTER 8 
THE ALIEN ACT AND THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM (1905-14) 
Chapter Eight: The Alien Act and the Right of Asylum 
(1905-14) 
During the 1890s, calls for the limitation of alien
immigration became increasingly common, and in the early
1900s the Tory government adopted the idea, ostensibly on
account of its supposedly harmful socio-economic impact. 1 It
was claimed that aliens competed unfairly with the British
worker, but by this time, labour organisations, such as the
T.U.C. and the London Trades Council, which had previously
(in 1891-4) called for alien legislation, had changed their
minds. ° In 1903 a Royal Commission found there was no real
socio-economic necessity for restricting immigration, but
nevertheless recommended "stringent measures of
restriction".	 The Tories hoped legislation "would not only
silence Tory pressure groups", but also "demonstrate sympathy
with the workers without angering the employers", and perhaps
even "recapture some working class votes".rn
1. cf. W.T.W. Ouin, 'Invasion of Destitute Aliens',
Nineteenth Century volume 31 (1892), pp.985-1000; C.E. Howard
Vincent, 'Alien Immigration', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 
volume 173 (1903), pp.132-41. In 1898 Lord Hardwicke
unsuccessfully revived that part of Salisbury's bill of 1894
which restricted pauper immigration: cf. Anon, 'The Aliens
Bill', Spectator volume 80 (1898), pp.901-2; and B. Gainer,
op.cit. p.157.
2. cf. B. Gainer., op.cit. pp.96-7. The biographers of one of
the leaders of the anti-alien campaign noted: "it was a
remarkable thing that the British Working-man did not appear
to welcome the Aliens Bill so heartily as might have been
expected": S. Jeyes and F. How, Life of Vincent (1912) p.339.
3. B. Gainer, op.cit. p.159. Its recommendations are
reprinted in: Liberal Publication Department, Ten Years of 
Tory Government (1905) pp.182-3.
4. B. Gainer, op.cit, (p.190. The Government knew
legislation was not strictly necessary: cf. CAB 37/59,
No.146; and HO 45/10241/B37811.
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A bill introduced in 1904 ran out of time, but a similar
measure was re-introduced a few months later, and the Aliens
Act (5 Edw.VII.cap.13) passed into law on 11 August, 1905.
Aliens were not to be admitted if they were poor, mad,
diseased, or criminal, or if they had previously been
expelled under the provisions of the Act. In addition, the
Home Secretary was empowered, on the recommendation of a
court (including a court of summary jurisdiction), to expel
any alien who was: convicted of serious crime, or poverty-
stricken, or had been "living under unsanitary conditions due
to overcrowding", or had been convicted abroad for an
extraditable offence.'s
The Act passed despite vigorous Liberal and Labour
opposition. Dilke (Liberal MP for the Forest of Dean) feared
it would "have cruel results for some hundreds of unfortunate
people who are at this time flying from persecution in the
East of Europe", while Spencer thought there was
"considerable danger in the Bill of wrecking that right of
asylum... which has existed for so many years in this
country, and under which those who suffer from political or
religious persecution abroad have always found safety in this
country". Trevelyan (Liberal MP for Elland, Yorkshire)
asserted that the principle of the legislation
5. On this question generally see B. Gainer, op.cit. 
passim.; and HO 45/10303/117267. There were private
members' aliens bill in 1903 and 1904: cf. HO
45/10283/106464; HO 45/10307/120474; and HO
45/10293/113513.
6. T. Bunyan.(History and Practice of the Political Police 
[1983 edition] p.110) incorrectly states that the Home
Secretary was empowered to deport "on the advice of the
police, magistrates and the Special Branch".
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"involved a wide breach of national traditions". 7 There was
no "proved necessity" for the Act, which "smirches those
ancient traditions of freedom and hospitality for which
Britain has been so long renowned".e
Large Tory majorities in both Houses of Parliament
ensured the measure's passage, but the opposition was able to
force one important change: the strengthening of that part of
the bill which embodied a sort of political offence
,
exemption. The final version read as follows:
in the case of an immigrant who proves that he is
seeking admission to this country solely to avoid
prosecution or punishment on religious or political
grounds or for an offence of a political character, or
persecution, involving danger of imprisonment or danger
to life or limb, on account of religious belief 5 leave
to land shall not be refused on the ground merely of
want of means, or the probability of his becoming a
charge on the rates.
Initially, aliens seeking admission under this clause
7. 4H 5 (C) 5 145,cc.703-5 5 (2 May 1905); 4H5(L)51505c.7555(28
July 1905); and 4H 5 (C) 5 135,c.1085 5 (8 June 1904). cf.
4H 5 (C) 5 132„cc.991-4 5 (29 March 1904); 4H5(C)5133,cc.1062-
1160 5 (25 April 1904); 4H 5 (C),145 5 c.472 5 (18 April 1905);
ibid. cc.696-801,(2 May 1905); 4H 5 (C),148,cc.865-7 9 (3 July
1905; ibid. cc-1186-8 5 (5 July 1905); 4H,(C),149,cc.151-74,(10
July 1905);ibid cc.943-8,(17 July 1905); ibid cc. 1258-725(19
July 1905); and 4H„(L) 5 150 5 cc.754-72 5 (28 July 1905).
8. Churchill to Laski (30 May 1904): R. Churchill, Winston S.
Churchill (1966) Companion volume to volume 2, 1343 .354-6. cf.
G. Drage, 'Alien Immigration'. Fortniohtly Review volume 57
(1895), pp.37-46; Reynolds's 1 May 1904, p.6; Justice 22
April & 6 May 1905, p.1; Clarion 5 May 1905, p.4; Socialist 
Standard 3 June 1905, p.6.
were required to prove their case, and there were allegations
that genuine political refugees were being refused entry.
While some of the claims were blatantly false, others may
have had more than a grain of truth in them, although none
was actually proved. c7 Herbert Gladstone, the Home Secretary
in the new Liberal government (formed in December 1905),
shared MPs' fears as to the Act's effects: it raised "many
vexatious points" and gave him "much trouble"." The Home
Office permanent secretary thought there was "a real
,
difficulty" over political-religious refugees, and suggested
something might be done to lift the burden of proof from
them. Russian political and religious repression was "so
notorious" that it was "a matter of common sense that if a
man proves that he comes from Russia and alleges that he is a
refugee there is a presumption of fact that his statement is
correct"." Therefore, on 9 March 1906, Gladstone issued his
famous 'benefit of doubt' order..1
While recognising "the extreme difficulty" of assessing
the validity of claims for political-religious refugee
status, Gladstone reminded the Immigration Boards which
administered the Act that it had been passed to check "the
immigration of undesirable aliens". Parliament "never
9. cf.4H,(C),153,cc.88-9,140,135-60,(5 March 1906); and
ibid. cc.565-807 March 1906).
10. Gladstone to Grey (Private. 13 Febru ary 1906): Grey
Papers, FO 800/97, f.13.
11. Chalmers to Gladstone (Private. 6 March 1906): H.
Glad.PP. BL Add. MS 45993, ff.17-18.
12. C.F. Fraser, Control of Aliens (1940 ) P.41, dates it 9
March 1905: before the Act was passed!
intended" the Act to be applied with absolute "rigidity": the
statements of those claiming religious-political refugee
status might be "insufficient or inaccurate" but nevertheless
true. Therefore, a certain latitude should be allowed:
In all cases in which immigrants coming from the parts
of the Continent which are at present in a disturbed
condition allege that they are flying from political or
religious persecution, the benefit of the doubt, where
any doubt exists, as to the truth of the allegation will
be allowed, and leave to land will given.2.
Even before 9 March, at least one immigrant was admitted
on the grounds that he was a political refugee: Moische
Smolenski. In January 1906 the Port of London Immigration
Board requested guidance on the case, the facts of which were
as follows. Smolenski, a Russian Jew, was a private in the
army at Krementschug, and there was an anti-Jewish riot in
the town. "Smolenski went out to protect a friend of his,
also a Jew, who was in danger from the mob". By doing so,
"he became liable to punishment (it is understood two years
hard labour) and deserted to avoid it".
More generally, the Board asked whether "having regard
to the present condition of Russia and the present treatment
of the Jews in that country, the following came within the
exception... (a) Leaving the country to avoid military
service (b) Desertion from the Army to avoid punishment for
refusing to fire on the mob, whether Jewish or otherwise, and
13. Home Office circular to the Immigration Boards; and
instructions to Immigration Officers (9 March 1906): HO
158/13„ pp.103-6.
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whether the disturbance is of a revolutionary or religious
character, or due merely to an ordinary strike of workmen".
Officials thought the case was "rather on the line", but were
"of the opinion on the whole that Smolenski's offence was of
a political character. Martial law was proclaimed and actual
political disturbances were taking place"." . He was
therefore admitted to Britain.
On the wider questions raised, Peddar advised that every
,
case would have to be decided "with strict regard to the
particular circumstances: (a) there may well be many cases in
which desertion from the Army has no political character;
(b) there is more possibility that in the circumstances
indicated in this paragraph political or religious
considerations would have weight, but no general rule can be
laid down".'	 The attitude adopted by the Home Office
therefore mirrored that adopted towards political offences in
extradition cases: judgement on a case by case basis.
Immigrants were thus given the widest possible latitude for
proving they were entitled to asylum. There is some evidence
that unscrupulous aliens may have abused Gladstone's
generosity. On 7 November 1906, Mr. Parker (MP for Halifax)
called attention to the arrest of one Zelig Zingar (at
Russia's request) on an extradition warrant. Since he was a
political refugee, he expected Gladstone to "see that the
14. Memorandum by Clerks to the Immigration Board (Port of
London. 9 January 1906): and minute by Waller (HO. 9
January 1906): HO 45/10327/132181. cf. Chalmers to Gladstone
(Private. 10 January 1906): H.Glad. PP. BL Add. MS 45993,
ff. 1-11.
15. Memorandum by Peddar (HO. n.d.): HO 45/10327/132181.
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protection afforded by our law to such was not violated"."'
Zingar was accused of throwing a bomb into a barracks at
Warsaw and killing several policeman, and had confessed to
the crime before the immigration authorities at Grimsby.
However, he now retracted his confession, claiming he "stated
that he was fleeing from justice in Russia for the purpose of
inducing the authorities at Grimsby to permit him to land in
this country as a political refugee. It is apparent from his
description that the man in custody is not the man wanted". 1-7
It was also apparent that Zingar had pulled the proverbial
'wool over the eyes' of the Immigration Board, and lied his
way into Britain. However, what concerned the Home Office
most was that it was "very desirable that it should be made
plain to the public that it was Zingar's own fault that he
was arrested". "3 The government wanted to avoid at all costs
the charge that it was conspiring with Russia to prosecute a
'politico'.
The Zingar case gave some credence to the arguments of
those who denounced the 'benefit of doubt order'. Evans
Gordon (Tory MP for Tower Hamlets) had expressed his
"amazement" at its terms. "The onus of proof had thereby
been removed entirely from the immigrant... the whole Act
became null and void under those conditions". Lord Newton
16. 4H,(C)„164„c.453,(7 November 1906).
17. MacNaghten to Home Office (Scotland Yard. 9 November
1906): HO 45/10348/146018, /8.
18. Minute by Troup (HO. 10 November 1906): ibid. /B. cf.
FO 372/28.
claimed the Act had become "little better than a farce","'
and others thought the Act was not being administered in the
manner "anticipated by those who passed it". 6° Gladstone
defended himself, asserting that all he had done was to
"remedy certain grievances and... prevent great hardship
being inflicted". He was "confident that the whole Country
would have resented it if I had not done so if it were in my
power to do so".1
The Aliens Act of course had great implications for the
right of asylum, even though it was not specifically directed
against political refugees generally or any group in
particular. Granting them absolute protection in extradition
was of no value if they could not get into Britain in the
first place. It is difficult to determine how much of a
difference Gladstone's order made: allegations that genuine
'politicos' were being excluded did not cease until August,2
but they seem to have had less basis in fact than earlier
claims. It was, however, nonsense to claim that the order
made the Act 'null and void'. Large numbers of immigrants
were still refused entry, and few were admitted as political
or religious refugees. There were 505 such admissions in
19. 4H,(C),153,cc.1312-3,(14 March 1906); and 4H,(L),
154,c,549,(22 March 1906).
20. Buckle to Gladstone (Private. 1 February 1909):
H.Glad.PP. BL Add. MS 46066, f.233. cf. The Times 17 March
1906, p.B; and 5 June 1906, p.7; and W. Evans Gordon, 'The
Attack on the Aliens Act', National Review volume 48 (1906),
PP.460-71.
21. 4H.(C) 9 153.c.1322.(14 March 1906).
22. cf. 4H,(C),154,c.79,(19 March 1906); ibid. cc .731-2,(23
March 1906); 4H, ( C)9 162,cc.431-2,(30 July 1906); and ibid.
c.1313,(2 August 1906),
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1906, 43 in 1907, 20 in 1908, 30 in 1909, and 5 in 1910.
The Act was rather inefficient anyway: it was "a
patchwork of half measures". 24. Ports where aliens were
allowed to land were specified, but no provision was made for
dealing with aliens who attempted to land elsewhere. The
tests imposed for proving an ability to support oneself were
evaded relatively easily. First class and cabin-class
passengers were exempt from the Act's provisions, and on some
ships steerage passengers were passed off as first and cabin-
class. The Act only applied to ships carrying more than 20
alien steerage passengers: aliens arriving on vessels with
less than 20 could land quite freely. Similarly it did not
apply to aliens who were visiting Britain 'temporarily', or
who were simply passing through on the way to their final
destination, or who held return tickets. Of the 534,805
aliens who sought admission in 1909, only 11,930 had to face
the tests imposed by the Act. 2 Any political refugee with
money, common-sense, or a bit of ingenuity could still secure
asylum in Britain with relative ease.
Compared with the legislation and practice of the
continent and the United States, the Alien Act was
23. 5H,(C),21,c.662,(10 February 1911): speech of Home
Secretary Churchill. These figures are of course no measure
of how many political and religious refugees entered Britain
during these years. Many hundreds, perhaps thousands,
entered every year without ever having to appeal to this part
of the Act.
24. C. Rogers, Battle of Stepney (1981) p.123.
25. ibid. p.123n. cf . HO 45/10326/1317E17, /93; 5H,(C),1,
c.967,(28 February 1909); and T.W.E. Roche. The Key in the 
Lock (1969) pp.70-4.
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exceedingly mild. Nevertheless, the right of asylum was no
longer absolute: knowledge of the Act may have deterred
political refugees from trying to seek asylum in the first
place. However, they were still far more likely to be
admitted to Britain than anywhere else, and far safer in
Britain than elsewhere.
* * *
Immigration laws do not only deal wit4 keeping aliens
out: in addition, they invariably provide for the
deportation of 'undesirable aliens'. Deportation has a
direct relevance to extradition, for it can be substituted
for it. During the second half of the 1900s a new practice
arose within Anglo-American extradition: that of 'disguised
extradition'. During 1906-1914, 'disguised extradition' (the
deportation of criminals at the request of the country where
the fugitive was wanted) superceded extradition as the means
by which Britain secured the return of fugitives from the
United States: 20 were deported, and 19 extradited.	 The
immigration authorities at New York were "extremely
obliging", to say the least: the practice became so
commonplace that code words were devised for use in cipher
telegrams relating to it.
26. These are my own figures, collected during examination of
Home and Foreign Office documents. cf . P. O'Higgins,
'Disguised Extradition', Modern Law Review volume 27 (1964),
p.523. Before 1906, 'disguised extradition', had taken
place, but not on any scale. There seem to have been only
two cases: Barfield (1896: HO 144/507/X60223); and Symmons
(1899: HO 144/523/X74241).
27. Bennett to Grey (New York. 21 November 1908): HO
45/10391/172119, /5. cf. Blackwell to Foreign Office (HO. 30
May 1908): FO 372/136
280
There were certain advantages to having fugitives
deported rather than extradited. Extraditio n from the United
States was a particularl y expensive business, and deportation
involved hardly any expense at al1. 0 The nature of the
offence charged was irrelevant: fugitives accused of non-
extraditable could be recovered.	 Similarly, the return of
a fugitive under immigration laws was unconditional.
The development of the phenomenon of 'disguised
,
extradition' was therefore very useful for Britain: it was a
"delightfully summary substitute for extradition". However,
the authorities were aware that the procedure had certain
drawbacks. It was "technically improper", and "might be
represented as an attempt to evade the provisions of the
Extradition Acts".	 Such considerations were particularly
important in the case of Irish fugitives: imagine the outcry
if Britain sought the deportation of a Fenian.1
One cannot blame Britain for taking advantage of foreign
laws, 2 but for the purposes of this study it is more
28. cf. the cases of Burke (F0 372/35); Amphlett (FO 372/85):
and Dernbach (FO 372/317); and Blackwell to Foreign Office
(HO. 5 January 1909): FO 372/185.
29. cf. the Moloney (HO 45/10394/175113); and Amphlett (FO
372/85) cases.
30. Minutes by Simpson (HO. 31 August 1896): HO
144/507/60223, /7; and Eagleston (HO. 27 February 1909): HO
45/10391/172119, /9; and Blackwell to Dublin Castle (HO. 8
December 1908): FO 372/185.
31. Any attempt to deport Lynchehaun would have aroused great
controversy.
32. Maycock minuted: "In one or two cases lately criminals
have been got back from foreign countries under the
Immigration Laws of those countries for non-extradition
crimes", (Minute by Maycock (FO. 28 March 1907): FO 372/85)
his use of 'countries' indicating that it was not just the
United States which permitted 'disguised extradition'.
important to discover whether Britain herself granted
'disguised extradition'. The procedure could be used in a
sinister way: against political refugees for example.
	 In
more general terms "it is clearly an abuse of the powers
vested in immigration officials", and constitutes "an
evasion" of extradition law. While extradition is a judicial
function, "the deportation procedure is lacking in such
safeguards and smacks of star chamber".
	
It was therefore
crucial for the maintenance of the right of asylum that
Britain did not grant 'disguised extradition', and all the
available evidence indicates that she did not do so.
In 1896, the New Zealand authorities wished to deport
one Thomas Kenny to the South African Republic, for there was
no extradition treaty, but the Foreign Office objected that
such a course would be illegal and the deportation was
blocked.	 Peddar noted that the substitution of deportation
for extradition would be grounds for objecting to alien
legislation, and in 1908 Blackwell minuted that "applications
addressed to us to use the Aliens Act for the purpose of
dispensing with extradition proceedings would certainly be
33. At the Rome conference, Russia had proposed coming to an
arrangement for the 'disguised extradition' of anarchists:
cf. R.B. Jensen, op.cit. p.133.
34. J. Castel and M. Edwardh, oo.cit. 133; P. O'Higgins,
'Disguised Extradition', p.521; and H.G. Reuschlein,
'Provisional Arrest', Georgetown Law Journal volume 23
(1934), p.77-8. cf. J.P. Clark, op.cit. p.405. Even the
Americans were aware that the procedure was rather improper:
cf. Straus to Root (22 September 1908), quoted in A.E. Evans,
'Acquisition of Custody', British Yearbook of International 
Law volume 40 (1964) p.84.
35. cf. FO 83/1439
refused".	 Later, it was asserted that deportation "cannot
properly be used as a substitute for extradition", and that
"the principle that deportation should not be used where
extradition is the proper remedy is one to which considerable
importance is attached"."
In more practical terms, in no case did Britain knowingly
grant 'disguised extradition'. In 1907, William Strongford
was due for deportation, and since he was a German subject,
normal practice would be to send him to Germany. However,
he was wanted in Germany,	 and it would be wrong to send
him there: "It would, in effect, amount to extraditing
him, without the necessary formalities laid down by the
extradition Acts being complied with". In 1911 a Russian
named Solomon Zausmer was convicted of larceny as a bailee,
and recommended for deportation. He appealed, stating that
he had been in England for ten years and had a British wife
and three children, and alleging that if he went back to
Russia, he would be shot for having deserted from the army.
The court found that although it had "been ascertained that
the appellant would not be shot if he were deported to
Russia", it was "probable that he would be punished for
36. Minutes by Peddar (HO. 13 February 1905): HO 45/10303
/117267, /27; and Blackwell (HO. 28 November 1908): HO
45/10391/172119, /4.
37. Locke to Foreign Office (HO. 8 April 1926): FO 372/2199,
f.59; and Memorandum by Godwin (FO. 3 December 1934): FO
371/18553, ff. 210-221. cf. Unsigned memorandum (HO.
November 1934): HO 45/1E1080/681045, /64.
38. Chalmers to Foreign Office (HO. 9 February 1907): FO
372/85.
39. Minutes by Maycock (FO. 11 & 13 February 1907): ibid.
The Home Office file (142077) has not survived.
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desertion. Having regard to all the circumstances, we think
that it is not a case in which it is advisable to inflict the
penalty of expulsion".. 4-0 British judges clearly would have
no truck with 'disguised extradition'.
***
During the later 1900s, re-extradition once again
aroused controversy. Kuhliger was extradited to Belgium and
in 1908 Germany informed the Foreign Office that Belgium had
refused re-extradition for forgery. Through her minister at
Brussels, Britain informed Belgium that she would have no
objections to the re-extradition, but in response Belgium
proposed amending the Anglo-Belgian treaty to prohibit re-
extradition. '
Foreign Office officials wanted nothing to do with the
proposal (Belgium was "very tiresome about this academical
guestion" 42), but those of the Home Office were rather more
sympathetic to the Belgian view. Eagleston thought it was
"perfectly right", while Simpson and Blackwell wondered how
40. C. Parry (ed.), op.cit. p.102. The Zausmer file (214717)
has not survived.
41. Metternich to Grey (21 November 1908): FO 372/111;
Campbell to Hardinge (No.19 Treaty)(FO. 29 December 1908):
ibid.: and Campbell to Home Office (FO. 27 April 1909); FO
372/147. In other cases, Britain similarly raised no
objections to re-extradition: de Valmore (1901: FO 7/1318;
and HO 144/666/X81244) was extradited to Austria and re-
extradited to Germany with British blessing; Gruenfeld and
Sameitky (1902: HO 144/666/X81531) were extradited to
Britain from Germany and then re-extradited to Russia; de
Meulemeester (1910: FO 372/214) was extradited to Britain
from Germany and then re-extradited to France. None of these
cases had any hint of political offences in them.
42. Minutes by Maycock (FO. 29 June 1909): FO 372/147.
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Britain was supposed to protect 'politicos' if re-extradition
was allowed.	 The Home Office therefore decided to consult
the Law Officers,"". and in the meantime, the papers on the
case were shown to Hurst (Foreign Office assistant legal
adviser) for the first time. He agreed with the Home Office.
If re-extradition was allowed, this must "weaken the
safeguards against the extradition of political of
Britain might refuse to surrender a political refugee to
Russia, but surrender the same man to Germany for theft.
Russia could then extradite him from Germany for what Britain
considered a political offence. 4	The Law Officers advised
that treaties should not allow re-extradition,'"' and the
Anglo-Belgian treaty was duly revised to clearly prohibit re-
extradition.	 Protecting political offenders remained a
high priority in British extradition law and practice.
In October 1912, a curious case arose with the Russian
demand for the extradition of one J. Gummerus. 4"3 It was an
"extraordinary request": he had been sentenced to a years'
imprisonment for publishing "articles containing speeches at
Socialist meetings in Trafalgar Square and elsewhere by Mr.
43. Minute by Eagleston (HO. 7 July 1909): HO
144/18862/155389, /14. cf. minutes by Simpson and Blackwell
(HO. 13 & 19 July 1909: ibid. /14.
44. cf. Blackwell to Foreign Office (HO. 12 August 1909): FO
372/147.
45. Minute by Hurst (FO. 16 August 1909): ibid.
46. Law Officers' Opinion by Robson and Isaacs (2 May 1910):
FO 881/9830.
47. Copy in FO 881/9891X.
48. cf. Benckendorff to Grey (11 October 1912): FO 372/383.
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Bernard Shaw, Mr. K ir Hardie and others, and also in France
offence was clearly political, andinsulting the Czar", The
it was "surprisin9 tht the request is put forward". Maycocka 
suggested Russia be asked to state which extraditabl e offence
Gummerus was accused of, but she never replied ,
 no doubt
realising that &Ammer-us would be judged a political
offender.'
Although the POlitical offence exemption did not come
before a British Court during 1904-1914, the activities of
the suffragettes caused widespread discussion of the
treatment of 'political offenders' in British goals, and this
in turn stimulated discussion of what was a political
offence. Sir J.D. Rees (Unionist MP for Nottingham)
satirically defined a political offender "as an offender with
whom the person using that expression is in sympathy", but of
course this was "not a satisfactory legal definition, however
accurate it may be". Atherley-Jones thought political
offences should be defined by testing the "end which is in
view. When people aim at a change in the Constitution, be it
beneficient or otherwise, and pursue any unlawful means... it
is... a political offence", while Keir Hardie asserted that
"the case law" which had been produced by the Extradition Act
49. Minutes by Wetherall and Maycock (FO. 12 October 1912):
ibid. cf . Dixon to Foreign Office (HO. 4 December 1912):
ibid. The Home Office file (229277) has not survived. This
was the only occasion upon which Russia sought the
extradition of a political refugee. This perhaps indicates
that the safeguards for political offenders included in the
Extradition Act, coupled with Britain's traditional regard
for the right of asylum, persuaded Russia that attempts to
extradite 'politicos' were not worth the trouble and public
outcry that they would have caused. J.H.G. Bergne (op.cit.
p.183) put forward this explanation.
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"leaves no doubt as to what is meant by the term political
of fender". 	 Herbert Gladstone was nearer the mark when he
asserted that their definition was "a matter of extreme
difficulty... which has puzzled generations, and is still
puzzling me", while Simpson thought extradition cases threw
"little or no light on the question".1
The government never admitted that suffragettes were
'political offenders' in the sense of deserving special
,
treatment in prison. Subjects were protected against "an
arbitrary or oppressive use of the criminal law" 2 by the
institution of trial by jury. However, the suffragettes were
recognised to be political offenders in the sense of
exemption from extradition. On 5 March 1912 a warrant was
issued for Christabel Pankhurst's arrest on a charge of
conspiracy to cause malicious damage to property, but she
managed to elude the police. The authorities had no idea
where she was, but on 19 March Bennett reported she was at
New York. Extradition was not sought, as it "would
doubtlessly be refused" on political offence grounds.
Christabel was in Paris anyway, and in September made her
whereabouts known in Votes for Women. Before doing so, she
had "sought legal advice, and had been assured by French
50. 5H,(C),19,cc.1338-9,(20 July 1910); 5H,(C),40,c.675,(28
June 1912); and 5H,(C),38,c.978,(14 May 1912).
51. 5H,(C),11,c.2183,(7 October 1909); and minute by Simpson
(HO. 3 May 1905): HO 45/10303/117267, /49.
52. Unsigned memorandum (HO. 1908): HO 45/10559/168140.
53. Bennett to Grey (Telegraphic. New York. 19 March 1912);
and minute by Maycock (FO. 20 March 1912): FO 372/405.
officials that she would not be extradited".	 Recognising
that offenders were political with respect to extradition
was, however, "no lesson for singling them out for special
treatment under municipal law".5
Further discussion was caused by the Belgian enquiry (of
March 1912) as to whether Britain would support the summoning
of a conference to discuss the adoption of uniform rules on
extradition, particularly with reference to procedural
matters and the definition of political crimes. 	 Crowe
noted that "in view of the difference between our
legislation... and that of Foreign States, I doubt any
'unification' being arrived at". 7 Davidson had "never
personally felt much difficulty" in defining political
offences, "except what was created by the judgements in R v
Castioni which have always appeared to me to contain some
very unsound doctrines". More generally:
These international conferences are becoming a perfect
nuisance: they afford moreover too much temptation
and opportunity to any petty State to bring herself into
temporary prominence by proposing a conference on this,
that or the other matter. We got on - in my humble
opinion - very much better without them and 'kept our
end up' better also.e59
54. A. Rosen, Rise Up. Women! (1974) p.172. cf. CRIM 1/131;
Sylvia Pankhurst, The Suffragette Movement (1977 edition)
pp.374-5; 5H,(C),53,c.329,(29 May 1913); and FO 372/432.
55. Minute by W.B. (HO. 28 August 1908): HO 45/10559/168140.
56. Lalaing to Grey (29 March 1912): FO 372/342.
57. Minute by Crowe (FO. 1 April 1912): ibid.
58. Minutes by Davidson (FO. n.d. & 2 April 1912): ibid.
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The Home Office recognised that "any measure of
uniformity in extradition procedure which could be attained
would be of considerable advantage" but the differences
between English and foreign systems were "so great and so
fundamental that anything like complete uniformity" was
impossible. Furthermore:
there are great difficulties and disadvantages in the
way of attempting to define 'political crime' too
-
strictly. There has not hitherto been sufficient
experience of cases... to permit of a statutory
definition being framed which would not be either too
narrow or too loose.
However, the Home Office would not object to sending a
delegate if the conference met. 	 Home Office arguments were
adopted in the reply to Belgium, 4"5 and in May 1913 Count
Lalaing announced that his government had abandoned their
proposa1. 4". Foreign Office officials were jubilant: Maycock
minuted, "Blessed good job too! Quite enough to do as it is"
while Davidson's only comment was, "Hear! Hear!"2
* * *
It is fitting that this study should conclude with the
59. Byrne to Foreign Office (HO. 9 May 1912): ibid. The Home
Office file on the matter (222168) has not survived.
60. Grey to La/aing (FQ. 17 May 1912): ibid.
61. Lalaing to Grey (12 May 1913): FO 372/419.
62. Minutes by Maycock and Davidson (FO. 14 May 1913): ibid.
last great political refugee case of the pre-1914 period. In
May 1912, Errico Malatesta (who, along with Reclus, Bakunin
and Kropotkin, was "one of the principal exponents of
anarchist doctrines") was convicted of libel. He and a
fellow Italian named Bellelli had quarrelled over the Italo-
Turkish war, and Bellelli spread the rumour that Malatesta
was a Turkish spy. In response, he issued a circular to the
Italian community in London. Malatesta denied the
allegation, and went on to say: "Bellelli calls himself (or
used to) an anarchist, but most persons consider him an
obtuse and mysterious type of man, and many look upon him as
an Italian police spy". It was this circular which had
formed the basis of the libel charge.4.4-
Before passing sentence, the judge allowed Powell of the
Special Branch to make a statement. He asserted that "the
defendant had been known to the police as an Anarchist of a
very dangerous type for a great number of years... wherever
he went there was a great deal of trouble. He was known as
the leader of militant Anarchists in this city... in fact,
all the world over". Powell also implied that Malatesta had
been involved in the notorious 'Hounsditch Murders,
although when challenged he admitted there was no evidence to
63. Anonymous biographical note to E. Malatesta, Anarchy 
(7th edition. 1942) p.i. On him generally: cf. M. Nettlau,
Errico Malatesta (New York 1924); Emma Goldman, Living My 
Life (1932) volume 1, p.166; Rudolf Rocker, London Years 
(1956) pp.75-6; and H -Oliver, op.cit. pp.11 & 49.
64. The circular is reprinted in The Times 11 June 1912,
65. On which, see below.
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support his contention. 4-1= A/1 in all Malatesta was the
victim of a vicious character assassination, and it is a fair
assumption that it influenced the nature of the sentence
passed, which was three months imprisonment, with costs,
coupled with a recommendation for expulsion.'
Malatesta appealed on the grounds that the "verdict was
unreasonable", and the sentence:
too severe... The police evidence as to his character
was most unfair... The police had no grounds for saying
that he was a dangerous type, or for hinting that he was
concerned in the Houndsditch murders... In view of his
opinion of the war it will be dangerous for him to
return to Italy.
However, the Court of Appeal found there was "no sufficient
reason" to set aside any part of the sentence..se
The short term of imprisonment would have been no great
hardship for Malatesta: he had been in prison before, but
never in Britain, and only for political crimes. The
recommendation for expulsion, however, if carried out, would
66. In fact, Malatesta had condemned those responsible as
"savages": Justice 13 January 1911, p.4, and "gave evidence
for the prosecution": CRIM 10/102, p.214. Powell's service
record has survived (MEPO 3/2892) but it contains no
reference to this episode. An indication of his character is
given by the fact that he was once recommended as a likely
candidate for the leadership of the Russian secret police's
English operations: cf. R.J. Johnson, op.cit. p.84; and B.
Porter. Vigilant State pp. 129 & 158
67. CRIM 10/102, pp.209-214; and The Times 21 May 1912, p.4.
There is a copy of the certificate of conviction and
recommendation for expulsion in CRIM 8/7, p.125.
68. cf. The Times 11 June 1912, p.3; and H. Cohen (ed.),
Criminal Appeal Reports volume 7 (1912), pp.273-5.
have placed him in very real danger. He was wanted in
several European countries for 'crimes connected with his
anarchist beliefs: the best he could expect was a very long
term of imprisonment, and execution was a definite
possibility. With the failure of his appeal. Malatesta's
only hope lay with Home Secretary McKenna, whose duty it was
to decide whether the expulsion order was to be carried out.
On 17 June, McKenna announced that, "After careful
consideration of all the circumstances, I pave decided notto
make an expulsion Order against Malatesta, but I see no
reason for advising remission of his sentence of
imprisonment".	 It is important to analyse the reasons
behind this decision, although doing so is somewhat
complicated by the fact that the Home Office file on the case
has not survived.7 6'
McKenna's decision was perhaps quite a surprise, as
Malatesta was the kind of man one would expect most
governments to be glad to be rid of. In 1882 a police report
described him as one of the "dangerous socialists" living in
London. Later, he was often under police surveillance, and
69. 5H,(C),39,c.1315,(17 June 1912). S. McKenna, Reqinald 
McKenna (1948) contains no reference to the case. In what
has been described as "the most unreliable history book ever
written by anyone who has not deliberately set out to
deceive" (B. Porter, 'Early Special Branch', p.389), Rupert
Allason (The Branch E19833 p.20) asserts that he was
"deported back to Italy".
70. D.J. Blackwood (Home Office Departmental Record Officer)
to author (31 October 1986). This file (223787) is perhaps
one of the most important to have been destroyed. Two other
files containing references to Malatesta (X14495 & X41142)
are also not extant.
was variously described as a "desperado", a "notorious
Anarchist", one "of the Anarchist leaders",and "a leading man
here". 1 The Times thought him "the most dangerous of
Anarchist leaders", and Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 
informed its readers that it was "commonly rumoured that his
brain directs the murderer's hand... Europe would sleep more
calmly were this dangerous madman under lock and key".
Similarly, Malatesta's philosophy and activities were
not such as would exactly endear him to any government.
Although he was no bomb-thrower, Malatesta, "had fingers in
every revolutionary pie that disturbed the digestion of the
frightened bourgeois world". .7 Although he did not incite
violence, neither did he condemn it:
he who struggles, well or badly, against the common
71. Report on 'Socialists in London' by Chief Superintendent
Williamson (8 May 1882): WVH.PP. Box 106, ff.65-8; Report by
Inspector Melville (27 April 1891): FO 45/677; Anderson to
Home Office (New Scotland Yard. 19 May 1892): HO
144/587/B2840C, /7; same to same (New Scotland Yard. 7 March
1895): ibid. /56b; Bradford to Foreign Office (New Scotland
Yard. 12 May 1898): F045/793. cf. Waddington to Rosebery (22
April 1893): FO 27/3147; Pemberton to Foreign Office (HO. 29
April 1891): FO 45/677; same to same (HO. 9 May 1893): HO
134/14, p.625; Rosebery to d'Estournalles (FO. 10 May 1893):
FO 27/3147; Constant to Kimberley (22 September 1894): HO
144/587/B2840C, /48; Minutes by H.C. (HO. 25 September 1894):
ibid. /48; Minutes by Anderson (27 September 1894): ibid.
/48; Murdoch to Foreign Office (HO. 4 January 1895): HO
151/5, p.559; Hatzfeldt to Bertie (Private. 5 August 1900):
FO 64/1507, f.2; Murdoch to Foreign Office (HO. 5 August
1900): FO 64/1512, ff.69-70; and Note handed to Lansdowne by
the Italian ambassador (23 April 1902): FO 83/1970
72. The Times 4 January 1911, p.10; and Anon, 'Musings
without Method', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine volume 168
(1900), p.404. cf. The Times 6 April 1892, p.5; and 25 June
1914, p.9; F.S. Nitti, 'Italian Anarchists', North American 
Review volume 167 (1898), pp.602-4; and Anon, 'Foreign
Undesirables', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine volume 169
(1901), p.288.
73. M. Nomad, Rebels and Renegades (New York 1932) p.23.
enemy and towards the same goal as us, is our friend
and has a right to expect our warm sympathy even if we
cannot accord him our unconditional approval..7.4
Looking at the press of 1911, one would have expected
Malatesta to be deported as a matter of course. Anarchists
had never been very popular in Britain, but in 1911 their
unpopularity reached unprecedented heights as a result of the
'Houndsditch murders' and the 'Sidney Street Siege'. In
-
December 1910, three policemen were fatally injured when they
came across a gang of burglars in the Houndsditch area of
London: in January 1911 the gang were traced to a house in
Sidney Street, and in the ensuing protracted siege, the army
were called out, shots exchanged, and the members of the gang
killed.
There was an "orgy of anti-alien sentiment". 7'4' Those
responsible were condemned as 'alien anarchists' (they were
aliens, and may have been anarchists, but that fact had
little relevance to the crime7 ) and many newspapers "started
an agitation against the Anarchists, against the political
refugees, and against the aliens generally...
	
There was
talk of sending all aliens back to where they
74. L'Aqitazione 22 September 1901, quoted in V. Richards
(ed.), Errico Malatesta (1965) p.62. cf. E. Malatesta,
Anarchy (7th edition. 1942); and his 'Anarchy and Violence'
in Liberty September 1894, pp.70-1.
75. cf. C. Rogers, op.cit. passim.
76. F.G. Clarke, pp.cit. p.47.
77. cf. B. Porter, Vigilant State p.162.
came from"..79 Two severe Alien bills were introduced (one
private, one government sponsored), which failed to pass only
because of a lack of Parliamentary time, and which
concentrated upon expelling more aliens who were convicted of
crime.7""
However, calls for severer alien laws were by no means
unanimous, Em and Winston Churchill (who was responsible for
the government bill) noted that none of its provisions was
intended to affect the right of asylum. 91 By 1912 "the
nightmare period" e had come to an end: there was no reason
why the alien bills should not have been re-introduced, but
they were not, and this is important. As Rudolf Rocker
remarked, "in any other country the consequences Eof Sidney
Street] would have been more serious". 9 The anti-alien,
78. R. Rocker, London Years (1956) pp.206-7. cf. R. Anderson,
'The Problem of the Criminal Alien', Nineteenth Century 
volume 69 (1911), pp.217-224; J. Kemmis,'Our Immigration
Laws', Fortnightly Review volume 96 (1911), pp-146-59; E.
Vizetelly. op-cit. p.297; Daily Mail 4 January 1911, p.4; The
Times 23 July 1910, p.12; and 4 January 1911, p.10;
Reynolds's 15 January 1911, p.l.
79. cf. 5H,(C),24,cc.624-6,(18 April 1911); and ibid.
cc .2106-2161,(28 April 1911); Memorandum by Churchill (HO. 19
January 1911): CAB 37/105, No.2; HO 45/10643/207426; HO
45/106411206332; C. Rogers, op.cit. pp.146-52; and B. Porter,
'British Government and Political Refugees', p.32. The King
pressed for the Alien Act to be strengthened: cf. R.
Churchill, op-cit. pp.410 & pp. 1239-40.
80. cf. Daily News 4 January 1911. p.4; Clarion 6 & 13
January 1911, p.4; Justice 14 January 1911, p.6; Anon, 'The
Outcry against Anarchists', Nation (London) volume 8 (1911),
pp.671-2; and R. Churchill, op.cit. p.1239.
81. Memorandum by Churchill (HO. 19 January 1911): CAB
37/105, No.2.
82. R. Rocker, op.cit. p.218.
83. ibid. p.213.
anti-right of asylum campaignwas only a temporary phenomenon.
Its sensationalist and vociferous nature masked enduring
attachment to the right of asylum, which remained quite a
force to be reckoned with when roused. For example, it was
certain that any Russian attempt to extradite political
refugees would produce a "violent uproar".e'l
There was certainly still enough liberal adherence to
the asylum policy around for a forceful campaign to be
mounted against Malatesta's expulsion. In_the Commons,
Harvey and Thorne (both Labour MPs) called attention to the
case, urged McKenna not to expel him, and alleged that "a
representative of the police had a private interview with the
jury after they had retired from Court and before they gave
their verdict". aes Ramsay Mcdonald asserted that he "happened
to know Malatesta", and if Powell's statement was accurate,
"I am the most deceived man in the whole world... The whole
of the man's life in this country has been the life of a
citizen". McKenna should uphold "the o/d traditions of
Liberal administration and Liberal law", and refuse to deport
him.94'
Outside Parliament, the recommendation for Malatesta's
expulsion "met with massive opposition", and it has been
asserted that he was saved "thanks to widespread
demonstrations and protests which... made clear in what
84. The Times 4 January 1911, p.10.
85. 5H,(C),313,cc.1931-2,(22 May 1912).
86. 5H,(C),38,cc.2012-4,(22 May 1912). Parliamentary opinion
was not unanimous. Rees called for the expulsion order to be
enforced: 5H,(C),38,c.2004 1 (22 May 1912).
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high esteem Malatesta was held by a wide public". B On 9
June, a demonstration was held in Trafalgar Square, which the
Glasgow Anarchist claimed was attended by 15,000, and even
The Times admitted was "largely attended".. 913 The Home Office
was inundated with calls for the expulsion order to be
quashed. It received more than 11,500 postcards in support
of Malatesta and more than 120 resolutions, petitions and
letters. Among the bodies which sent them were 13 branches
of the Independent Labour Party, 18 Branches of the British
Socialist Party, 30 trade union branches, and other
organisations, including the Huddersfield and Glasgow
Socialist Sunday Schools, and the Grange Moor Co-operative
Society.'="5'
Justice asserted that Malatesta's deportation "would
have constituted a serious blow at the right of asylum, as
well as an outrageous attack upon a man for his political
opinions". g"a The Glasgow Anarchist thought the sentence was
"savage", and "influenced" by his anarchist beliefs. It was
a "ridiculous outrage", and if it stood, "every political
refugee in this country will be placed at the mercy of
partisan judges and magistrates". Freedom noted that
87. J. Quail, op.cit. p. 268; and V. Richards (ed.), op.cit.
p.223.
88. Anarchist (Glasgow) 14 June 1912, p, 6; and The Times 10
June 1912, p.6. The Islington Daily Gazette (11 June 1912,
p.5) reported that it was attended by a "goodly crowd"; the
Daily News (10 June 1912, p.3) gave a figure of 5,000. On 30
June a second meeting was held at Trafalgar Square to
celebrate the quashing of the recommendation for deportation,
which was almost as well attended as that of 9 June: Freedom 
July 1912, p.55.
89. cf. HO 46/169.
90. Justice 22 June 1912, p.l.
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"if Jesus Christ came to London... he would by the same
ruling be immediately recommended for deportation. For he
would soon become known to the police as a dangerous
agitator".'91
The campaign was not exclusively working class or
anarchist-socialist based. 2 Josiah Wedgwood (Liberal MP for
Newcastle-under-Lyme) joined it and Robert Cunninghame
Graham (former Liberal-Labour MP for Lanarkshire) asserted
-
that the recommendation for expulsion was a "disgrace to our
English justice and a stigma upon the fair name of our
beloved country".	 The liberal Daily News thought it
"monstrous". Malatesta was being punished "because he
professes Anarchist principles". It was "unjust" and
"cruel", and marked "the initiation of a new public policy
from the Bench": an attack on the right of asylum.'". The
Star asserted that the recommendation for deportation called
for "the strongest protest". The Radical Nation thought the
sentence "harsh", asserted that Powell's testimony deserved
"no weight at all", and welcomed McKenna 's decision as a sign
that Britain was "fortified afresh against a serious breach
of the right of asylum".5"2'
91. Anarchist (Glasgow) 21 June 1912, p.1; and Freedom June
1912, p.44. cf. P. Kropotkin, 'The Case of Malatesta'. Nation 
(London) volume 11 (1912), pp.366-8; Labour Leader 7 June
1912, p.374; and Reynolds's 26 May 1912, p.4.
92. Indeed, the Socialist Standard (July 1912, p.85) refused
to join it on the grounds that the campaigners included
"working-class enemies".
93. The Times 10 June 1912, p 6.
94. Daily News 10 & 18 June 1912, p.6.
95. Star 10 June 1912, p.2; and Anon, 'Diary of the Week',
Nation (London) volume 11 (1912), pp.270 & 422.
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The anti-expulsion campaign was therefore quite strong, but
perhaps not strong enough to force McKenna's hand. He had a
choice, and although the fact that the Liberal government
largely depended on Labour support to stay in office was no
doubt a consideration, other more positive factors must have
been involved.
When his attention was called to the case, McKenna
answered that if what Macdonald said was accurate, no Home
Secretary would expel Malatesta. g'4' He no doubt found on
further investigation that Macdonald was right. Malatesta
(born in 1853) was by now an old man, and hardly the threat
that he was in younger days. Furthermore, the only
connection he had with the Houndsditch murderers was a wholly
innocent one: he had sold some equipment to them.5
Malatesta had been in Britain for 12 years, but this was the
first time he had been prosecuted for, or suspected of,
actual crime: he "never disturbed the peace and security of
the British state". '5"21 When he was attacked by Rees for
refusing to expel Malatesta, McKenna replied that the prison
sentence and the payment of costs were "sufficient
punishment... and having regard to the nature of the
96. 5H,(C),38,cc.2029-30,(22 May 1912).
97. cf. R. Rocker, op.cit. pp-205-6; M. Nomad, op.cit. pp.31-
2; C. Rogers, op.cit. pp.76-7: D. Rumbelow, Houndsditch 
Murders (1973) pp.71-73; and F.G. Clarke, op.cit. p.40. The
equipment in question consisted of a cylinder of oxygen,
rubber tubing and other miscellaneous articles.
98. R. Rocker, op.cit. p.76. In court, Powell stated that
Malatesta was "on one occasion fined for assaulting a school
teacher who chastised his son at school": GRIM 10/102,
p.214. However, the Calendar of Prisoners for the Central
Criminal Court listed Malatesta's dependents as "none", and
his previous convictions as "none": CRIM 9/58, p.I5.
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offence and to the reports which I obtained as to his
character and antecedents, I did not think that an expulsion
order was required in the public interest". Malatesta's
crime was hardly very serious. Had he been involved in some
crime of violence or robbery it would perhaps have been more
difficult for McKenna to arrive at the decision that he
did.s"?
Home Office registers of correspondence reveal that
'
letters were received (none of which has survived) on the
case from the Colonial and Foreign Offices, and the
Metropolitan Police.' 	 According to Home Office registers
and other sources, the Foreign Office letter merely enclosed
a copy of a note from the Swiss Minister, who had asked for
information on the case.' 1
 The contents of the Colonial
Office letters can be discovered from registers: in 1899
Malatesta had escaped from prison to Malta, and the
government had paid his passage to Britain. 12 This is
interesting, but unlikely to have influenced McKenna's
decision.
The police letters were doubtless more important. Two
simply dealt with meetings and leaflets relative to the case,
while two others (dated 14 and 26 June) contained the
99. 5H,(C),39,cc.1834-5020 June 1912). I am informed by Dr.
Bernard Porter that McKenna's private papers (held at
Churchill College, Cambridge) contain nothing on the
Malatesta case.
100. cf. HO 46/169.
101. ibid.: and Blackwell to Foreign Office (HO. 11 July
1912): HO 162/21, p.716.
102. cf. CO 355/16; and Blackwell to Colonial Office (HO. 1
June 1912): HO 162/21, pp.343-4.
3410
observations of the Commissioner, and a report from an
Assistant Commissioner (presumably the one in charge of the
Special Branch). One might speculate that the police letters
dealt with the allegations of improper police behaviour
(which McKenna had said would influence him if found to be
true/ 45 ), or perhaps contained an up to date report of
surveillance, which may have showed that Malatesta was not
particularly dangerous anymore. These may well have been the
major factors behind McKenna's decision, bvt without knowing
their contents, it is impossible to be sure. There exists an
indirect indication. In explaining his decision to the judge
who had recommended Malatesta be expelled, McKenna asserted
that after "consultation" with the police, he had found it
was "not necessary" to enforce the expulsion. On "further
investigation", the police had found that the "impression"
given by Powell was inaccurate-La"'
Had Malatesta been expelled, it would have been a
flagrant case of 'disguised extradition'. Britain avoided
granting the 'disguised extradition' of ordinary criminals:
to have granted it when the 'criminal' involved was a bona 
fide political refugee would have been unthinkable. McKenna
may well have shared the traditional liberal sympathy for
political refugees espoused by the organisers and members of
the campaign mounted against expulsion: it may have been the
case that McKenna simply could not bring himself to expel a
political refugee whose fate abroad would certainly be a
103. 5H,(C),38,c.1932,(22 May 1912).
104. cf. Blackwell to Bosanquet (HD. 17 June 1912): HO
162/21, p.462.
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long term of imprisonment, and perhaps even death. Whatever
his reasons, the important fact is that McKenna refused to
expel Malatesta: once again, Britain protected a political
refugee, despite his being an anarchist.
***
In 1916, Simpson predicted that "the whole question of
extradition will no doubt stand on a very different footing
in the next generation", 1	and so it did,_but that is
another story. When the war had begun, extradition had come
to an almost complete halt. A few fugitives were extradited
here and there, but on nothing like the scale of the pre-war
period. The legal position was not altered by the outbreak
of war, but since most fugitives had been extradited to
France and Germany, the conflict had a severe impact: the
one was now hardly likely to be bothered with extradition,
the other Britain's mortal enemy-la"'
105. In fact, no political refugee was deported from Britain
before 1914.
106. Minute by Simpson (HO. 25 May 1916): HO
45/10670/218103, /23.
107. A couple of interesting cases occurred, those of
Ignatius T.T. Lincoln, an ex-Liberal MP turned forger and
Berman agent and propagandist, and Louis Lavigne. The former
unsuccessfully attempted to avoid extradition from the United
States on the ground that it was only being sought for
political reasons. cf . FO 372/741 & 900; HO
144/20968/172630; HO 144/20969/172630; 5H,(C),76,c.1556,(9
December 1915); 5H,(C),B0,c.410,(21 February 1916);
5H,(C)„83,c.715,(27 June 1916); ibid. c.1030,(29 June 1916);
The Times 6 August 1915, p.6; 11 September 1915, p.6; 19
January 1916, 1916, p.B; 21 February 1916, p.B; and 5 July
1916, p.5; B. Wasserstein, The Secret Lives of Trebitsch 
Lincoln (19E8); C.C. Hyde, International Law (2nd edition.
Boston 1951) volume 2, p.1026; and P. Jacob, 'International
Extradition', Yale Law Journal volume 59 (1949-50), p.632.
Lavigne was wanted in France for desertion and spying, and in
1916 was handed over by the Gibraltar authorities: cf. FO
371/2675, ff. 199-209.
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Strangely, when peace returned, extradition did not recover:
even in 1927 it was "in a somewhat precarious state". Lam
 It
dwindled away almost into insignificance in numerical terms,
and today has become increasingly rare. So much so that
every case seems to merit media attention.
108.Simpson to Home Office (Private. 16 August 1927): HO
45/13380/474839,/2.
CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions 
Such was the British extradition experience during the
Victorian and Edwardian eras. It can scarcely be said to
have been an enjoyable one, and was occasionally thoroughly
disagreeable. The discomfort it caused might be likened to
suffering from arthritis - a permanent annoyance coupled with
occasional flare-ups. It will have been noticed that the
latter stages of this thesis have dealt with alien laws
(which of course have a direct relevance to extradition)
rather than extradition specifically. This was where the
public interest and controversy arose then. Extradition was
less of an issue in the early years of the twentieth century,
but only because very many of the interesting and potentially
controversial issues arose, and were discussed, away from the
public eye. The campaign aroused by the Malatesta case
showed that the British public were still sensitive over the
right of asylum. Had it been believed that any change in
extradition law or practice would have threatened political
refugees, extradition would once again have become a central
issue. A fear of provoking a public reaction was quite
clearly in the minds of ministers and officials whenever
extradition was being considered. Extradition remained
potentially very controversial indeed, and was an important
policy matter.
During the course of this study, certain important and
recurring themes have been discussed and illustrated. Here
it is appropriate both to re-emphasise and to re-direct
attention to them. In extradition law and practice, the most
important 'theoretical' issue was the definition of political
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offences. The vague exemption included in the 1870 Act was
delimited, interpreted, and clarified to a certain extent
before 1914, but still remained rather unclear. The question
provided "inexhaustible matter for... controversy", for it
was "almost impossible to define satisfactorily the phrase
'offence of a political character'" 1 . This was perhaps
inevitable, for the definition of political offences is
inherently circumstantial: indeed it is doubly so. Any
definition is influenced not only by the circumstances
surrounding the crime itself, but also by the circumstances
prevailing in the country where the issue is judged. The
Meunier decision illustrates "the degree to which the concept
of a political offence is intimately tied to the existing
social and political conditions of a country as well as to
the prevailing beliefs of acceptable forms of political
opposition and struggle."°
In any case, it was in Britain's interests for the
definition of political offences to be somewhat ambiguous,
and she probably preferred it that way. The worst of all
worlds would have been for Britain to have committed herself
to one line on political offences, only to find that a case
arose in which she wished to diverge from it. For example,
had Britain declared that the assassination of a head of
state was in every case to be an extraditable crime,
1. Minutes by Wellesley (FO. 30 August 1913); and Hurst (FO.
3 September 1913): FO 371/1675, f.358.
2. J.G. Castel and M. Edwardh, oo.cit. p.97. cf. J.H.G.
Bergne, oo.cit. p.186; J.E.P. Wallis, op. cit. p.367; and
Editorial Comment, 'Political Offence in Extradition
Treaties', American Journal of International Law volume 3
(1909), p.460.
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what would she have done if a case occurred in which she
wished to protect an assassin: a scenario that was by no
means inconceivable. Thus, political offences were left
wholly undefined in British statute law, and it was left to
the courts to define them on a case by case basis in the
first instance. Just in case the courts failed to protect a
political offender, the safety-valve of the Home Secretary's
discretionary power to refuse extradition was established.
This was the best of all worlds. Political refugees
were given the widest possible latitude to prove that they
should be exempt from extradition, and the government was
committed to nothing. It was unlikely that a fugitive
considered by the government to be a political refugee would
be committed for extradition by the courts, and therefore the
government could avoid direct responsibility for refusing
extradition on political offence grounds. Foreign
governments were unlikely to be best pleased when extradition
was refused on those grounds: if this was done in court, the
British government could meet their protests with the reply
that the courts were outside government control. Had the
responsibility for judging what was a political offence been
left solely with ministers, endless difficulties would have
been caused. Foreign regimes would have exerted immense
pressure upon ministers to regard genuine political crimes as
non-political. Any decision in favour of a political refugee
would have been regarded abroad as an unfriendly act, perhaps
to the hazard of friendly relations between Britain and the
state concerned.
To this day, the definition of political offences
remains very much a 'grey area' of international law. Almost
every publication dealing with the subject concludes that it
is virtually a practical impossibility. The term 'political
offence':
can be viewed as a spectrum, with at one extreme
purely passive offences such as political dissidence
and on the other active offences of opposition against
prevailing social order or against the ruling group in
power. It is a continuum of offences in which the
political and common elements are more or less
represented, rather than a distinct category of crimes
which could be distinguished from the common offence.
As long as differences of political opinion exist, there will
always be disagreement over the definition of political
offences for the purpose of the political offence exemption
to extradition.
The most fundamental practical problem within the
British extradition experience was balancing the need to
punish crime against the need to protect the position of
political refugees. Before 1870, the need to punish crime
was not the first priority. Even the Extradition Act (wrote
a retired civil servant in 1927) "reeks of the jealousy of
the Executive Government, the nervous dread of any
interference with the liberty of the subject and the deep-
rooted distrust of most, if not all European powers, which
3. C. Van den Wijngaert, op. cit. p.95.
marked the Legislation of the middle of last century".'*
Britain might perhaps be criticised for being rather
excessive in her devotion to giving political refugees
absolute protection within extradition law. It resulted in
measures that were desirable in the interests of the
efficient punishment of common crimes being abandoned on more
than one occasion, on the grounds that a particular amendment
of the law might just possibly, in an extreme case, work to
the disadvantage of a political refugee. One would have
thought that Britain's diplomatic standing, and the threat of
sanctions, would have been enough to prevent the abuse of
extradition against 'politicos', without the need for legal
guarantees which hampered the extradition of ordinary
cv-iminals. After all, the very basis of extradition was
outual trust.
In defence of those responsible for British policy, one
could suggest that a government that was prepared to abuse
extradition (and not all governments, that of Naples for
example, could be trusted, or were not trusted, not to, if
given the chance) was unlikely to listen to diplomatic
argument. Knowing the likely British reaction to an abuse of
extradition, a foreign government would be unlikely to take
such a step in the first place unless it was prepared to
accept the consequences. Furthermore, when what Britain
regarded as abuses of extradition occurred (for example, in
the Lamirande and Lawrence cases), diplomatic pressure had
little effect. Trying to protect a political refugee after
4. Simpson to Home Office (Private. 16 August 1927): HO
45/13390/474839, /2.
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he had suffered through the abuse of extradition or foreign
trickery would be rather like trying to close the stable door
not just after the horse had bolted, but after it had run a
few miles away. Britain preferred to ensure that the stable
door was firmly closed in the first place, and it is
difficult to criticise her motives for doing so.
Nevertheless, the passing of the Extradition Act of 1E370
marked the beginning of a trend in which extradition came to
serve the needs of the law rather more efficiently. By the
1910s, extradition from Britain was a fairly uncomplicated
business as far as ordinary criminals were concerned. The
needs of justice were well served, but 'politicos' still
retained a very privileged position under British law. Very
few common criminals brought before an extradition court were
not surrendered.	 Of course, there were still some
difficulties. For example, in 1902 a surrender warrant was
issued wrongly on account of the "raging toothache" of the
responsible Home Office official's.
Perhaps the most important factor behind the value
Britain attached to extradition was her position as the
leading economic power of the developed world. It was
clearly important for such a power that offenders who harmed
her economic life - fraudulent bankrupts, embezzlers, and the
like - should not escape punishment, and that potential
offenders should be deterred from
5. cf. Appendices 3 and 4.
6. Dryhurst to Wetheral/ (Private. 27 September 1902): FO
45/868.
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committing such crimes. Extradition had this dual function.
In contrast (and particularly during the early decades of the
period covered by this thesis), continental European nations
seem to have been more interested in the extradition of
political offenders. This points to a fundamental difference
between the British and continental approaches to
extradition.
Such a divergence of approaches was perhaps inevitable.
Until perhaps the late 18705 and early leeos, the economies
of continental Europe were nothing like so developed as that
of Britain. Hence, the continentals were less likely to
appreciate the economic value of extradition. Further, in
Britain, as early as the 1840s the holders of economic power
also, by and large, wielded political power, and were in a
position to have their needs translated into policy.
Continental merchants and industrialists were not in a
similar position until later in the nineteenth century.
Continental governments tended to be more dynastic, less
constitutional, and less 'liberal-capitalist': as a result,
they were perhaps primarily interested in the preservation of
the dynasty and the position of the ruling elite. In this
situation, the most important crimes were political crimes
which threatened this preservation.
We have seen that from the 1880s, extradition became
less of a burning issue in Britain's foreign relations. In
part, this might be attributed to a certain coming together
of British and continental perspectives and attitudes. From
the 1880s, the continent experienced rapid economic
development, and began to catch up, even overtake in some
areas, the British economy. Thus, continentals were becoming
more likely to appreciate extradition's economic function.
Similarly, much of continental Europe experienced a process
of political development, whereby political power came to be
less the exclusive preserve of a political elite. As
political power came to be more widely held, so the narrow
interest in the preservation of the political status quo was,
if not perhaps replaced, forced to accommodate other
interests, such as the suppression and punishment of ordinary
crime, and especially 'commercial' crime.
This coming together of Britain and Europe was not
simply a one way process. Britain also moved closer to the
continent. The rise of political violence, and especially
indiscriminate terrorism, was perhaps one of the central
factors behind this, particularly with reference to
extradition. After the mid-1870s, the character of the
political refugees who had caused so much trouble between
Britain and her neighbours altered radically. Gone were the
predominantly respectable, liberal revolutionaries of the
1840s and 1850s, with whom Britons had sympathised so much.
In their place came more extreme, left-wing and anarchist
revolutionaries, some of whom indulged in ever more terrible
terrorist tactics. The rise of terrorism led to a change in
notions of legitimate forms of political protest. The old,
acceptable method of mass popular risings was replaced by
attacks on innocent bystanders in Parisian cafés, Spanish
theatres, and the like7.
It was significant that this change in revolutionary
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tactics came at a time when continental regimes were becoming
more liberal. It had been easy for Britons to justify and
approve of liberal revolutionaries rising up against despotic
regimes, but how could terrorism be justified? Bad, despotic
government had caused, and deserved, liberal revolutions, but
now the roles had been reversed. Increasingly liberal
regimes were being attacked by illiberal, anarchist
terrorists, who represented a minority interest in just the
same way as the despotic regimes had done in the past.
-
Furthermore, Britain was not immune from terrorism.
Anarchism was never a serious problem in Britain, but she did
have her own Fenian bombers and assassins. For the first
time, Britain came to have a certain identity of interest
with the continent, which led to a new community of interest.
However, it would by wrong to exaggerate the degree to
which Britain and Europe came together. The process was far
from complete, and significant differences remained. Britain
was never prepared to participate in the wholesale repression
of anarchism, and refused to take action except where actual
crime had been committed or was in preparation. The
continuing divergence between British and continental
attitudes was perhaps most clearly illustrated in their
respective approaches to assassination. Continentals
regarded the assassination of a sovereign or head of state as
7. Much the same reasons account for the fact that after the
1030s, conflict over political offenders in extradition law
and practice was most common in colonies. There, political
dissidence still tended to take the form of mass popular
risings against illiberal governments (and this was
especially true in German South West Africa). The situation
in the colonies was rather like that in Britain and Europe in
the mid-nineteenth century.
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the most serious of crimes, to be visited in every case with
heavy punishment. In no way could such an offence be
extenuated or justified by political motivation, and the
almost universal adoption of the 'attentat clause' ensured
that assassins could not find an asylum in continental
Europe. In contrast, Britain never adopted the 'attentat
clause', and refused to accept that in every case assassins
were to be subject to extradition: the circumstances in which
such a crime was committed could not be left out of the
-
equation. In 997. of cases, Britain would not doubt have
surrendered assassins, but the fact that she refused to
commit herself to do so in every case was of great
significance. It was not just a matter of words: it revealed
a deep divergence between British and continental thought.
There was perhaps a degree of hypocrisy in the British
attitude towards political offences and offenders. Britain
refused to surrender political offenders to other nations,
and erected substantial guarantees for political refugees
within extradition law, but she expected foreign nations to
surrender to her men like the Phoenix Park murderers. Of
course, all nations regard their 'political offenders' as
common criminals in the sense of not deserving immunity from
extradition, and so all are open to the charge of hypocrisy
and double-standards. However, not all nations made such a
point as Britain did of being the asylum for political
refugees of all nations: indeed, many nations showed no
scruples about both seeking and granting the extradition of
'political' offenders. Therefore, although no nation can be
absolved from the charge of hypocrisy, Britain was perhaps
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most guilty in this respect.
Contrasting attitudes to political offences generally,
and assassination specifically, were not the only differences
between Britain and Europe brought into sharp relief by
extradition. The contrast between the respective approaches
to the extradition of ordinary criminals illustrated a
fundamental difference in attitudes towards police and legal
matters. In Britain, extradition was a judicial function,
granted or refused in open court. In Eurape, it was much
more of an administrative, police, function. Britain
required prima facie evidence of the guilt of the accused
that would be sufficient to justify the accused's committal
for trial if the offence had been committed it Britain. In
contrast, most European countries were prepared to surrender
a fugitive simply on the production of an arrest warrant, and
courts often had absolutely no role in the matter. This was
perhaps a result of the fact that in Britain there was
generally a greater presumption in favour of the innocence of
an accused person: he was 'innocent until proven guilty'.
Abroad, it was more a question of 'guilty until proven
innocent'. Such a notion was alien to all the basic
instincts of Britons, brought up on the basics of freedom
from arbitrary arrest, habeus corpus, a fair trial before a
jury of one's peers, and so on. This explains why the
continental wish that Britain grant extradition simply upon
the production of an arrest warrant always caused so much
trouble.
Throughout this study, a common theme has been the clash
between British domestic and foreign policy aims, which arose
from extradition's almost unique bridging position between
the two. Before the 1670s, in domestic terms, it would have
been easier for governments if they could have ignored
extradition totally.	 Whenever extradition came before
Parliament, they were subjected to embarrassing and unwelcome
debates (especially those over the French and Prussian
treaties of 1852 and 1864), which caused problems on the
wider foreign policy front. However, extradition could not
be ignored. Point blank refusal to negotiate a treaty caused
offence, which could be discounted in the case of
insignificant powers such as Naples, but not in the case of
great powers such as France and Prussia. Even after 1870,
problems did not cease. Reforms in British extradition law
and practice which were desired by the continentals (and
which in some cases were intrinsically desirable) were not
implemented, or even put to the test of Parliamentary
opinion, partly because governments were unsure whether
Parliamentary and public opinion would sanction them.
Although there was a clash between domestic and foreign
policy aims over extradition, it would be wrong to give the
impression that there was a 'Foreign Office position' on
extradition which clashed with the 'Home Office position'.
Things were not so simple as that. Although the two
departments sometimes wanted different, and mutually
exclusive, things, such differences arose as a result of the
personalities and views of the ministers who headed them at
any one time. For example, when Palmerston was at the
Foreign Office, the 'Foreign Office position' was
Palmerston's position, and vice versa when he was at the Home
Office.
Similarly, extradition was not a matter of party
political conflict. As was the case regarding so many
political matters before 1914, there was a broad consensus of
opinion between the Liberal and Tory parties. When a change
of government brought a change of policy, it was not the
result of differing party political ideologies. Again, it
was more of a personal matter. For example, Cross (a Tory)
-
abandoned the extradition bill prepared by Harcourt (a
Liberal), because it was too illiberal for his tastes. The
relative lack of absolute distinction between the two great
parties produced the somewhat curious position in which a
Liberal Home Secretary was far less liberal than his Tory
counter-part.
Finally, in general terms, the progress of extradition
policy was often intimately tied to factors which in
themselves were not closely related to it. General foreign
policy aims and issues played their part. For example, the
government's desire to conciliate France in 1852 contributed
to the decision to submit the treaty to Parliament, even
though the prevailing conditions were far from ideal. Later,
in the latter 1880s, general anti-British feeling in the
United States Senate resulted in the rejection of the Anglo-
American treaty.
* * *
The right of asylum and the liberal policies associated
with it remained substantially secure before 1914. It is of
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great significance that despite the very real Fenian threat
and the perceived anarchist threat, Britain did not enact
repressive legislation. Of course, the Meunier decision was
anti-anarchist, but did not have the force of law except for
that particular case. In "different circumstances it seems
inevitable that another test would have to be appliedua.
Elsewhere, some extradition treaties abandoned the exemption
of political offences entirely.'" Of course, the passage of
the Alien Act meant that the right of asylum was no longer
,
absolute, but it remained far more secure in Britain than in
any other country. Britain was Malatesta's "place of exile,
because no other country in Europe would let him stay
there... [she] was the only country where political refugees
really enjoyed the right of asylum, where they did not live
with the constant dread of expulsion hanging over their
heads" LW
It was not the Alien Act of 1905 which put an end to
Britain's proud history as the asylum of the oppressed of all
nations. Rather, it was the Great War coupled with the
Russian Revolution that was responsible for this. The
extremely severe Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 (4 & 5 Geo.5
c.12) was passed unopposed in a single day ("without a murmur
8. Minute by Simpson (HO 3 May 1905): HO 45/10303/117267,
/49.
9. cf. Russia's treaties with Germany and Spain of 1885 and
1888: The Times 24 January 1885, p.5; and F. Snow, Cases and 
Opinions (Boston 1893) p.171n.
10. R. Rocker, op. cit. pp.77 & 204. cf. E Goldman, op. cit. 
volume 1, p.165.
from the champions of asylum""), but it was only a war
measure, a temporary expedient passed in a time of national
emergency.'	 Furthermore, Britain still refused to expel
political refugees.. 1
However, the horrors of the war years were such that
when peace came, pre-war attitudes were thoroughly revised:
Britain's asylum policy was lost amid fears for national
security and prosperity. Her economy was in crisis, and the
Bolshevik threat appeared very real. Britain had tolerated
,
political refugees partly because they were believed to pose
no threat to her, but the perceived Bolshevik threat was used
as a justification for severe anti-alien measures. It is a
moot point whether Britain was truly threatened, but the
important fact is that the confidence which had allowed her
11. B. Gainer, op. cit. p.207. cf. 5H,(C),65,cc.1986-905
August 1914).
12. cf. Minute by Peddar (HO. 1 October 1914): HO
45/10515/135080, /35.
13. There is a list of 40 such cases in HO 45/10886/349367.
cf. Drummond to Harris (Private. 5 August 1915): HO
45/10767/272533,110; minute by Grey (FO. n.d.): FO 371/2360;
minute by Troup (HO. 24 March 1917): HO
45110820/318095,1235; and minutes by Moylan and Henderson
(HO. 2 March 14 April 1917): HO 45/10767/272533. /61 & 71;
5H,(C),83,c.1085,(29 June 1916); 5H0C) 5 85 0 cc.177-8,(1 August
1916); 5H,(C),91,c.739,(12 March 1917); and HO
144/1582/332650 on the Remondin case. Two men who claimed to
be political refugees (Sarno and Thierry) were expelled, but
their claims were not especially strong, and in Sarno's case,
one of those who had led the fight against expulsion admitted
he was not a bona fide political refugee: cf.
5H,(C) 1 84,c.2073,(31 July 1916): and 5H,(0,85,cc.247-801
August 1916). On Sarno: cf. Law Reports of the King's Bench 
Division (1916) volume 2, pp.742-53; and on Thierry: cf.
Law Reports of the King's Bench Division (1916) volume 1,
pp.552-7; Law Times volume 116 (1917), pp.226-37; and P.
O'Higgins, 'Disguised Extradition', pp.525-8. The Home
Office files on these cases (316622 & 317963) have not
survived.
to ignore the politicos of the past had evaporated. Britain
now felt threatened, and that is more important than whether
she actually was or not.
The severity of the Alien Act of 1919 (9 & 10 6E0.5
c.92) was unprecedented in peacetime, but it was opposed by
only a very small minority." The time for being worried
about unfortunate foreigners had passed as far as most
Britons were concerned. It was time to worry about Britain
herself: the traditional asylum policy would now only be
-
maintained "in so far as under modern conditions its
maintenance is not inconsistent with the security of this
country". 1	Refugees were denied asylum and deported simply
because of their Bolshevik views."' It was a sad day for
Britain, but perhaps almost inevitable in the light of her
war experience and the situation in which she found herself
after 1918. The national self-confidence and self-assurance
which had underpinned and sustained Victorian liberal
attitudes and policies had gone, and seems most unlikely ever
to return.
14. cf. 5H,(C),114,cc.2746-2802,(15 April 1919); and
5H,(C),121,cc.827-42,(18 November 1919).
15. Report of the Aliens Committee (25 January 1918): CAB
1/26/7.
16. cf. Minutes by Peddar (HO. 15 & 27 February 1919): HO
45/10823/318095, /662; 51-1,(C),112,cc.969-70,(19 February
1919); and 5H,(C),121,c.495,(13 November 1919).
APPEND ICES 
Appendix 1 
Numbers of Fugitives Extradited from Britain to various 
countries: 
Years Total US Fr Den Ger Bel Aus Rus Ita Mis
1840s 2 0 -74_ - - - - - - -
1850s 13 13 0- - - - - - -
1860s 34 21 121 - - - - - -
1870s 178 15 25 1 56 46 7 - 10 18
1880s 289 12 90 6 107 35 o o
,
7 22
1890s 385 24 127 3 108 35 16 25 14 33
1900s 395 35 96 5 146 32 25 14 6 36
1910-14 195 20 41 7 80 6 17 4 6 14
1915-18 9 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
1919-21 16 4 5 0 -74_ 2 0 0 1 2
Miscellaneous consists of fugitives extradited to:
Netherlands: 42. Sweden/Norway: 28. Switzerland: 52.Spain: 6.
Ley
US: United States. Fr: France. Den: Denmark. Ger: Germany.
Bel: Belgium. Aus: Austria. Rus: Russia. Ita: Italy.
Mis: Miscellaneous.
Appendix 2 
Numbers of Fugitives Extradited to Britain from various 
countries: 
These figures are less easy to collect than those for
fugitives surrendered by Britain, and are therefore less
complete. However, it is unlikely that further research
would significantly alter the general picture described here:
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Years Total US Fr Den Ger Bel Aus Rus Ita Mis
1840s 3 1 2 - - - - - - -
1850s 4 1 3 - - - - - - -
1860s 9 4 5 0 - - - - - -
1870s 22 8 0 0 3 8 0 0 0 3
1880s 57 18 15 0 10 4 0 0 1 9
1890s 64 15 20 0 4 12 -,.,_ 0 6 5
1900s 66 31 18 0 6 3 1 0 1 6
1910-13 20 890 0 1 0 0 '0 2
Miscellaneous consists of fugitives extradited from:
Netherlands: 3. Switzerland: 3. Spain: 15. Portugal: 2.
Uruguay: 1. Argentina: 1.
k
..i.ea
US: United States. Fr: France. 	 Den: Denmark. Ger: Germany.
Bel: Belguim.	 Aus: Austria. Rus: Russia. 	 Ita: Italy.
Mis: Miscellaneous.
Appendix 3 
Reasons why extradition from Britain was refused 
Large numbers of fugitives whose extradition was sought were
never arrested, or the applications were withdrawn when they
were found elsewhere: such cases are not included in these
statistics:
(Appendix 3 Cont'd.)
Years TotalABCDEF
1870s 12 6 1 4001
1880s 42 14 513 2 08
1890s 56 36 3 2 1 1 3
1900s 46 31 0 1 7 0 7
1910-13 18 14 0 1 2 0 1
EEX:
A: Insufficient evidence.	 B: Nationality.
C: Not an extraditable offence. 	 D: Procedural reasons.
E: Political offence. 	 F: In prison in Britain.
Appendix 4 
Failures to extradite from Britain expressed as a percentage
of total cases 
1870s	 6.3%
1880s	 :	 12.77.
1890s	 :	 12.77.
1900s	 :	 10.47.
1910-13 :	 8.57.
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